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Epistemic Crisis
As a result of psychological research, coupled with the 
modern means of communication, the practice of democracy 
has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely 
more significant than any shifting of economic power
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, 1922
On Sunday, December 4, 2016, a young man carrying an assault rifle 
walked into Comet Pizza in Northwest Washington, D.C., to investigate 
reports that Hillary Clinton and her campaign chief were running a pedophilia 
ring from the basement of the pizza parlor.1 A week later, a YouGov poll found 
that, however whacky the story, the young man was not alone in believing it; 
nearly half of Trump voters polled “gave some credence” to the rumors.2
Two weeks earlier, BuzzFeed’s Craig Silverman had published an article 
that launched the term “fake news.”3 Silverman’s article examined engagements 
with news stories on Facebook through shares, reactions, and comments and 
argued that the best- performing stories produced by political clickbait sites 
masquerading as actual news sites, often located offshore, generated more 
Facebook engagements than the top stories of legitimate news sites. On 
January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released 
a report that blamed Russia of running a disinformation campaign aimed 
to influence the U.S.  election with the aim of helping Donald Trump get 
elected.4
The steady flow of stories reinforced a perception that the 2016 election 
had involved an unusual degree of misleading information flowing in the 
American media ecosystem. From claims during the primary that Jeb Bush 
had “close Nazi ties,”5 through claims during the general election that Hillary 
Clinton’s campaign was 20  percent funded by the Saudi royal family,6 the 
campaign was littered with misleading stories, often from sources that masked 
their identity or affiliation. Moreover, just as with the alleged pedophilia case, 
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many of the stories seemed designed to elicit fear and disgust, as the titles of 
Breitbart’s most widely shared stories on immigration exhibit: “Six Diseases 
Return to US as Migration Advocates Celebrate World Refugee Day,” and 
“More than 347,000 Convicted Criminal Immigrants At Large in U.S.”7
The 2016 U.S. presidential election won by Donald Trump followed closely 
on the heels of the equally shocking success of the Leave campaign in Britain’s 
vote to exit the European Union. Both seemed to mark an epistemic crisis in 
contemporary democratic societies. As 2016 was drawing to a close, many in 
the United States and the European Union saw these events as signals that 
democracy itself was in crisis, buckling under the pressure of technological 
processes that had overwhelmed our collective capacity to tell truth from 
falsehood and reason from its absence. Brexit and the rise of far- right parties 
in countries such as France, Hungary, Austria, and even Sweden signaled 
a deep crisis in the pluralist, cosmopolitan, democratic project that was at 
the heart of the project of Europe. The victory of Donald Trump marked 
a triumph of a radical populist right- wing politics that had long simmered 
on the margins of the American right and the Republican Party:  from the 
segregationist third- party candidacy of George Wallace in 1968, through 
Pat Buchanan’s primary runs in 1992 and 1996, to the rise of the Tea Party 
after 2008. These remarkable political victories for what were once marginal 
ideologies appeared at the same time that democracies around the world, 
from the Philippines, through India, to Turkey saw shifts from more liberal 
democratic forms to a new model of illiberal, and in some cases authoritarian, 
majoritarianism.
Something fundamental was happening to threaten democracy, and 
our collective eye fell on the novel and rapidly changing— technology. 
Technological processes beyond the control of any person or country— 
the convergence of social media, algorithmic news curation, bots, artificial 
intelligence, and big data analysis— were creating echo chambers that 
reinforced our biases, were removing indicia of trustworthiness, and were 
generally overwhelming our capacity to make sense of the world, and with it 
our capacity to govern ourselves as reasonable democracies.
The first year of the Trump presidency brought no relief. The president 
himself adopted the term “fake news” to describe all news that was critical or 
embarrassing. By the end of his first year in office, the president was handing 
out “Fake News Awards” to his critics, and four in ten Republicans responded 
that they “considered accurate news stories that cast a politician or political 
group in a negative light to be fake news.”8 While trust in news media 
declined in a broad range of countries, the patterns of trust and mistrust 
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differed widely across different countries. Together with Hungary and Israel, 
two other democracies with powerful right- wing parties, the United States 
was an outlier: distrust was high on average but markedly higher for one party 
affiliation.9
Echo chambers ringing with false news make democracies ungovernable. 
We can imagine a pluralist democracy in which populations contested 
elections and won or lost based on their votes, without ever sharing a 
viewpoint on what is going on in the world. Partisan press hurling accusations 
at the other party was, after all, the norm in nineteenth- century America. 
One party might believe that we are under attack from zombies and vote to 
counter this existential menace, while another party might believe that we are 
threatened by a long- term decline in productivity growth and vote to focus 
on that problem. Whoever won would design policies to counter what they 
saw as the major policy question of our times. The role of pluralist democracy 
would be to govern the rules of orderly transition from the zombie slayers to 
the productivity wonks and back with the ebb and flow of electoral success.
In practice, given the intensity of the “zombie- threat” party’s sense of 
impending doom, such a pluralist democracy would be deeply unstable. 
Some shared means of defining what facts or beliefs are off the wall and what 
are plausibly open to reasoned debate is necessary to maintain a democracy. 
The twentieth century in particular saw the development of a range of 
institutional and cultural practices designed to create a shared order out of 
the increasingly complex and interconnected world in which citizens were 
forced to address a world beyond their local communities, values, and beliefs. 
The medical profession, for example, rapidly and fundamentally transformed 
itself after the discovery of germ theory in 1876. Between 1900 and 1910, the 
American Medical Association grew from 8,400 to 70,000 members. This 
growth represented the transition from dubiously effective local medical 
practices to a nationally organized profession acting as an institutional 
gatekeeper for scientifically- based practices. The same pattern can be found 
in the establishment of other truth- seeking professions during the early 
twentieth century, including education, law, and academia. All of these 
professions organized themselves into their modern national, institutional 
forms in roughly the first 20 years of the twentieth century. Those years saw 
the emergence of, among others, the American Bar Association; the National 
Education Association; and the American Historical, American Economic, 
American Statistical, and American Political Science Associations.10
During this same critical period, journalism experienced its own 
transformation, into an institutionalized profession that adopted practices we 
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would recognize as modern objective journalism. By 1912 Columbia Univer-
sity’s journalism school had been founded, which helped to institutionalize 
through professional training a set of practices that had developed in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that we now associate with 
objective journalism— detachment, nonpartisanship, the inverted pyramid 
writing style, facticity, and balance. Before this development, none of these 
attributes were broadly present in journalism.11 These shifts in the professions 
in general, and in journalism in particular, were in turn part of the broad 
shift associated with modernism, employing rational planning, expertise, 
and objective evidence in both private sector management and public 
administration.
Since the end of World War II this trend toward institutionalized 
professions for truth seeking has accelerated. Government statistics agencies; 
science and academic investigations; law and the legal profession; and 
journalism developed increasingly rationalized and formalized solutions to 
the problem of how societies made up of diverse populations with diverse 
and conflicting political views can nonetheless form a shared sense of what 
is going on in the world.12 As the quip usually attributed to Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan put it, “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his 
own facts.” Politics was always centrally about identity and belonging and 
meaning, but in the decades following World War II, democracy operated 
within constraints with regard to a shared set of institutional statements 
about reality. Zombie invasions were out.
Zombie invasions are definitely back in. The year following the 2016 
U.S.  presidential election saw publication of reports13 and academic 
papers14 seeking to categorize the confusion, defining misinformation (the 
unintentional spread of false beliefs) and disinformation and propaganda (the 
intentional manipulation of beliefs), identifying their sources,15 and studying 
the dynamics by which they spread.16 This flurry of work exhibited a broad 
sense that as a public we have lost our capacity to agree on shared modes of 
validation as to what is going on and what is just plain whacky. The perceived 
threats to our very capacity to tell truth from convenient political fiction, if 
true, strike at the very foundations of democratic society. But it is important 
to recognize that for all the anxiety, not to say panic, about disinformation 
through social media, we do not yet have anything approaching a scientific 
consensus on what exactly happened, who were the primary sources of 
disinformation, what were its primary vectors or channels, and how it affected 
the outcome of the election. In this book we try to advance that diagnosis 
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by applying a wide range of tools to very large data sets and reviewing the 
literature that developed over the first year after the election.
The critical thing to understand as you read this book is that the epochal 
change reflected by the 2016 election and the first year of the Trump presidency 
was not that Republicans beat Democrats despite having a demonstrably less 
qualified candidate. The critical change was that in 2016 the party of Ronald 
Reagan and the two presidents Bush was defeated by the party of Donald 
Trump, Breitbart, and billionaire Robert Mercer. As our data show, in 2017 
Fox News joined the victors in launching sustained attacks on core pillars 
of the Party of Reagan— free trade and a relatively open immigration policy, 
and, most directly, the national security establishment and law enforcement 
when these threatened President Trump himself. Our work helps to explain 
how a media ecosystem that initially helped the GOP gain and retain 
power ultimately spun out of control. From the nomination of Roy Moore 
as Republican candidate for the Alabama special Senate election over the 
objections of Republican Party leadership to Republican congressman 
Francis Rooney’s call to “purge the FBI,” and from the retirement of Paul 
Ryan from his position as Speaker of the House to evangelical leader Franklin 
Graham’s shrug at Donald Trump’s marital infidelities, a range of apparently 
incongruous political stories can be understood as elements of this basic 
conflict between Trumpism and Reaganism over control of the Republican 
Party. In the 2016 election, once the Trump Party took over the Republican 
Party, many Republicans chose to support the party that had long anchored 
their political identity, even if they did not love the candidate at the top of 
the ticket. Indeed, it is likely that the vehemence of the attacks on Hillary 
Clinton that we document in Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 were intended precisely 
to reduce that dissonance, and to make that bitter medicine go down more 
easily. Our observations, and the propaganda feedback loop we identify in 
Chapters  2 and 3 help explain both how such a radicalization could have 
succeeded within the Republican Party, and how that transformation could 
achieve an electoral victory in a two- party system that should, according to 
the standard median voter models favored in political science, have led the 
party rebels to electoral defeat and swept them into the dustbin of history. 
We leave until Part Three our historical explanation for how and when that 
propaganda feedback loop established itself in the right wing of American 
politics.
The bulk of this book comprises detailed analyses of large data sets, case 
studies of the emergence of broad frames and particular narratives, and 
synthesis with the work of others who have tried to make sense of what 
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happened at both abstract and concrete levels. Our goal is to understand 
which actors were responsible for this transformation of the American public 
sphere, and how this new public sphere operated through those actors so as to 
make it so vulnerable to disinformation, propaganda, and just sheer bullshit. 
Our heavy focus on data is complemented by an effort to make sense of what 
we see today in historical context, both political and cultural.
We take a political economy view of technology, suggesting that the 
fundamental mistake of “the internet polarizes” narrative is that it adopts too 
naïve a view of how technology works and understates the degree to which 
institutions, culture, and politics shape technological adoption and diffusion 
patterns. These, we think, were the prime movers of the architecture of 
American political media, and it is this finding that makes this book, for all 
its detailed focus on American politics and media, a useful guide for other 
countries as well. We argue that it would simply be a mistake for countries 
such as, say, Germany, to look at elections in the United States or the United 
Kingdom, see the concerns over online information pollution or propaganda, 
and conclude that the technology, which they too use, is the source of 
disruption. Different political systems, coming from different historical 
trajectories and institutional traditions, will likely exhibit different effects 
of the same basic technological affordances. So it was with mass circulation 
presses, movies, radio, and television, and so it is with the internet and social 
media. Each country’s institutions, media ecosystems, and political culture will 
interact to influence the relative significance of the internet’s democratizing 
affordances relative to its authoritarian and nihilistic affordances. What 
our analysis of the American system offers others is a method, an approach 
to observing empirically what in fact is happening in a country’s political 
media ecosystem, and a framework for understanding why the particular 
new technological affordances may develop differently in one country than 
another.
Dramatis Personae
Media and academic discussions of the post- truth moment have identified 
a set of actors and technological drivers as the prime suspects in causing the 
present state of information disorder, such as fake news purveyors, Russians, 
and so forth. These discussions have also employed a broad range of definitions 
of the problem. Before turning to our analysis, we offer, first, the list of actors 
who have been described as potentially responsible for disrupting American 





use in describing the sources and forms of misperceptions that spread through 
the American media ecosystem.
“Fake News” Entrepreneurs/ Political Clickbait Fabricators.— Before Donald 
Trump appropriated the term, the “fake news” phrase took off in the wake of 
Craig Silverman’s reporting on BuzzFeed about the success of fake election 
news stories.17 This reporting built on Silverman’s earlier story describing 
over 100 pro- Trump websites run from a single town in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian teenagers responsible had little 
interest in American politics but had found that by imitating actual news 
sites, and pushing outlandish hyperpartisan stories, they got lots of Facebook 
engagements from Trump supporters, which translated into very real advertising 
dollars.18 For a while, these websites received a lot of media attention.19 Their 
operators had figured out how to leverage a core affordance of Facebook— its 
ability not only to connect publishers with audiences, but also to generate 
revenues and distribute them to publishers able to elicit “engagements” on 
the platform. The social media entrepreneurs who created these sites were the 
perfect target of anxiety for traditional media:  they diverted attention and 
advertising dollars from “legitimate” media, they manipulated Facebook’s 
algorithm, they were mostly foreign in these stories, and they were purely 
in it for the money. Here, we call them “clickbait fabricators,” and primarily 
address their role in Chapter 9. By “clickbait” we mean media items designed 
to trigger an affective response from a user that leads them to click on the 
item— be it an image, a video, or a headline— because the click itself generates 
revenue for the clickbait purveyor. While this can easily apply to many 
news headlines and much of online advertising, “clickbait fabricators” are 
individuals or firms whose product is in effect purely the clickbait item, rather 
than any meaningful underlying news or product. We use the “fake news” 
moniker to introduce them here because it was used early on to identify this 
particular threat of pollution from political clickbait fabricators. Elsewhere, 
we avoid the term itself because it is too vague as a category of analysis and its 
meaning quickly eroded soon after it was first introduced.
Russian Hackers, Bots, and Sockpuppets—Claims of Russian intervention in 
the U.S. election surfaced immediately after the hacking of the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) email server, in June 2016.20 By the end 
of the year, it had become an official assessment of the U.S.  intelligence 
community.21 Over the course of 2017 and 2018 this set of concerns has been 
the most politically important, not least because of the criminal investigation 
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into alleged connections between the Trump campaign and Russia. Reports 
and documentation released by congressional committees shone particular 
attention on Russian propaganda use of Facebook advertising. Facebook 
itself, and later Twitter, issued reports confirming that they had identified 
instances of Russian interference. A  range of independent academic and 
nonprofit reports confirmed the effort. The types of interventions described 
included the email hacks themselves— primarily the DNC and John Podesta 
emails— which provided grist for the partisan mill in the months before 
the election; and the use on Facebook and Twitter of automated accounts 
(“bots”), and “fake” accounts masquerading as something other than Russian 
agents (“sockpuppets”), which incited people on both the right and the left 
to protest, and pushed and gave particular prominence to anti- Clinton and 
pro- Trump messages. We dedicate Chapter 8 to assessing the Russian threat 
in detail.
The Facebook News Feed algorithm and Online Echo Chambers—A third 
major suspect was centered on the Facebook News Feed algorithm, although 
it extended to other social media and the internet more generally as well. To 
some extent, this was simply a reprise of the nearly 20- year- old concern that 
personalization of news, “the Daily Me,” would drive us into “echo chambers” 
or “filter bubbles.” To some extent it reflected a wave of newer literature 
concerned in general with algorithmic governance, or the replacement of 
human, legible, and accountable judgments with “black box” algorithms.22 In 
particular it reflected the application of this literature to politics in the wake 
of a series of experiments published by Facebook research teams on the News 
Feed algorithm’s ability to affect attitudes and bring out the vote.23 It was 
this algorithm that rewarded the clickbait sites circulating the hyperpartisan 
bullshit. It was this algorithm that reinforced patterns of sharing in tightly 
clustered communities that supported the relative insularity of user com-
munities. As a result, many of the most visible reform efforts in 2017 and 2018 
were focused on revisions of the Facebook News Feed algorithm to constrain 
the dissemination of political clickbait and Russian propaganda. As with 
the case of the Russians, concern over the Facebook News Feed algorithm 
in particular, and over algorithmic shaping of reading and viewing habits in 
general, is legitimate and serious. In our observations, Facebook appears to 
be a more polluted information environment than Twitter or the open web. 
In Chapters  2, 3, and 9, we show that sites that are particularly prominent 
on Facebook but not on Twitter or the open web tend to be more prone to 




although there is more than enough pollution on these other media as well. 
But, we will explain why manipulations of Facebook’s platform, like Russian 
intervention, were nonetheless not the primary driver of disinformation and 
confusion.
Fake news entrepreneurs, Russians, the Facebook algorithm, and online 
echo chambers provide normatively unproblematic, nonpartisan explanations 
to the current epistemic crisis. For all of these actors, the strong emphasis on 
technology suggests a novel challenge that our normal systems do not know 
how to handle but that can be addressed in a nonpartisan manner. Moreover, 
focusing on “fake news” from foreign sources and on Russian efforts to 
intervene places the blame onto foreigners with no legitimate stake in our 
democracy. Both liberal political theory and professional journalism con-
sistently seek neutral justifications for democratic institutions, so visibly 
nonpartisan explanations such as these have enormous attraction. The rest of 
the actors, described below, lack this nonpartisan characteristic.
Cambridge Analytica—Another commonly blamed actor is the Trump 
campaign’s use of Cambridge Analytica to manipulate behavior using 
artificial intelligence (AI)- driven social media advertising. The extent to 
which Cambridge Analytica, a U.K.- based data analytics political consultancy 
that had used tens of millions of Facebook profiles to develop techniques for 
manipulating voters, in fact used psychographic data and manipulated targets 
is debatable. What is clear is that the social media companies, Facebook in 
particular, helped the Trump campaign, as they would any paying customer, 
to use their deep data and behavioral insights to target advertising.24 It is 
less clear, however, that there is anything wrong, from the perspective of 
American norms of electoral politics, with this campaign usage of cutting- 
edge, data- driven behavioral marketing. In 2012, when the Obama campaign 
used then- state- of- the- art data- driven targeting, post- campaign analyses 
feted the campaign geeks.25 If there is a problem here, it is part of a much 
broader and deeper critique of behavioral marketing more generally, and 
how it undermines consumer and citizen sovereignty. We outline some of 
the events and the broader concerns in Chapter 9, explain why the threat is 
likely more remote than news coverage of Cambridge Analytica implied, and 
suggest how some of the proposed solutions may, or may not, help with this 
long- term threat in Chapter 13.
White Supremacist and Alt- Right Trolls—One of the most troubling aspects 
of the 2016 election and the politics of 2017 was the rise of white supremacists 
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in American politics. As Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis carefully 
documented, white supremacists, neo- Nazis, and other long- standing 
denizens of the American far- right found fellow travelers in young, net- 
native subcultures on Reddit, 4chan, and 8chan, graduates of the Gamergate 
controversy, and other online trolls, to undertake a meme war.26 The core 
argument is that these decentralized, politically mobilized, and meme- savvy 
activists deployed a set of disinformation memes and framings that altered 
the election. Serious anthropological and computational work, in addition 
to the work of Marwick and Lewis, supports the argument that these meme 
campaigns had significant impact on the campaign.27 Our own work detailed 
in the following chapters, however, aligns with that of researchers, including 
Whitney Phillips, Jessica Breyer, and Gabriella Coleman,28 who were more 
skeptical of the central role assigned to “alt- right” online activists by some. 
In Chapter  4 we document how isolated the white supremacist sites were 
from the overall Islamophobic framing of immigration that typified right- 
wing media. In Chapter 7 we document how these activists intersected with 
Russian propagandists to propel stories up the propaganda pipeline, but 
also suggest that these events were, in the scheme of things, of secondary 
importance.
The impact of the white supremacists matters a great deal, because fear over 
their impact has created nettlesome problems for Americans concerned with 
democracy and the First Amendment; and for Europeans concerned with far- 
right propaganda on one hand, and the fear of American companies imposing 
their speech standards on Europeans on the other hand. Far- right activ-
ist meme wars undoubtedly represent core political speech, by a politically 
mobilized minority. It is hard to think of a clearer case for First Amendment 
protection. But many of the techniques involved in these campaigns involve 
releasing embarrassing documents, hateful drowning- out of opponents, and 
other substantial personal offenses. The substantive abhorrence of explicitly 
racist and misogynistic views and the genuine concern with the effects of 
the intimidation and silencing campaigns have increased calls for online cen-
sorship by privately owned platforms. The most visible results of these calls 
were the decisions by GoDaddy, Google, and Cloudflare to deny services 
to the Daily Stormer, a neo- Nazi site, in the wake of the white supremacist 
demonstrations in Charlottesville, Virginia, in the middle of 2017. In Europe 
explicitly Nazi content is an easier constitutional case, but questions of what 
counts as illegal and worthy of removal will remain central. A German law 
called the ‘NetzDG’ law, effectively enforced since January 2018, became the 
most aggressive effort by a liberal democracy to require online platforms to 
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police their systems. Aimed at hate speech in particular, the law imposed very 
large fines on major online platforms if they failed to remove speech that 
violates a broad set of German criminal prohibitions, some of which applied 
to much broader and vaguer categories than obvious hate speech. We offer a 
more detailed description of this law and its limitations in Chapter 13. That 
law will undoubtedly inform other countries in Europe and elsewhere as 
they decide to create their own versions of laws that push private platforms 
to impose what some would call “editorial control” and others “private 
censorship.” Our data support the more reticent approach, based on the 
scarcity of evidence of transformational impact of these extremists on the 
U.S. media ecosystem. Throughout our case studies we observe instances of 
alt- right memes trickling through the media ecosystem, but to do so they rely 
overwhelmingly on transmission by the more prominent nodes in the right- 
wing media network. These major right- wing outlets, in turn, are adept at 
producing their own conspiracy theories and defamation campaigns, and do 
not depend on decentralized networks of Redditors to write their materials. 
Given the secondary and dependent role that these sites have on the shape of 
the American media ecosystem, the gains from silencing the more insulated 
far- right forums may be less significant than would justify expansion of the 
powers of private censorship by already powerful online platforms in relatively 
concentrated markets.
Right- Wing Media Ecosystem—Our own contribution to debates about the 
2016 election was to shine a light on the right- wing media ecosystem itself as 
the primary culprit in sowing confusion and distrust in the broader American 
media ecosystem. In the first two parts of this book we continue that work 
by documenting how the right- wing media ecosystem differs categorically 
from the rest of the media environment and how much more susceptible it 
has been to disinformation, lies, and half- truths. In short, we find that the 
influence in the right- wing media ecosystem, whether judged by hyperlinks, 
Twitter sharing, or Facebook sharing, is both highly skewed to the far right 
and highly insulated from other segments of the network, from center- right 
(which is nearly nonexistent) through the far left. We did not come to this 
work looking for a partisan- skewed explanation. As we began to analyze 
the millions of online stories, tweets, and Facebook sharing data points, the 
pattern that emerged was clear. Our own earlier work, which analyzed specific 
campaigns around intellectual property law and found that right and left 
online media collaborated, made us skeptical of our initial observations, but 
these proved highly resilient to a wide range of specifications and robustness 
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checks. Something very different was happening in right- wing media than in 
centrist, center- left, and left- wing media.
We will make the argument throughout this book that the behavior of 
the right- wing media ecosystem represents a radicalization of roughly a third 
of the American media system. We use the term “radicalization” advisedly in 
two senses. First, to speak of “polarization” is to assume symmetry. No fact 
emerges more clearly from our analysis of how four million political stories 
were linked, tweeted, and shared over a three- year period than that there is no 
symmetry in the architecture and dynamics of communications within the 
right- wing media ecosystem and outside of it. Second, throughout this period 
we have observed repeated public humiliation and vicious disinformation 
campaigns mounted by the leading sites in this sphere against individuals 
who were the core pillars of Republican identity a mere decade earlier. At 
the beginning of this period, Jeb Bush, the son and brother of the two most 
recent Republican presidents, was besmirched as having “close Nazi ties” on 
Infowars. By November 2017 life- long Republicans who had been appointed 
to leading law enforcement positions by President George W.  Bush found 
themselves under sustained, weeks- long disinformation campaigns aimed 
to impugn their integrity and undermine their professional independence. 
When a solidly conservative party is taken over by its most extreme wing in 
a campaign that includes attacks that are no less vicious when aimed at that 
conservative party’s mainstream pillars than they are at the opposition party, 
we think “radicalization” is an objectively appropriate term.
This radicalization was driven by a group of extreme sites including 
Breitbart, Infowars, Truthfeed, Zero Hedge, and the Gateway Pundit, none 
of which claim to follow the norms or processes of professional journalistic 
objectivity. As we will see time and again, both in our overall analysis of the 
architecture and in our detailed case studies, even core right- wing sites that 
do claim to follow journalistic norms, Fox News and the Daily Caller, do not 
in fact do so, and therefore fail to act as a truth- telling brake on these radical 
sites. Indeed, repeatedly we found Fox News accrediting and amplifying the 
excesses of the radical sites. As the case studies in Chapter 5 document, over 
the course of 2017 Fox News had become the propaganda arm of the White 
House in all but name. This pattern is not mirrored on the left wing. First, 
while we do find fringe sites on the left that mirror the radical sites, these 
simply do not have the kind of visibility and prominence on the left as they 
do on the right. Second, the most visible sites on the left, like Huffington 
Post, are at their worst mirrors of Fox News, not of the Gateway Pundit 
or Zero Hedge. And third, all these sites on the left are tightly integrated 
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with traditional mainstream media sites like the New  York Times and the 
Washington Post, and most, though not all, of these sites operate either directly 
under long- standing journalistic norms or are indirectly sensitive to criticism 
based on reporting that adheres to such norms. As we show in Chapter 3, 
there is ample supply of and demand for false hyperpartisan narratives on 
the left. The difference is that the audience and hyperpartisan commercial 
clickbait fabricators oriented toward the left form part of a single media 
ecosystem with center, center- left, and left- wing sites that are committed 
to journalistic truth- seeking norms. Those norm- constrained sites, both 
mainstream and net- native, serve as a consistent check on dissemination and 
validation of the most extreme stories when they do emerge on the left, and 
have no parallels in the levels of visibility or trust that can perform the same 
function on the right.
We do not expect our findings to persuade anyone who is already committed 
to the right- wing media ecosystem. The maps we draw in Chapter 2 could be 
interpreted differently. They could be viewed as a media system overwhelmed 
by liberal bias and opposed only by a tightly- clustered set of right- wing sites 
courageously telling the truth in the teeth of what Sean Hannity calls the 
“corrupt, lying media,” rather than our interpretation of a radicalized right 
set apart from a media system anchored in century- old norms of professional 
journalism. We take up this issue in Chapter  3 where we compare left and 
right news sites for their patterns of reporting and correction and where we 
describe our explicit efforts to find conspiracy theories that made it out of the 
margins of the left to the center of mainstream media. We dedicate Chapter 6 
to exploring the modes of failure of mainstream media in their election 
coverage, and examine the recipients of the Trump Fake News Awards and 
how they responded to having made the significant errors that won them that 
honor. We think that fundamentally, anyone who insists on claiming that we 
cannot draw conclusions about which side is biased, and which side gravitates 
more closely to the truth, must explain how the media sources most trusted 
by consistently conservative survey respondents— Fox News, Hannity, Rush 
Limbaugh, and Glenn Beck— are the equivalent of the sites that occupy the 
same positions among consistently liberal respondents: NPR, PBS, the BBC, 
and the New York Times.29
The central role of the radicalized right in creating the current crisis of 
disinformation and misinformation creates a significant challenge for policy 
recommendations and is not easy to reconcile with democratic theory. It 
seems too partisan a perspective to convert into a general, nonpartisan policy 
recommendation or neutral argument about what democracy requires. 
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And yet, we believe that there is a core set of concerns that transcend party 
affiliation and should appeal across party lines. First, having a segment of the 
population that is systematically disengaged from objective journalism and 
the ability to tell truth from partisan fiction is dangerous to any country. It 
creates fertile ground for propaganda. Second, it makes actual governance 
difficult. Other than their major success with tax reform, Republicans found 
it difficult to govern during the first year of the Trump presidency, despite 
holding majorities in both houses of Congress and the presidency. In large 
part, this is due to the inability to bridge the gap between the state of the 
world as many in their base know it and the state of the world as it is. Third, 
the divorce of a party base from the institutions and norms that provide a 
reality check on our leaders is a political disaster waiting to happen— see for 
instance the primary victory of Roy Moore over Lucas Strange and Moore’s 
subsequent defeat in the general election. However strident and loyal the 
party base may be, not even a clear majority of Republican voters is exclusively 
focused on the right- wing media ecosystem. Over time, the incongruence 
between the reality inside and outside that ecosystem will make it harder for 
non- base “lean- Republican” voters to swallow candidates that are palatable 
inside it. Our hope, then, is that perhaps Republicans see in our findings 
reason enough to look for a change in the dynamic of the media ecosystem 
that their most loyal supporters inhabit.
Finding nonpartisan or bipartisan solutions in a society as highly polarized 
as the United States has become difficult, to say the least. But ignoring the 
stark partisan asymmetry at the root of our present epistemic crisis will make 
it impossible to develop solutions that address the actual causes of that crisis. 
Any argument that depends for its own sense of neutrality and objectivity on 
drawing empirically false equivalents between Fox News and CNN, much 
less between top left- wing sites like Mother Jones and Salon and equivalently 
prominent sites on the right like the Gateway Pundit or Infowars, undermines 
clear thinking on the problem at hand.
Mainstream Media—Most Americans do not get their news from Facebook, 
and even most Trump voters did not get their news solely from Fox News or 
right- wing online media.30 As Thomas Patterson’s study of mainstream media 
coverage of the 2016 election documented,31 and Watts and Rothschild’s study 
of the New York Times in the run- up to the election showed,32 mainstream 
media coverage of the election was mostly focused on the horserace, was 
overwhelmingly negative about both candidates, and treated both candidates 




extent to which non- horserace coverage in mainstream media followed the 
agenda of the right- wing media and the Trump campaign.
As Figure 1.1 shows, Trump got more coverage, and, however negative, 
the stories still covered his core substantive issues— immigration, jobs, and 
trade. By contrast, Clinton’s coverage was dominated by scandals— emails, 
the Clinton Foundation, and, to a lesser extent, Benghazi. The effect of this 
was most clearly shown in a September 2016 Gallup poll that showed that 
the word Americans most consistently associated with Clinton was “emails,” 
followed by “lie,” “scandal,” and “foundation.” By contrast, for Trump, 
“Mexico,” “immigration,” and so forth were more prominent.33 Given that 
only a portion of Trump supporters were primarily focused on the right wing, 
it would have been impossible for this stark divergence of association to arise 
without the adoption by major media of the framing and agenda- setting 
efforts of the right wing and the Trump campaign. Patterson’s explanation 
for the negativity in coverage is that journalists have developed professional 
norms that use cynicism and negative coverage as a sign of even- handed, hard- 
hitting journalism. Certainly the need to attract viewers and earn advertising 
revenues is rendered easier by focusing on easy- to- digest exciting news like 
horserace or scandals than by running in- depth analyses of wonkish policy 
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Figure  1.1 Sentences in mass- market open web media mentioning topics related to 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during the 2016 election period.
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drivers of advertising- supported media. We document and analyze these 
dynamics in Chapter 6, in particular the fragility of basic journalistic norms 
of neutrality in the teeth of an asymmetric, propaganda- rich media ecosys-
tem. It is, we believe, impossible to gauge the effects of any of the other actors 
or dynamics without considering how they flowed through, and affected cov-
erage by, professional mainstream media that were the primary source of news 
for most Americans outside the right- wing bubble.
Donald Trump:  Candidate and President—All the explanations we have 
presented to this point ignore a central player in the dynamics of the 
moment— Donald Trump himself. But as we see repeatedly throughout this 
book, the president played a central catalyzing role in all these dynamics. 
In Chapter 4, when we look at the topic of immigration and the peaks and 
valleys in coverage, there is little doubt that Trump launched his campaign 
with an anti- immigrant message and continued to shape the patterns of 
coverage with his own statements throughout. Even Breitbart, clearly the 
most effective media actor promoting immigration as the core agenda of the 
election and framing it in terms of anti- Muslim fears, seems to have taken its 
cues from the candidate no less than Trump took cues from the site. Trump’s 
comments as candidate repeatedly drew heated coverage and commentary 
from the mainstream press. He used this tactic to hold the spotlight from 
the beginning to the end of the campaign. Audacity, outrage, and divisiveness 
fueled his campaign. Trump launched his political career largely on his 
support of the “birther” movement, and has since embraced a wide range of 
conspiracy theories, from implying that Ted Cruz’s father was associated with 
the Kennedy assassination, through reviving the Vince Foster conspiracy, to 
asserting that Hillary Clinton aided ISIS. Since becoming president Trump 
has repeatedly embraced and propagated conspiracy theories against political 
opponents, many of which fall within the broad frame of the “deep state,” as 
when he embraced the Uranium One conspiracy theory designed to discredit 
the FBI and special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation. He has also 
adopted the term “fake news” to describe all critical mainstream media. It is 
highly likely his steady drumbeat of condemnation will have only heightened 
the distrust of media among his supporters.
Trump’s use of Twitter has been one the defining facets of his presidency. 
One way to understand Trump’s use of Twitter is as a mechanism to 
communicate directly with the public, particularly his tens of millions of 
followers (although it is unknown how many of these are in fact U.S. voters, 




Trump not only uses Twitter to communicate with his followers, but also uses 
Twitter as a means of exerting power— over the media, the executive branch, 
the legislature, or opponents. Both as candidate and as president Trump has 
used Twitter in a feedback loop with the media. There have been several stories 
that document Trump “live tweeting” cable news, picking up talking points 
from what the president sees every morning on Fox and Friends, and tweeting 
them back out to the world.34 There are many signs that guests that appear 
on the president’s favorite Fox News, for example House Speaker Paul Ryan 
promoting a spending bill, are in effect performing for an audience of one;35 
others have documented how coverage is crafted to influence Trump.36 The 
influence flows in both directions in an unusual multimedia relationship. Not 
a day goes by without the president’s tweets becoming a news story. However 
outlandish a claim, as soon as the president makes or repeats it on Twitter, 
it is legitimate news not only on right- wing media but across the media 
ecosystem. In this manner, Trump has been able to insert himself as the center 
of media attention at any time and with little effort, and in doing so influence 
the media agenda. During the campaign, this attention “earned” him vastly 
greater media coverage than Hillary Clinton got. Over the course of his first 
year in office, the president has used Twitter to short- circuit normal processes 
in the executive branch as well, such as firing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, 
announcing a ban on transgender troops, and creating “facts on the ground” 
that his subordinates have had to either explain away or, more often than not, 
accept and adjust their marching orders. While in principle the president 
could have used regular appearances at the daily press briefing in a similarly 
mercurial fashion, there is little doubt that the easy availability of a mass 
media outlet in the palm of his hand, at all hours of the day, has given the 
president a new and highly unorthodox lever of power.
Overall, the debate since the election seems to have focused on the 
presidency of Donald Trump more as the consequence to be explained 
than as an active player in a positive feedback contributing to information 
disorder. It might also be argued that the exact opposite is the case. That the 
media dynamics we observe in 2016 and since the election are the anomalous 
result of the presence of Trump, a charismatic reality TV personality with 
unusually strong media skills, first as candidate and then as president. There 
is little doubt that Trump is an outlier in this sense. Nonetheless, the highly 
asymmetric architecture of the media ecosystem precedes him, as do the 
asymmetric patterns of political polarization, and we think it more likely that 
his success was enabled by a political and media landscape ripe for takeover 
rather than that he himself upended the ecosystem. Trump, as both candidate 
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and president, was both contributing cause and outcome, operating on the 
playing field of an already radicalized, asymmetric media ecosystem. As we 
explain in Chapters  10 and 11, Donald Trump represents the present state 
of a dynamic system that has been moving Republican politicians, voters, 
audiences, and media to the right at least since Rush Limbaugh launched 
this model of mass media propaganda on talk radio in 1988 and became, as 
the National Review wrote in 1993, “the Leader of the Opposition.” In that 
ecosystem, Trump now operates as catalyst in chief.
Mapping the Actors: Politics, Commerce, 
Technology, and Centralization
In addition to identifying the specific actors responsible for the current crisis, 
we try to examine over the course of this book the larger drivers behind 
those specific actors. Our argument is that the crisis is more institutional 
than technological, more focused on U.S.  media ecosystem dynamics than 
on Russia, and more driven by asymmetric political polarization than 
by commercial advertising systems. To highlight these larger questions, 
we have included two figures below. In both figures, we map each of the 
actors we have identified above along a horizontal axis of political versus 
commercial orientation. In Figure 1.2, we map the actors with a vertical axis 
that distinguishes between threats that come from centralized sources, like 
states or big companies, as opposed to decentralized sources, like grassroots 
mobilization or small businesses out to make a buck. In Figure 1.3, we map 
actors along a vertical axis that distinguishes between threats that are seen as 
caused by technological change versus those seen as coming from institutional 
dynamics— laws or social norms that shape how we develop our beliefs about 
what’s going on and why.
Three things become quite clear from looking at these maps. First, 
most efforts to understand the apparent epistemic crisis have focused on 
technology— social media, the Facebook algorithm, behavioral microtarget-
ing, bots, and online organic fragmentation and polarization. Second, Russia 
and Facebook play a very large role in the explanations. And third, most of 
the explanations focus on threats and failures that are politically neutral, or 
nonpartisan.
Our research suggests that our present epistemic crisis has an inescapably 
partisan shape. The patterns of mistrust in media and lack of ability to tell 




fundamental explanation for these differences cannot be laid at the feet of 
Facebook, Russia, or new technology. They are rooted in long- term changes in 
American politics. We are not arguing that technology does not matter, that 
the Russians did not actively interfere with U.S. politics, or that Facebook’s 
algorithm is unimportant. Instead, we suggest that each of these “usual 
suspects” acts through and depends on the asymmetric partisan ecosystem 
that has developed over the past four decades. What that means in practice, 
for Americans, is that solutions that focus purely on short- term causes, like 
the Facebook algorithm, are unlikely to significantly improve our public 
discourse.
For others around the world it means understanding the costs and benefits 
of proposed interventions based on local institutional conditions, rather than 
context- free explanations based on “the nature” of the technology. Germany’s 
new law, which puts Facebook and Google under severe pressure to censor 
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Figure  1.2 Threat models distinguished by political vs. commercial orientation and 
centralized vs. decentralized origins.
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is not likely needed to counter propaganda generally because of the high trust 
in public media in Germany. This social background fact likely helped keep 
Russian propaganda on the margins in the 2017 German election, and the 
highly stable political institutional structures further limited the destabilizing 
effect of network propaganda and kept the far right at the margins of 
political significance despite electoral success. On the other hand, perhaps it 
is precisely Germany’s willingness to wade into regulating its public sphere, 
born of its own bitter historical experience with democratic failure, that has 
given it its relatively stable media ecosystem. We do not suggest an answer to 
that question in this book, but we do offer a set of tools and an approach to 
understanding technology that may help those evaluating that question reach 
a clearer answer.
Technology does not determine outcomes or the patterns of its own 
adoption. Specific technologies, under specific institutional and cultural 



























Figure  1.3 Threat models distinguished by political vs. commercial orientation and 
technological vs. institutional origins.
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Rwandan genocide, and possibly troll- farms in Russia and WhatsApp in 
India, suggest that technology, in interaction with particular political- 
institutional conditions, can become the critical ingredient that tips some 
societies into instability, maybe at local levels or for brief periods. But we have 
not seen sufficient evidence to support the proposition that social media, or 
the internet, or technology in itself can be a sufficient cause for democratic 
destabilization at the national scale. Indeed, our own detailed study of the 
American case suggests that it is only where the underlying institutional and 
political- cultural fabric is frayed that technology can exacerbate existing 
problems and dynamics to the point of crisis. In the 2016 election, it was 
the already- present asymmetric architecture of news media, and asymmetric 
attitudes toward professional journalism governed by norms of objectivity, that 
fed the divergent patterns of media adoption online. It was this asymmetric 
architecture, and the insularity of right- wing media and audiences from the 
corrective function of professional journalism, that made that segment of the 
overall media ecosystem more susceptible to political clickbait fabricators, 
Russian propaganda, and extremist hyperpartisan bullshit of the Pizzagate 
variety.
Definitions: Propaganda and Its Elements, 
Purposes, and Outcomes
The widespread sense that we have entered a “post- truth” era and the general 
confusion over how we have gotten to this point has led to several careful 
efforts to define the terms of reference in the debate. The initial surge in “fake 
news” usage by observers from the center and left was quickly superseded by 
the term’s adoption by President Trump to denote coverage critical of him, 
and has since essentially lost any real meaning. Influential work by Clair 
Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan for the Council of Europe and by Caroline 
Jack at the Data & Society Institute began to bring order to well- known but 
ill- defined terms like “propaganda,” “misinformation,” or “disinformation,” as 
well as introducing neologisms like “malinformation” to denote leaks and 
harassment strategies.37
In the rest of this section, we present a brief history of the study of 
propaganda and lay out the definitions of these terms as we will use 
them through the rest of the book. We focus on the information and 
communications measures, rather than the harassment and intimidation 
activities. We anchor our definitions both in the salient forms we observed in 
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our study of communications from April of 2015 to March of 2018 and in the 
long tradition of propaganda studies.
This segment may be a touch academic for some readers who want to 
get to the meat of our observations about how propaganda in fact played 
out in America in the presidential elections and the first year of the Trump 
presidency. For those readers we offer a brief cheat sheet here and invite you 
to skip the history and definitions and either go straight to our description of 
the plan of the book in this chapter or just dive in to Chapter 2.
• “Propaganda” and “disinformation”: manipulating and misleading people 
intentionally to achieve political ends.
• “Network propaganda”:  the ways in which the architecture of a media 
ecosystem makes it more or less susceptible to disseminating these kinds 
of manipulations and lies.
• “Bullshit”:  communications of outlets that don’t care whether their 
statements are true or false, and usually not what their political effect is, as 
long as they make a buck.
• “Misinformation”: publishing wrong information without meaning to be 
wrong or having a political purpose in communicating false information.
• “Disorientation”:  a condition that some propaganda seeks to induce, in 
which the target population simply loses the ability to tell truth from 
falsehood or where to go for help in distinguishing between the two.
There are more details in the definitions and history, and like all cheat sheets, 
this one is neither complete nor precise. But these will serve to make sure that 
if you skip the next segment you will not miss any important aspects of the 
chapters that follow.
A brief intellectual history of propaganda
Histories of propaganda, including Harold Laswell’s field- defining work in 
the 1920s and 1930s,38 emphasize sometimes the ancient origins of the use 
of communications to exercise control over populations and sometimes the 
Catholic Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in the seventeenth 
century. It seems, nonetheless, that the intense interest in propaganda is a 
distinctly modern phenomenon. Several factors lent new urgency to the 
question of how governing elites were to manage mass populations:  The 
discovery of “the masses,” uprooted by industrialization and mass migration 




technologies, from the penny presses and mass circulation papers through 
movies in the nickelodeons to radio in the 1920s; the invention of psychology 
as a field of scientific inquiry and its application to mass populations; and the 
urgent need to mobilize these populations in the teeth of total war on a scale 
never seen before. Propaganda as a field was an application of the modernist 
commitment to expertise and scientific management, applied to the problem 
of managing a mass population in time of crisis. Walter Lippmann’s words 
in Public Opinion might as well have been written in 2017 about behavioral 
psychology, A/ B testing, and microtargeting as it was in 1922:
That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no 
one, I  think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is 
certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages, and the 
opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the 
process are plain enough. The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a 
very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance 
of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved 
enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather 
than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, 
coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of 
democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely 
more significant than any shifting of economic power.
Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion 
has become a self- conscious art and a regular organ of popular 
government. None of us begins to understand the consequences, but 
it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of how to create 
consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political 
premise. Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the 
sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking 
have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example, to believe 
in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for 
the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the 
human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self- 
deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify.39
The Committee on Public Information that operated to shape public opinion 
in support of the American war effort in World War I, the Creel Committee, 
implemented the idea of applying the best cutting- edge techniques of 
technology and psychology to engage in the “Engineering of Consent,” as one 
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of its most influential alumni, Edward Bernays, would later call it.40 Bernays, 
in this regard, embodies the translation of cutting- edge social psychology 
and the idea of expert engineering into the domain of manufacturing public 
opinion, and became one of the founders of the public relations industry 
in the early 1920s. Over the course of the 1920s to 1940s, writing about 
propaganda that remains influential today was caught between the will to 
systematize the definition and understanding of propaganda so as to make 
it an appropriately professional, scientific field of practice, and the negative 
inflection that the term had received during World War I, when all antiwar 
efforts were branded “German propaganda.” While the negative connotation 
lingered, the professional orientation toward a managerial definition 
anchored in psychological manipulation is captured both in Laswell’s classic 
1927 definition “Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the 
manipulation of significant symbols”41 and in the state- of- the- art definition 
adopted by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937: “Propaganda is the 
expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or 
groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals 
or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations.”
The critical elements of this era of professionalized attention to propaganda 
were, therefore: (a) an actor with intent to manage a (b) target population’s 
attitudes or behaviors (c)  through symbolic manipulation informed by a 
psychological model of belief or attitude formation and revision, as opposed 
to rational or deliberative approach. This purposive, managerial approach 
remains central to self- conscious professional propagandists to this day. The 
Army Field Manual of Psychological Operations, for example, describes the 
role of PSYOP soldiers to “[i] nfluence foreign populations by expressing 
information subjectively to influence attitudes and behavior, and to obtain 
compliance, noninterference, or other desired behavioral changes.”42 These 
definitions emphasize the propagandist actor: an agent who acts intentionally; 
the purpose: to influence or manage a target population, which distinguishes 
propaganda from one- on- one persuasion, manipulation, or fraud; and the 
means: “manipulation,” or “expressing information subjectively” in the terms 
of the PSYOP field manual— that is to say, communicating in a manner 
behaviorally designed to trigger a response in the target population to affect 
beliefs, attitudes, or preferences of the target population in order to obtain 
behavior compliant with the subjective goals of the propagandist.
The tension between this understanding of propaganda and a more 
deliberative or participatory view of democracy was already explicitly present 
in Lippmann’s 1922 Public Opinion. If, as an empirical fact of the matter, the 
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opinions of citizens as a population are poorly formed and weakly held, and 
if they are subject to manipulation through ever- more- refined interventions 
informed by ever- improving scientifically tested social and cognitive 
psychology, then the idea of deliberative democracy by an informed citizenry 
exercising self- governance is a utopia. In 1922 Lippmann was still willing to 
make the argument explicitly, and use it as a basis for an expertise- informed, 
elite- governed, democracy, recognizing that the inevitability of public opinion 
being manipulated may as well be used to mobilize support for good policies 
rather than for exploitation. The same is true for propaganda in markets. 
Bernays, who had cut his teeth in the Committee on Political Information, 
would go on to developing marketing campaigns, such as branding cigarettes 
“torches of freedom” in a 1929 effort to market cigarettes to women.43 If 
consumer preferences were manufactured by sellers, and citizens’ beliefs were 
manufactured by elites, then both anchors of liberal market democracies were 
fundamentally unstable. The use of the term “propaganda” made both of these 
tensions too palpable, and the term receded from use by expert practitioners, 
to be replaced by less morally freighted terms: “marketing,” “communications,” 
“public relations,” or “publicity.” “Propaganda,” when used by mainstream 
authors, was left to describe what the Soviet Union did. Mostly, its use shifted 
to become a critical framework from which to criticize modern liberal market 
society, most famously in Jacques Ellul’s Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s 
Attitudes and later Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.
Ellul’s now- classic work reoriented the study of propaganda from 
understanding the practice of intentional management of beliefs and attitudes 
at the population level to understanding the structure of consciousness 
in technologically mediated market society. Propaganda was no longer 
something an actor perpetrates on a population (although it is that too), 
but the overall social practice and effect that normalizes and regularizes life 
and meaning in modern, technologically mediated society. “In the midst 
of increasing mechanization and technological organization, propaganda 
is simply the means used to prevent these things from being felt as too 
oppressive and to persuade man to submit with good grace.”44 This focus 
on how propaganda in this pacification sense is a pervasive characteristic in 
modern, mass- mediated society, and bridging from political communication 
to marketing and even education, became the typical approach of a mostly 
dwindling field of study.45 Most prominently in this period, Herman and 
Chomsky’s “Propaganda Model” of mass media offered the most explicit 
application of the term “propaganda” to the claim that “the media serve, and 
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propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and 
finance them.”46 They delivered a detailed critique of media coverage of a 
range of politically sensitive topics and described the dynamics of newsroom 
politics, of ownership and control, media concentration and advertising 
dependence. Herman and Chomsky assimilate the term “propaganda” into 
the more general critique of commercial mass media that became prominent 
from the 1980s to the early 2000s. Other important contributions in this 
vein, which did not use the terminology of “propaganda” to make their 
point, include Ben Bagdikian’s Media Monopoly, Neil Postman’s Amusing 
Ourselves to Death, Robert McChesney’s Rich Media, Poor Democracy, and Ed 
Baker’s Media, Markets, and Democracy. This literature examined important 
failings of the commercial mass media model that typified the state of the 
media pre- internet, and continues to shed light on some of the failures of 
media conglomerates and the threats of concentrated commercial media 
to a well- functioning democratic public sphere. But in appropriating the 
term “propaganda” to describe the broad structure of ideology in modern, 
technologically mediated market society, as Ellul did, or the failings of 
commercial mass media during the rise of neoliberalism, as Herman and 
Chomsky did, the critical turn removed the term “propaganda” from the 
toolkit of those who wish to study intentional manipulation of public 
opinion, particularly as applied to politics.
We do not ignore or reject the validity and value of sustained study and 
critique of the democratic distortions introduced by commercial mass media, 
particularly concentrated media. Indeed, one of us relied on it in exploring 
the role of the internet in reversing some of these destructive characteristics of 
the commercial mass- mediated public sphere.47 But the dynamics of the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, Brexit, and other political arenas lead us to believe 
that it would be more useful to adopt the approach of work in the 1990s 
and 2000s that itself sought to revive the technocratic or scientific study of 
propaganda as a coherent topic of analysis. This work focused primarily on 
retaining the negative connotation of propaganda, while overcoming the urge 
to treat communications from “our” side as “communications,” and those of 
opponents as “propaganda.” The primary effort was to coherently distinguish 
“propaganda” from a variety of other terms that refer to communication to a 
population that has a similar desired outcome: persuasion, marketing, public 
relations, and education. The most influential treatment in this technical, 
observational line of work was Gareth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell’s 
Propaganda and Persuasion.48 The book offered the most comprehensive 
intellectual history of propaganda studies, psychological research on the 
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influence of media on attitudes and behaviors, and psychological warfare, and 
sought to systematize a definition and analysis approach out of that broad 
survey of the field. We follow that line of work in characterizing propaganda. 
Our claim for these definitions is not their abstract truth but their utility. We 
think they can help focus analysis on the set of threats that appear to be most 
salient in the present state and help define a coherent set of research questions 
without spilling over into too many associated fields of inquiry.
Definitions: Propaganda and Its Elements
Propaganda
Communication designed to manipulate a target population by 
affecting its beliefs, attitudes, or preferences in order to obtain behavior 
compliant with political goals of the propagandist.
This definition focuses the study of propaganda on intentional com-
munications that are designed by the propagator to obtain outcomes. 
Unintentionally false communications that in fact affect behavior, but not 
by design, would not count. It limits the study to communications targeted 
at a population, excluding interpersonal manipulation or very small- scale 
efforts to manipulate a small group. This limitation in part is to keep the term 
in its broad original sense of dealing with mass populations, and in part to 
avoid confounding it simply with all forms of interpersonal manipulation. It 
limits the term to purposive behavior intended to affect a political outcome 
desired by the propagandist. In this, we purposefully exclude marketing, 
which fits all other elements of the definition and which shares many of the 
practices. We do so because we believe normative judgments about how it is 
appropriate for parties to treat each other in markets may differ from those 
we consider appropriate for interactions among citizens and between them 
and their governments or other political actors. Historically, even in more 
critical usage, “propaganda” has tended to highlight politics and power rather 
than commercial advantage, although critical usage has tended to expand the 
meaning and reach of the political. We recognize that what commentators 
will consider “political” will vary and that a campaign to market soap may 
be properly described as political if it is understood to reinforce a certain 
viewpoint about the appropriate standards by which women should be judged, 
for example. We certainly do not intend to exclude politics in this sense from 
our definition of political. Nonetheless, we think that confounding political 
manipulation with manipulative and misleading marketing for commercial 
 
 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da30
30
gain will muddy the waters in both. The rise in consumer surveillance and 
behavioral marketing will certainly require extensive work on measuring and 
combating such practices. We think it will likely benefit from being part of a 
renewed literature on misleading advertising and consumer protection and 
that the study of manipulative marketing and propaganda will share a good 
bit of empirical overlap in terms of how to identify the practices, measure 
their effects, and so forth. But we believe there is an advantage to keeping 
separate the domain of politics, with its normative commitment to democracy, 
from the domain of commerce, and its normative commitment to welfare, 
consumer sovereignty, and consumer protection. And using “propaganda” to 
refer to the political domain is both consistent with longtime usage of the 
term and allows a more distinct focus for this kind of manipulation from this 
set of actors who operate within a distinct institutional framework for a set of 
distinct motivations.
Manipulation
Directly influencing someone’s beliefs, attitudes, or preferences in ways 
that fall short of what an empathetic observer would deem normatively 
appropriate in context.
We emphasize the manipulative character of communications we deem 
propaganda. But “manipulation” is itself a term requiring definition. By Cass 
Sunstein’s account, “manipulation” entails influencing people in a manner 
that “does not sufficiently engage or appeal to their capacity for reflection and 
deliberation.”49 We think this is too restrictive, because there can be emotional 
appeals that circumvent the rational capacities but are entirely appropriate for 
the relevant situation— such as a coach rallying her players’ spirits at halftime 
after a disastrous first half. The critical issue is appropriateness for the situation. 
We adopt a variant of Anne Barnhill’s definition that “[m] anipulation is directly 
influencing someone’s beliefs, desires, or emotions such that she falls short of 
ideals for belief, desire, or emotion in ways typically not in her self- interest 
or likely not in her self- interest in the present context.”50 We adopt a variant, 
rather than Barnhill’s definition, because in the political context appeals that 
are not in the self- interest of the individual are common and appropriate for 
the context, and so we focus instead on the property of appropriateness for 
the context. Indeed, we consider “autonomy” rather than “self- interest” as the 
touchstone, and adopt an “empathetic observer” standard, which one of us 
initially proposed in the context of characterizing modes of communication 
as appropriate and inappropriate from the perspective of an autonomous 
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subject.51 The “empathetic observer” differs from the “reasonable person” in 
that she takes the first- person perspective of the target of the communication, 
and asks whether that person, knowing the entire situation, including the 
intentions and psychological techniques of the alleged manipulator, would 
welcome the allegedly manipulative communication. While manipulation 
is often aided by cutting- edge behavioral psychology, we do not take the 
fact of scientifically informed design to be definitional, in the sense that 
manipulation informed by intuition and pop psychology is no less and no 
more objectionable for that reason.
What “manipulate” adds to a definition of propaganda, which already 
focuses on intentional action to shape beliefs, attitudes, or preferences, is the 
need to explain why the communication falls short of a normative ideal for how 
beliefs, attitudes, or preferences ought to be shaped. Outright false or materially 
misleading communications are relatively easy to categorize as normatively 
inappropriate, but emotionally evocative language presents harder questions. 
What is the difference between Martin Luther King Jr.’s soaring oratory in the 
“I Have a Dream” speech, and the Gateway Pundit’s anti- immigration article 
entitled “Obama Changes Law:  Allows Immigrants with Blistering STDs 
and Leprosy into U.S.”? Perhaps appeals to strongly negative emotions such as 
fear, hatred, or disgust should be considered more inappropriate than strongly 
positive emotions, such as love, patriotism, or pride? One might imagine that 
from the perspective of democratic engagement, at least, the former would be 
more destructive to the possibility of public reason- giving and persuasion than 
the latter, and so from the perspective of a democracy committed to collective 
self- governance by people who treat each other as worthy of equal concern as 
citizens, the latter would more readily fall into the category of normatively 
inappropriate. But some of the worst abuses in human history were framed 
in terms that in the abstract sound positive and uplifting, be it love of 
country and patriotism or the universal solidarity of workers. The empathetic 
observer allows us to ground the difference in arguments about respecting 
the autonomy of members of the population subject to the intervention. Its 
risk, of course, is that those who think it is trivially true to think that King’s 
oratory is appropriate and the Gateway Pundit’s is not have to contend with 
the possibility that the readers of the Gateway Pundit are fully aware of the 
intent and effect of the communication, and desire it no less than the nearly 
defeated athletes at halftime desire the rousing pep talk from the coach. If that 
turns out to be sociologically true, then one needs some framework based not 
on respect for the autonomy of citizens as individuals but based on a more 
collective normative framework, such as what democracy requires of citizens. 
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We do not try to resolve that question here but emphasize that some form 
of manipulation is a necessary part of justifying the normatively negative 
connotation of “propaganda” and that connotation must have a well- defined 
normative foundation other than “I don’t agree with what they said.”
Disinformation
Dissemination of explicitly false or misleading information.
We use the term “disinformation” to denote a subset of propaganda that 
includes dissemination of explicitly false or misleading information. The 
falsehood may be the origin of the information, as when Russian- controlled 
Facebook or Twitter accounts masquerade as American, or it may be in 
relation to specific facts, as when Alex Jones of Infowars ran a Pizzagate 
story that he was later forced to retract. We mean to include both “black” 
and “gray” propaganda in the term disinformation, that is to say, propaganda 
whose source or content is purely false, as well as propaganda whose source 
and content is more subtly masked and manipulated to appear other than 
what it is.
Bullshit—Here we adopt philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s by now widely 
popular definition, which covers communicating with no regard to the truth 
or falsehood of the statements made. A  liar knows the truth and speaks 
what he knows to be untruthful. The bullshit artist “does not care whether 
the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or 
makes them up, to suit his purpose.”52 “Fake news” producers in the original 
meaning, that is, purely commercial actors with no apparent political agenda 
who propagated made- up stories to garner engagements and advertising 
revenue, were the quintessence of bullshit artists in this sense. Not all bullshit 
is propaganda, because its propagators are indifferent to its impact on beliefs, 
attitudes, or preferences and have no agenda to shape behavior, political 
or otherwise, other than to induce a click. Here, in our case studies, we 
repeatedly encounter behavior that may be pure bullshit artistry and may be 
propaganda, depending on our best understanding of the motive and beliefs 
of the propagator. Broadcasting propaganda can be enormously profitable. It 
is hard to tell whether Sean Hannity or Alex Jones, for example, were acting 
as propagandists or bullshit artists in some of the stories we tell in Chapters 4 
through 9. In all these cases, and those of many other actors in our studies, 
there is certainly a symbiotic relationship between the propagandists and 




framing that could be used, copied, circulated, and amplified throughout 
the network, such that as a practical matter what we interchangeably call 
commercial bullshit and political clickbait fabricators formed an important 
component of network propaganda.
Network Propaganda—What we observe in our broad, macroscale studies 
as well as in our detailed case studies is that the overall effect on beliefs and 
attitudes emerges from the interaction among a diverse and often broad set 
of discrete sources and narrative bits. The effects we define below— induced 
misperceptions, disorientation, and distraction— which contribute to 
population- scale changes in attitudes and beliefs, come not from a single 
story or source but from the fact that a wide range of outlets, some controlled 
by the propagandist, most not, repeat various versions of the propagandist’s 
communications, adding credibility and improving recall of the false, 
misleading, or otherwise manipulative narrative in the target population, 
and disseminating that narrative more widely in that population. We call this 
dynamic “network propaganda” to allow us to treat it as a whole, while, as 
network analysis usually does, emphasizing the possibility and necessity of 
zooming in and out from individual nodes and connections to meso- and 
macroscale dynamics in order to understand the propagation characteristics 
and effect of propaganda campaigns, and in particular the role of network 
architecture and information flow dynamics in supporting and accelerating 
propagation, as opposed to resisting or correcting the propagandist efforts as 
they begin to propagate.
Propaganda Feedback  Loop—This is a network dynamic in which media 
outlets, political elites, activists, and publics form and break connections 
based on the contents of statements, and that progressively lowers the costs of 
telling lies that are consistent with a shared political narrative and increases the 
costs of resisting that shared narrative in the name of truth. A network caught 
within such a feedback loop makes it difficult for a media outlet or politician 
to adopt a consistently truth- focused strategy without being expelled from 
the network and losing influence in the relevant segment of the public. We 
dedicate Chapter 3 to describing and documenting the effect.
Propaganda Pipeline and the  Attention Backbone—In earlier work, one 
of us identified a dynamic, “the attention backbone,” whereby peripheral 
nodes in the network garner attention for their agenda and frame, attract 
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interested in the perspective, and through relatively more visible members of 
that subnetwork amplify that agenda or frame progressively upward to ever- 
more publicly influential sites to reach the public at large.53 He argued that 
this dynamic was democratizing in that it circumvented the power of major 
media outlets to set, or sell the power to set, the agenda, and that it allowed 
for more diverse viewpoints than would normally be admissible in the mass- 
mediated public sphere to rise to the public agenda. In our work here, we 
have encountered that same structural dynamic being used to propagate 
disinformation and propaganda from peripheral nodes into the core. While 
the mechanisms are identical, we distinguish its use for propaganda purposes 
(which is determined by the character of the content, not its transmission 




Politically active factual beliefs that are false, contradict the best avail-
able evidence in the public domain, or represent patently implausible 
interpretations of observed evidence.
By “misperception,” we follow D.J. Flynn, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler, 
who define “misperceptions” as “factual beliefs that are false or contradict 
the best available evidence in the public domain.”54 By “politically active,” 
we follow Jennifer Hochschild and Katherine Levine Einstein’s typology, 
and focus on what people think they know that is associated with distinctive 
involvement in the public arena.55 This limitation flows from our concern 
in propaganda with politics. Our observations regarding the practices of 
disinformation in the American public sphere lead us to emphasize that the 
falsehood of a belief cannot be limited to factual misstatement but must 
include patently implausible interpretations of observed evidence. We include 
as “patently implausible” both interpretations containing obvious logical 
errors and, more controversially, bad faith interpretations or framing that 
contradicts well- documented professional consensus. While interpretation 
adds fuzziness to judgments about beliefs, it is impossible to ignore the broad 
range of disinformation tactics we have observed that construct paranoid 
conspiracy interpretations around a core of true facts. Limiting our focus to 
discrete, false statements of fact will cause us to lose sight of more important 





facts. For example, in one of its most widely shared immigration- related 
stories, Breitbart wrote a factually correct set of statements, that Governor 
Jerry Brown of California signed a motor voter law that, if the secretary of 
state fails to check the citizenship of applicants, could allow undocumented 
immigrants to vote. The story was posted with the URL designation: “Jerry 
Brown Signs Bill Allowing Illegal Immigrants to Vote.” This then shaped 
how the headline appeared in Google searches (Figure 1.4) or the Facebook 
newsfeed, so that this was the title as the story appeared in users’ normal flow, 
creating what we consider an example of a false interpretation of a set of true 
facts. While the text of the article included factually correct statements— that 
Jerry Brown signed a law that automatically registered eligible voters when 
they obtained a driver’s license, and that, if the secretary of state of California 
should fail to check the eligibility of registrants such a law could result in 
undocumented immigrants being registered— the gap between the chain of 
unlikely but possible events that would lead to such an outcome and the highly 
salient interpretation embedded in the distribution of the story suggests an 
effort of intentional manipulation that would lead to “misperception” as we 
define it here.
Distraction—Propaganda can often take the form of distracting a population 
into paying no attention to a given subject and thus losing the capacity to 
form politically active beliefs about or attitudes toward it. As Gary King, 
Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts showed in a large empirical study 
of Chinese domestic propaganda that the “50 Cent Army”— the tens or 
hundreds of thousands of people paid by the Chinese government to post 
online to affect online discussion— primarily engages in distraction, rather 
than persuasion or manipulation to achieve particular results. Studying over 
400 million posts by these paid propagandists, King, Pan, and Roberts argue 
that they do not generally engage anyone in debate, or attempt to persuade 
anyone of anything; instead, their primary purpose appears to be to “distract 
and redirect public attention from discussion or events with collective action 
potential.”56
Jerry Brown Signs Bill Allowing Illegal Immigrants to Vote - Breitbart
www.breitbart.com/california/.../gov-jerry-brown-signs-bill-allowing-illegal-aliens-vot...
Oct 12, 2015 - On Saturday, California Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly Bill 1461, the New Motor
Voter Act, which will automatically register people to vote through the DMV, and could result in illegal
aliens voting. Any person who renewed or secured a driver’s license through the DMV may now register
to vote, ...
Figure 1.4 Google search result for Breitbart story on California motor voter law.
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Disorientation—The emphasis on disorientation appears in the literature 
on modern Russian propaganda, both in inward- focused applications and 
in its international propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT (formerly, Russia 
Today). Here, the purpose is not to convince the audience of any particular 
truth but instead to make it impossible for people in the society subject 
to the propagandist’s intervention to tell truth from non- truth. As Peter 
Pomerantsev put it in Nothing Is True and Everything is Possible:
In today’s Russia, by contrast, the idea of truth is irrelevant. On Russian 
“news” broadcasts, the borders between fact and fiction have become 
utterly blurred. Russian current- affairs programs feature apparent 
actors posing as refugees from eastern Ukraine, crying for the cameras 
about invented threats from imagined fascist gangs. [. . .] “The public 
likes how our main TV channels present material, the tone of our 
programs,” [the deputy minister of communications] said. “The share 
of viewers for news programs on Russian TV has doubled over the last 
two months.” The Kremlin tells its stories well, having mastered the 
mixture of authoritarianism and entertainment culture. The notion 
of “journalism,” in the sense of reporting “facts” or “truth,” has been 
wiped out. [. . .] When the Kremlin and its affiliated media outlets 
spat out outlandish stories about the downing of Malaysia Airlines 
Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July— reports that characterized the 
crash as everything from an assault by Ukrainian fighter jets following 
U.S.  instructions, to an attempted NATO attack on Putin’s private 
jet— they were trying not so much to convince viewers of any one 
version of events, but rather to leave them confused, paranoid, and 
passive— living in a Kremlin- controlled virtual reality that can no 
longer be mediated or debated by any appeal to “truth.”57
As we will see, disorientation has been a central strategy of right- wing media 
since the early days of Rush Limbaugh’s emergence as a popular conservative 
radio talk show host and political commentator with millions of listeners. 
Limbaugh’s decades- long diatribes against one or all of what he calls “the 
four corners of Deceit”— government, academia, science, and the media— 
seem designed to disorient his audience and unmoor them from the core 
institutionalized mechanisms for defining truth in modernity. Repeatedly 
throughout our research for this book we have encountered truly fantastical 
stories circulated widely in the right- wing media ecosystem, from Hillary 




lusts, to Hillary Clinton herself participating in pedophilia on “Orgy Island,” 
to John Podesta’s participation in satanic rituals, to the Uranium One story 
in which the special counsel investigating Russian interference in support 
of Donald Trump’s campaign, Robert Mueller, and the deputy attorney 
general who appointed him, Rod Rosenstein, were portrayed as corruptly 
facilitating the Obama administration’s sale of 20 percent of America’s nuclear 
capabilities to Russia. These are all stories reported widely in the core sites 
of the right wing, and polls report that substantial numbers of Republicans 
claim to believe these stories— whether because they actually believe them 
factually or because claiming to believe them is part of what identifies them 
as Republicans.58 But all of these seem so ludicrously implausible that it is 
difficult to imagine that they are in fact intended to make people believe 
them, rather than simply to create a profound disorientation and disconnect 
from any sense that there is anyone who actually “knows the truth.” Left with 
nothing but this anomic disorientation, audiences can no longer tell truth 
from fiction, even if they want to. They are left with nothing but to choose 
statements that are ideologically congenial or mark them as members of 
the tribe. And in a world in which there is no truth, the most entertaining 
conspiracy theory will often win.
Propaganda and its effects, in our usage, always involve intention to com-
municate. A potentially important fact about the internet is that it may also 
create a good bit of error and confusion that are not the result of anyone’s effort 
to shape political belief. We follow other work in defining misinformation.
Misinformation
Communication of false information without intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or otherwise obtain an outcome.
This may occur because in the 24- hour news cycle, journalists and others who 
seek to keep abreast of breaking news make honest mistakes; it may occur 
because the internet allows a much wider range of people to communicate 
broadly, and it covers many people without the resources or training to avoid 
error or correct it quickly. A  major line of concern with the internet and 
social media is precisely that what characterizes our “post- truth” moment is 
misinformation in this sense. A common articulation of this concern is that 
as a society we are experiencing the disorientation that results from inhabiting 
a fast- moving, chaotic process and that the information chaos is an emergent 
property of a ubiquitously connected, always- on society over which we have 
no control.
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Our data lead us to believe that, at least insofar as political communications 
are concerned, this diagnosis is false. The much simpler explanation in the 
political domain is that we are operating in a propaganda- rich environment 
and that network propaganda is a much deeper threat to democracy than 
any out- of- human- control emergent socio- technical process. We recognize 
that misinformation may play a larger role in fields that are not pervasively 
populated by intentional, well- organized, and well- resourced actors. False 
beliefs about health, such as anti- vaccine and anti- fluoridation sentiment, 
may well be more of function of misinformation than propaganda dynamics, 
as Brittney Seymour and her collaborators have shown.59 But political 
communication operates in its own distinct ecosystem and that network 
is pervaded by propaganda. Describing the evidence that leads us to this 
conclusion and documenting the highly asymmetric pattern of susceptibility 
to and diffusion of propaganda and bullshit in the American media ecosystem 
will take up most of the book. As we will see, our conclusions make it difficult 
to identify solutions that are consistent with free speech and respect for 
freewheeling political contestation. We identify some responses, incremental 
and partial though they may be. We do believe that there are discrete 
interventions that can help. But the fundamental challenge is not purely or 
even primarily technological. It is institutional and cultural; which is to say, 
ultimately, political.
Plan of the Book
In the next chapter we describe our macrolevel findings about the architecture 
of the American news media ecosystem from 2015 to 2018. We collected and 
analyzed two million stories published during the 2016 presidential election 
campaign, and another 1.9  million stories about the Trump presidency 
during its first year. We analyze patterns of interlinking between the sites 
to understand the relations of authority and credibility among publishers 
high and low, and the tweeting and Facebook sharing practices of users 
to understand attention patterns to these media. What we find is a highly 
asymmetric media ecosystem, with a tightly integrated, insular right wing, 
while the rest of the media ecosystem comprises not a symmetrically separated 
left and a center but rather a single media ecosystem, spanning the range from 
relatively conservative publications like the Wall Street Journal to liberal or 
left publications like The Nation or Mother Jones, anchored in the traditional 
professional media. This basic pattern has remain unchanged in the year 




already in place at least as early as the 2012 election cycle. Chapter 3 presents 
a model of how such an insular media ecosystem might emerge and how two 
fundamentally different media ecosystems can coexist— one in which false 
narratives that reinforce partisan identity not only flourish but crowd out true 
narratives even when these are presented by leading insiders, and the other in 
which false narratives are tested, confronted, and contained by diverse outlets 
and actors operating in a truth- oriented norms dynamic. We then show how 
parallel but politically divergent false rumors, about Trump raping a 13- year- 
old and Hillary and Bill Clinton being involved in pedophilia, followed 
fundamentally different paths through the media ecosystems into which each 
was introduced. We argue that the difference in how the two highly divergent 
media ecosystems amplified or resisted the false narratives, not in the initial 
availability of falsehoods or the enthusiasm with which audiences wanted 
to hear them, made the Trump rape allegations wither on the vine while the 
Clinton pedophilia rumors thrived.
In Part Two we analyze the main actors in the asymmetric media ecosystem 
and how they used it to affect the formation of beliefs and the propagation 
of disinformation in the American public sphere. Chapter 4 looks at how the 
more radical parts of the right- wing media ecosystem, centered on Breitbart, 
interacted with Donald Trump as a candidate to force immigration to the 
forefront of the substantive agenda in both the Republican primary and the 
general election, and framed immigration primarily in terms of Islamophobia 
and threats to personal security. Chapter 5 turns to Fox News in particular. 
Through a series of case studies surrounding the central controversy of the 
first year of the Trump presidency— the Trump Russia investigation— 
we show how Fox News repeatedly mounted propaganda attacks at major 
transition moments in the controversy— the Michael Flynn firing in March 
2017, when Fox adopted the “deep state” framing of the entire controversy; 
the James Comey firing and the Robert Mueller appointment in May 2017, 
when Fox propagated the Seth Rich murder conspiracy; and in October and 
November 2017, when the arrests of Paul Manafort and guilty plea of Michael 
Flynn seemed to mark a new level of threat to the president, when Fox 
reframed the Uranium One story as an attack on the integrity of the FBI and 
Justice Department officials in charge of the investigation. In each case, the 
attacks persisted over one or more months. In the case of the “deep state,” the 
attack created the basic frame through which the right- wing media ecosystem 
interpreted the entire investigation. In each case the narrative and framing 
elements were repeated across diverse programs, by diverse personalities, 
across Fox News and Fox Business on television and on Fox’s online site.
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Chapter  6 turns its attention to the failure and recovery modes of 
mainstream media. Most Americans do not get their news from the right- 
wing media ecosystem. The 2016 election was heavily influenced by the ways 
in which those parts of the public sphere anchored around mainstream media 
operated. In particular, we show how standard journalistic norms of balance 
and chasing the scoop and the flashy headline create predictable failure modes 
in the presence of a highly asymmetric and propaganda- rich ecosystem. In the 
search for balance, professional media outlets emphasized negative coverage 
and focused heavily on scandals in their coverage of Clinton, particularly 
on emails and the Clinton Foundation. In search of the scoop, traditional 
media could not resist email- based coverage, and repeatedly covered it with 
a mismatch between the actual revelations, which were usually fairly banal, 
and the framing and headlines, which often overstated the significance of the 
findings. We use the case of the Clinton Foundation coverage in particular 
as a detailed case study of how Steve Bannon, Breitbart- CEO turned Trump 
campaign CEO and later White House chief strategist for the first seven 
months of the Trump administration, manipulated first the New York Times, 
and then most of the rest of the mainstream media ecosystem, into lending 
their credibility to his opposition research efforts in ways that were likely 
enormously damaging to Clinton’s standing with the broad electorate. We 
end Chapter 6 with a study of the several news failures that populated the 
president’s Fake News Awards list for 2017 and show that in all these cases the 
media ecosystem dynamic of “the rest,” outside the right wing, functioned to 
introduce corrections early and to reinforce the incentives of all media outlets 
and reporters in that larger part of the ecosystem to commit resources and 
follow procedures that will allow them to get their facts straight.
Part Three looks at the remaining prime suspects in manipulating the 
election or political coverage during the election and the first year of the 
Trump presidency. In Chapter  7 we document a widely reported, but we 
think relatively less important part of the story— the propaganda pipeline. We 
show how statements by marginal actors on Reddit and 4chan were collated 
and prepared for propagation by more visible sites; and we show how this 
technique was used by both alt- right and Russia- related actors to successfully 
get a story from the periphery to Sean Hannity. But we also explain why we 
think that this process depends on actors to which we dedicated Chapters 3, 
4, and 5, and why the propaganda pipeline, while open, was of secondary 
importance.
Chapter 8 addresses Russian propaganda more generally. We describe the 
existing sources of evidence that overwhelmingly support the proposition 
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that Russia mounted sustained and significant information operations in the 
United States. We do not raise doubts as to the fact that the efforts occurred 
and continue. We do, however outline a series of questions about how 
important the Russian interference really was. Repeatedly, when we assess 
the concrete allegations made, we suggest reasons to think that these were 
likely of marginal significance, and mostly jumped on a bandwagon already 
hurtling down whatever path it was taking rather than giving that bandwagon 
the shove that got it going. Understanding not only that Russian propaganda 
efforts happened, but also how effective they were is, we think, critical to 
putting those efforts in context. Critically, if the biggest win for Russian 
information operations is to disorient American political communications, in 
the way we define the term here, then overstating the impact of those efforts 
actually helps consolidate their success. We do not suggest that we should 
understate the effects when we do see them. But it is important not to confuse 
the high degree to which Russian operations are observable with the extent 
to which they actually made a difference to politically active beliefs, attitudes, 
and behaviors on America.
Chapter 9 looks at the three major Facebook- based culprits— fake news 
entrepreneurs, behavioral manipulation by Cambridge Analytica, and plain 
old Facebook microtargeted advertising. We review the work of others, and 
complement it to some extent with our own data, to explain why we are 
skeptical of the importance of clickbait fabricators or Cambridge Analytica. 
The core long- term concern, we suggest, is Facebook’s capacity to run highly 
targeted campaigns, using behavioral science and large- scale experimentation. 
In Chapter  13 we address possible solutions regarding political advertising 
regulation and the adoption, by regulation or voluntary compliance, of a 
public health approach to providing independent research accountability 
to the effects of Facebook and other major platforms on the health of the 
American media ecosystem.
Part Four takes on the claim that “the internet polarizes” or that social 
media creates “filter bubbles” as the primary causal mechanism for polarization 
online, as compared to the claim that the highly asymmetric media ecosystem 
we observe is a function of long- term institutional and political dynamics. 
Chapter  10 engages with the political science literature on polarization and 
shows that polarization long precedes the internet and results primarily from 
asymmetric political- elite- driven dynamics. We believe that that elite process, 
however, is influenced by the propaganda feedback loop we describe in 
Chapter 3. We lay out that argument in Chapter 11, when we turn to media 
history and describe the rise of second- wave right- wing media. We take a 
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political economy approach that explains how institutions, politics, culture, 
and technology combine to explain why Rush Limbaugh, televangelism, 
and Fox News were able to emerge as mass media when they did, rather than 
remaining, as first- generation right- wing media after World War II had, small 
niche players. We then describe how the emergence of the online right- wing 
media ecosystem simply followed the offline media ecosystem architecture 
and, indeed, was left little choice by the propaganda feedback loop but to 
follow the path that it took. We see that asymmetric polarization precedes the 
emergence of the internet, and that even today the internet is highly unlikely to 
be the main cause of polarization, by comparison to Fox News and talk radio. 
In Chapter 12 we turn to consider what these insights imply for how we think 
about the internet; whether it can, or cannot, contribute to democratization, 
and under what conditions. Chapter  13 offers solutions. Unfortunately, 
the complex, long- term causes we outline do not lend themselves to small 
technocratic solutions. But we do emphasize adaptations that traditional 
media can undertake, in particular shifting the performance of objectivity 
from demonstrating neutrality to institutionalized accountability in truth 
seeking, as well as reforms in rules surrounding political advertising and 
data collection and use in behavioral advertising. We consider these all to be 
meaningful incremental steps to at least contain the extension of the unhealthy 
propaganda dynamics we observe to deeper and more invidious forms, but we 
acknowledge that given the decades- long effects of the propaganda feedback 
loop on the architecture of right- wing media in America, the solution is only 
likely to come with sustained political change.
In the final chapter, we underscore two core conclusions. First, if we 
are to understand how technology impacts society in general, and politics 
and democratic communications in particular, we must not be caught up in 
the particular, novel, technical disruption. Instead, we have to expand our 
viewpoint across time and systems, and understand the long term structural 
interactions between technology, institutions, and culture. Through this 
broader and longer- term lens, the present epistemic crisis is not made of 
technology; it cannot be placed at the feet of the internet, social media, or 
artificial intelligence. It is a phenomenon rooted in the radicalization of the 
right wing of American politics and a thirty- year process of media markets 
rewarding right- wing propagandists. We suspect that a similarly broad and 
long- term lens will be required to properly understand the rise of far- right 
parties and their information ecosystems elsewhere. At least in the United 




Second, much of contemporary discussion of the causes of crisis confound 
what is novel and observable with what actually has impact. It is hard to 
find bots; and when researchers find them, they are new and interesting. 
But repeatedly in our work they operate as background noise, and do not 
change the structure of the conversation. It is hard to spot Russians; and 
when Russia- hunters find them, they are sinister and newly menacing. But 
our work suggests that, while they were there, and much of what they did 
is likely illegal, they were mostly jumping on bandwagons already hurtling 
full- tilt downhill and cheering on a process entirely made in America. It is 
challenging to measure, and titillating to imagine, young nihilists generating 
fake news for American consumption and overwhelming traditional media. 
But when we measure the actual impact, it does not seem to be significant. 
So too with psychographically- informed behavioral marketing Cambridge 
Analytica- style.
It is not complacency that we seek to communicate, but the necessity of 
evidence- based diagnosis. If the evidence is too narrowly focused, or lacks the 
context to interpret the observations correctly, it will lead us to misdiagnose 
the problem and to develop solutions for emotionally salient but functionally 
marginal contributing causes of information disorder. These will, in turn, 
divert our attention and efforts to the wrong solutions, for the wrong reasons, 
at the wrong time. In the present crisis of the project of democracy, that is a 
misdiagnosis that we cannot afford.
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The Architecture of Our Discontent
Tens of thousands of entities form the complex ecosystem of 
American political media. Americans receive their political information 
from this diverse set of sources, which aim at a mix of broad and niche 
audiences. Although a growing proportion of the U.S.  population uses 
Facebook and other social media as primary sources of news, a large portion, 
particularly those over 50 but even many who are younger, still rely on 
broadcast television and cable news.1 Talk radio remains an important source 
of information and ideology for many Americans. Although the number of 
people who read newspapers and news magazines is shrinking, it remains 
significant, and political news is also brought to our attention by many other 
means, including face- to- face conversations in offline social networks, email, 
campaign advertising, social media, and family dinners.
To understand media and politics, we must understand the entire 
ecosystem:  the outlets and influencers who form networks, the structure 
of networks, and the flow of information in networks. The increasing role 
of online platforms in shaping the media agenda is a challenge for political 
communications scholars and media observers. Researchers no longer have 
the convenience of simply looking at major news channels and newspapers to 
monitor the media agenda. And, conversely, a social- media- oriented strategy 
that only looks at Twitter or Facebook will miss much of what matters. We 
have to try to understand the interplay of broadcast news and newspapers 
with digital news outlets and blogs; of pundits, politicians, and personalities 
with large followings on social media, as well as the more distributed processes 
that occur in digital media. Some patterns of information flow emerge 
from organic, decentralized processes, and some are caused by intentional 
manipulation and marketing by centralized actors— most prominently 
political campaigns and state propaganda.
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In this chapter, we provide an overview of the architecture of political 
communication in America from the spring of 2015, when the 2016 presidential 
campaign kicked off, until the one- year anniversary of Donald Trump’s 
presidency. We look separately at the structure of communication during 
the 2016 presidential election and the post- election period and document 
how that structure remained largely but not entirely stable during Trump’s 
first year in office. In later chapters we complement this broad structural 
view with case studies that incorporate television and offer broader media 
coverage and more granular analysis. Here, we provide two types of maps for 
each period: an open web map, which describes the hyperlinking practices of 
online media producers on the web, and social media maps, which describe 
the content sharing practices of Twitter and Facebook users over the same 
period. These maps and the resulting analysis were developed using the Media 
Cloud platform and are based on the linking, tweeting, and sharing of just 
under four million political stories from over 40,000 online news sources. 
Media Cloud is an open platform for the analysis of online media that 
provides free access, through code, web tools, and data, to over 800 million 
stories from about 60,000 regularly crawled sources.2
Asymmetric Polarization  
in the 2016 Presidential Election
We present our data first as a series of network maps that describe news 
media sources and their relations to each other by different measures. We 
provide the more technical explanation of the methods, the data used to 
make these maps, and high- resolution images of each map in the online 
appendix.
The nodes, or circles, in each map, represent news sources. The size of each 
node represents its relative prominence by one of three measures. In the open 
web map, the node size represents the number of media sources that link to 
a site in the period the map describes. We think of these open- web links as 
expressions of judgment by online media producers about which sources are 
more influential as sources to cite. In the Twitter map, the size of the nodes 
represents the total number of tweets that shared stories from that site. In the 
Facebook map, the size of the nodes represents the total number of Facebook 
shares of stories on the site. As a rule of thumb, the sizes on the open web map 
are mostly determined by thousands of web publishers, those on the Twitter 
map are determined by millions of tweeters, and those on the Facebook map 
are determined by tens of millions of Facebook users.
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The edges, or links between the nodes, are what give the network its 
architecture. They represent the relationships among the nodes. In the open 
web map, the architecture is defined by the hyperlinks between media sources. 
For any pair of media sources, the higher the number of stories on either site 
that link to the other site, the closer they are drawn together by the model. 
The structure of the Twitter maps is determined by the media source sharing 
patterns of Twitter users. In these, we create a link between two sites each 
time a single Twitter handle shares a story from each of those two sites on 
the same day. The intuitive interpretation is that if someone shares something 
from Breitbart and from the Daily Caller, that is an indication that Breitbart 
and the Daily Caller draw a common set of readers. The greater the number 
of accounts that tweet out links to the two sites, the closer the sites are on 
the map. Again, it is hardly surprising that more people who tweet out a 
Breitbart story will also tweet out a story on the Daily Caller or Fox News 
on the same day or that more people who tweet out a New York Times story 
will tweet a Washington Post story on the same day. Critically, the Twitter- 
derived networks give us the architecture of attention by politically engaged 
social media users, while the open web maps are based on the decisions of 
media producers. This provides us with two very different and important 
perspectives.
We also produce a second version of the Twitter- based network maps to 
highlight popularity on Facebook. The architecture of these maps is based on 
the same patterns of Twitter users in sharing links, but the nodes are sized by 
the number of shares on Facebook. We use the Twitter sharing architecture 
for the Facebook maps because the data Facebook made available at the time 
of this research to public researchers only provided total share numbers and 
not the network structure of those shares.
The similarity of the architecture of the open web maps compared to the 
Twitter maps strongly supports the robustness of our observations about that 
architecture. Particularly in evaluating the changes in 2017, the open web 
map offers us a measure of change that is insulated from the decisions of the 
social media companies. In this regard it offers us a baseline against which 
to evaluate changes in Facebook or Twitter prominence and the extent to 
which any changes reflect a change in algorithm or a change more generally 
in attention to that site.
The colors of the nodes reflect the partisanship of attention given to the 
media sources on Twitter. The partisanship is expressed in quintiles: red for 
the right, pink for the center- right, green for the center, light blue for the 
center- left, and dark blue for the left. The scores used to color the nodes 
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reflect the share of that site’s stories tweeted by users who also retweeted 
either Hillary Clinton or Trump during the election. These colors therefore 
reflect the attention patterns of audiences, not analysis of content of the sites, 
and are entirely based on user behavior rather than researcher judgment. Dark 
blue sites draw attention in ratios of at least 4:1 from Clinton supporters; 
red sites 4:1 from Trump supporters. Green sites were retweeted more or less 
equally by supporters of each candidate. Light- blue sites draw 3:2 Clinton 
supporters, and pink draw 3:2 Trump supporters.
The Open Web: 2016 Election
This aggregate view of the open web link economy during the 2016 election 
period (Figure 2.1) shows a marked difference between the right and everything 
that is not the right. There is a clear overlap and interaction between the left, 
center- left, and center media outlets. These are all centered on the cluster of 
professional, mainstream journalism sites: the Washington Post, the New York 
Figure 2.1 Network map of election media sources based on media inlinks.
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Times, CNN, and Politico form a basin of attraction for outlets ranging from 
the editorially conservative Wall Street Journal, ABC News, Business Week, 
or USA Today, through the liberally oriented MSNBC. Zooming in (Figure 
2.2), we see that the right side of the spectrum, by contrast, has Breitbart and 
Fox News as its basin of attraction, has almost no overlap with the center, and 
is sharply separated from the rest of the map. The other leading sites on the 
right include the New York Post, the Washington Times, the Daily Caller, the 
Daily Mail, and the Washington Examiner. There is almost no center- right, 
and what there is, anchored around the National Review, is distinct from the 
set of sites anchored by Fox and Breitbart on the right. The Huffington Post, 
the Guardian, and MSNBC receive the largest number of media inlinks on 
the left, joined by Mother Jones, Slate, Vox, and Salon.
The centrality of the Washington Post, the New York Times, CNN, Politico, 
and The Hill is determined not only by the large number of media inlinks they 
receive but also by the fact that they receive inlinks from across the network. 
The Washington Post, for example, is referenced by 5,100 unique media sources. 
The prominence of these large media sources can be explained in part by the 
reputation and authoritative voice of these long- standing institutions. But 
Figure 2.2 A closer look at the center of the open web media network map (Figure 2.1).
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the sheer volume of stories produced by each outlet is another factor in these 
patterns. The Washington Post produced more than 50,000 stories over the 
18- month election period, while the New York Times, CNN, and Huffington 
Post each published more than 30,000 stories.
The open web map— a reflection of which sources media producers 
deem worthy of citation— offers insights into the views of this elite 
cohort. As Table 2.1 suggests, this media- centric view attributes most of 
its attention and authority to professional media outlets, several with quite 
long institutional histories— legacy media, if you will. The roster of sites 
Table 2.1 Top 50 media sources by media inlinks.
Media Source Media Inlinks Media Source Media Inlinks
Washington Post 5100 HillaryClinton.com 1561
New York Times 5026 NPR 1539
CNN 4131 Los Angeles Times 1536
Politico 3866 PolitiFact 1489
YouTube 3846 BuzzFeed 1476
Huffington Post 2963 Yahoo! News 1462
The Hill 2605 National Review 1445
Wikipedia 2437 Slate 1410
Real Clear Politics 2381 New York Post 1407
Guardian 2206 Washington Times 1396
Wall Street Journal 2128 Daily Caller 1390
Facebook 2085 New York Daily News 1354
Business Week 2018 Daily Mail 1352
Breitbart 1990 Business Insider 1348
ABC News 1981 Salon 1340
Fox News 1967 BernieSanders.com 1296
MSNBC 1925 Washington Examiner 1295
USA Today 1921 Mother Jones 1259
NBC News 1897 New Yorker 1210
DonaldJTrump.com 1858 FiveThirtyEight 1177
CBS News 1829 New York Magazine 1173
Vox 1702 Amazon 1096
The Atlantic 1680 Talking Points Memo 1052
Daily Beast 1666 BBC 1043
Reuters 1605 Forbes 1037
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that receive many inlinks on the open web includes some newcomers, 
certainly, but does not mark an epistemic crisis. Both versions of the social 
media maps, from Twitter and Facebook, replicate some of this attention 
pattern but exhibit more asymmetry between the right and the rest of the 
media landscape. And the largest nodes in the Twitter and Facebook maps 
include substantially more sites that are both relatively newer and do not 
claim to follow professional journalistic norms. As we will see later, this 
difference sharpens further when we break the attention down by partisan 
quintile, rather than taking a broad view of the top sites across the entire 
spectrum.
Twitter in the 2016 Election Period
The Twitter- based media network map displays many parallels with the open 
web network map (Figure 2.3). The separation of the right- wing media sphere 
and the central role played by Breitbart during the election period are even 
Figure 2.3 Network map based on Twitter media sharing, May 1, 2015– November 7, 
2016. Nodes sized by number of Twitter shares.
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more clearly visible. On Twitter, the left appears to be less integrated with the 
center- left, suggesting greater polarization on social media than on the open 
web both on the left and the right. The New York Times, CNN, Washington 
Post, and Politico remain as important nodes in the center- left along with The 
Hill in the center. The Huffington Post is still the most important media source 
on the left. On the right, Breitbart overshadows Fox News as the central node 
of conservative discourse on Twitter, but both rise in the overall hierarchy of 
sites across the ideological divide, Breitbart to fourth place and Fox to eighth 
(Table 2.2). Moreover, younger, more net- native, more frankly partisan sites 
gain significantly in prominence. On the left, Daily Kos, Politicus USA, Raw 
Story, and Salon gain visibility relative to their place in the link economy. On 
the right, the New York Post and Washington Times lose ground, surpassed by 
the Daily Caller and a newfound prominence for the Gateway Pundit and the 
Right Scoop.
Because of the influence of bots and coordinated propaganda efforts on 
Twitter, we tested to see whether the results would change meaningfully if we 
were to remove all the Twitter handles that would fall under the definition of 
“bot” according to a slightly revised version of one of the most widely used 
bot- detection approaches.3 We also generated the maps by using the simple 
Table 2.2 Media sources most frequently shared on Twitter.
1 CNN 16 Raw Story
2 The Hill 17 Salon
3 New York Times 18 Gateway Pundit
4 Breitbart 19 MSNBC
5 Washington Post 20 NBC News
6 Huffington Post 21 Wall Street Journal
7 Politico 22 USA Today
8 Fox News 23 Mother Jones
9 Politicus USA 24 Business Week
10 Washington Examiner 25 BuzzFeed
11 Guardian 26 Think Progress
12 Mashable 27 Daily Beast
13 Daily Kos 28 Reuters
14 Daily Caller 29 Vox
15 Yahoo! News 30 ABC News
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rule of removing any bot that tweeted more than 200 times per day. Neither 
of these bot- filtering methods changed any of our results meaningfully. For 
reasons we will explain in Chapter 7, we are not confident that this approach 
fully accounts for all bots or in fact finds only bots we should care about, so 
we leave all the accounts in the next few figures. We are not claiming that 
intentional, automated, or human manipulation was unimportant in the 
campaign. We are observing that removing suspected bot handles does not 
meaningfully change the overall architecture of the media ecosystem.
Facebook in the 2016 Election Period
Using Facebook shares instead of Twitter shares to size the nodes (but still using 
tweets for the architecture of the network), there is an evident sharpening of 
the partisan divide (Figure 2.4). The principal nodes that anchor the center 
and center- left remain unchanged. The most remarkable feature of this map 
is the overwhelming prominence of Breitbart. Our data certainly support 
Figure 2.4 Network map of media sources shared on Twitter. Nodes sized by number 
of Facebook shares.
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Steve Bannon’s claim that “Facebook is what propelled Breitbart to a massive 
audience.”4 More generally, the roster of top sites on Facebook retains some 
overlap with Twitter, while diverging even further from the popular sites on 
the open web (Table 2.3). On the left, many of the mainstays of liberal media 
are popular on Facebook, including the Huffington Post, Vox, Slate, Salon, 
Daily Kos, and Mother Jones. Politicus USA is still important and is joined 
by a set of newer highly partisan sites further left on the spectrum: Occupy 
Democrats, Addicting Info, Daily Newsbin, and Bipartisan Report. The most 
popular sites on Facebook from the right also include a number of more 
recent highly partisan entrants:  Conservative Tribune, Truthfeed, Western 
Journalism, and the Political Insider.
Asymmetric Patterns of Authority and Attention
The maps offer one way of looking at the asymmetric architecture of the 
media ecosystem. The asymmetry becomes clearer with simple bar graphs that 
depict different measures of attention at different points of political spectrum. 
Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show the top 250 sites during the 2016 presidential 
election by three measures:  media inlinks, Twitter shares, and Facebook 
Table 2.3 Media sources most frequently shared on Facebook.
1 New York Times 16 Daily Kos
2 CNN 17 Daily Caller
3 Breitbart 18 Truthfeed
4 Huffington Post 19 Guardian
5 The Hill 20 ABC News
6 Washington Post 21 New Yorker
7 Politicus USA 22 Occupy Democrats
8 MSNBC 23 Addicting Info
9 NBC News 24 Bipartisan Report
10 Vox 25 Slate
11 Conservative Tribune 26 Western Journalism Center
12 Gateway Pundit 27 Daily Newsbin
13 Raw Story 28 Political Insider
14 Fox News 29 Salon
15 US Uncut 30 Mother Jones
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shares. In broad outline, these graphs make clearer that attention, whether 
by Twitter, Facebook, or the more authoritative cross- media links, follows 
an asymmetric bimodal distribution, meaning that there are two peaks, and 
the left peak is closer to the center than the right peak. Starting at the center 
right and moving left we see a more or less normal distribution. Attention and 
authority both peak at the major professional journalism outlets that make up 
the center- left category and drop off as one moves left or right from that peak. 
By contrast, starting at the center- right and moving right, the distribution 
























































































































Figure 2.6 Partisan distribution of top 250 media sites by Twitter shares, 2015– 2016.
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gets. This is a fundamentally different structure of attention. People on the 
left do not emphasize media that draw only left attention, but frequently 
instead read, share, and quote the mainstream media, the New York Times, 
Washington Post, or CNN. These sites also account for substantial attention 
from people who otherwise read or write publications from the center, and 
even center- right.
By contrast, media producers and social media users on the right read, 
share, and quote almost only right- oriented media, and even among sites in 
the right quintile, the further right a site is the more attention it gets. The 
particular prominence of the right- most column in Figure 2.7 reflects the 
overwhelming prominence of Breitbart, as also reflected in the network maps. 
The general pattern is consistent across all three measures, although media 
sources frequently shared on Twitter and Facebook are weighted more toward 
the extremes, on right and left. This pattern is more pronounced on Facebook 
than on Twitter. On Twitter, the center- right is the least represented. On 
Facebook, both the center and center- right garnered relatively little attention. 
This pattern suggests that social media sharing in general is more partisan than 
hyperlinking, and sharing on Facebook is more partisan than on Twitter. This 
finding agrees with prior studies that indicate that more politically engaged 
citizens are also more partisan, as those sharing political content on Twitter 
and Facebook are likely those who are politically engaged.5 Nonetheless, 
the overall structure, and in particular the clear difference in distribution of 































































Figure 2.7 Partisan distribution of top 250 media sites by Facebook shares, 2015– 2016.
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Breitbart, Fox News, and Influence in Conservative Media
The 2016 elections showed an unusual pattern of support for Trump as a 
candidate. Some right- leaning outlets, most notably Breitbart, launched 
attacks targeted not only at Democrats and Trump’s Republican rivals but 
also at media outlets that did not fully support Trump’s candidacy. A review 
of the stories most widely shared during the primary season shows that Jeb 
Bush, Marco Rubio, and Fox News were major targets of attack from Breitbart 
and related sites. The anti- elitist and anti- establishment narrative adopted by 
Trump and Breitbart led toward attacks on traditional institutions on both 
sides of the political spectrum.
Competition among the Republican contenders during the primaries had 
a strong impact on the shape of conservative media. Breitbart rose to serve as 
a focal point for Trump supporters and media organizations on the far right. 
This was arguably the largest change in the conservative media sphere, and 
the increasing role that Breitbart played during the election is clearly visible 
in our data. One important aspect that is less apparent in the network maps 
is how Breitbart served as a translator and bridge that helped to legitimate 
and popularize extreme views on topics such as immigration and anti- Muslim 
sentiments.
Breitbart and Fox News were the two principal poles of conservative 
media depicted in the link economy maps. This structure remained stable 
over the duration of the election. Changes over time are more evident in the 
Twitter- based maps. Recall that the position of media sources on these maps 
is shaped by the proclivity for Twitter users to share media sources. The most 
engaged partisans on Twitter effectively voted on which media sources were 
complementary, as reflected in the maps by their proximity.
In October 2015, with a broad set of candidates running for the GOP 
nomination, Fox News and Breitbart occupied similar areas of the map, 
with Fox News closer to the center and Breitbart further to the right 
(Figure 2.8).
By February 2016, Breitbart had grown more prominent while Fox had 
declined. In Figure 2.9, Fox News appears as a smaller node quite distant from 
the Breitbart- centered right. This shift reflects the fact that Fox News then 
received less Twitter attention than it did earlier or later in the campaign, 
and less attention in particular from users who also paid attention to the 
core Breitbart- centered sites. The March map is similar, and only over April 




Figure 2.8 Network map based on Twitter media sharing, October 2015.
Figure 2.9 Network map based on Twitter media sharing, February 2016.
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This sidelining of Fox News in early 2016 coincided with sustained 
attacks against the network by Breitbart. The top 20 stories in the right- 
wing media ecology during January included, for example, “Trump 
Campaign Manager Reveals Fox News Debate Chief Has Daughter 
Working for Rubio.” Many of the strongest attacks on Fox were linked to 
immigration, which, as we document in Chapter 4, was the central agenda 
of Trump’s 2016 candidacy. The five most widely shared stories in which 
Breitbart referred to Fox were stories intended to brand Fox News as weak 
on immigration and unseat it as the central arbiter of conservative news. 
The narrative tied together Breitbart’s stance on immigration with its 
successful framing of immigration as centrally concerned with Muslims, 
terrorism, and elite corruption:
The Anti- Trump Network: Fox News Money Flows into Open Borders 
Group
NY Times Bombshell Scoop: Fox News Colluded with Rubio to Give 
Amnesty to Illegal Aliens
Google and Fox TV Invite Anti- Trump, Hitler- Citing, Muslim 
Advocate to Join Next GOP TV- Debate
Fox, Google Pick 1994 Illegal Immigrant To Ask Question In Iowa 
GOP Debate
Fox News At Facebook Meeting Is Misdirection:  Murdoch and 
Zuckerberg Are Deeply Connected Over Immigration
The repeated theme of conspiracy, corruption, and media betrayal is palpable 
in these highly shared Breitbart headlines linking Fox News, Rubio, and 
illegal immigration.
These sustained attacks likely contributed to the apparent decline in the 
standing of Fox News among the most conservative voters. As Breitbart 
trumpeted at the time,6 a survey reported that in February 2016 the perception 
of Fox News among conservative audiences was at its lowest point in more 
than three years.7
Our maps show that, as the primaries ended, attention to Fox recovered 
and Fox became more closely integrated with Breitbart and the remainder 
of the right- wing media sphere (Figure 2.10). As right- wing media closed 
ranks behind their chosen candidate, tensions within the right wing were 
reduced, and attacks from right- wing media uniformly targeted traditional 
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mainstream media. While the prominence of individual media sources in the 
right- wing sphere varies when assessed by shares on Facebook and Twitter, 
the content and core structure, with Breitbart at the center, is stable across 
platforms. Even in the highly charged pre- election months, everyone outside 
the Breitbart- centered universe formed a tightly interconnected attention 
network, with major traditional mass- media and professional sources at 
the core. The right, by contrast, formed its own insular sphere centered on 
Breitbart.
Post- Election Asymmetry: Fox News Rises on the 
Right, the Left Tunes in to the Mainstream
The overall architecture of the American political media ecosystem remained 
as asymmetric in 2017 as it was in the preceding two years. In fact, each segment 
of the media ecosystem became a clearer version of itself. Outside the right- 
wing ecosystem, we did not see a leftward polarization but its opposite— an 
increase in the authority of, and attention paid to, the traditional professional 
media that occupy the center and center- left, at the expense of the left. On the 
right, the most important shift was that Fox News reasserted its authority as 
Figure 2.10 Network map based on Twitter media sharing, September 2016.
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the central node of the online right- wing media ecosystem. This revival came 
at the expense of Breitbart, which declined to second place online (leaving 
aside Fox dominance of conservative television throughout the election and 
post- election periods). However, Fox News’s resurgence did not increase 
connections between the right and the rest of the network. During the 
election, Fox online received 40 percent of its inlinks from the right quintile. 
In the year after the election, Fox received 51 percent of its links from the right 
quintile. This shift reflected a decline in linking to Fox across- the- board, not 
only from the left. Indeed, links from the center- right and the center to Fox 
declined proportionately more than did links from the center- left and left.8
The network map shown in Figure 2.11 is based on 1.6 million open web 
stories related to Trump from the day after the election until mid- September 
2017. When compared to the pre- election data (Figure 2.1), the post- election 
network shows a less prominent right- wing media presence.
Figure 2.12 zooms in to underscore the heightened role of Fox within the 
right- wing and the general decline in the total number of links to the right, 
while the center and center- left grew.
Figure  2.11 Network map based on media inlinks, coverage of Donald Trump, 
November 8, 2016– September 14, 2017.
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Figure 2.13 compares inlinks in the 18  months prior to the election, 
colored by their quintile, to inlinks from Election Day to September of 
2017, represented next to them and colored grey for contrast. Links provide 
a particularly valuable baseline because they are not affected by any of the 
platform companies’ algorithm changes. Facebook, Twitter, or Google may 
have a modest impact on the media diet of media producers, but cross- media 
links are deliberate choices of journalists and other online media producers, 
and are therefore less influenced by the vagaries of platform policies and 
algorithms. On the left, we see the three most- leftward columns decline in 
their share of inlinks. The most centrist media sources on the left and those 
in the center- left gained in inlink shares. These segments, as you recall, are 
populated primarily by professional journalism outlets. Even within the left, 
publishers linked more to NPR than to MSNBC or Talking Points Memo. 
We also see a distinct increase in links to the center in three of its four columns, 
with the major movers there reflecting an increase in the relative prominence 
Figure  2.12 Core of the network map based on media inlinks, coverage of Donald 
Trump, November 8, 2016– September 14, 2017.
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of The Hill and Reuters, and a decrease for ABC News and the Wall Street 
Journal. On the right, the biggest change is the dramatic decline in Breitbart’s 
relative weight— and remember, this graph reflects not social- media attention 
but linking, and therefore is not a function of any social media algorithmic 
changes. This shift represents the structure of authority on the right, primarily 
a reassertion of authority by Fox News online.
Table 2.4 shows the share each quintile received of the total inlinks during 













































Inlinks 2016 Inlinks 2017
Figure  2.13 Partisan distribution of top 250 media sites by inlinks— comparison of 
pre- election and post- election.
Table 2.4 Cross- media inlinks to each quintile.
Total inlinks to quintile,  
in thousands
Share of total
2016 2017 2016 2017
Left 204.9 145.2 0.20 0.18
Center- left 440.8 369.7 0.43 0.46
Center 186.1 170.2 0.18 0.21
Center- right 44.2 26.2 0.04 0.03
Right 138.6 100.6 0.14 0.12
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65 percent of all links went to the center, center- left, and center- right, while 
the left got 20 percent of the links and the right 14 percent. In 2017, the shares 
of the left and right both declined as a proportion of overall authority, and 
the share of the three center quintiles rose to 70 percent. The asymmetry is a 
Table 2.5b Proportion of all inlinks to top 50 sites on the left, by site.
Total inlinks, in thousands Proportion of total inlinks 
to left quintile
2016 2017 2016 2017
Huffington Post 25.0 16.3 0.12 0.11
MSNBC 16.9 4.3 0.08 0.03
PolitiFact 11.4 5.5 0.06 0.04
NPR 10.4 14.8 0.05 0.10
Vox 10.2 11.2 0.05 0.08
Daily Beast 9.6 7.4 0.05 0.05
Slate 8.2 6.9 0.04 0.05
Talking Points Memo 7.1 4.2 0.04 0.03
HillaryClinton.com 7.1 0.1 0.04 0.00
Salon 6.8 4.5 0.03 0.03
Table 2.5a Proportion of all inlinks to top 50 sites on the right, by site.
Total inlinks, in thousands Proportion of total inlinks 
to right quintile
2016 2017 2016 2017
Breitbart 16.6 11.8 0.12 0.12
Fox News 14.4 16.5 0.10 0.16
Daily Caller 10.2 8.3 0.07 0.08
Washington Examiner 9.1 7.6 0.06 0.08
NY Post 7.6 6.5 0.05 0.06
DonaldJTrump.com 7.5 2.9 0.05 0.03
Washington Times 7.0 5.2 0.05 0.05
Daily Mail 6.1 4.6 0.04 0.05
WikiLeaks 4.7 0.2 0.03 0.00
Free Beacon 4.3 2.7 0.03 0.03
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function of the fact that the center right is largely absent in both years, and 
this does not change meaningfully in 2017.
Tables 2.5a and 2.5b dig deeper into the most influential media on the left 
and the right. As a proportion of all links that went to the top 50 media outlets 
on the left and right, the big positive mover on the right was Fox News, and to 
a lesser extent the Washington Examiner, while on the left we saw a significant 
decline for MSNBC and a substantial increase for NPR and Vox.
Social Media During the First Year of the Trump Presidency
As we saw in the comparison of cross- media links and social media activity 
prior to the election, the sharing patterns of politically engaged users on 
Twitter and Facebook offer a view of media activity that is more partisan and 
more centered around nontraditional news media.
Figure 2.14, based on Twitter sharing patterns, shows the now- familiar 
highly segregated network structure. The right stands clearly apart from the 
center, center- left, and left. Unlike the pre- election period, Fox garners the 
most attention on the right. Figure 2.15, which compares the distribution of 
Figure 2.14 Network map based on Twitter media sharing, January 22, 2017– January 
21, 2018. Nodes sized by number of Twitter shares.
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attention across the partisan spectrum in the pre- election and post- election 
periods, shows a remarkable level of consistency across the two time periods. 
There are some notable changes. Here we see a small increase in the farthest left 
column, decreased in the next two columns on the left, and then an increase in 
the most centrist of the left columns. Three of the center- left segments gained 
in shares along with the segment in the center occupied by The Hill. On the 
center- right and right we see a broad decline except for the two right- most 
columns, where Fox News’s rise reflects in an increase in the second- from- 
right segment, and the decline of Breitbart and the increase in the Twitter 
shares of Truthfeed, Zero Hedge, and the Gateway Pundit balance out.
Fox News surpassed Breitbart in both inlinks and Twitter shares. 
Breitbart continues to have more Facebook shares, but its lead shrinks from 
400 percent to only 30 percent, due to both a collapse in Breitbart’s numbers 
and a substantial increase in Fox’s numbers (Table 2.6).
Figure 2.16 shows that the big gains in Facebook share are in the center 
left and center professional media segments, not on the further left. There is 
steep decline in the far right. As we will show, this is partially a drop in shares 
to Breitbart but also a decline for other media sources on the far right. The 
second to the right column, led by Fox, gains slightly.
Directing attention to particular media sources yields clear insights about 


















































Twitter 2016 Twitter 2017
Figure 2.15 Partisan distribution of top 250 media sites by Twitter shares— comparison 
of pre- election and post- election.
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Figures 2.17 and 2.18 represent the top sites and their relative changes on 
Facebook and Twitter comparing the pre- election and post- election periods. 
The New York Times, Washington Post, Fox News, and The Hill all increased 
their share of social attention in 2017 on both Twitter and Facebook. CNN, 
the Huffington Post, and Breitbart, although still very prominent, declined 
on both platforms. The shift in media coverage after the election is part of 
the story as post- election media coverage focused more on reporting and 
investigative journalism and less on campaign horserace coverage. The trend 
we see among the most popular media outlets is consistent with a shift in 
attention to larger established media outlets. Two liberal U.K.- based media 
outlets, the Guardian and the Independent, broke into the top 10 in 2017 by 
Table 2.6 Breitbart and Fox comparison of pre- election  









Pre- election Breitbart 1,990 16,649 38,467 83,529
Fox 1,967 14,420 19,532 19,862
Post- election Breitbart 1,475 11,821 13,579 31,208














































Facebook 2016 Facebook 2017
Figure  2.16 Partisan distribution of top 250 media sites by Facebook shares— 































Figure  2.17 Proportion of total shares for media sources most shared on Twitter— 































Proportion of shares 2016
Figure 2.18 Proportion of total shares for media sources most shared on Facebook— 
comparison of 2016 and 2017.
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Facebook shares. The rising prominence of Fox News is clear, accompanied by 
the declining influence of Breitbart on the right.
Occupy Democrats is the only far- left site that gained prominence 
on Facebook in 2017. These gains occurred before June. Thereafter the site 
rapidly declined and effectively shifted to new domains: washingtonjournal.
com, first, and then washintonpress.com; neither had as much influence as 
the site had earlier.9 Palmer Report and Raw Story, other left- wing sites, saw 
more attention on Twitter in 2017, as seen in Figure 2.19, which shows the 
movement among second- tier media sources on Twitter. Figure 2.20 shows 
the corresponding changes for second- tier sites on Facebook. The other sites 
from the left that increased in 2017 on Facebook include the Atlantic, the 
New Yorker, and Slate. On Twitter, the winners on the left include MSNBC, 
Vox, and Mother Jones.
Hyperpartisan and conspiracy- minded sites on both ends of the political 
































































Figure  2.19 Proportion of total shares for second- tier media sources on Twitter— 
comparison of 2016 and 2017.
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the Facebook newsfeed algorithm. On the left, the losers include Bipartisan 
Report, Addicting Info, and Palmer Report (when compared to the prior 
incarnation of Bill Palmer’s site, Daily News Bin). On the right, the slate of 
hyperpartisan sites declined dramatically, including Conservative Tribune, 
Western Journalism, Young Cons, Ending the Fed, and Red State Watcher, 
along with the more popular Daily Caller, Truthfeed, and Gateway Pundit.
On Twitter, there were also far more losers than winners. Overall, the 
focus of attention shifted toward the top sites and away from second- tier sites. 
Reuters and the Guardian performed better on Twitter in 2017. Looking at 
Twitter shares on the right, Truthfeed and the Gateway Pundit are outliers, 
gaining substantially in their share of attention. Infowars also made moderate 
gains on Twitter, as did the Daily Caller.
Changes on both the left and the right were mixed. As we saw when looking 
in the aggregate, sites on the left as a whole lost prominence on social media, 
while sites on the center- left and professional news sites like NPR increased. 
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Figure 2.20 Proportion of total shares for second- tier media sources on Facebook— 
comparison of 2016 and 2017.
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from joining the Huffington Post as the three most tweeted sources in the 
left media set. Similarly, results on the right were mixed. On the one hand, 
Breitbart was replaced by Fox News as the leading site, which suggests some 
moderation of the style and extremity of views sought by viewers and readers. 
On the other hand, other winners on the right in 2017 on Twitter included 
Gateway Pundit, Infowars, and Truthfeed, sites that make Breitbart seem 
moderate. This shift might be more consistent with a different interpretation 
of the rise of Fox: that the network became a more extreme version of itself in 
2017. We examine that question in Chapter 5, when we turn our focus to what 
happened to Fox News in 2017.
The changes in 2017 on the left and center- left are not consistent with 
the sense of a pervasive epistemic crisis. If anything, they mark a moderate 
strengthening of the role of professional journalistic organizations. Certainly, 
there were outlets on the left that adopted the hyperpartisan strategy of 
many of the most successful sites on the right. Occupy Democrats and the 
Palmer Report are the two clearest examples. As we will show throughout 
Part Two of the book, however, conspiracy theories and disinformation 
campaigns require more than a single site or two to spin them up to move 
from isolated chatter to gain broader currency. The architecture of the 
network in which these left- oriented hyperpartisan clickbait sites operate 
is fundamentally different from the network architecture which their right- 
oriented counterparts occupy. And, as we argue in the next several chapters, 
that architecture and the institutional character of the media outlets that 
constitute it, more than the Russians, more than the fake news entrepreneurs, 
more than Facebook advertising, and more than Cambridge Analytica, are 
most directly responsible for the prevalence and success of disinformation, 
propaganda, and commercial bullshit in the American media ecosystem.
We began this chapter with an acknowledgment that observing online 
communications, much less a single medium like Twitter or Facebook, 
offers only a partial and almost certainly imperfect view of the American 
media ecosystem. In the run- up to the election, a Pew survey suggested that 
57  percent of Americans got their news from television:  cable, local, and 
network news; while 38 percent got their news online.10 A Pew study from 
earlier in 2016 found that only 14  percent identified social media as their 
“most helpful” source for getting information on the election, while cable, 
local news, network news, and radio were described so by about 60 percent 
of the audience.11 A  2017 survey by Hunt Alcott and Matthew Gentzkow 
similarly found that 14 percent of respondents stated that social media were 
their “most important” source of election news.12 Narrowing down more 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da72
72
specifically to election news, a Pew survey conducted a few weeks after the 
election found that Fox News was the primary source of news for 40 percent 
of Trump voters, alongside CNN (8  percent), the three major networks 
(12  percent in total), local TV (5  percent), and radio (3  percent), leaving 
Facebook as the primary source of news for only 7 percent of Trump voters. 
No print media broke the 3 percent minimum share to be reported in that 
study. Clinton voters, by contrast, had a more varied diet, with CNN topping 
at 18 percent, MSNBC (9 percent), local TV (8 percent), NPR (7 percent), 
the networks (15 percent), the New York Times (5 percent), local newspapers 
(4 percent), and Fox News (3 percent). But Facebook use was quite similar 
to that of Trump followers, and was the primary source of news for only 
8 percent of Clinton supporters.13
These observations seem to be at odds with a 2017 Pew survey often cited 
for the claim that 67 percent of Americans get their news on social media.14 
While that higher number is often cited, it is important to remember that 
the 67  percent includes 20  percent who say they “hardly ever” get news 
on social media. The headline finding from that survey might have been 
entitled:  “53  percent of Americans never or hardly ever get their news 
from social media.” Only 20  percent of respondents in that survey said 
that they often get their news on social media, and another 27 percent said 
they sometimes do. When asked looser survey questions about their news 
consumption habits, such as where they got news “often,” 57 percent responded 
that they got news on television, ranging across all cable, network, and local, 
and another 25 percent get their news from radio, some of which is talk radio 
and some of which is NPR and networks.15 Clearly, online news continues 
to grow as a source of news people often turn to, and will continue to grow 
in importance. This trend is driven by readers over 50, and in particular over 
65, increasing their previously low use of online sources, rather than younger 
people meaningfully changing their already substantial use of online media.16 
Still, television remains the primary source of news and will likely continue to 
occupy that spot for several more election cycles.
There are several ways in which we try to expand our data collection and 
interpret our data to allow us to say more about the overall media ecosystem, 
and not only about online news sources and social media. First, even if only 
about half of Americans get their news online often or sometimes, these news 
readers interact socially, and offline social relations are an important source of 
news for the majority of the population.17 Many Americans who do not get 
their news online are a conversation away from those who are. Second, our 
data include the online versions of the major television news channels, and 
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while this may not replicate exactly the content of television programming, it 
represents a reasonable proxy. It also offers us a structural view of how these 
sources interact with other sources, the patterns of attention they draw, and 
their relation to other news sites whose content we can analyze in great detail. 
Third, the prominence of particular sites and stories enables us to identify 
salient television news coverage that we can then use a database of television 
broadcasts by major news networks and select local stations maintained by 
the Internet Archive to study as case studies. This targeting for case studies is 
further complemented by our ability to analyze YouTube videos, another useful 
avenue to identify particularly influential television moments. Throughout 
Chapters  3 to 8 we will combine our online data analysis with television 
analysis based on these bridges to give a more complete picture of what the 
media ecosystem looked like even when we do not have a full picture of every 
communication. Finally, but not least, political and media elites— politicians, 
pundits, journalists, and activists— all use online media extensively, and their 
actions are influenced not only by what they read but also by what is written 
about them and how they perceive this coverage. The combined effect of 
these approaches gives us a good degree of confidence that our findings reflect 
something very real about the American public sphere. And our fundamental 
observations regarding the asymmetric structure of online media receive clear 
confirmation from a 2014 Pew survey about media consumption and patterns 
of trust. That survey found that respondents who score as “consistently 
conservative” on a survey of their political views reported that their most 
trusted news sources were Fox News, Sean Hannity, and Rush Limbaugh. 
“Consistently liberal” respondents placed NPR, PBS, and the BBC in those 
top three most trusted positions.18 This pattern of trust in television and radio 
sources— one side trusting a highly partisan commercial outlet and two of 
the most incendiary personalities in American political media, and the other 
in three public institutions of the most traditional journalistic form, suggests 
that the overall pattern of the media ecosystem is highly congruent with the 
patterns we observe online.
The consistent pattern that emerges from our data is that, both 
during the highly divisive election campaign and even more so during the 
first year of the Trump presidency, there is no left- right division, but rather 
a division between the right and the rest of the media ecosystem. The right 
wing of the media ecosystem behaves precisely as the echo- chamber models 
predict— exhibiting high insularity, susceptibility to information cascades, 
rumor and conspiracy theory, and drift toward more extreme versions of 
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itself. The rest of the media ecosystem, however, operates as an interconnected 
network anchored by organizations, both for profit and nonprofit, that 
adhere to professional journalistic norms. The members of that integrated 
ecosystem range from traditionally conservative publications like the Wall 
Street Journal or Forbes to historically left publications like Mother Jones or 
liberal and progressive activist sites like Daily Kos. This architecture changes 
the dynamics of information propagation and correction. It imposes higher 
reputational costs on sites and authors who propagate rumor and provides 
avenues for relatively rapid fact checking, criticism of false claims, and 
rapid dissemination of and coalescence around corrected narratives. The 
insular right wing of the media ecosystem creates positive feedbacks for 
bias- confirming statements as a central feature of its normal operation. The 
rest of the media ecosystem comprises sites diverse enough in their political 
orientation, organizational culture, business model, and reputational needs to 
create impedance in the network. This system resists and corrects falsehood 
as its normal operation, even though, like all systems, it also occasionally fails, 
sometimes spectacularly.
In Chapter  3 we offer a more detailed account of how these different 
network dynamics might emerge, and use two case studies to show how the 
architectural differences result, in the case of the right, in high diffusion and 
amplification of rumors and lies, while on the left, anchored as it is in “the 
rest” network rather than having its own symmetric echo chamber, rumors 
and lies get dampened and contained. We return in Chapter 11 to the deeper 
question of when and why these dynamics developed on the right but not on 
the left.
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3
The Propaganda Feedback Loop
In Chapter 2 we showed that the American media ecosystem consists of 
two distinct, structurally different media ecosystems. One part is the right- 
wing, dominated by partisan media outlets that are densely interconnected 
and insular and anchored by Fox News and Breitbart. The other part spans 
the rest of the spectrum. It includes outlets from the left to historically 
center- right publications like the Wall Street Journal and is anchored by 
media organizations on the center and center- left that adhere to professional 
standards of journalism. There is no distinct left- wing media ecosystem that 
parallels the right in its internal coherence or insularity from the center.
Throughout the book we document how these segments of the media 
system operate differently. Here we sketch out a framework for understanding 
the differences in the incentives, mechanics, and practices between the two 
parts of the media landscape. The model is a stylized description of the 
relationships, interactions, and feedback loops between elites, media, and 
the public. Dynamics on the right tend to reinforce partisan statements, 
irrespective of their truth, and to punish actors— be they media outlets or 
politicians and pundits— who insist on speaking truths that are inconsistent 
with partisan frames and narratives dominant within the ecosystem. Dynamics 
in the rest of the media landscape, including the left, tend to dampen and 
contain partisan statements that are demonstrably false. This does not suggest 
that the center and left are always error- free or pure of heart. In this chapter we 
describe the reporting on a smear lawsuit alleging that Donald Trump raped a 
13- year- old, which suggests that there is ample supply of and demand for nasty 
falsehoods on the left. In Chapter 6 we will encounter plenty of errors in the 
mainstream media. What we try to explain here is why on average and at a 
population level (by which we mean the population of the public, the media 
outlets, and political elites), we see partisan falsehoods thrive on the right not 
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as errors but as design features of the network, and why these design features 
have made the right- wing ecosystem a richer breeding ground and receptive 
ecosystem for propagandist efforts, foreign and domestic.
Our basic model initially divides the political landscape into political elites, 
media outlets, and the public. We assume, for purposes of this basic model, 
that members of the public consume news because they want to know what is 
going on in the world and how their political leaders are doing, but also want 
to get information that confirms them in their worldview and identity. They 
operate under motivated reasoning, which is to say, the basic psychological 
model that states that we tend to believe what we want to believe, seek out 
confirming information, reject or discount disconfirming evidence, and to 
do otherwise requires hard cognitive and emotional work. Members of the 
public get some gain from knowing what is really going on and some gain 
from being reinforced in their beliefs. And they incur some discomfort or 
cost from being misinformed, and from being challenged in their beliefs. 
They look for media outlets and politicians that will inform them as best as 
possible without suffering too much cognitive discomfort. Media outlets seek 
to attract large audiences, whether to make money, in the case of for- profits, 
or to better fulfill their mission, in the case of nonprofits. This involves 
interactions between reporters, editors, and owners, all of whom themselves 
operate under motivated reasoning and are perfectly able to lie to themselves 
to reduce the tensions between their often conflicting goals. Politicians want 
to be elected and achieve their policy goals. Although politicians find ways to 
reach out directly to their constituents, they must work through media 
outlets to reach a larger public. Politicians must also be informed both about 
the state of the world and about their voters’ perceptions of the state of the 
world, and must balance between these goals when they are in tension. For 
this purpose, politicians consume the media their voters do. Pundits occupy 
a position between politicians and media outlets, unconstrained by the need 
to be re- elected but more constrained by their need to attract audiences 
to media outlets. In that regard, they are less constrained by facts than 
politicians, and more like media outlets in their responsiveness to audience 
preferences. Political activists occupy a spot somewhere between politicians 
and the public, more focused on substantive victories than on re- election and 
less sensitive to criticism from media than politicians, but more capable of 
strategic directed action than members of the public. For simplicity, we focus 
on the politicians to stand in for political elites more generally.
Media and politicians have the option to serve their audiences and followers 
by exclusively delivering messages that confirm the prior inclinations of their 
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constituents, or by also including true but disconfirming news when the 
actual state of the world does not conform to partisan beliefs. For media, this 
is the key distinction between partisan media and objective media. Partisan 
media are oriented more toward offering identity- confirming information 
to partisan audiences while objective media strive for accuracy and aspire 
to neutrality. Audiences in turn can accept or reject the information from 
politicians and media, and can decide to continue to follow or abandon the 
politicians and outlets who deliver the news, whether good or bad. The media 
outlets, politicians, and public all choose each other iteratively, engaging 
in the sorting and matching game over time that brings together political 
affinity groups.
Imagine a media ecosystem in what we call a “reality- check dynamic” 
(Figure 3.1). Here, media outlets more or less follow institutionalized truth- 
seeking norms, and aim for more- or- less centrist or neutral perspectives 
to reduce— to the extent possible— the discomfort that their audience 
experiences when truth- seeking news is disconfirming. Outlets compete 
on the truth and freshness of their news, and the search for scoops and 
sensationalism is in tension with the internal norms and the fact that other 
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Figure 3.1 The reality- check dynamic.
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outlets will try to build their own credibility and audience in part by policing 
them if they get it wrong. They deliver both confirming and disconfirming 
news to their readers/ viewers, and separate news from opinion. Politicians 
need media outlets to communicate to voters and must navigate this media 
ecosystem and are constrained in what they can get away with. They try to 
deliver identity- confirming statements to their voters, but have to keep 
reasonably close to the truth, at least as reported in media their voters 
consume, to avoid the reputational harm of being portrayed as dishonest. 
The media, in turn, report on these politicians in neutral terms and police 
them for the truth- value of their statements as they police each other. In this 
dynamic members of the public will receive a mix of truth along with both 
bias confirmation and disconfirmation. Centrist members of the public are 
the happiest while media criticism flourishes on the wings— neither of which 
is getting exactly the trade- off that it wants between partisan confirmation 
and truth. Levels of trust in any given medium are moderate, because each has 
occasionally been found in error by its competitors, and each has delivered 
their audience some disconfirming news.
Now, a new media outlet is launched that adopts a different strategy by 
emphasizing partisan- confirming news over truth and helping segments of the 
public to reduce their discomfort by telling them that the outlets providing 
disconfirming news are not trustworthy. Members of the public who tend to 
seek confirmation more than truth reward this outlet with attention. Some 
politicians seek out those outlets and those members. Members of the public 
now have media outlets and elites confirming their prior beliefs, contrary to 
what they hear on other media, and are also told by these outlets and elites that 
other media that contradict what they say are themselves biased and hence 
untrustworthy. The public that buys into this adjust their levels of trust in 
other media downward. This reduces the psychological cost of tuning in only 
to the bias- confirming outlets, as they are now more confident that the partisan 
good news they hear is true and conflicting news from other outlets is false. 
Politicians who thrive in this media ecosystem will have done so by aligning 
their positions and narratives with like- minded publics and supportive media 
sources or by shifting the narrative in a direction that the public and media are 
willing to follow. Ideological positions, interpretations of real- world events, 
and partisan talking points are jointly negotiated by elites, partisan media, 
pundits, and political activists. News media reject the separation of news 
and opinion, and compete by policing each other for deviance from identity 
confirmation, not truth. They similarly align their coverage of politicians to 
offer favorable coverage to identity- confirming politicians and attacks on 
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opponents, and when they police deviance from politicians, it is identity 
confirmation, not truth, that they police. All these are intended to help 
sustain a steady flow of identity- confirming news to audiences who tune in to 
get precisely that from their media. Subsequent politicians who now enter the 
arena will find it harder to rely on the mainstream media to challenge assertions 
made by politicians focused on bias- confirming statements. The public that 
occupies the partisan media ecosystem no longer believes the external lying 
media. Challengers within the party are forced to use the same partisan 
media, subject to the same trade- offs between truth and bias confirmation 
as the incumbent. Incumbents and challengers consume the partisan media 
more, because they need to understand what their public believes, what they 
must confirm, and what parameters shape the way in which they can challenge 
incumbents. We call this dynamic the “propaganda feedback loop,” because 
once it is set in motion the media, elites, and public are all participants in 
a self- reinforcing feedback loop that disciplines those who try to step off it 
with lower attention or votes, and gradually over time increases the costs to 
everyone of introducing news that is not identity confirming, or challenges 
the partisan narratives and frames (Figure 3.2). Audiences in this loop will 
exhibit high trust in identity- confirming media, and low trust in external 
media. Politicians are not constrained by media policing truth when they 
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Figure 3.2 The propaganda feedback loop.
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deliver identity- confirming news to outlets, but rather by media policing the 
consistency of their statements with party identity.
Propaganda as we define it in Chapter  1—the manipulation of public 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors for political ends, framed in terms that 
reinforce partisan narratives— is much easier to insert into a system whose 
audiences, outlets, and elites have nothing to gain by disputing or disbelieving 
it and everything to lose by doing so, and will survive longer and propagate 
further in it. The network takes these inputs and converts them into a partisan 
package delivered to its various constituents: a steady flow of bias- confirming 
stories that create a shared narrative of the state of the world; a steady flow 
of audiences, viewers, or clicks for the outlets; and a steady flow of voters 
highly resilient to arguments made by outsiders on outlets that are outside 
the network. Outlets within the network are not designed to check or refute 
propaganda as long as it is consistent with the partisan narrative. There is 
nothing to gain and everything to lose. Our discussion in Chapter 2 of what 
happened to Fox News during the primaries and since the election follows 
these contours precisely. This does not mean that partisan audiences are not 
exposed to arguments from the other side. Research shows that engaged 
partisans are indeed aware of the arguments and reporting from the other 
side,1 but partisan news audiences simply discount opposing views. When 
the propagandist’s efforts are exposed to external criticism and fact checking, 
the mechanisms that developed for reducing the cost of disconfirmation— 
lower attention and lower trust to external media— kick in to insulate the 
propagandists’ efforts from this external criticism.
By contrast, a media ecosystem that operates under the reality- check 
dynamic, will tend to be more robust to disinformation operations because 
each outlet in this system gains from exposing the untruth and loses from 
being caught in the lie or error. Its audiences are less likely to trust any media 
source in particular, and more likely to check across different media to see 
whether a story is, in fact, true. Politicians operating within this type of 
media system will tend to experience resistance when they lie, even if the lies 
initially confirm the biases of their voters, because the voters will soon learn 
that the politician lied and reality is not as rosy as the politician promised. 
The politicians and outlets face starkly different incentives than politicians 
who operate in the partisan media ecosystem, and the outlets have developed 
norms and institutions that reflect those incentives and stabilize the truth- 
seeking behavior.
Nothing prevents the opposite wing of the political system from developing 
a parallel partisan media ecosystem, and there are many well- functioning 
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democracies with a frankly partisan press, particularly in multipolar political 
systems. But once one wing has established the strategy of partisan bias 
confirmation, the centrist media with their truth- seeking institutions and 
reputations suddenly deliver a new benefit to partisans of the opposite pole— 
as objective external arbiters they can offer institutionalized credibility to 
reinforce their view that what their opposition is saying is false. Once one 
partisan media pole is established, the coverage of existing objective media 
outlets takes on a partisan flavor without any shift in their own focus on 
objectivity.
The mainstream media will be able to reconcile their goals of truth- seeking 
and confirmation from the center with providing a steady flow of partisan- 
confirming news for the wing in opposition to the wing that is already in the 
grip of the propaganda feedback loop. The outlets that formed the partisan 
ecosystem have a first- mover advantage over outlets that try to copy them on 
the opposite side, because as they decrease the value of the mainstream media 
to their own audiences, they increase it for the putative audiences of their 
opponents. The further the first- moving partisan media ecosystem goes down 
the path of its own propaganda feedback loop, the greater its tendency to 
produce untrue statements, and the greater the opportunities for reality- check 
centrist media organizations to deliver news that is both truthful and pleasing 
to partisans from the other side. Creating a second partisan media ecosystem 
then becomes more difficult as their potential audience now receives partisan 
confirmation from centrist objectivity- seeking outlets, and the incremental 
identity- confirmation benefit they offer their audience is reduced.
In the real world, as opposed to the model, there are of course elements 
of these two media models found in different media on both sides of the 
political spectrum. The left includes hyperpartisan media sources, and there 
are many professional journalists on the right who adhere to standards of 
objective journalism. The differences lie in the relative power and prominence 
of the different parts of the system. On the left, politicians and partisans have 
to navigate the scrutiny and fact checking of objective media sources to reach 
broader audiences. On the partisan right, the gatekeepers are Fox News, talk 
radio, Breitbart, and the Drudge Report.
We return in Chapter  11 to examine the historical development of the 
right- wing media ecosystem, and argue that Rush Limbaugh, and after him 
Fox News, triggered a propaganda feedback loop that shaped the right- 
wing media ecosystem as we observe it today. The leading right- wing online 
media of 2018 were introduced into what was already a decade or two of that 
feedback loop. Even Breitbart was founded in 2007, almost twenty years after 
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Limbaugh became nationally syndicated. The other major right- wing net- 
native sites like the Daily Caller are of even more recent vintage. By contrast, 
when the Huffington Post emerged in 2005, the left was still attentive to media 
functioning roughly within a reality- check dynamic, however strained by 
failures in coverage of the Iraq War and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
Here, we turn to two case studies to put some narrative meat on this rather 
bare- bones model. The first takes an imperfect but nonetheless best- there- is 
accounting of how much lying there is on the various television networks, 
and who does the lying where. The second takes the most directly comparable 
rumors during the election period— an allegation that Trump raped a 13- year- 
old and allegations tying Clinton to pedophilia— and traces how each fared 
in the two parts of the media ecosystem. Both cases offer concrete examples 
of how, a propaganda feedback loop operated on the right, while on the left, 
an ample supply and appetite for bias- confirming news was contained by the 
reality- check dynamic.
Who Lies on TV?
It is hard to conduct a large- scale study of the prevalence of false statements 
on different media, because it is difficult to find unambiguously objective 
arbiters, and harder still to find arbiters who make their data available 
in a way that is readily available to aggregate at the news outlet level. 
Several studies since the 2016 election have sought to use consensus across 
several fact- checking sites to identify false stories. The limitation of those 
approaches is that most sites do not organize their findings in ways that 
are conducive to studying specific outlets or sources. We used PolitiFact, 
which is the only major fact- checking site to aggregate its findings by media 
outlet and which reports stories that they determined to be true as well as 
false. This therefore allows for at least a baseline sense of what proportion 
of the statements for a given media outlet that were suspicious enough to 
check ended up being true or false. PolitiFact was accused of political bias 
a few years ago after a George Mason study found that PolitiFact rated 
statements by Republicans as false more often than they rated statements 
by Democrats as false. This finding, which was not accompanied by any 
effort to independently assess the fairness of the underlying decisions, was 
interpreted by conservative media as evidence that PolitiFact was biased, 
rather than that the prevalence of lying on the right might actually be 
higher.2 Without valid independent evaluation of the actual truth or 
falsehood of the claims assessed, it is of course impossible to tell whether 
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PolitiFact found more lies on the right than on the left because the site was 
biased in its selection of stories to check or in its determination of the facts, 
or whether, in fact, right- wing politicians lie more often than do those on 
the left.3 That possibility, that the difference is in base rates of lying, rather 
than the bias of the fact checker, is further supported by some early studies 
of the Washington Post’s Fact Checker, which also found more lying on the 
right than on the left.4 Nonetheless, because this basic question of selection 
bias is not resolvable by outside observers, we offer the following analysis 
merely as an initial qualitative illustration of this systematic difference. 
We do not present it as quantitative evidence of its existence, and caution 
against overinterpreting it in quantitative terms.
PolitiFact is run by professional staff of the Tampa Bay Times, which is 
owned by the Poynter Institute. The site’s staff select statements to be checked 
based on whether they are rooted in a verifiable fact, whether the editors 
believe the statements might be misleading, and whether they are publicly 
significant. In other words, we should expect to see a relatively high base rate 
of false statements in the full set, because stories only get checked if they at 
least raise suspicion in the minds of a professional reporter and fact checker. 
As a rough measure of the partisan bias of the site, we can compare PolitiFact’s 
findings on prominent politicians and pundits from the two sides of the aisle. 
For example, as of December 2017 the Republican and Democratic leadership 
had remarkably similar proportions of statements rated by PolitiFact as “mostly 
false” or worse:  Mitch McConnell (43  percent), Paul Ryan (43  percent), 
Nancy Pelosi (41 percent), and Chuck Schumer (42 percent) were practically 
indistinguishable in terms of the likelihood that the statements they make that 
seem suspicious enough to warrant fact- checking turn out in fact to be mostly 
false or worse. Similarly, Rachel Maddow (48 percent) is not systematically 
different in PolitiFact’s measurements than Bill O’Reilly (53 percent) or Sean 
Hannity (50 percent), all of whom are quite different from, say, Rush Limbaugh 
(81 percent) and possibly Glenn Beck (59 percent). These numbers show the 
high ratio of false statements in the stories selected for checking. The overall 
rates per channel that we describe below do not represent the proportion of 
false statements out of all statements on the channel, but only the proportion 
of those statements treated as fishy enough to check. And while the site indeed 
checks more statements by these right- wing personalities than by the left- wing 
personalities, the similarities in findings of falsehood suggest that Politifact is 
not politically biased in its determinations of truth or falsehood. .
Comparing Fox News to CNN, MSNBC, and ABC is revealing.5 As 
Figure 3.3 shows, the proportion of Fox News statements that are mostly false 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da84
84
or worse is almost 50 percent higher than for MSNBC, and more than twice 
that of CNN.
More revealing yet is the proportion of false statements on each channel 
that are made by conservative speakers, both paid hosts and pundits and 
unpaid interviewees. As Figure 3.4 shows, part of the Fox News business 
model seems to be to pay conservative hosts and pundits to make statements 
that confirm the biases of its viewers, whether these statements are false or 
not. MSNBC seems to use a similar approach, but may be less disciplined 
about it. Most interesting perhaps is that 60 percent of false statements that 
PolitiFact found on CNN were made by conservative interviewees, some 
paid pundits, most not, while only 20 percent of such statements were made 
by liberals. Similarly, nearly 50 percent of the false statements on ABC were 
made by conservative speakers, and only 21 percent by liberals.
These findings suggest that Fox News and MSNBC are mostly mirror 
images of each other and follow a fundamentally different model than CNN 
or ABC. Both Fox News and MSNBC follow a bias- confirming strategy, 
while CNN and ABC are following roughly a neutral, balanced- perspective 
strategy. The differential lying by conservatives on CNN and ABC, in turn, is 
consistent with what we outline in the propaganda feedback loop: politicians 
who serve a population that is itself trapped in a bias- confirming media 
ecosystem will tend to lie more often on average than those who serve a 
constituency that follows neutral channels. For a politician who depends on 






















Figure 3.3 PolitiFact scoring for CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and ABC. Proportion of 
statements scored mostly false or worse.
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“caught” in making identity- inconsistent statements even on mainstream 
media is more costly than being “caught” lying on those media. The difference 
in rates of making false statements on media persists on CNN and ABC, 
which suggests that MSNBC’s market share is too small, and liberals and 
Democrats use too many other media that do not follow the bias- confirming 
strategy to drive liberal politicians and pundits to lie quite as often as their 
conservative counterparts.
A Case Study in the Effects of the Propaganda 
Feedback Loop vs. the Reality- Check Dynamic: 
Clinton Pedophilia vs. Trump Rape   
in the 2016 Election
There is quite possibly no crime so widely reviled in America as sexual abuse 
of children. During the campaign, accusations relating to pedophilia were 
reported against both candidates. Accusations against Clinton ranged from 
the core story of Bill Clinton (and later Hillary) flying to “orgy island” on the 
“Lolita Express,” to claims that Clinton’s State Department was involved in 


























Paid Conservative Unpaid Conservative Paid Liberal
Unpaid Liberal Non-Aligned Paid Non-Aligned Unpaid
Figure  3.4 PolitiFact scoring for CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and ABC. Proportion 
of false statements by political alignment by speaker and whether they are paid by the 
channel.
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and “Pizzagate.” For Trump, they were focused on allegations in a civil suit 
that the candidate had raped a 13- year- old in 1994. One can get a sense of 
the vehemence on the left, manifest in an Occupy Democrats headline from 
October 24, 2016: “Trump allegedly tied- up 13 year- old girl he raped, struck 
her in the face.” This headline appeared over a story that included sentences 
such as:  “The imagery of a nude, seething, sweating Trump having his way 
with a defenseless teenager is enough to induce vomiting” leaving little doubt 
as to the intended effect on readers.6 The Huffington Post analysis of the 
story, while more measured in tone, argued that the story deserved significant 
attention, and was itself the most widely shared story of rape or pedophilia 
thrown at either candidate throughout the entire campaign. In fact, it had 
over five times as many Facebook shares (over 1.25 million) as the most widely 
shared story about Clinton pedophilia.7 There was no lack of appetite on the 
left to hear disgusting stories about Donald Trump.
We can look at the spread of these narratives in online media by counting 
the number of sentences that mention either the Clinton pedophilia frame or 
the Trump rape frame. We start by looking at the frequency of these frames 
on the right and the left that are popular on Facebook but have little or no 
presence in the open web link economy and Twitter. As we explained in 
Chapter 2, sites with this attention profile include some of the worst offenders 
in terms of hyperpartisan bullshit on both sides of the aisle— Bipartisan 
Report, Addicting Info, and Occupy Democrats on the left, and Truthfeed, 
Ending the Fed, and Western Journalism, on the right. Looking at these sites 
(Figure 3.5), we see a symmetric pattern: the sites on the left scream “Trump 
Rape!”; the sites on the right scream “Clinton Pedophilia!”
The difference between the left and the right is not at the extreme margins, 
but in the transmission to the mainstream and in the amplification effects 
of the propaganda feedback loop as opposed to the resistance of the reality- 
check dynamic. We can run the same textual comparison on the sites that 
receive the most media inlinks from other sites, which is a useful measure of 
the sites considered most authoritative (Figure 3.6). The accusations against 
Trump, although they offered an easy opportunity to report allegations made 
in publicly available court filings, received a fraction of the attention that the 
accusations against Clinton received among these top media. In fact, the top 
media on the left wrote more than twice as many stories, and almost three 
times as many sentences, about the pedophilia accusations against Clinton 
as they did about the allegations against Trump. The right, by contrast, wrote 
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Top right hyperpartisan sites on Facebook
Figure  3.5 Coverage of the “Trump rape” and “Clinton pedophilia” frames on 
Addicting Info, Bipartisan Report, and Occupy Democrats on the left and Truthfeed, 


















Top left sites by media links Top right sites by media links
Figure 3.6 Coverage of the “Trump rape” and “Clinton pedophilia” frames by the 10 
most linked sites on the left and right during the election.
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Overall, the number of stories that the Facebook hyperpartisan sites 
publish is smaller than the larger, better- staffed sites. The overall magnitude 
of sentences is therefore lower, but the pattern of symmetric polarization 
among the hyperpartisan sites is clearly visible in the supply of disgusting, 
stories intended to provoke partisan rage. The critical difference made clear in 
the two sets of charts is that on the left, those media higher up the food chain 
that lend credibility to stories and amplify them to larger audiences refused to 
pick up the storyline and bring it to the wider public.
We can observe the extent to which the right- wing media was different in 
its treatment of these incendiary stories by comparing top- performing media 
by quintile across Facebook, Twitter, and links (Figures 3.7a– c).8 The same 
picture emerges; the pattern remains stable as we compare the top media by 
linking, tweeting, and Facebook sharing across the five partisan- attention 
quintiles. A key difference is that the pattern is less symmetric on Facebook, 
with substantially more coverage on the right than the left. With the larger 
number of media outlets included in this view, the craziest sites on the left are 
diluted, while the bench is deeper on the right. Facebook remains the only 
medium on which sites on the left give more attention to the Trump rape 
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Figures 3.7a Coverage of the “Trump rape” and “Clinton pedophilia” frames by the 

















Trump Jane Doe Clinton Pedophilia
Figures 3.7b Coverage of the “Trump rape” and “Clinton pedophilia” frames by the 













Trump Jane Doe Clinton Pedophilia
(c)
Figures 3.7c Coverage of the “Trump rape” and “Clinton pedophilia” frames by the 
10 most linked sites during the election by quintile.
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right- wing sites repeat the Clinton pedophilia stories several times as often as 
any other quintile does, and other than on Facebook, there is no symmetrically 
excessive attention being paid on the left to the mirror- image story intended 
to elicit visceral disgust toward Donald Trump. Even on Facebook, where 
we do see the left quintile pushing the Trump rape narrative, it does so to 
a substantially smaller degree than the right pushes the pedophilia stories 
on Facebook. The asymmetry we observe in the architecture of attention 
appears to be replicated here in the emphasis that the sites themselves pay to 
producing feelings of outrage and disgust in their audience. The top media by 
all metrics on the right are in the thrall of the propaganda feedback loop. They 
must participate to retain credibility. The top media in the rest of the media 
ecosystem are constrained by the inverse dynamic. They cannot participate 
if they are to retain credibility and audiences. And the reason they cannot 
participate is revealed when we move from looking at overall emphasis to the 
network architecture of the two frames.
Figure  3.8 Network map of media sources reporting on “Trump rape” and “Clinton 
pedophilia” stories, May 2015– November 8, 2016.
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Figure 3.8 describes the network of sites that reported both frames, with 
edges and node sizes determined by hyperlinks into the story. One feature 
pops out at anyone who has already been exposed to our maps in Chapter 2. 
The top sites on the center- left and center that normally occupy the central 
position in our map— the New York Times, the Washington Post, CNN, The 
Hill— played a peripheral role in this map. The map is driven by partisan sites, 
not by mainstream media. The second feature is that the Daily Beast, the 
Guardian, Gawker, and New York Magazine play a central role on the left and 
center- left, while Fox News and the Daily Mail are the basin of attraction on 
the right. This offers us very clear targets to examine the diffusion dynamics 
in the two networks.
Jane Doe and the Trump Rape Accusations
On June 20, 2016, an anonymous “Jane Doe” filed a lawsuit against Donald 
Trump, accusing him of having raped her 22 years earlier, when she was 13, at 
an event organized by Jeffery Epstein. On June 29, Lisa Bloom, legal analyst 
for NBC News, published a piece on the Huffington Post that went through 
the complaint and argued that the media should cover the case, rather than 
turning a blind eye as it did in the Bill Cosby case. Bloom argued that Trump’s 
overt misogyny, past accusations of sexual assault against him, Trump’s 
known and publicly admitted long- term relationship with Epstein, and the 
highly unusual presence of sworn affidavits— one from the victim herself 
and another from a witness— make the case particularly worthy of attention. 
Bloom concluded her piece with a clear challenge: “What do you call a nation 
that refuses to even look at sexual assault claims against a man seeking to lead 
the free world? Rape culture. We ignore the voices of women at our peril.” 
Bloom’s piece was shared over a million times on Facebook. It was followed 
on July 7 by a piece on MSN, which made roughly the same argument as 
in Bloom’s closing line, and which became the second- most Facebook- shared 
story addressing either of the two rumors.
On that same day the Guardian published a story that led with, “Lawsuits 
accusing Donald Trump of sexually assaulting a child in the 1990s appear to 
have been orchestrated by an eccentric anti- Trump campaigner with a record 
of making outlandish claims about celebrities.”9 The story highlighted an 
earlier debunking story on Jezebel, which had framed its own discussion 
with the statement:  “The allegations are beyond the pale, even for Trump, 
and there’s little sourcing for them beyond the lawsuit itself.”10 Anna Merlan’s 
story in Jezebel recounted, among other details, how both Gawker and 
 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da92
92
Jezebel had been approached by an “Al Taylor,” who put them in touch with 
a conservative NeverTrump activist, Steve Baer, and tried to sell them on the 
rape story, and how both outlets decided to reject the proffered “evidence” and 
not report on the story. The Guardian story then dug deeper and found that 
“Al Taylor” was likely Norm Lubow, a former producer for the Jerry Springer 
Show, and proceeded to recount the many times in which Lubow had been 
involved in generating fake conspiracies. Two weeks later, on the eve of the 
Republican convention, the Daily Beast dug deeper into the NeverTrump 
angle, and how the activists created the story but then fell into a cycle of 
mutual recriminations.11 There were very few stories after the Guardian or 
Daily Beast stories that reached any prominence at all on the left or center- 
left, except much later, and those that did outside of the hyperpartisan set like 
Occupy Democrats all noted and linked back to the Guardian, Daily Beast, 
and several other debunking or critical stories, such as coverage on LawNewz. 
And what about Gawker’s prominence in the map? Gawker, which had 
chosen not to buy into the Trump rape case, found itself a part of the “Clinton 
pedophilia” frame through the good graces of Fox News.
What prevented the “Trump raped a 13- year- old” frame from taking off on 
the left was not a lack of audience desire to receive strong, visceral confirmation 
of their hatred of Trump. Nothing could be more bias- confirming for Trump 
opponents. The tremendous success of the Huffington Post and MSN stories 
during the week of June 29– July 7 exhibits that the desire to believe such a story 
about Trump existed in spades. It was not the absence of political clickbait 
fabricators who were trying to push the story to their financial benefit. The 
passage we quoted from Occupy Democrats and the supply of Trump rape 
stories from that kind of political clickbait site we showed in Figure 3.5 
establish that there were efforts to capitalize on supplying more of this type 
of story. What prevented this disinformation effort from taking root was the 
network dynamic whereby diverse sites, many operating on norms dedicated 
to evaluating the veracity of a story rather than its fit to political purpose or 
clickbait value, check each other. Even in the absence of the more traditional 
mainstream press (except the Guardian), the presence and attention of both 
journalists and readers to diverse sites was enough to enforce a hard constraint 
on the ability to disseminate politically affirming falsehoods.
Jeffrey Epstein, the Lolita Express, and Orgy Island
The prominence of Fox News in the pedophilia narrative underscores that 
network propaganda is not primarily a story about marginal sites being 
 
 The Propaganda Feedback Loop 93
93
amplified by big sites, although it sometimes exhibits that dynamic, too. 
What we see when looking at the Clinton pedophilia frame on the right is 
a dynamic that rewards the most popular and widely viewed channels at the 
very top of the media ecosystem for delivering stories, whether true or false, 
that protect the team, reinforce its beliefs, attack opponents, and refute any 
claims that might threaten “our” team from outsiders. The Clinton pedophilia 
story was not primarily a bottom- up, Reddit- imposed, post- truth moment 
that was then reinforced by higher level media. It was first and foremost the 
product of a propagandist dynamic between Fox News, as party propaganda 
organ, and Donald Trump, who, after winning the Indiana primary on May 
4, 2016, became the presumptive party nominee. The Clinton pedophilia 
story was a direct response to the first round of media attacks on Trump 
for his treatment of women. Fox News’s critical contribution to the Clinton 
pedophilia narrative was the most widely tweeted, most widely Facebook- 
shared, and third- most widely linked Fox News story published in May 2016 
of any election- related story. Indeed, the story remained the most widely 
shared Fox News story on Facebook throughout the entire campaign out of 
nearly 6,500 Fox News stories in our set. And it was in May that Fox News 
return to the fold, after having been browbeaten by Breitbart and shunned 
by Trump supporters while the primary was still contested, as we saw in 
Chapter 2.
On May 13, 2017, Fox News online published a story entitled “Flight logs 
show Bill Clinton flew on sex offender’s jet much more than previously,”12 a 
story that Fox sent out for syndication via RSS and apparently on Facebook 
with the more “clickbaity” title: “JET PURV- EYED FOR BILL Clinton a 
frequent flyer on sex- offender’s plane.”13 The story resurfaced a story that had 
been reported by Gawker a year earlier, but embellished it with a new set of 
“flight logs showing the former president taking at least 26 trips aboard the 
‘Lolita Express’— even apparently ditching his Secret Service detail for at least 
five of the flights, according to records obtained by FoxNews.com.” The story 
then wove various elements from Epstein’s own prosecution to embellish the 
details of Orgy Island. That same day, Breitbart reported on the Fox News 
story to its readers,14 as did the British tabloid the Daily Mail,15 one of the 
most linked and shared sites among Trump supporters. The Daily Caller16 
and Washington Times17 reported on it the next day.
On May 14, the New York Times published online a scathing story entitled 
“Crossing the Lines: How Donald Trump Behaved with Women in Private,” 
which started with a description of how Trump had asked a young woman, 
Rowan Brewer Lane, to change out of her clothes and into a bikini at a pool 
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party at Mar- a- Lago, a pattern of behavior the Times called “a debasing 
face- to- face encounter between Mr. Trump and a young woman he hardly 
knew,” based on interviews with over 50 women.18 One must assume that 
the Times had contacted the Trump campaign for its response before the 
May 14 online publication. The story was printed in the May 15 Sunday 
Times. In a dynamic typical of the network diversity of the non- right media 
ecosystem, the next morning, on May 16, MSNBC ran a 17- minute segment 
of “Morning Joe” eviscerating the New York Times for poor reporting, and 
leading with a segment from a Fox News interview with Rowan Brewer Lane, 
where Lane rejected the interpretation of the Times article, saying that Trump 
“treated her like a gentleman.”19 After about 10 minutes of criticism of the 
Times’s journalistic decisions in developing and publishing the stories, the 
conversation shifted to assessing what impact it would have on the campaign, 
and the panelists all agreed that it would be “gloves off ” as far as looking at 
Bill Clinton sex stories. At that point Donny Deutsch raised the Epstein story 
and emphasized that it would be a likely target for a significant push. Three 
hours later, in another MSNBC show, conservative talk show host Hugh 
Hewitt repeated the Deutsch point.20
Like “Morning Joe” on MSNBC, Sean Hannity ran a segment on his May 
16 show, which also began with an interview with Lane, who claimed her 
words were taken out of context and blamed the Times piece as being a hit 
piece. Newt Gingrich followed Lane and said:21
GINGRICH: Well, look, The New York Times is totally in the tank 
for Hillary Clinton. They’re faced with this terrible story about Bill 
Clinton flying around the world with a convicted pedophile, actually 
leaving his Secret Service agents behind on at least five trips to go off 
with his guy by himself for whatever reason. And so they basically 
wanted to smother a real scandal involving Bill Clinton once again 
with this made- up story.
The Daily Caller added another round, reporting that “Former President 
Bill Clinton is set to campaign in the U.S. Virgin Islands Monday where his 
friend and convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein operated ‘Orgy Island,’ ”22 
while Breitbart used the Deutsch’s comment on Morning Joe to publish 
the headline:  “ ‘Morning Joe’ Panel:  Clinton Connection with Billionaire 
Pedophile Jeffrey Epstein Will ‘Blow Up’ Campaign.”23
The next day, May 17, “Special Report with Bret Baier” ran a segment that 
began with the words “there’s smoke, and where there’s smoke, it’s worthy 
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of an investigation.”24 The story essentially repeated for Baier’s TV audience 
the detailed account that Fox News had published online four days earlier, 
showing the image of the flight logs “and Orgy Island,” and emphasizing and 
analyzing the significance of the absence of Secret Service agents on some 
of these flights.25 And again, on May 18, Gingrich returned to the Epstein 
“Orgy Island” story on Fox News’s “On the Record” with Greta Van Susteren, 
an interview that the Daily Caller dutifully reported.26 On May 19, Hannity 
interviewed Donald Trump for his response to the Times’s story, an interview 
during which Trump and Hannity emphasized the refutations by several 
women mentioned in the story and during which Trump underscored that 
Bill Clinton had been accused of rape, referring to the Juanita Broderick 
accusations.27 The Epstein “Lolita Express” story returned periodically in the 
major right- wing outlets over the remainder of the campaign, as a general 
trope standing in for Bill Clinton’s sexual misbehavior more generally. 
A  June 2016 report on Breitbart excerpted a portion of a transcript from 
Rush Limbaugh, where Limbaugh says: “if there ever is a man who has had 
numerous affairs in the Oval Office, outside the Oval Office, in the governor’s 
office in Arkansas, around the world, palling around with noted pedophile 
Jeffrey Epstein— why does Bill Clinton get the benefit of the doubt? After all 
of these years, there ought to be a reaction. Common sense would say, ‘You 
know what? This many allegations, there has to be something there.’ ”28 In 
July, as the Clinton Foundation story that we discuss in Chapter 6 was taking 
off, Malia Zimmerman, who had authored the original May 13 story based on 
the flight logs, published another piece, entitled “Billionaire Sex Offender 
Epstein once claimed he co- founded Clinton Foundation,” a claim that the 
Daily Mail faithfully repeated, crediting Fox News.29
The announcement by James Comey that the FBI was reopening the 
Clinton email investigation because of emails found on Anthony Weiner’s 
laptop provided a new opportunity for reviving the pedophilia conspiracy 
theory. On November 2, True Pundit, a particularly consistent purveyor of 
disinformation and conspiracy theories, published a story in which it said 
that “NYPD and FBI sources” confirmed “they now believe Hillary Clinton 
traveled as Epstein’s guest on at least six occasions, probably more,”30 as well as 
noting the earlier stories that had “confirmed” that Bill Clinton had traveled 
more than 20 times to the island and that Huma Abedin and Weiner were 
cooperating with the FBI. That same day, the story was repeated and linked 
to by YourNewsWire.31 As we will see in Chapter 8, both True Pundit and 
YourNewsWire are among the sites that could plausibly be Russian gray 
propaganda sites, although YourNewsWire seems to be more of a “useful idiot” 
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site than a gray site. The following day, November 3, Michael Flynn, then of the 
Trump campaign and later briefly national security adviser, tweeted out a link 
to the True Pundit story, attached to a message that read: “U decide— NYPD 
Blows Whistle on New Hillary Emails:  Money Laundering, Sex Crimes w 
Children, etc. . .  MUST READ!”32 On November 4, Erik Prince, founder 
of Blackwater USA, later Trump transition team member, and brother to 
Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, spoke in an interview on the Breitbart XM 
radio show and broadcast the True Pundit story in all its significant details. As 
Breitbart described the interview, “Prince claimed he had insider knowledge 
of the investigation that could help explain why FBI Director James Comey 
had to announce he was reopening the investigation into Clinton’s email 
server last week.” Prince claimed that his informants told him: “They found 
State Department emails. They found a lot of other really damning criminal 
information, including money laundering, including the fact that Hillary 
went to this sex island with convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein. Bill Clinton 
went there more than 20 times. Hillary Clinton went there at least six times,” 
he said.33 The story leaves little doubt that Prince’s “inside” sources were likely 
the True Pundit story— whether he read it directly, picked it up by following 
Flynn on Twitter, or read the YourNewsWire repeat.
Unlike many of the other stories, which tried to insinuate that Bill Clinton 
traveled to Orgy Island (a fact that, though oft- repeated, was inconsistent 
with the flight logs, which showed Clinton on other trips on the plane, none 
to the Caribbean), Prince’s broadcast of True Pundit’s story took elements of 
the story developed by Fox News in May and created a new layer of fabrication 
from them. The numbers used evoke the earlier story lines— more than 20 
times clearly connects to the “at least 26 flights” from the Fox News online 
and Bret Baier stories, and Hillary’s alleged six visits relate to the number 
of times the Secret Service was not on board. In combination, True Pundit, 
Flynn, and Prince sent Hillary to Orgy Island repeatedly. The validation 
of this storyline by Prince and Breitbart helped to make this new twist the 
primary narrative in the Clinton pedophilia libel. WND, a popular site on 
the right, cited the Breitbart story on Erik Prince’s radio interview under 
the headline “Source: FBI Has Evidence Hillary Visited Orgy Island; Huma 
Abedin said to be cooperating with investigators.”34 Other visible right- wing 
sites, IJR, Western Journalism, and Conservative Tribune, all linked to and 
repeated various variations on the story over the following 24 hours, along 
with several other, more peripheral sites.
If the quintessential moment that captured the sense of epistemic crisis in 
America was the day on which an armed 20- something walked into a pizza 
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parlor in search of the Clinton pedophilia ring, a close study of the ways in 
which the association between Clinton and pedophilia emerged points the 
finger at the very top sites in the right- wing media sphere as the primary culprits 
in feeding and sustaining this crisis. Russians may well have joined in the fun 
at various points, as we will see in Chapters 7 and 8. Alt- right agitators happily 
contributed memes and associations, as we show in Chapter 7. But these exotic 
explanations seem entirely unnecessary when the political leadership and 
leading media outlets of the American Republican Party were all repeating 
the lies as truths in outlets watched, heard, and read by millions of people. 
Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, made the 
accusation on- air, interviewed by Sean Hannity and by Greta Van Susteren 
on Fox News. Bret Baier, anchoring Fox News’s prime- time news show ran a 
detailed segment on the accusations of Bill Clinton flying to Orgy Island on 
the Lolita Express. Fox News online published the underlying materials. Rush 
Limbaugh discussed the allegation as something everyone knows. Trump’s 
campaign adviser and national security adviser in waiting, Michael Flynn, 
tweeted it out. Breitbart, the most widely shared right- wing online site whose 
on- leave CEO Steve Bannon was then running Trump’s campaign, aired an 
interview constructed of pure disinformation. It seems highly unlikely that 
any of the people involved— Prince, Flynn, or the publishers of Breitbart— 
thought that the accusation that Hillary Clinton had flown six times to Orgy 
Island was anything other than utterly false, and yet they published it four 
days before the election on Breitbart’s radio station and online. Not one right- 
wing outlet came out to criticize and expose this blatant lie for what it was. 
In the grip of the propaganda feedback loop, the right- wing media ecosystem 
had no mechanism for self- correction, and instead exhibited dynamics of 
self- reinforcement, confirmation, and repetition so that readers, viewers, and 
listeners encountered multiple versions of the same story, over months, to the 
point that both recall and credibility were enhanced. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that a YouGov poll from December 2016 found that over 40 percent 
of Republican respondents thought that it was at least somewhat likely that 
someone was running a pedophilia ring out of the Clinton campaign.
Our observations about the asymmetric shape of the American 
networked public sphere show that we do not have a fully polarized media 
ecosystem, in which both Democrats and Republicans occupy symmetrically 
closed media bubbles with symmetric, but opposing, self- reinforcing views. 
Instead, both pre- and post- election, a substantial portion of Republicans 
and self- identified conservatives occupied a self- reinforcing bubble, while 
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Democrats and Independents occupied a media sphere anchored by more 
traditional media outlets that continue to practice the norms of objective 
journalism, surrounded by more partisan net- native outlets, many of which 
also adhere to truth- seeking norms rather than purely partisan advantage. 
The incentives for elites, and the feedback mechanisms between media, elites, 
and the public, therefore diverged between the two spheres. The center and 
left dynamics combine networked media and major media outlets, with the 
latter playing a moderating effect on partisan bullshit and on politicians who 
still have to worry about fact- checking sites giving them too many Pinocchios, 
and the former checking the more traditional media from becoming too 
complacent or comfortable with conventional wisdom, and were able to adhere 
to truth- seeking norms because their audience, in turn, was ready and able to 
distinguish truth from falsehood and reward the former. That still leaves plenty 
of room for partisanship— in agenda setting and topic selection, in perspective 
and framing— but it appears to significantly constrain disinformation. The 
interaction between these diverse media sources, their audiences, and political 
elites creates resistance to the spread of falsehoods, even when politically 
convenient. The right followed a distinctly different media model, with outlets 
and elites providing reinforcement and legitimation to partisan propaganda. 
In this insular ecosystem, subject to the dynamics of propaganda feedback 
loops, politicians are more or less immune to fact checking because their 
core audiences treat the professional fact- checking process as itself partisan, 
and media outlets, audiences, and elites all discipline each other to remain 
true to faith and confirm party beliefs and ideology on pain of exclusion and 
demotion— at the ballot box or in the market for attention.
In Chapter  11 we describe how this asymmetric media architectures 
resulted in highly divergent levels and patterns of trust in media, patterns that 
offer substantial support for our observations and represent one component 
of the propaganda feedback loop, on one hand, or the reality- check dynamic, 
on the other hand. Conservative audiences tend to focus their attention more 
intensely on fewer sources, which are purely conservative, and to trust these 
sources much more than liberals do. Consistently conservative respondents 
trust Fox News, Hannity, Limbaugh, and Glenn Beck much more than 
they trust ABC, CBS, or NBC, and trust CNN or public radio even less. 
Consistently liberal audiences, by contrast, spread their attention and trust 
more broadly, and focus on major mainstream publications and channels.
Parts Two and Three of the book demonstrate that the difference in media 
ecosystem architecture, the dynamics they set in place, and the divergent 
patterns of attention, authority, and trust they reflect resulted in different 
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susceptibility to manipulation, propaganda, and belief in false factual claims. 
Russian propaganda seems to have targeted both sides, and Facebook clickbait 
sites tried to manipulate denizens of all sides of the American public sphere. 
But, just as we saw in the case of the competing Trump rape and Clinton 
pedophilia frames, the responsiveness and success appear to have been very 
different in the two parts of the media ecosystem. In the right- wing media 
the propaganda feedback loop enabled conspiracy theories, false rumors, and 
logically implausible claims to perform better, survive longer, and be shared 
more widely than were parallel efforts aimed at the left.
Our explanation of the difference between the right and the rest is 
grounded in historically- specific changes in media institutions and cultural 
practices, rather than in technological or psychological factors. It is not that 
Republicans are more gullible, or less rational, than Democrats. It is not that 
technology has destroyed the possibility of shared discourse for all. It is the 
structure of the media ecosystem within which Republican voters, whether 
conservatives or right- wing radicals, on the one hand, and Republican 
politicians, on the other hand, find themselves that made them particularly 
susceptible to misperception and manipulation, while the media ecosystem 
that Democrats and their supporters occupied exhibited structural features 
that were more robust to propaganda efforts and offered more avenues for self- 
correction and self- healing. Nonetheless, as we will show in Chapter 6, this 
media ecosystem still suffers from significant failure modes that are tied to the 
norms of journalism and the very competitive dynamics that usually protect 
the system from manipulation. And it was precisely those failure modes that 
enabled Donald Trump the candidate and his allies in Breitbart in particular 
to frame the Clinton candidacy almost entirely in terms of corruption. In Part 
Four, after we describe the actual dynamics of disinformation in the different 
parts of the media ecosystem, we return to describing the institutional, 
political, and cultural roots of the asymmetry between the right and the 





Dynamics of Network Propaganda
Political communications usually focus on three primary mechanisms 
by which media ecosystems affect politics:  agenda setting, priming, and 
framing. Agenda setting is focused on shaping what questions are salient in 
audiences’ minds.1 Priming focuses on what standards they should use to 
evaluate candidates or positions on these salient issues.2 Framing is a more 
gestalt idea. It relates to the context within which an issue, opinion, or 
claim is made, and influences our understanding of and attitudes toward it. 
Consider the politics of drugs in a gubernatorial race as an example of the 
three different types of effects. Whether to think about drugs and drug use, 
as opposed to, say, education policy or jobs, as the important political issue 
of the election is agenda setting. Whether to assess the incumbent governor’s 
performance on the issue of drugs by focusing on changes in the number of 
overdose deaths of habitual drug users or by focusing on the number of kilos 
seized and prosecutions brought is a priming question. And whether to think 
about drug use as a criminal- enforcement issue or a public health issue is a 
framing question.3 Whether one thinks of drug use in the frame of “crime” or 
in the frame of “public health” or whether one is primed to focus on public 
health measures or criminal enforcement measures has enormous practical 
implications for where elected and appointed officials put the state’s efforts 
and which classes of policy responses seem reasonable or whacky. As we will 
see in Chapter 4, for example, the major agenda- setting success of the Donald 
Trump campaign and Breitbart was to make immigration the core substantive 
agenda item in the 2016 election. Using text analysis and other measures of 
salience, we will see that right- wing media framed immigration primarily 
in terms of fear of Muslims and Islamic terrorism, rather than framing the 
question in terms of solving the problems of undocumented immigrants in 
the United States, or of Latin American immigration, as it was in the rest 
of the media ecosystem. Because of that successful framing, Trump voters 
were primed to look for progress on that front first and foremost, which helps 
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explain why the newly sworn President Trump rushed to issue his “Muslim 
ban” within a week of taking office.
How do agenda setting, framing, and priming map on to the questions 
of propaganda? What might it mean to say that if political party A  wants 
the election to focus on issue A rather than B, that would be “manipulating” 
public opinion, or in any sense be “false”? At the simplest level, one could 
pretend to be what one is not and inject agenda- setting or framing narratives 
into the political debate. So, for example, if we believed that the origin of the 
large email dumps and the incessant focus on Hillary Clinton emails were 
in fact the product of Russian hackers and sockpuppets masquerading as 
American media outlets and activists (spoiler alert for Chapters 6 and 8: we 
do not), we would call the successful agenda- setting campaign “propaganda” 
in the sense that the origin of the campaign is masked in order to achieve a 
manipulative propagandist purpose.
Beyond origin, in principle, though we do not observe it in the 
American system in the period we asses, one could keep up a steady flow 
of communications intended to deflect public attention from what you are 
actually trying to achieve and crowd the agenda with side issues. For example, 
you might really want to make sure you can pass a massive tax cut that would 
benefit rich donors, but, knowing that your voters are fed up with tax cuts, 
distract your target population by persuading them that the most important 
issue of the day is Muslim immigration and that you will give them what they 
want on that front. More realistically, given that the actual 2017 tax reform 
was experienced as defeat by the Trump wing of the Republican Party, if your 
real belief is that immigration is the major issue, but that focusing on Muslim 
rather than Latin American immigration would make it easier to sustain the 
alliance between the white- identity and Christian- identity wings of your 
coalition, you might emphasize the frame of Muslim immigration even if you 
knew that, in fact, it was a marginal factor in actual patterns and effects of 
immigration. Recall that the touchstone of propaganda is the intention of the 
propagandist.
More pervasively, the salience of an agenda item and its framing are the 
product of narratives about what the agenda item is, why it is important, how 
we should fit the flow of daily stories into it, and so forth. If these stories, 
in their individual detail and their overall effect, are manipulative, false, or 
materially misleading, we can describe even the broader shift in agenda and 
frame that they achieve as “propaganda.” Much of what we see in Chapters 4 
to 6 is the “who” and “how” of network propaganda. We see a network of 
sites, some peripheral, but more importantly central, keeping up a steady flow 
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of false or misleading stories that together add up to a narrative of Muslim 
immigration threat (Chapter 4), the deep state attempting to overturn the 
2016 election (Chapter  5), or that, whatever you think of Donald Trump, 
Hillary Clinton is a corrupt, vile criminal who as secretary of state sold 
out her country to terrorism- supporting Arab sheiks and Russian oligarchs 
(Chapters 4 and 6).
In Chapter  4, we describe how Breitbart, interacting with Donald 
Trump the candidate, forced immigration to become the main Republican 
election agenda, despite the desire of party leadership to stay away from 
that issue, by keeping up a steady flow of misleading stories that associated 
immigration with terrorism, the spread of incurable disease, criminality, and 
abuse of the welfare system. We then dig deeper into text analysis to explain 
how Islamophobia allowed Breitbart to serve as a bridge between the frank 
racism and anti- semitism of the white nationalists and the more muted racial 
anxiety of the more mainstream white- and Christian- identity pillars of the 
Republican coalition. We conclude by exploring how the network of right- 
wing sites interacted during the month before the election to weave together 
the Islamophobia frame and the “Clinton corruption” frame to make for a 
coherent narrative that left wavering Republicans no choice but to hold their 
noses and vote for Trump.
In Chapter 5, we shift to focus particularly on Fox News and the central 
role that it played during the first year of the Trump presidency in creating 
a narrative that deeply challenges the rule of law in America. Working from 
the broad frame of the “deep state,” through the specific conspiracy theories 
of Seth Rich and Uranium One, we document how the reassertion by Fox 
News of its leading role in the right- wing media ecosystem, which we showed 
in Chapter 2, was achieved by the network effectively turning itself into the 
president’s personal propaganda network. Throughout these stories, Fox led 
and interacted with the rest of the right- wing media ecosystem to combat 
civil servants, national security, and law enforcement agents, many of whom 
were lifelong Republicans, who put their commitment to their civic role 
ahead of partisan loyalty. Inside the propaganda loop, the choice of these 
Republican public servants, based on the possibility of objective truth— that 
there is a truth of the matter about what did or did not happen, and of what 
is or is not legal— is simply incomprehensible. Inside that loop, such choices 
necessarily imply corruption or betrayal. We document how, both online 
and on television, Fox led a persistent campaign at peak moments in the 
development of the Trump- Russia controversy, to impugn the intelligence 
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community and federal law enforcement agencies in order to protect the 
president.
In Chapter  6, we turn to examine the operation of mainstream media 
in a propaganda- rich environment. We begin with the election period 
and document how internal dynamics of news reporting led mainstream 
media to emphasize the email investigation over substantive discussion of 
politics. We dedicate the bulk of the chapter to describing how Breitbart 
exploited the hunger for scoops and the public performance of objectivity 
and critical remove of mainstream journalism to harness the credibility of 
the New  York Times, and later other major publications, to propagate and 
accredit the “Clinton corruption” frame. We conclude the chapter with a 
review of how media outlets in the self- correcting media ecosystem outside 
the propaganda loop dealt with errors and failures by describing the failures 
and corrective mechanisms surrounding the recipients of President Trump’s 
Fake News Awards for 2017. Because one of our findings is that mainstream 
professional media still play a critical role in shaping the American media 
ecosystem, we think it particularly important to document and identify 
failure modes in the presence of asymmetric propaganda dynamics and to 
help professional journalists adjust their practices and self- conception to fit 
this highly asymmetric system with which they interact. As we underscore in 
our “solutions” Chapter 13, one of the core recommendations of our work is 
that professional journalism has to revisit how it performs its commitment 
to objectivity— shifting from neutrality among competing views to a more 
scientific sense of provisional assertions of “objective” truth based on fairly 
disclosed and framed best evidence as the fundamental touchstone of that 
commitment.
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Immigration and  
Islamophobia: Breitbart  
and the Trump Party
On June 17, 2015, Donald Trump launched his campaign with this now- 
famous statement:
The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems. 
[Applause] Thank you. It’s true, and these are the best and the finest. 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re 
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that 
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And 
some, I assume, are good people.1
Immigration was to become the topic most associated with Donald Trump’s 
candidacy, as we saw in Figure 1.1. It became his primary agenda item, and 
his supporters were primed throughout this period to judge him by how he 
implemented his core agenda. In terms of framing, as we will see in this chapter, 
despite Trump’s initial emphasis on Mexico, and even though as a matter of 
practical policy, immigration in the United States involves Latino immigrants 
much more than immigrants from Muslim countries, over the course of the 
campaign immigration came to be framed primarily in anti- Muslim terms.
The centrality of immigration as an agenda item and its framing as centrally 
concerned with Muslims, and in particular with “radical Islamic terrorism,”2 
explain why within a week of coming to office President Trump signed the 
first version of his “Muslim ban.” This executive order sought to stop all 
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immigration from several Muslim- majority countries, purportedly to prevent 
the entry of terrorists. The order was poorly conceived as a matter of policy 
and constitutionality, and had to be revised several times before it could pass 
judicial scrutiny. But it was first and foremost a symbol of faith— Donald 
Trump keeping faith with the central claim of his run— that America was deeply 
threatened by Muslim immigrants and that immigration was a leading vector for 
physical threats to Americans— Islamist terrorists, crime, and disease. Because 
immigration, particularly with this anti- Muslim inflection, plays a central role 
in the rise of far- right parties in Europe, understanding the media dynamics 
around the emergence of immigration as the core agenda shaping feature of the 
Trump candidacy and its framing in Islamophobic terms offers a clear bridge 
between the American- centered analysis we offer here and the dynamics that are 
putting stress on Europe’s pluralistic, democratic institutions as well.
Agenda Setting: This Election  
Is About Immigration
In 1980 Ronald Reagan concluded his nomination acceptance speech with an 
embrace of immigration from all over the world:
Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this island 
of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world who yearn 
to breathe freely: Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the 
Iron Curtain, the boat people of Southeast Asia, of Cuba and Haiti, 
the victims of drought and famine in Africa, the freedom fighters of 
Afghanistan and our own countrymen held in savage captivity.
He then called the assembled to pray. This view of immigration was not 
meaningfully contested in the Republican Party at the time. During the primaries, 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush were asked in one of their debates whether “the 
children of illegal aliens should be allowed to access Texas public schools free,” or 
should they be required to pay a fee. Bush emphasized the immigrants’ humanity 
and their hard- working families, and insisted that their children should be given 
everything that society gives to their neighbors, and that 6- and 8- year- olds 
should not be kept uneducated or “made to feel they are living outside the law.” 
Reagan responded with a greater focus on national security, emphasizing that 
high unemployment in Mexico could lead to a revolution and create hostile 
relations. On this basis he emphasized the need for free flow of labor across the 
border, rather than building a fence, as the only safety valve against that threat.3 
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Unsurprisingly in that political environment, Reagan signed an immigration 
reform bill in 1986 that strengthened border security while granting amnesty to 
all immigrants who had entered illegally before 1982.
It was in 1992 that Pat Buchanan first ran in the Republican presidential 
primary with a campaign that called for a fence on the southern border and 
touted an anti- immigrant, anti- trade, “America First” message. Buchanan, 
who had worked for the Nixon administration, was primarily known as the 
conservative firebrand on CNN’s “Crossfire” and the nationally syndicated 
television show, “The McLaughlin Group.” He repeated the run in 1996. 
In neither case was he successful. Throughout the 1990s and up until 2006, 
attitudes toward immigrants in general and on the question of whether they 
were a benefit or a burden to the country, were largely similar among Republican 
and lean- Republican voters and Democratic and lean- Democratic voters.4 
Following the collapse of a series of bipartisan efforts to pass comprehensive 
immigration reform in 2005, 2006, and 2007, led by both Republican 
Party and Democratic Party leadership and supported by President George 
W. Bush, partisan views on immigration began to diverge sharply. Part of this 
may be due to Latino voters, who, disappointed with the Republican Party’s 
opposition to comprehensive immigration reform, shifted from a near even 
split of Republicans and Democrats toward a more consistently Democratic 
vote. While George W.  Bush had won 44  percent of the Hispanic vote, 
Mitt Romney won only 27 percent of that vote.5 Part of the effect was likely 
accounted for by the broader political polarization dynamics we discuss in 
Chapters 10 and 11. Be that as it may, the Republican National Committee’s 
postmortem of the 2012 election, written by a taskforce formed by then- RNC 
Chair Reince Priebus, who later became Donald Trump’s first White House 
chief of staff, explicitly emphasized the long- term threat of losing Hispanic 
voters as a block and insisted that Republicans had to find a way to appeal 
to Latino voters and that “among the steps Republicans take in the Hispanic 
community and beyond we must embrace and champion comprehensive 
immigration reform. If we do not, our Party’s appeal will continue to 
shrink to its core constituencies only. We also believe that comprehensive 
immigration reform is consistent with Republican economic policies that 
promote job growth and opportunity for all.”6 Going into the 2016 election, 
at a bare minimum the Republican establishment wanted to emphasize 
growth, tax cuts, and deregulation, not immigration, and it certainly did not 
want Republicans to run on an agenda hostile to immigrants. Throughout 
the primaries, Fox News largely downplayed immigration, except in response 
to comments such as Trump’s announcement of his candidacy. But candidate 
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Trump, in a mutually reinforcing dynamic with Breitbart and the ecosystem 
of sites around it, would not follow the GOP playbook.
Immigration was Breitbart’s issue long before Trump gave it the perfect 
candidate. Figure 4.1 tracks the number of sentences per day that mentioned 
variations of the term “immigration” between the re- election of Barack 
Obama in November 2012 and the end of Trump’s first year in office across 
four of the top right- wing sites— Fox News, the New York Post, Breitbart, and 
the Daily Caller— as well as the Wall Street Journal to represent business- 
conservative opinion, and CNN, as a baseline for mainstream media.
Figure 4.1 makes clear that Breitbart consistently produced substantially 
more stories that mention immigration than any of these other leading sites 
both during the 2014 fights over President Obama’s efforts to revive 
comprehensive immigration reform and during the primary. Breitbart’s rise 
within the right wing accelerated after it expanded its staff and opened offices 
in Texas and London in February of 2014,7 likely funded by a $10  million 
invest ment from Robert Mercer.8 Its prominence was revived in response to 
the Trump announcement of his campaign and his placing immigration at the 
center of his candidacy. Beginning in July 2015 and continuing through Election 
Day in 2016, Breitbart carried between two and five times as much coverage 
that mentioned immigration as any of the other sites, including the major right- 
wing sites. Overall, as Figure 4.2 describes, nearly 1 out of every 25 sentences 
in Breitbart’s election- related corpus over the course of the election period 
mentioned immigration, between two and three times as many as other major 
publications across the partisan spectrum. Nonetheless, analyzing the peaks 
Figure 4.1 Sentences mentioning immigration across six top media outlets, November 
2012– February 2018.
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and troughs of coverage during the 2016 election, all but one of the peaks are 
responses to statements that Trump made on the campaign trail. Recognizing 
this allows us to put things in perspective. While as we document in a good 
bit of detail here, Breitbart was the lead singer in the anti- immigrant right- 
wing choir, Trump was very much chorus master.
Breitbart played a large role by not only producing its own immigration 
stories but also acting as a source of stories and authority for other sites on 
the right and as the center of attention among social media users who shared 
content from right- wing sites on Twitter or Facebook. As a source of authority, 
Breitbart and the anti- immigration think tank, Center for Immigration Studies 
(CIS), were the only right- partisan sites in the 10 most linked- to sites discussing 
immigration. Table 4.1 lists the top 20 sites by number of inlinks from a topic 
































































Figure 4.2 Proportion of sentences in each media outlet that mention immigration.
Table 4.1 Most linked- to sites discussing immigration during the election.
Media Source Media Inlinks Stories
Washington Post 723 2572
New York Times 719 2135
Pew Research Center 708 309
Breitbart 497 2300
Guardian 462 2795
Migration Policy Institute 412 357
Reuters 404 1169
Center for Immigration Studies 365 500
(Continued)
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Figure 4.3 Map of sites discussing immigration during the election period. Architecture 
and node sizing by media inlinks.




Huffington Post 328 1905
DonaldJTrump.com 327 9
US Citizenship and Immigration Services 304 128
Fox News 297 1128
Vox 253 1027
USA Today 250 761
The Hill 242 509
Real Clear Politics 238 484
Washington Examiner 221 366
Table 4.1 (Continued)
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Figure 4.3 shows a network map of the linking patterns among 
immigration- related stories and sites. This map shows that Breitbart, 
CIS, and Fox News were the major sources of authority on the right and 
were insulated from the rest of the media ecosystem, which was anchored 
around the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Pew Research 
Center.
One way of assessing the distinct nature of the right wing from the 
rest of the map is to run a community- detection algorithm on the map. 
These algorithms are designed to analyze the network and identify sets of 
sites that are sufficiently interconnected to each other to form a distinct 
subnetwork, or community, within the whole. We ran the commonly used 
Louvain community detection algorithm several times, tuning it to produce 
more or fewer communities. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show that the subnetwork 
Figure  4.4 Link- based map of immigration stories during the election. Node colors 
reflect modularity class, Louvain community detection, resolution 1.0.
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anchored around Breitbart, Fox, and CIS is more homogenous and retains 
its coherence as a community even as distinctions begin to emerge in other 
parts of the network.
When measured by social media sharing, Breitbart again dominates 
the network, and the right is even more clearly separated from the rest of 
the network. Figure 4.6 shows the network with nodes sized by Facebook 
shares. The Wall Street Journal appears far from the right- wing ecosystem 
on the issue of immigration, reflecting the fact that its immigration 
coverage maintained its business- friendly free trade stance even as most 
other right- wing media had reoriented their immigration coverage into the 
Breitbart orbit.
In general, the list of top sites by Twitter sharing includes more of the 
right- wing sites than was true of the list of top sites by links from other top 
sites (Table 4.2).
Figure  4.5 Link- based map of immigration stories during the election. Node colors 
reflect modularity class, Louvain community detection, resolution 2.0.
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Figure 4.6 Map of sites discussing immigration during the election period. Architecture 
by co- tweets. Nodes sized by number of Facebook shares.
Table 4.2 Most tweeted sites discussing immigration during the election.
Media Source Twitter Shares Stories Facebook Shares 
(thousands)
Breitbart 50913 1767 15037
Guardian 22718 1222 7732
New York Times 21668 1484 19122
Reuters 19585 928 1058
Fox News 19267 1154 2436
Wall Street Journal 16744 595 1167
(Continued)
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Framing: Immigration Is About Personal Security, 
Particularly Fear of Muslims and Islamic Terrorism
While for most of the American media ecosystem immigration in America 
was primarily focused on undocumented immigrants who were already in 
the United States, or on the southern border and immigration from Mexico 
and elsewhere in Latin America, the Breitbart- centered right- wing media 
ecosystem framed immigration primarily in terms of fear of Muslims, Islam, 
and Islamic terrorism. We can get an initial feel for what this frame looks like 
by reading the headlines of the 20 immigration- related stories published on 
Breitbart and most widely shared on Facebook (Table 4.3). Sixteen of these 
20 stories were framed in terms of a Muslim threat, three of these combined 
fear of Muslims with other themes. Not a single story of these top 20 was 
focused purely on immigration from Latin America, and only two included 
that concern alongside fear of Muslims.
Media Source Twitter Shares Stories Facebook Shares 
(thousands)
Pew 13397 172 274
Huffington Post 13243 793 4814
Washington Post 12574 904 7477
Yahoo! News 11793 1044 2906
BBC 10628 1155 5582
Los Angeles Times 10439 484 1157
Washington Examiner 10393 1836 1581
Business Insider 8442 263 918
Judicial Watch 7283 74 2495
Infowars 6556 207 1996
Daily Mail 6445 959 5636
NPR 5993 338 2007
The Hill 5828 368 1911
Washington Times 5810 508 875
Daily Caller 5349 263 923
Think Progress 5151 202 97
Free Beacon 4945 73 472
Vice 4784 225 602
Forbes 4701 258 538
Table 4.2 (Continued)
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Table 4.3 Most Facebook- shared immigration stories  
on Breitbart, election period; by frame.












Migrant Video Going 
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Table 4.3 (Continued)











Paris Terrorist Was 
Migrant Who 
Registered as a 
Refugee in Greece
√
Donald Trump Calls 
for Complete 
Shutdown of 
Muslims Entering the 
United States
√
After Paul Ryan Funds 
Visas for 300,000 
Muslim Migrants, 
House Republicans 







Paul Ryan Betrays 
America: $1.1 
Trillion, 2,000- Plus 
Page Omnibus Bill 
Funds
√ √ √ √ √
Panic Mode: Khizr 
Khan Deletes Law 
Firm Website that 




Schlafly Makes the 
Case for President 
Trump: “Only 
Hope to Defeat the 
Kingmakers”
√ √ √
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Shock Poll: 51% of 
U.S. Muslims Want 




Clinton to Resettle 




South Carolina House 
Passes Bill Excluding 



















Things look more or less the same when looking at the top most tweeted 
stories (Table 4.4). Here, 14 of the 20 stories are framed in terms of fear of 
Muslims, three in terms of Latin American immigration, either alone or in 
combination with Muslim immigration.
And again, looking at the stories with the highest number of links on the 
web, we see only a slight shift toward other topics, but still 60 percent of the 
coverage focused on fear of Muslims (Table 4.5).
Table 4.3 (Continued)
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Table 4.4 Most tweeted immigration stories on Breitbart,  
election period, by frame.
Title Jobs Burden on 
the state
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Convicted Criminal 











Migrants to U.S. 
Border, Many From 
Al- Shabaab Terror 
Hotbed
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Six Diseases Return 




Paul Ryan Says U.S. 
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Migrants, Sends Kids 
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(Continued)
Title Jobs Burden on 
the state
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Title Jobs Burden on 
the state





In Wake of Orlando 
Shooting, Paul Ryan 
Pushes Business 
Deregulation; Says 
U.S. Can’t Pause 
Muslim Migration
√
Only Ten Percent 
of Migrant Influx 
Has Reached Us So 
Far, Says German 
Minister
√
U.S. Resettled Nearly 
Three Quarters of 
a Million Migrants 
from Countries that 
Execute Gays
√
30 Million Illegal 
Immigrants in US, 
Says Mexico’s Former 
Ambassador
√
Since 9/ 11 U.S. Has 





Ryan’s Strategy to 
“Keep the American 
People Safe” 
Fails: U.S. to Issue 
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Table 4.5 Most linked- to immigration stories  
on Breitbart on the open web, election period, by frame.
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Migrants Under One 
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By diverse measures of “top,” these lists of top immigration stories from 
Breitbart offer an immediate sense of the more quantitative text analysis to 
which we now turn to understand how the right differed from the rest of the 
media ecosystem. They emphasize Muslim immigrants and a fear of Islamist 
terrorism more than they focus on Hispanic or Latin American immigration, 
and they work to evoke fear and disgust through claims that immigrants are 
disease carriers and criminals. The appeal to visceral feelings becomes clearer 
yet when looking at the top immigration headlines of the Gateway Pundit, 
the fifth- most tweeted and third- most Facebook- shared site on the right 
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across the entire election coverage, which made sure no one would miss the 
message. Its most shared stories included titles like:
Droves of African Migrants Amass at Mexican Border Waiting U.S. 
Asylum Under Secret Obama Pact
Obama Changes Law: Allows Immigrants with Blistering STDs and 
Leprosy into U.S.
Muslim Immigrant Arrested After Purchasing Firearm for ISIS Attack 
on U.S. Soil
Trump Was Right => At Least Nine American Members of ISIS Were 
Immigrants to U.S.
To expand our view from this top- level analysis, we look at many thousands 
of sources, of which about 4,000 sources published more than three 
immigration- related stories over the entire election period. This broad lens 
allows us not only to understand the frame produced by Breitbart but also 
to examine the influence of explicitly white- nationalist publications on the 
debate and begin to consider to what extent these sites influenced the 2016 
election, in particular through framing and pushing the immigration debate. 
Our analysis suggests that white nationalists actually played a peripheral role. 
To the extent they had an influence it was only through the bridging function 
that Breitbart played— cleansing their rhetoric from its most explicitly anti- 
semitic and racist rhetoric, and turning it into the Islamophobic language that 
the lists above illustrate. VDARE, the most widely linked and influential of 
the white- nationalist sites, was the only white- nationalist site that reached the 
top 100 most linked sites in the immigration set. When measured by tweets 
or Facebook shares, it did not break the top 1,000 sites. The Daily Stormer, 
one of the more notorious neo- Nazi sites, did not break the top 1,000 sites by 
linking, or the top 3,000 by Facebook sharing.
Working in collaboration with our colleague Bruce Etling, we analyzed 
over 180,000 immigration- related stories, training eight different machine 
learning algorithms to identify stories as “white nationalists,” right, center- 
right, center, center- left, and left. We deviate in this from our standard 
partisanship metric in order to get purchase on the influence of the white 
nationalists. Out of the “right” set we drew 36 sites that were categorized as 
“white nationalist” by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Wikipedia, and an 
analysis of election- related Twitter clusters by an analytics firm with which 
we have often collaborated, Graphika.9 We then created sets of sites that our 
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retweet- partisanship scores identified as we described in Chapter  2, except 
that we excluded from that set any sites that we already identified as white 
nationalists. We trained eight algorithms on 3,000 stories from these five 
quintiles plus the nationalists to recognize whether a given story falls into 
one or another of the categories. We analyzed the remainder of the 180,000 
stories using these algorithms and treated a story as within a given category 
when at least six of the eight algorithms agreed on which category the story 
fit in. The algorithms had the hardest time distinguishing between center, 
center- left, and left stories, and had the highest accuracy in identifying white- 
nationalist stories. Figure 4.7 portrays six word clouds that present the top 
100 words among all the stories that our classifier labeled as white nationalist 
and each of the five usual quintiles. We use a standard TF- IDF scheme, which 
looks for which words that appear most frequently in a document such as this 
(say, a story categorized as “white nationalist” or “left”) relative to how often 
it appears in the overall set of documents. The terms in green in the center are 
the most typical of stories in that quintile or set.
What becomes eminently clear in looking at these word clouds is that white 
nationalists are distinctly characterized by their unabashed anti- semitism and 
blatant racism, whereas what characterizes the right quintile without the 
white nationalists, consistent with what the lists of most shared stories from 
Breitbart showed, is an emphasis on Muslims, Islam, and terrorism. The center 
focuses mainly on Mexico, with some attention to Muslims, the center- left 
combines a focus on Mexican and other Latin American immigration with 
a clear emphasis on the Syrian refugee crisis and asylum seekers, and the left 
focuses on deportation, families, and the undocumented as well as Muslim 
immigration and the war in Syria. To some extent what is surprising is the fact 
that the center- right publications seem to have been drawn into emphasizing 
Muslims and Islam more than any term denoting a focus on Latin American 
immigration.
Figure 4.8 uses this data to plot typical sites among the six categories on 
a multidimensional scaling plot. In this plot, each site is plotted between the 
various segments based on the proportion of stories on that site that at least 
six of our algorithms agreed were typical of one or another of the quintiles or 
segments. Several things emerge from this plot. First, media sources across the 
center- through- left spectrum make up a single cluster, with minor differences 
separating them. Just as we saw when mapping based on links, tweets, and 
Facebook shares, here too the center, center- left, and left formed a single 
media ecosystem that discussed similar items in similar language. Second, 
the language that white nationalists use puts them on an entirely different 
126
Figure  4.7 Words most representative of immigration in stories classified by our 
algorithms as white nationalist (top left), right (top right), center- right (mid- left), center 
(mid- right), center- left (bottom left), and left (bottom right).
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plane from everyone else. No site that was not on our original list of white- 
nationalist sites had more than 2  percent of its stories categorized by our 
algorithms as “white nationalist” by its language. Third, Fox News pursues 
a mixed strategy online. We divided the Fox oeuvre into four buckets. We 
separated Fox stories from before May 2016 (fox_ primary) from Fox stories 
from May to November (fox_ general) to see whether Fox significantly 
changed its coverage of immigration after Donald Trump won the election. 
We also analyzed Fox stories from two distinct brands: Fox News Insider and 
Fox Nation. The text analysis shows that Fox moved only slightly from the 
center to the right in the transition from the primaries to the general election. 
Instead, it served its audience right-wing immigration fare through its Fox 
News Insider and Fox Nation properties, both of which clustered tightly 
with Breitbart, the Daily Caller, and the Gateway Pundit. Fourth, and finally, 
the center- right, although its influence was small in the overall election, did 
in fact have a focus and a way of talking about immigration that was highly 
distinctive and different from either the right or the larger cluster made of 
center- through- left outlets.
The major Fox News site’s position close to the center is easy to understand 
when looking at its most widely tweeted stories about immigration, which, 
like the center, emphasize Mexican immigration over Muslim immigration, 
along with a focus on waste of public money and arguments that emphasized 
MDS Plot of Immigration Story Text




















Figure 4.8 Multidimensional scaling plot of top sites, Fox subsets, VDARE, and Daily 
Stormer.
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crime and personal insecurity. Nonetheless, these have a somewhat different 
tone to the headlines we saw from Breitbart or the Gateway Pundit.
ICE spends millions flying illegal immigrant children across U.S.
Con game? Immigrants lying about abuse to stay in the U.S.
Mexico warns Texas not to refuse its immigrants’ babies U.S.  birth 
certificates
US, Mexican governments helping Haitian migrants enter country, 
lawmaker says
US immigration policies allow gangs to thrive in violence- plagued NY 
community, say critics
Mexico issuing transit visas to African migrants flocking to 
U.S.- Mexico border
Although Breitbart assiduously avoided the frankly anti- semitic language 
that so clearly marked the white nationalists, journalistic reporting has 
certainly identified it as a bridge between the white nationalists and the rest 
of the media ecosystem.10 In our own data, this can be seen most clearly by 
following the trajectory of the term “globalist” and how it came to be used by 
Breitbart to denote opponents who historically would have been referred to as 
“neoliberals” or “neoconservatives,” or as “free- traders” or “internationalists.”
Figure 4.9 is a histogram of the average number of sentences per day that 
use the term “globalist” across VDARE, as a marker for the white nationalists; 
Alex Jones, who used the term early in his conspiracy theories; and Breitbart 
from April 2015, when the presidential campaign began, to March of 2018. 
The histogram makes very clear that the term “globalist” was primarily a 
VDARE construct in 2015, although Breitbart used it occasionally late in that 
year, and that Breitbart picked up the term at the height of the primary season 
and then really leaned into it around the party conventions, through the fall 
of the election, and since.
It is also clear that coverage outside the right- wing media ecosystem 
clearly understood that “globalist” was a dog-whistle reference to the cabal of 
Jewish bankers who have filled the imagination of anti- semites at least since 
the Rothschilds replaced the Jewish moneylender in the Christian pantheon 
of villains. Looking at coverage of that term by all the media we code as 
center- right, center, center- left, and left from April 2015 to December of 2015, 
just before it was embraced by Breitbart, there was no ambiguity by anyone 
reporting on usage of the term that that is exactly what it is meant to evoke 
(Figure 4.10). The term “globalist” is surrounded by “cabal,” “banksters,” 
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“neocons,” and the acronym “NWO” (for the “New World Order” conspiracy 
theory that the globalists are seeking to impose is at the center), and “Hillary” 
is accompanied by “jewish.”
That recognition does not disappear as Breitbart begins to adopt the term, 















































































Figure  4.9 Sentences per day mentioning “globalist” in open web media, April 
2015– April 2018.
Figure 4.10 Coverage of the use of the term “globalist” in media from the center- right 
to the left, April– December 2015.
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of Israeli politics, which is to say its governing coalition. Figure 4.11 shows 
that coverage from the center- right through the left still sees the anti- semitic 
overtones of the term, as “Hillary” continues to be associated with “jewish,” 
but the emphasis has shifted to using the term against other opponents, 
particularly in reporting on how Fox Business host and longtime anti- 
immigration voice Lou Dobbs applied the term in a new context— to Evan 
McMullin’s challenge to Trump in Utah, deriding McMullin as “nothing but 
a Globalist, Romney and Mormon Mafia Tool.” (Figure 4.12).
Figure 4.11 Coverage of the use of the term “globalist” in media from the center- right 
to the left, January– November 2016.
Figure 4.12 Lou Dobbs tweet deriding Evan McMullin as a “Globalist, Romney and 
Mormon Mafia Tool.”
Source: https:// twitter.com/ LouDobbs/ status/ 790024160160411648.
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After President Trump took office, as his lead adviser Steve Bannon 
continued to use “globalist” to describe allegedly coherent competing 
ideologies, the recognition was lost that “globalist” is not a description of 
actual positions anyone takes, but a veiled reference to a global conspiracy of 
Jewish bankers. As Figure 4.13 shows, coverage of the term from the center- 
right to the left no longer notes its particular anti- semitic frame.
Few examples capture the transition more clearly than an April 20, 2017, 
story from the New York Times, where the Times reports on yet another twist 
in the Trump administration trade policy. After describing a set of pro- trade 
moves, the Times, apparently oblivious to the origins of the term, cheerfully 
lists the Jews and Jewish bankers in Trump’s orbit as it explained:
The flurry of activity amounts to a comeback by nationalists like Mr. 
Bannon, who views trade as crucial to Mr. Trump’s populist appeal 
but whose star has dimmed after clashes with globalist- minded aides 
like Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump’s son- in- law, and Gary D.  Cohn, the 
former Goldman Sachs banker and lifelong Democrat who is head of 
the National Economic Council.
The outcome of the debate between nationalists and globalists 
remains far from settled.
Figure 4.13 Coverage of the use of the term “globalist” in media from the center- right 
to the left, November 2016– April 2018.
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da132
132
And there you have it. From VDARE conspiracy theory to New York Times 
matter- of- fact reporting in less than 18 months, all through the good graces of 
Breitbart and Bannon.
The fear and loathing of immigrants, so frequently associated with white- 
identity movements in the United States and so visible in right- wing media 
immigration coverage during the election, led many to argue that the white 
nationalists were a major player during the 2016 campaign. Our data suggest 
that, if they did have a major influence, it was only through Breitbart and 
the bridging function that it played in transposing the basic frames of the 
white supremacists to the rest of the right- wing media ecosystem. But 
whether or not we focus on that bridging function, there is no question 
that the interaction between Trump the candidate and Breitbart the media 
outlet set the message that was at the heart of the campaign. That message 
set the agenda, declaring that immigration was the most important issue. 
That message framed immigration as primarily about fear of Muslims, and 
to some extent Africans and Mexicans, who would bring crime, disease, and 
terrorism. And it was a message that needed little help from the fringe. It was 
central to Donald Trump’s campaign itself, and central to the way that the 
most influential media outlets in the right- wing media ecosystem framed the 
immigration debate.
Mobilizing Fear and Loathing: The Clinton 
Foundation and Islamophobia
As we will see in Chapter 6, defining Hillary Clinton in terms of corruption 
was the central success of the Trump campaign and the right- wing media 
ecosystem during the 2016 election. Coverage of the Clinton Foundation in 
particular played a substantial role in a successful campaign, long engineered 
by Bannon and Breitbart, to shape the post- convention debate over the course 
of the month of August 2016, and to orient the debate around allegations 
of corruption surrounding the foundation. But for purposes of this chapter, 
with its focus on the interaction between the candidate and political elites 
and the core of the right- wing media ecosystem to frame the election around 
Islamophobia, we focus instead on how the Clinton Foundation was made 
to do double duty— in the mainstream, discussed primarily in August 2016, 
it was about potential conflicts of interest. But in September and October, 
as mainstream media moved their attention to the presidential debates and 
the Hollywood Access video that captured Donald Trump making lewd 
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comments about women, coverage of the Clinton Foundation became a 
vehicle for reinforcing the core Islamophobic frame that was at the heart of 
the immigration agenda. In the telling of the right- wing media ecosystem, 
Clinton was a traitor who collaborated with the enemy. And the enemy was 
Muslim, and mostly Arab.
Figure 4.14 shows monthly network maps from July to October 2016 of 
stories related to the Clinton Foundation on right- wing sites. These maps 
show that, in August, when mainstream media were focused on the Clinton 
Foundation story, the right- wing media were sparsely connected, directing 
most of their attention via cross- media links to amplifying the legitimating 
stories in the mainstream press. In July, September, and October, by contrast, 
the right- wing network was more densely interconnected, and the Daily 
Caller and Breitbart played a central role.
The Daily Caller in particular played a central role in setting up the 
Clinton Foundation topic in July. The site continued to play a significant 
role during the fall by publishing stories that found little purchase outside 
the right- wing media ecosystem but that stoked the anti- Clinton fervor 
Figure 4.14 Directed linking behavior of right- wing media sources within the Clinton 
Foundation topic during the months of July, August, September, and October 2016.
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among core Trump followers. These stories claimed that Clinton’s behavior 
was criminal rather than merely questionable. In a campaign that expressed 
deep anti- Muslim sentiment, a repeated theme was that Hillary Clinton was 
seriously in hock to Muslim nations. It is here that the stories become a more 
explicit disinformation campaign.
On July 13, 2016, just as the focus on the Clinton Foundation was about 
to intensify, the Daily Caller published one of its most highly tweeted stories, 
“New Ties Emerge Between Clinton And Mysterious Islamic Cleric.” Above 
the fold, the story is breathless:
A newly- released email and lobbying documents filed with Congress 
reveals new ties between Clintonworld and members of a network 
operated by a mysterious Islamic cleric from Turkey. Connections 
between Clinton and acolytes of the imam, Fethullah Gulen, could 
muddle the complex relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, a key 
NATO ally, if the former secretary of state wins the White House.11
The story weaves Clinton Foundation donations into a tapestry of 
insinuations of corruption and influence by Gulenists in the Clinton 
Foundation and State Department. Many of the discrete incidents reported 
are likely factual. Reading carefully and skeptically below the fold reveals a 
loosely connected set of observations about a network that threatened the 
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his own country, but that was 
likely more Western- oriented and less Islamic in its political orientation than 
Erdogan’s own party. The overall tenor and import, however, was intended 
to produce a belief that Clinton was working closely with a subversive 
“Islamic cleric.”
The most tweeted stories in October from the Daily Caller make its 
stance clear and are consistent with our observations about the immigration 
subtopic and the overall prominence of anti- Muslim stories in the right- wing 
quintile. The most tweeted story was headlined “Clinton Charity Got Up To 
$56 Million From Nations That Are Anti- Women, Gays,” accompanied by the 
image reproduced in Figure 4.15 and describing various contributions to the 
foundation from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia.
The second- most tweeted story ran under the headline 
“WIKILEAKS: Here’s How The Clinton’s Free Private Jet Scam Works.”12 
It offered a case study in how disinformation is created by weaving bits and 
pieces of evidence into a fundamentally misleading presentation that, again, 
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implied inappropriate connections between Hillary Clinton and influential 
Muslims. Above the fold it read:
Ira Magaziner, the CEO of the Clinton Health Access Initiative, asked 
former President Bill Clinton to thank Morocco’s King Mohammed 
VI for “offering his plane to the conference in Ethiopia.” 
“CHAI would like to request that President Clinton call Sheik 
Mohammed to thank him for offering his plane to the conference in 
Ethiopia,” Magaziner gushed in a November 22, 2011 email released by 
WikiLeaks. 
Clinton frequently has expected free, luxurious private jet travel 
during his post- presidential life. Clinton, his wife and daughter have 
artfully secured free air travel and luxurious accommodations since 
they left the White House. It’s an effective way to accept gifts of great 
value without declaring them for the Clinton Foundation.
“It’s highly illegal and it’s likely that the owners of these aircraft 
took tax deductions as a gift to the Clinton Foundation,” Charles 
Ortel, a Wall Street analyst and critic of the Clinton Foundation, told 
The Daily Caller News Foundation.
Later in the same story the Daily Caller reported:  “In the Moroccan case, 
Clinton was able to fly for free, jetting 3,367 miles from Rabat, Morocco, to 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the King’s specially equipped 747- 400 jumbo jet.” 
Further along it made this seemingly incriminating statement: “But neither the 
Clinton Foundation nor CHAI have listed any ‘non- cash contributions’— such 
as free jumbo jet travel— on their 2011 tax return for the free use of the aircraft.”
Figure  4.15 Image shared by the Daily Caller alongside the article “Clinton Charity 
Got Up To $56 Million From Nations That Are Anti- Women, Gays.”
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Reading the actual email on which the story is based makes clear that the 
story is pure bunk. The email, part of WikiLeaks’ Podesta emails dump,13 
included the quoted words, but stated nearly the opposite of what the story 
implies:
CHAI would like to request that President Clinton call Sheik 
Mohammed to thank him for offering his plane to the conference in 
Ethiopia and expressing regrets that President Clinton’s schedule does not 
permit him to attend the conference. (emphasis added).
In other words, according to the email there was no flight, and Bill Clinton 
did not go to the conference. Moreover, the email says that the offer came 
from “Sheikh Mohammed,” not “King Mohammed,” two very different titles. 
If anything in the Daily Caller story is true, it is likely that the person the story 
describes as “Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Al- Amoudi,” a businessman who 
is not the king of Morocco but whom the story describes as organizing the 
conference in Ethiopia, offered the flight. But leaving King Mohammed of 
Morocco out of the story would have made it harder to weave in the factoid that 
“[n] ot including the flight, King Mohammed has donated at least $28 million 
to the Clinton Foundation.” After we published this story in our August 2017 
report, the Daily Caller called us and asked for our data; they questioned one 
of us about his personal political campaign donations, presumably trying to 
find embarrassing information. In the end, they just removed the story from 
their site and issued a retraction. But that was long after the campaign had 
ended and the role the story was meant to play had run its course.
Here, as elsewhere in the campaign, emails played a critical role as concrete, 
material “evidence” for fantasized conspiracy. As Richard Hofstadter 
presciently wrote in his classic piece on the paranoid style in American 
politics,
A final characteristic of the paranoid style is related to the quality of its 
pedantry. One of the impressive things about paranoid literature is the 
contrast between its fantasied conclusions and the almost touching 
concern with factuality it invariably shows. It produces heroic strivings 
for evidence to prove that the unbelievable is the only thing that can 
be believed.
But respectable paranoid literature not only starts from certain 
moral commitments that can indeed be justified but also carefully and 
all but obsessively accumulates “evidence.” The difference between this 
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“evidence” and that commonly employed by others is that it seems less 
a means of entering into normal political controversy than a means 
of warding off the profane intrusion of the secular political world. 
The paranoid seems to have little expectation of actually convincing a 
hostile world, but he can accumulate evidence in order to protect his 
cherished convictions from it.14
The ability to scour emails for “evidence” and to locate, quote, and link to 
actual secret documents offers a paradise for paranoid logic. In large bodies 
of documentation almost anything can be found in writing if one is engaged 
in motivated observation and reasoning. The fact that the emails were private 
and were pried loose from unwilling hands (whether through Freedom of 
Information Act litigation or hacking) enhanced their claim to veracity. 
Precisely because these were private conversations among the conspirators 
that they wished to deny the public, the emails became totems of truth in the 
paranoid imagination of the world.
Another major feature of network propaganda is the repetition of claims 
and statements so that they become familiar and easily recalled. (For example, 
the Daily Caller “jet scam” story ends, for good measure, with a reprise of 
the “Lolita Express” story as “perhaps the most notorious freebie flights” 
Clinton took.) Unsurprisingly, therefore, the next most tweeted story from 
the Daily Caller, published on the same day by the same reporter as the “jet 
scam” story, was “Hillary’s Two Official Favors To Morocco Resulted In $28 
Million For Clinton Foundation.”15 The major part of the story was an utterly 
unsubstantiated and unsourced claim that in 2011 Clinton had gotten EPA 
head Lisa Jackson to try to shut down Mosaic Fertilizer, described as America’s 
largest phosphate mining company, in exchange for a $15 million donation to 
the Clinton Foundation from King Mohammed VI of Morocco, ostensibly 
to benefit Morocco’s state- owned phosphate company. The only evidence of 
Clinton’s supposed control over Jackson, which would allow the secretary of 
state, without any authority and contrary to law, to direct a regulatory action 
by an agency, was that two years later, in 2013, Jackson would join the board of 
the Clinton Foundation. As the foundation’s disclosure form shows, Jackson 
was paid exactly $0 for this “reward.”16
The Daily Caller story did not offer any details as to what regulatory 
action Jackson supposedly took at the behest of Hillary Clinton. The article 
reported vaguely, “The regulatory assault against the U.S. phosphate agency 
began in earnest when Jackson launched a barrage of intimidating regulatory 
initiatives against Mosaic.” Indeed, the article noted that there had been 
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environmental concerns about phosphate production since 1979, “but the 
EPA did little to address concerns related to phosphates until Jackson’s 
2011 moves.” Jackson’s and Clinton’s powers were supposedly so great that 
“the regulatory assault on the U.S. phosphate industry encompassed several 
agencies,” including the Department of Homeland Security. And, to top it all, 
the EPA threatened Superfund penalties (the agency’s primary mechanism 
to force and fund cleaning up land contaminated by industrial waste) that 
could have bankrupted Mosaic. The story offered nothing to explain how 
an interdepartmental intervention like this could all have originated with 
the secretary of state based on a personal relationship. It did not note that 
the Department of Justice Environment and Natural Resources Division 
had described in its “Accomplishment Report” for fiscal year 2010 a consent 
decree with Mosaic to spend $30  million to update its site in Uncle Sam, 
Louisiana, and “cease sulphuric acid production in Bartow, Florida.”17 Nor 
did it mention that in 2015 Mosaic agreed to a consent decree with the 
Department of Justice, the EPA, and the EPA’s state equivalents in Florida 
and Louisiana to establish a $1.8 billion fund to clean up hazardous waste at 
six Florida and two Louisiana sites.18 The idea that multi- agency cooperation 
on this level between departments with strong histories of independence and 
encompassing the federal government and two states, would arise from the 
request of a secretary with no authority in the matter, endure for years after 
both she and Lisa Jackson had left government, and result in such a large 
court- approved settlement, is nothing short of fantastical. It is typical of the 
paranoid style of reasoning in American politics that such conspiracies loom, 
and fear and distrust are used to bridge the yawning gaps in logic and evidence.
Despite the absence of detail or evidence, the story quoted two Republican 
representatives, Dennis Ross, whose district includes a Mosaic facility, and 
Marsha Blackburn, who had initiated the letter to the IRS on which the 
Daily Caller began its reporting in late July. According to the story, Ross 
said, “An environmental concern never existed. This targeting was all done 
as a payback to Morocco for donating millions of dollars to the Clinton 
Foundation,” and Blackburn said, “These facts seem to reveal the possibility 
of more pay- to- play activities at the Clinton Foundation.” And yet, again, 
less than a year earlier Mosaic had agreed to create a $1.8 billion cleanup 
fund in a consent decree not only with the EPA but with the Department 
of Justice and the Florida and Louisiana environmental agencies as well. 
Active participation of elected politicians, acting as a source or attesting to 
the credibility of the story, underscores the extent to which it is a mistake 
to understand the present epistemic crisis in technological terms, or purely 
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in terms of Russian intervention. And while it is in principle possible that 
the author and publisher of these stories were themselves too far gone 
through the looking glass to recognize the yawning gaps in their own logic, 
the much more natural explanation is that they were simply propagandists, 
intentionally manipulating their audience on the eve of the election to help 
mobilize their base to vote out of fear and hatred of their opponent. Partisan 
propaganda, intended to achieve political advantage, sometimes driven and 
often supported by political elites indifferent to the truth, is a central part 
of the story. This interaction between partisan media and party elites is a 
constituent dynamic of the propaganda feedback loop.
The sheer implausibility of the story did not prevent other outlets from 
repeating it. Fox News republished Pollock’s story essentially unchanged,19 
whereas more extreme outlets led with the subtext, as in this headline: 
“LEAK— Muslims Paid Hillary $28 MILLION To Do THIS, It’s SICK.”20 
The anti- Muslim theme was reinforced in the next most tweeted Daily Caller 
story about the Clinton Foundation in October, “Here’s A (Dirty) Laundry 
List Of The Clinton Foundation’s Most Questionable Foreign Donations.”21 
Other than the Russian donation said to have been tied to the Uranium One 
deal, all the foreign donations noted were from Muslim- majority countries— 
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman.
The Podesta email dump provided a new cache of evidence with 
which to work. The Daily Caller story most linked to (as opposed to most 
tweeted) in October 2016 was “Hillary In Leaked Email: Saudi Arabia And 
Qatar Are Funding ISIS,” which exposes another characteristic of network 
propaganda: the reworking of stories into a shared folklore.22 The Daily Caller 
story itself was reasonable in its basic frame. It cited an email from Clinton to 
John Podesta in which Clinton outlined a plan to defeat ISIS. This anti- ISIS 
plan emphasized arming the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government with heavier 
weapons than had been done in the past, supporting special operations, and 
seeking help for the Free Syrian Army or similar moderate paramilitary groups 
in Syria. Clinton added: “While this military/ paramilitary operation is moving 
forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence assets 
to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are 
providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical 
Sunni groups in the region.” Focusing on this language, the Daily Caller story 
reminded its readers that Qatar and Saudi Arabia had both donated to the 
Clinton Foundation and reported that “[t] he Clinton campaign has not 
replied to a Daily Caller inquiry about whether the Clinton Foundation will 
return donations from these two nations that, according to Hillary Clinton, 
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fund ISIS.” In context of the repeated flow of stories connecting the Clinton 
Foundation to Arab and Muslim funders, the implication that she knew that 
these donors had funded ISIS was far less benign.
That thesis was at the heart of the story that became the most Facebook- 
shared October story on Ending the Fed (Figure  4.16), the site that filled 
five of the top 10 spots on BuzzFeed’s list of most widely shared “fake news” 
stories. Ending the Fed’s headline read: “IT’S OVER: Hillary’s ISIS Email Just 
Leaked & It’s Worse Than Anyone Could Have Imagined.”23 It opens with 
the sentence “Today Wikileaks released what is, by far, the most devastating 
leak of the entire campaign. This makes Trump’s dirty talk video look like an 
episode of Barney and Friends.” Offering a screenshot of the email from the 
WikiLeaks site, the story states:
Assange promised his latest batch of leaks would lead to the indictment 
of Hillary, and it looks like he was not kidding. The email proves 
Hillary knew and was complicit in the funding and arming of ISIS by 
our “allies” Saudi Arabia and Qatar!
Figure  4.16 Sites linking to the WikiLeaks email entitled Congrats!, which includes 
the statement regarding ISIS and Saudi and Qatari funding. Nodes sized by the number 
of Facebook shares the sites received for all email- linked stories on each site.
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The media is yet to report on this, even though Wikileaks has a 
10  year history of being 100% accurate in their leaks, never once 
releasing info that proved to be false.
. . . Can you guess why?
Maybe it has something to do with the fact that The Saudi’s brag about 
funding 20% of Hillary’s Presidential campaign, and along with Qatar, 
are among the largest donors to the CLINTON FOUNDATION.
While the original Daily Caller article presented a plausible framing— Clinton 
should return donations given by governments that were also supporting 
ISIS— the Ending the Fed story ramped it up, claiming that the email proved 
that “Hillary knew and was complicit in the funding and arming of ISIS by our 
‘allies’ Saudi Arabia and Qatar.” Not only that, it alleged that the media were 
not reporting on this because the Saudis bragged that they funded 20 percent 
of Clinton’s presidential campaign and were among the largest donors to the 
Clinton Foundation. One can read the paragraph as many times as one wishes 
and still come up short in explaining how a series of non sequiturs adds up to 
the idea that Hillary Clinton admitted to funding and arming ISIS. However, 
the repeated insinuations that the Clinton Foundation was a funnel through 
which various Muslim governments (especially Saudi Arabia) got Clinton to 
do their bidding, and the intentional conflation of foundation donations and 
personal speaking fees with pay- to- play corruption, had long been circulating 
throughout the right- wing media environment.
The 20  percent funding claim originated in a June 14 story on Zero 
Hedge24 and was repeated and amplified that same day by Fox News25 (Fox 
has since removed the evidence of its republication of this story from its 
site and blocked its archiving by the Internet Archive) and Infowars.26 The 
origin of the story raises many questions. Apparently on Sunday, June 12, 
the Jordanian Petra News Agency published a story claiming that the then- 
Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had provided an exclusive 
interview in which he claimed that Saudi Arabia had provided 20 percent of 
the Clinton campaign’s funds. The report was soon removed, and the Petra 
News Agency issued a press release asserting that its system had been hacked 
and that the hack was the source of the bogus report.27 Before the story was 
removed, however, it was captured by a Washington- based think tank, the 
Institute for Gulf Affairs, whose focus is the Saudi government’s human rights 
violations and the cozy relationship between the United States and the Saudi 
royal family. The story was then published on June 13 in Middle East Eye 
(MEE),28 a U.K.- based site that describes itself as independent but is reported 
by a wide range of outlets to have diverse and conflicting political interests.29
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Despite MEE’s retraction of the story, it had been picked up by Zero 
Hedge and amplified through the network of paranoid right- wing sites. RT 
also reported on the hack and the story, emphasizing the angle that MEE 
had reported that it had been pointed to the Jordanian agency’s error by the 
Podesta Group, the lobbying firm cofounded by John and Tony Podesta, 
which, it said, counts Saudi Arabia as a lucrative client.30 Like the emails, a 
document that was published and then removed offers a peek into occult 
knowledge that confirms conspiracy. Making the accusation by planting 
such a document in a remote site would offer it enormous credibility within 
the network of conspiracy theorists. Certainly, it is not impossible that 
the young, soon- to- be- elevated crown prince made a strategic error in an 
interview with the Jordanian news agency, and Saudi diplomatic power was 
brought to bear to release a bogus retraction and hacking story. For this to 
be the case one would have to assume that the prince in fact made such an 
embarrassing mistake and was nonetheless elevated to crown prince within a 
few months, and that, contrary to law, the Clinton campaign in fact received 
tens of millions of dollars in donations from a foreign government.
The alternative explanation is that the Jordanian agency was in fact hacked 
by someone who intended to harm both the Saudi government and the 
Clinton campaign. Such a hack would be similar to the hack of the Qatari 
news agency, which has variously been blamed on Russia31 or the United 
Arab Emirates.32 Even if a Muslim or Arab adversary aimed the original hack 
primarily at the Saudi government, its importation into the U.S. campaign fed 
into a strong racist, anti- Muslim narrative. The image of a laughing Clinton, 
on the background of squinting or self- satisfied Arabs and piles of dollars that 
accompanied the Infowars republication of the Zero Hedge story, leaves little 
for interpretation (Figure 4.17).
Even if we accept that Ending the Fed (which ceased operations shortly after 
Trump’s election) was a quintessential “fake news” site, a clickbait fabricator 
designed to make money by reaping Facebook advertising dollars, it did not 
rely solely on making up stories out of whole cloth, as in the notorious story 
claiming that the pope had endorsed Donald Trump, to serve as clickbait. It 
depended more heavily on stories from major nodes in the right- wing media 
ecosystem— from Zero Hedge to Fox News and Infowars— that created, 
replicated, and offered credence to various elements of stories that could then 
be recombined into new, believable conspiracy theories. If Ending the Fed 
had a meaningful role in influencing the debate; it was the amplification of 
already circulating tropes whose currency and efficacy depend on their being 
broadly familiar and intuitively recognizable— like canonical folk tales— to 
their readers. Such sites should be considered important if there is measurable 
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reason to think that their amplification contributed substantially to the effect 
produced by the network as a whole. The prominence of Ending the Fed on 
Facebook, coupled with the fact that a sizable group of voters used Facebook 
as a major source of news, suggests that such an amplification effect is at least 
possible. As we explain in more detail in Chapter 9, measuring that influence 
would be difficult because credibility in the field depends on embeddedness 
in an epistemic network, and truth or falsity will depend heavily on the 
familiarity and identity value of the elements of the story.
The “Hillary helped fund and arm ISIS” story depends on a rich shared 
narrative created by media that have longer and deeper purchase on the 
minds of those who are exposed to it. If such stories were believed, it is almost 
certainly because the sustained effort to tie all these themes together was 
central to the right- wing media ecosystem, as the sixth- most Facebook- shared 
Breitbart story of the entire 18- month period suggests: “Clinton Cash: Khizr 
Khan’s Deep Legal, Financial Connections to Saudi Arabia, Hillary’s Clinton 
Foundation Tie Terror, Immigration, Email Scandals Together.” In the 
paranoid imagination, all threads tie together.
And then there is Sean Hannity, host of the most- watched show on Fox 
News. On the same day that the Ending the Fed story came out, Hannity ran 
a segment, with Sebastian Gorka, who would become a deputy assistant to the 
Figure 4.17 Infowars story reporting on Zero Hedge’s story that links Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign to Saudi funding, June 14, 2016.
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president during the first seven months of the Trump administration, built 
around the ISIS funding email. Hannity opened the segment with the words:
more headaches for the Clinton campaign because of the Wikileaks email 
dump. According to the hacked e- mails back in 2014, Hillary Clinton sent 
an email to John Podesta claiming Saudi Arabia and Qatar were both giving 
support to ISIS and other extremist groups. Mind you, Saudi Arabia has 
given up to $25 million dollars to the Clinton Foundation. In addition to 
that, according to the Washington Post, the royal Saudi family, well, they 
gave the Clinton Library around 10 million, and the Clinton Foundation 
took in between $1 and $5 million from the government of Qatar.33
What followed was a diatribe of how “America’s national interest will be in 
the auction block if she becomes Commander in Chief. It will be the highest 
bidder, whether it’s the Saudis or the Russians.” And the corrupt media were 
not going to ask Clinton the hard questions. A week later Donald Trump, 
during the third presidential debate, interjected “she gave us ISIS as sure as 
you are sitting there.”34
Ending the Fed’s story had a truly mind- boggling 750,000 Facebook shares.
Sean Hannity has over three million viewers.
And over 70 million viewers watched the third presidential debate.
As a candidate, Donald Trump ran an outsider’s campaign and used 
immigration, which he insisted on framing in terms of “radical Islamic 
terrorism,” as a battering ram against the walls of the Republican Party 
establishment. The first year of the Trump presidency was marked by escalating 
rhetoric against incumbent establishment Republicans, a large number of 
primary challenges from the far- right candidates against incumbents, and a 
wave of retirements by Republican incumbents ahead of the 2018 elections 
and the primary challenges they were sure to bring. In May 2018 immigration 
became the issue on which the House self- styled “Freedom Caucus,” the most 
radical wing of the Republican House members, blocked passage of a farm 
bill that would have achieved the goals of two major parts of the Republican 
establishment— providing large payments to farmers in core rural states in 
the Republican heartland, and encumbering food assistance for poor people 
consistent with the long- term goal of Reagan Republicans to reduce welfare 
payments. And while Trump did not invent the anti- immigration, anti- trade 
populism on the America right, his candidacy certainly was the fulcrum 
for that wing to achieve its most significant victory, and his presidency has 
provided the platform around which that battle is being fought.
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The Fox Diet
For years we’ve been telling you, journalism is dead.
Sean Hannity
On November 28, 2017, the forty- fifth president of the United States 
asked his 50 million Twitter followers why “our deep State authorities” were 
not investigating “Crooked Hillary” and whether the lack of investigation 
was evidence of a rigged and corrupt system. He concluded this remarkable 
tweet by calling on the two most widely viewed hosts on Fox News: Tucker 
Carlson and Sean Hannity (Figure 5.1).
An American president turning on his own national security establishment 
for failing to attack his political opponent exhibits a troubling authoritarian 
bent. The fact that he leaned on Hannity and Carlson should, by the end of 
2017, have come as no surprise. By that point Fox News had become the lead 
player in what had become the president’s personal propaganda network in 
his battles against the intelligence community, the media, and, increasingly 
Figure 5.1 Donald Trump tweet, November 28, 2017.
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over the course of the year, his make- or- break- struggle against the very idea of 
professionalism in law enforcement and through it the rule of law.
This chapter consists of three detailed case studies of how Fox News 
actively used its position at the core of the right- wing media ecosystem to 
support the president in the central political controversy of his presidency: the 
investigation led by special counsel Robert Mueller into the allegation that 
Russia had intervened in the U.S.  election in support of the candidacy of 
Donald Trump, and the question of whether it had done so in coordination 
with the Trump campaign. The first study describes the emergence of the 
“deep state” as the overarching frame through which the story came to be 
understood in right- wing media as a partisan effort to unseat Donald Trump 
directed by holdovers from the Obama administration in the intelligence 
community and law enforcement. The next two studies involve discrete 
elements of this overarching frame. One case involves the argument that 
Democratic activist Seth Rich was murdered to hide the fact that he, not 
Russia, was responsible for leaking the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) emails. The other case involves use of a story surrounding a company 
called Uranium One to attack the integrity and independence of the key law 
enforcement officers involved in the special counsel investigation. The timing 
and pattern we show in these case studies strongly suggest that they were 
launched for the specific partisan purpose of deflecting the Trump- Russia 
allegations and undermining the special counsel investigation. And in the two 
specifically fact- based cases, we show that Fox News actively promoted these 
stories despite the fact that they were repeatedly fact checked and debunked 
by a wide variety of professional journalists.
In Chapter 2 we saw that the overall architecture of the American media 
environment consists of two highly asymmetric networks and that the 
right was structurally different from the rest. In Chapter  3 we explained 
the propaganda feedback loop and the reality- check dynamic that could 
explain the emergence of such an asymmetric system, and the susceptibility 
of the former to the dissemination and accreditation of disinformation and 
propaganda. In Chapter 4 we showed how Breitbart and Donald Trump as 
a candidate interacted to use the propagandist affordances of the right- wing 
media ecosystem to take over the Republican Party and to mobilize its base in 
the general election. Here, we document how Fox News reasserted its role at 
the center of the right- wing media ecosystem by becoming the central node 
of network propaganda on behalf of an embattled president, on the issue that 
most threatened his legitimacy and possibly his tenure in office. Journalists 
and academics observing the American media system recognize their own 
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biases, and many are therefore reticent to point the finger at Fox. Here, we use 
our large data sets and analytic tools as a source of objective validation that 
what we are seeing is really there, in the content and propagation dynamics 
of the frames and stories we cover. These data warrant the conclusion that 
Fox shares little but a few visual trappings with the world of professional 
journalism at the core of the rest of the U.S.  media system. It is, across its 
online and television properties, America’s leading propaganda outlet.
Deep State: Fox News vs. the  
National Security Establishment
Prior to 2017 usage of the term “deep state” had been almost entirely reserved 
for references to political dynamics in Turkey, Egypt after the Arab Spring, 
and occasionally other Middle Eastern countries. It was generally only used 
in reference to the United States at the periphery, either by the libertarian 
right or the civil- libertarian left. As recently as February 2017, Chris Wallace 
on Fox News skeptically explained the term as he introduced Rush Limbaugh, 
the dean of right- wing talk radio: “You also use a phrase which I have to say 
that I only heard for the first time in the last couple of weeks, the ‘deep state.’ 
And that’s the notion that there’s an Obama shadow government embedded 
in the bureaucracy that is working against this new president.”1 Limbaugh 
responded, “Well, I would love to claim credit for that, but actually, I think 
a reporter by the name of Glenn Greenwald at The Intercept who has got a 
relationship with— what’s his name? Assange. I think he actually coined the 
term. And I think it works. I don’t think— who is driving this business that the 
Russians hacked the election? It’s the Democrat Party. It’s Hillary. It’s Obama.”
Limbaugh was referring to Glenn Greenwald, a longtime defender of 
civil liberties and critic of the national security establishment, best known 
for his role in reporting on the disclosures by Edward Snowden and Chelsea 
Manning. On January 11, 2017, Greenwald published a piece, entitled “The 
Deep State Goes to War with President Elect, Using Unverified Claims, as 
Democrats Cheer.” 2 A week earlier, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence had reported, with little supporting evidence, that the intelligence 
community had high confidence that Russia had hacked the DNC emails and 
meddled in the U.S. election. That same week BuzzFeed had published the 
Steele Dossier, an opposition research dossier that first laid out the allegations 
of Trump relations with Russia.3 Greenwald claimed that the CIA had long 
sought to increase its war- making capacity in Syria and to escalate conflict 
with Russia. He also claimed that Hillary Clinton had supported these goals 
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and that Trump had opposed them. The next day Tucker Carlson invited 
Greenwald to explain his criticism of Democrats and mainstream media to 
roughly three million viewers on Fox News.
By the time Limbaugh appeared on Fox News in mid- February, the frame 
had shifted. Despite citing Greenwald for credibility, Limbaugh’s interview 
captured the essence of an entirely different and new turn that the “deep 
state” frame was to take in 2017:  “It’s the Democrat Party. It’s Hillary. It’s 
Obama.” Before the 2016 presidential election, the term had been applied 
from both ends of the political spectrum— libertarians on the right and the 
civil- libertarian left— to describe a set of entrenched interests that superseded 
both parties and kept both under control. It was a rarely used term that was 
the direct descendant of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s parting warning 
about the power of the “military- industrial complex,” not a partisan cudgel. 
Use of the term, which appeared rarely prior to 2016 election, took a sharp 
upturn in early 2017 (Figure 5.2).
If we analyze the words used in association with “deep state” before and 
after Election Day 2016, the shift is clear. Figure 5.3 compares an image of the 
words most associated with “deep state” from 2012 until Election Day 2016 
(panel a) and an image of words associated with the term from Election Day 
























































Figure 5.2 Sentences per day mentioning “deep state” in the top 50 mainstream media 
and top 50 digital native media, November 2012– March 2018.
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algorithm to show words that appear more commonly together in the 
text as clustered together, while separating word clusters that are usually 
distinct from each other. Before the election of Donald Trump, “deep state” 
was overwhelmingly used to describe Middle Eastern power structures, 
primarily the battles of Erdogan against the original bearer of the “deep 
state” name; the Turkish military and intelligence agencies; and around 
the reassertion of control by Egypt’s military after the failed Arab Spring. 
After the U.S. presidential election the usage was overwhelmingly domestic, 
(a)
Figure 5.3a “Deep state” in top media, November 2012– November 2016.
(b)
Figure 5.3b “Deep state” in top media, November 2016– March 2018.
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emphasizing “Trump” in connection with “intelligence,” “leaks,” “undermine,” 
“coup,” “Fox,” “Hannity,” and “Newt.” Separate clusters associated “Obama,” 
“Hillary,” “Washington,” and the “GOP” on one hand, and “Democrats,” 
“Republicans,” and “globalists,” on the other hand.
Buried right underneath the central word “Egypt” in Figure 5.3a are two 
names, whose size and location on the map suggest they are similarly central 
to this period. The first, “Erdogan,” is less surprising. The second, “Lofgren,” 
is tied to the “Mike” that appears more visibly right under “Turkey.” Both 
identify the most influential effort to import the term to describe American 
politics before the 2016 election. In February 2014 Mike Lofgren, who retired 
in 2011 from a nearly 30- year career as a congressional staffer Republican in 
the House and Senate, published on the Bill Moyers website an essay entitled 
“Anatomy of the Deep State.” 4 In this essay, Lofgren wove together an image 
of a power structure anchored by the major security and intelligence agencies, 
military contractors, and core players in the financial and technology industry, 
all of whom were:
[D] eeply dyed in the hue of the official ideology of the governing class, 
an ideology that is neither specifically Democrat nor Republican. 
Domestically, whatever they might privately believe about essentially 
diversionary social issues such as abortion or gay marriage, they almost 
invariably believe in the “Washington Consensus”:  financialization, 
outsourcing, privatization, deregulation and the commodifying 
of labor. Internationally, they espouse 21st- century “American 
Exceptionalism”: the right and duty of the United States to meddle in 
every region of the world with coercive diplomacy and boots on the 
ground and to ignore painfully won international norms of civilized 
behavior.
It is to this explicitly anti- establishment frame that retired Republican 
Congressman and twice grassroots libertarian candidate in Republican 
presidential primaries Ron Paul was clearly referring when he became the first 
person to use the term in the post- election period in a November 10 interview 
on Fox Business5 and then again in a November 11, 2016 interview on RT.6 
And it is in this same sense that libertarian Doug Casey decried under the 
Zero Hedge persona of Tyler Durden the next day, “I’ve said for years that the 
Demopublicans and the Republicrats are just two wings of the same party. 
One says it’s for social freedom (which is a lie), but is actively antagonistic to 
economic freedom. The other says it’s for economic freedom (which is a lie), 
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but is actively antagonistic to social freedom. Both are controlled by members 
of the Deep State.”7
The “deep state” framing changed in response to a December 9 story by 
the Washington Post entitled “Secret CIA assessment says Russia was trying 
to help Trump win White House”8 and to the Obama administration 
announcement that it had tasked the intelligence community with producing 
a report on cyberattacks in the 2016 election. The next day, an unsigned piece 
under the Tyler Durden pseudonym on Zero Hedge decried “A ‘Soft’ Coup 
Attempt.” Russia Insider published a similarly framed attack, decrying “Silent 
Coup in Progress: American Intelligence Agencies Are Trying to Stop Trump 
From Taking Office.”9 The “coup” construct, together with the “deep state” 
frame reappeared in a piece published on December 12 on antiwar.com, 
informationclearinghouse.info, and Veterans News Now,10 thought to be a 
Russian gray site.11 That same day Paul Joseph Watson of Infowars ran a video 
segment that received half a million views on YouTube that laid out the “deep 
state” theory of the Trump- Russia allegations.12
A story on Breitbart under the pseudonym Virgil reframed the “deep 
state” to include all the forces arraigned against Donald Trump: Democrats, 
the mainstream media, and the Washington swamp.
Do the Democrats want Donald Trump to become the 45th president? 
Of course not. And how about the Democrats’ handmaiden, the Main 
Stream Media? Do they want Trump in the White House? Of course 
not. And how ‘bout all the other affluent residents of the Washington 
“swamp,” which Trump has pledged to drain— do you think any 
of them want Trump? Of course not. Together, these anti- Trump 
constituencies help form what has been called the Deep State . . .13
The story went on to include a quote from the Daily Beast alleging that agents 
within the CIA didn’t like Michael Flynn and “hate[d] Trump’s guts.” Virgil 
theorized that “liberal Democrats have controlled the executive branch for 16 
of the last 24 years, and so there had been plenty of time to cultivate liberals— 
even liberal activists— within the ranks and to bring them to the pinnacles of 
bureaucratic power.” About the military, the piece acknowledged that “[t]o 
be sure, the vast bulk of our nation’s warriors are staunch believers in Douglas 
MacArthur’s trinity of “duty, honor, country. . . .’ Yet still, during the Obama 
years, such patriots have been layered over by liberal apparatchiks. And the 
same left- pushing syndrome has been equally true of all federal security 
agencies.”
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All the elements of the reframed “deep state” were laid out in this 
piece. The “deep state” was no longer a nonpartisan permanent power that 
protected an oligarchy and was equally immune to both parties’ democratic 
claims. Now the “deep state” was a partisan effort to portray Donald Trump’s 
victory as a Russian hack instead of the democratic victory of American 
populism over the Washington establishment. This framing pitted the Trump 
forces of good against Democrats, Obama holdovers in the national security 
establishment (and later law enforcement), the mainstream media, and anti- 
Trump Republicans.
This new partisan “deep state” frame lay dormant for a month after its 
initial birth (except for claims on Infowars by Trump associates Roger Stone 
and Alex Jones that they had each been targeted for assassination by the 
“deep state”).14 Greenwald did not advance this partisan frame in his January 
piece in The Intercept, which was still focused on the persistent power of 
the CIA, its history of lying, and his argument that the CIA was resisting 
Trump because Trump threatened its policy preferences. The partisan frame 
re- emerged in response to the news that Michael Flynn was forced to resign 
his position as national security adviser on February 13, 2017, ostensibly for 
misleading Vice President Mike Pence about having had a phone conversation 
with the Russian ambassador before President Trump took office. The next 
few days saw an explosion of stories and YouTube videos discussing the Flynn 
resignation in terms of the “deep state.” The most highly tweeted story on 
February 14 was a story by Eli Lake on Bloomberg, entitled “The Political 
Assassination of Michael Flynn,” in which Lake argued that “[s] electively 
disclosing details of private conversations monitored by the FBI or NSA 
gives the permanent state the power to destroy reputations from the cloak 
of anonymity. This is what police states do,” and that “Flynn was working to 
reform the intelligence- industrial complex, something that threatened the 
bureaucratic prerogatives of his rivals.”15
Infowars had several segments on YouTube with viewership numbers 
ranging from 50,000 to over 200,000, including the second- and sixth- most 
tweeted stories in our set from that day. The top 10 tweeted stories were 
rounded out by Breitbart stories, PJ Media, a Judicial Watch YouTube video, 
and the appearance of the story entitled “It[’]s over Folks:  The Neocons 
and the ‘Deep State’ Have Neutered the Trump Presidency” by an author 
writing under the pseudonym The Saker on Paul Craig Roberts’s site and 
on Zero Hedge. The Saker’s website tagline is “Stop the War on Russia,” and 
the piece claimed, “Ever since Trump made it to the White House, he has 
taken blow after blow from the Neocon- run Ziomedia, from Congress, from 
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all the Hollywood doubleplusgoodthinking ‘stars’ and even from European 
politicians. [. . .] In order to defeat Trump, the US deep state has had to terribly 
weaken the US and the AngloZionist Empire.”16 Over the next several days, 
Breitbart continued to attract attention with its “deep state” coverage, as did 
Infowars, YouTube videos, and Zero Hedge guest posts.
During February, Fox News began to introduce the “deep state” frame, 
but still ambivalently. On the morning of Flynn’s resignation, Fox News 
commentator and former left- wing U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich 
used the “deep state” frame on the “Mornings With Maria” show on Fox 
Business,17 and that evening Sean Hannity invited Bloomberg’s Eli Lake to 
discuss his claim that Flynn’s removal was a “political assassination” by the 
permanent state. Later that same week, Rush Limbaugh jumped on the 
bandwagon and brought it with him to the interview on Fox News on Sunday 
with Mike Wallace that we described at the opening. Nonetheless, through 
February, Fox News was still generally skeptical of the frame. Wallace asked 
Limbaugh whether this all sounded too conspiratorial; an earlier online Fox 
News story, entitled “Trump knocks down ‘Deep State’ claims,” concluded 
that “what Trump made clear in his press conference today is that he sees it 
for what it is: the political and ideological struggle that always buffets behind- 
the- scenes Washington, not a part of a vast conspiracy.”18
Fox’s stance on the “deep state” changed after President Trump first 
tweeted on March 4, “Terrible! Just found out that Obama had my ‘wires 
tapped’ in Trump Tower just before the victory. Nothing found. This is 
McCarthyism!” and then compared it to Watergate in a subsequent tweet 
that morning. Figure 5.4 documents the explosion of coverage of the deep 
state frame using media attention measured by open web stories, tweets, and 
Google searches.
The publication of the Steele dossier by BuzzFeed and the Flynn firing 
appear as the first spikes in attention. The sharp uptick across all three measures 
in March coincides with the president’s tweets. That was also when Fox News 
embraced the term both online and, more importantly, on television. Lou 
Dobbs’s March 26 interview of Fox analyst Andrew Napolitano on the topic 
became the most widely viewed video on YouTube that month,19 and Dobbs 
returned to the topic two days later to accuse the “deep state” and the “national 
left- wing media” of “a full- on assault on the President of the United States.”20 
Not to be undone, Hannity cheerfully added the authoritarian terminology of 
“purge” on March 10: “Deep- state Obama holdovers embedded like barnacles 
in the federal bureaucracy are hell- bent on destroying President Trump. It’s 
time for the Trump administration to purge these saboteurs.”21
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The continuous interplay between Dobbs, Hannity, Carlson, and others 
on Fox Business and Fox News became the dominant pattern on network 
news, as Figure 5.5 shows. The peaks in 2017 coincide with the appointment 
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Figure  5.5 Percentage of 15- second segments mentioning “deep state” on MSNBC, 
CNN, Fox News, and Fox Business.
 The Fox Diet 155
15
search of Paul Manafort’s home, and the Flynn guilty plea. This pattern 
strongly implies that repeated invocation of the “deep state” frame is 
intentionally deployed when the president is most under threat from the 
investigation. We offer more details for the May and October– November 
spikes in this chapter, with the Seth Rich and Uranium One case studies. 
In Chapter  8, we explore in more detail the July– August spike, where we 
discuss the Guccifer 2.0/ Forensicator story as a suspected Russian influence 
campaign.
The rest of the media ecosystem had an ambivalent relationship with 
the “deep state” framing. Some, like Greenwald, saw an underlying truth of 
the matter— that the national security establishment was in fact going after 
Trump because he opposed their agenda and that having the CIA intervene in 
politics in this way was a graver threat to democracy than a Trump presidency. 
Greenwald’s interview with Amy Goodman on “Democracy Now!” became 
the most watched video on the “deep state” in February 2017.22 Others 
reported on this spectacle of the Republican Party, which had long branded 
itself as stronger on national security, attacking the revered national security 
establishment as partisan and corrupt. But there was little to fact check about 
the “deep state” that could anchor a counternarrative. As a result, when we 
map the networks of authority and social media attention, the mainstream 
professional media are secondary. Breitbart, Fox, and the president’s Twitter 
account anchored the “deep state” frame, as Figure 5.6 shows. (We include 
Twitter and YouTube in Figure 5.6, the map of web linking, because half of 
the inlinks to Twitter in this set are to tweets by the president, and so it offers 
some insight into his role in the frame; and because YouTube served as a major 
distribution platform.)
The web- linking map also shows the large role that Infowars played on 
YouTube (accounting for four of the top 10 most watched videos), the distinct 
network around Zero Hedge, and the independent and large role that the 
Intercept played as a distinct center of gravity away from either the right- wing 
or mainstream ecosystems.
When we move from attention and authority among publications and 
media producers to mapping the attention of politically engaged Twitter 
users, the picture changes dramatically. Everyone but the right- wing media 
ecosystem fades away. On Twitter, the frame is purely internal to the right- 
wing ecosystem. The New  York Times and the Intercept recede, and the 
craziest sites— the Gateway Pundit, Infowars, True Pundit, and Truthfeed— 
congregate around YouTube, while Breitbart, Zero Hedge, and Fox News 
make up a distinct cluster at the center of the map.
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da156
156
When we zoom in and remove YouTube, the architecture remains 
unchanged.
It is important not to read Figures 5.6 and 5.7 as marking yet again a 
marginalization of Fox. Alex Jones’s most widely viewed YouTube video 
about the “deep state” drew about half a million viewers, one- sixth of 
the daily viewership of either Hannity or Carlson, and most of them got 
anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000 views. As we showed in Chapter 2, over 
the course of 2017, Fox News reclaimed its central role in the right- wing 




Figure  5.7a “Deep state” on Twitter. Nodes sized by number of Twitter shares. 
Architecture by co- tweeting patterns.
(b)
Figure 5.7b “Deep state” on Twitter with YouTube removed.
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media ecosystem across the broader range of stories that make up the 
political agenda. Moreover, using overall traffic analysis from web metrics 
firm SimilarWeb, it is clear that Fox News dominated in terms of actual 
traffic to the site, both in terms of total number of visits and in terms of 
unique visitors (see Figure 5.8).
As we look at the reshaping of the new “deep state” frame from its 
original, nonpartisan concern into a distinct narrative about a partisan 
attack on Donald Trump, we can certainly find critical moments at which 
Breitbart played a central reframing role. And we certainly find plenty of 
the craziest conspiracy theories hovering at the margins. But as we move 
now to analyze how this broad frame was translated over the course of 2017 
into repeated concerted efforts to defend the president from the Russia 
suspicion, we see Fox News taking center stage in a much clearer and 
more distinctive way by deflecting attention and blame, interpreting the 
investigation in deeply partisan terms, and sowing confusion and doubt. 
And it is here too that the broad and loose gestalt frame takes on distinct 
falsifiable forms whose pattern fits that of a sustained disinformation 
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Figure 5.8 Average monthly visits and unique visitors, 2017– 2018, SimilarWeb.
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Seth Rich: Fox News vs. the  
Intelligence Community
No single case more clearly exhibits the characteristics of a disinformation 
campaign aimed to divert attention from the president’s political woes than 
Fox News’s coverage in May of 2017 of the conspiracy theory that DNC 
staffer Seth Rich was murdered because he, rather than state- backed Russian 
hackers, was the source of the DNC emails disclosed in the middle of the 
2016 campaign.
The question of who hacked into the Democratic National Committee’s 
email server and passed the stolen emails on to WikiLeaks was a central 
locus of the fight over Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election. 
Competing narratives emerged to answer the question. The first was that 
Russian state actors hacked the DNC computer system. A different version 
painted it as the work of a lone hacker. A  third account was that a DNC 
insider leaked the emails out of disaffection with the internal corruption of 
the party. If the Russian state was responsible, Trump’s victory would look 
less like a genuine American populist victory. If, by contrast, the emails were 
leaked by a disgruntled insider, Trump’s victory would look even more like 
a popular rejection of “the swamp,” so much so that even honest Democrats 
could no longer abide. This discrete factual dispute therefore became central 
for months over the course of 2017.
The DNC blamed the attack on Russian information operations in its 
original public announcement on June 14, 2016. Throughout the summer 
and fall of 2016, several technology publications and security firms published 
reports that supported the Russian theory. At the same time two alternative 
theories developed in the right- wing media ecosystem, and episodically on 
the left as well. One theory was that a young DNC staffer, Seth Rich, was the 
source of the leak. Seth Rich had been murdered in Washington, D.C., on July 
10, 2016, and the theory was that the murder was orchestrated by the Clinton 
campaign, and by some accounts by Clinton herself. The second theory was 
that a lone hacker who took the name “Guccifer 2.0” was responsible for the 
attack. We return to that theory and how it played out in Chapter 8, where we 
discuss it in context of Russian white and gray propaganda.
The first spike in attention to the Seth Rich story occurred in July 2016 
(Figure 5.9), right after Rich’s murder. A  second spike was in early August, 
after Julian Assange offered a reward for information about his murder and 
first implied that Rich had been WikiLeaks’ source of the DNC emails. Both 
these early peaks are dwarfed by the coverage in May 2017, when Fox News 
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took over, as well as the July– August 2017 peak associated with the revived 
“Guccifer 2.0” theory.
Conspiracy theories began to bubble up almost immediately after Seth Rich 
was shot in the early morning hours of July 10, 2016. By July 12 YouNewsWire.
com was already weaving tweets from several sources, including @Ricky_ 
Vaughn99, into a story entitled “DNC Election Fraud Whistleblower Found 
Murdered.”23 Over the next few weeks, YourNewsWire.com published several 
more stories that ultimately made it one of the two sites whose stories on 
the Seth Rich conspiracy theory were most widely shared on Facebook, 
alongside Gateway Pundit. YourNewsWire.com played an early central role 
in propagating the Pizzagate conspiracy, and in Chapter 8 we discuss whether 
it better fits the “gray propaganda” or “useful idiot” category in relation 
to Russian propaganda. @Ricky_ Vaughn99, described by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center as “one of the most prolific and longstanding Alt- Right 
personalities,” was suspended from Twitter a few weeks before the election.24 
Over the next few days, the conspiracy theories remained mostly on marginal 
sites, although it did appear on a few sites with moderate audiences, like 
















































































Figure 5.9 Sentences per day mentioning Seth Rich in open web media, July 1, 2017– 
January 31, 2018.
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The story picked up again in late July, after two Reddit threads tried to 
revive the theory.26 The Reddit threads pointed to an NBC Nightly News 
interview in which Julian Assange denied evidence that the DNC emails had 
been hacked by Russians.27 The story received more attention this time from 
more influential conspiracy sites. This round of attention included a story 
by Truthfeed, which relied primarily on a tweet by the alt- right handle @
JaredWyand,28 a YouTube video by One America News Network that received 
over 90,000 views,29 and a few days later, a story in the Gateway Pundit.30 
The presence in this storyline of well- known alt- right handles like @Ricky_ 
Vaughn99 or @JaredWyand offers some evidence of the influence of the alt- 
right. But they played a relatively marginal role and relied on more visible 
influencers to move from their own networks to the broader network. This 
reliance on more central right- wing actors is part of what leads us to put these 
actors in the second or third tier of concerns over disinformation.
Coverage expanded to broader media outlets only after Assange, on August 
9, tweeted a $20,000 reward for “information leading to the conviction for 
the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich,” and implied in an interview on Dutch 
TV that Rich may have been the source of the DNC email dump and that 
his death may have been tied with that fact.31 The story was only covered by 
broader major media after that interview. As we saw in Chapter 3 with the 
pedophilia and rape assertions, conspiracy theories that germinate in the 
nether regions of the internet stay there unless they find an amplification 
vector. In this case Julian Assange lent the story visibility and credibility. But 
interest in the story rapidly tapered off, only to reappear on a much grander 
scale, as Figure 5.9 makes clear, and on a much more important platform in 
the middle of May 2017.
The pattern of coverage in May of 2017 strongly suggests that the re- 
emergence of the Seth Rich conspiracy theory almost a year after it had 
receded was part of an intentional effort to shield the president from 
mounting pressure surrounding his ties to Russia. On May 9, 2017, Donald 
Trump fired the director of the FBI, James Comey. The next day, Trump 
hosted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador 
to the United States Sergey Kislyak in the White House. On May 16, the 
New York Times reported that a memo written contemporaneously by Comey 
documented that Trump had asked Comey to drop the investigation of 
Trump’s former National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn.32 With pressure 
mounting on May 17, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed 
Robert Mueller as special counsel to investigate the allegations of connections 
between the Trump campaign and Russia. A  comparison of May 2017 
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sentences mentioning Trump and Russia and Seth Rich among all media we 
code as “right” and “center” in May 2017 exhibits a clear interference pattern 
(Figure 5.10). (Center- left and left publications followed an almost identical 
pattern to the center, each publishing more stories than the center.) There are 
two peaks in coverage on the center related to the Comey dismissal and the 
Comey memo. The right exploded with Seth Rich coverage on May 16, the 
day the Times reported the Comey memo.
At 4:30 a.m. on May 16, 2017, the Washington, D.C., local Fox 5 reported 
that a private investigator hired by Seth Rich’s family, Rod Wheeler, had 
communicated to Fox 5 that Seth Rich had been in touch with WikiLeaks 
before his death and that a source inside the D.C. police told him that the 
police were told to stand down the investigation.33 At 5:40 a.m., Fox and 
Friends interviewed the Fox D.C.  reporter34 and developed its own story, 
which first ran at 6:17 a.m., that repeated the story and vouched for Wheeler’s 
credibility.35 That story ran again an hour later.36 Online, Fox News published 
Malia Zimmerman’s version of the story, the version that would ultimately be 
the basis of lawsuits that Wheeler, and later Rich’s family, filed against Fox.37 
That evening Sean Hannity made the connection to the Russia investigation 
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Figure 5.10 Sentences per day mentioning “Seth Rich” or both “Donald Trump” and 
“Russia,” May 2017. All media sources coded right and center.
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Julian Assange in January 2017, in which Assange said that the email dumps 
were not from a state actor (the screen suggests they were talking about 
the Podesta email dump, not those from the DNC). Hannity then told his 
audience “let me connect the dots from here,” and delivered the core point:
If this is true, and Seth Rich gave Wikileaks these DNC emails, which, 
ultimately led to the firing, remember, of Debbie Wasserman Schulz on 
the eve of the DNC convention, this blows the whole Russia collusion 
narrative completely out of the water.38
Hannity then went on to explain to his listeners that there are:
Five forces aligning against President Trump. You’ve got the destroy 
Trump propaganda media, the destroy Trump Democrats, the 
Washington Deep State establishment, meaning some members of the 
intelligence community, you’ve got weak establishment Republicans, 
and the NeverTrumpers, they now seem to be working together, in an 
unprecedented attack on the sitting president.39
By that evening, however, Wheeler had already told CNN that he did not have 
evidence of emails between Rich and WikiLeaks, and that the information he 
had referenced in the Fox 5 interview was information he had received from 
a Fox News reporter, whom he did not name in that CNN interview. That 
CNN story had already made public that his services had been paid for by 
Ed Butkowsky, a Trump supporter, occasional Fox News commentator, and 
Breitbart contributor. Twenty- four hours later, Fox 5, the local Fox affiliate, 
published a clarification that Wheeler had “backtracked” on his statement.40 
The retraction by Wheeler did not tamp down the story even though 
Wheeler’s statement was the entire basis of the initial reports. On May 21, 
Newt Gingrich, former Republican Speaker of the House and architect of the 
Republican Party’s turn to a more rigidly partisan strategy in the early 1990s,41 
once again repeated the claim on “Fox and Friends,” a statement to which 
PolitiFact awarded its “pants on fire” rating42 and FactCheck.org covered in 
an assessment entitled “Gingrich spreads conspiracy theory.”43 On May 23, 
Fox online retracted the original Zimmerman story.44 Two days later the ABC 
affiliate in Washington, D.C., owned by conservative Sinclair Broadcasting, 
gave the story another lease of life.45 The station published a report by “the 
Profiling Project,” a group funded by Republican lobbyist Jack Burkman 
with a near- obsessive attachment to the Seth Rich conspiracy story.46 Fox 
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News D.C. then dutifully reported on the Burkman profiling project with a 
story entitled “Independent Group releases new report on Seth Rich murder 
investigation.”47 A few days later RT ran a segment of Cross Talk, attempting 
to rehabilitate the story,48 but by that point most of the coverage had receded. 
Later that year Wheeler filed a defamation action against Fox News, in which 
Wheeler alleged that the Seth Rich article was an intentional effort to “put 
to bed speculation that President Trump colluded with Russia in an attempt 
to influence the outcome of the Presidential election.”49 The pattern of 
reporting, the repetition, and the framing, particularly in Hannity’s retelling, 
is certainly consistent with intentional misdirection.
Mapping the network of stories on Seth Rich offers a clear view of the 
central role played by Fox News and Fox DC as sources of authority and 
stories, but also the extent to which conspiracy sites played in propagating 
the conspiracy theory on Facebook. Both maps below use the linking patterns 
of websites as the architecture of the network. The first map (Figure 5.11) sizes 
nodes based on inlinks, identifying the nodes that were influential as sources 
Figure  5.11 Network map of media sources mentioning Seth Rich in stories. 
Architecture and nodes sizing by media inlinks.
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for other media producers. It shows the central role that the Fox DC affiliate 
and Fox News played in developing and propagating the story to other 
media, and how central YouTube was to disseminating Fox News network 
programming online, particularly Hannity. It also shows the central role the 
Washington Post and CNN played in criticizing Fox.
The second map (Figure 5.12), with node sizes based on Facebook shares, 
emphasizes the media outlets that wrote stories that were more widely shared 
on Facebook. Its most remarkable feature is how central the Gateway Pundit 
and YourNewsWire.com were on Facebook. YourNewsWire.com’s most 
popular stories on Facebook appeared in July– August 2016. Its core role 
appears to have been to implant and spin up the Seth Rich conspiracy theory. 
The Gateway Pundit had stories that were frequently shared on Facebook 
both in the original effort to point the finger away from Russia and toward the 
DNC in July– August 2016 and during the May 2017 Fox- led effort to revive 
the story. YourNewsWire.com was not a marginal flash in the pan. In the first 
quarter of 2018, according to SimilarWeb metrics, YourNewsWire.com had 
Figure  5.12 Seth Rich conspiracy diffusion on the right, and debunking on the left. 
Nodes sized by Facebook shares.
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about one- third the number of monthly visits of the National Review, three- 
quarters the audience of Reason, and more than 30 percent more visits than 
the Weekly Standard. The Gateway Pundit, in turn, had 50 percent more visits 
than the National Review. From the election these ratios remained roughly 
stable throughout 2017 and early 2018.50 The Hill’s relatively prominent place 
was driven by stories about Wheeler’s lawsuit, the Fox News retraction, and 
Hannity losing advertisers over his Seth Rich conspiracy campaign. Vox’s 
most shared story on Facebook was an essay describing the linkages between 
the epistemic crisis and social- identity theory.
Uranium One: Fox News vs. the Rule of Law  
and the Idea of Professional Journalism
On September 19, 2017, FBI agents broke down Paul Manafort’s door and 
executed a search warrant as part of the investigation led by Robert Mueller. 
Two days later, Mueller requested phone records from Air Force One related 
to the claim that President Trump had dictated the misleading initial response 
to revelations of Donald Trump Jr.’s now famous June 9 Trump Tower 
meeting with a Russian attorney. Trump Jr. appeared to believe the attorney 
was working with Russian state authorities to get dirt on Hillary Clinton. 
Mueller also issued a subpoena to Facebook for records of accounts tied to 
suspected Russian operations. Congress, in the meantime, was considering 
steps to protect Mueller from the threat of being fired.51
By the first week of October, concern over Russian interference in the 2016 
election mounted, as Facebook disclosures of Russian advertising purchases 
gave shape to the previously more amorphous sense of Russian efforts.52 At 
the same time, the investigation surfaced the fact that the president’s daughter 
and son- in- law were using private email accounts, possibly for government- 
related work, again drawing the president’s family into the maelstrom.53 By 
the end of the second week in October, reporting emerged that the president’s 
legal advisers were cooperating with the investigation and considering how to 
permit the president to sit for an interview with Mueller.54
The following week, the Uranium One story erupted with an intensity 
and vehemence not seen at any point since Peter Schweizer first published 
the allegations in April 2015 (we describe the role of the Uranium One story 
in pre- election debates over the Clinton Foundation in Chapter  6). Over 
the coming weeks, as Michael Flynn’s plea bargain and cooperation with 
the investigation were announced, reporting on Uranium One as “the real 
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Russia scandal” reached a fevered pitch. Newt Gingrich called it “the greatest 
corruption scandal in American history” on Hannity.55 Sebastian Gorka, 
former deputy assistant to the president, claimed that “this is equivalent to 
what the Rosenbergs did, and those people got the chair.”56
In reality, it turns out that Hillary and Bill Clinton were not quite the 
twenty- first- century heirs to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. What instead 
happened was that Hannity, Gingrich, and the rest of the right- wing media 
ecosystem were resurrecting a two- and- a- half year old story with a completely 
new twist— framing it as an attack on the integrity of special counsel Robert 
Mueller and deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein. The original story 
had been told in Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign 
Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich, published in 
May 2015 by Peter Schweizer. Schweizer was at the time a “Breitbart Senior 
Editor at Large.”57 He cofounded with Steve Bannon the organization that 
funded his research on the book, the Government Accountability Institute 
(GAI).58 The GAI was funded by Robert Mercer, a major investor in Breitbart 
and a super PAC donor to the Trump campaign.59 At the time the book was 
published, Clinton Cash received wide coverage. Most prominently, the 
New York Times published an extensive piece based on the research materials 
in an advance copy of the book, titled “Cash Flowed to Clinton Foundation 
Amid Russian Uranium Deal.”60 The heart of the story was that the Russian 
atomic energy company Rosatom purchased a Canadian firm, Uranium One, 
which had acquired uranium extraction rights around the world, including to 
20 percent of uranium deposits in the United States (the deal did not include 
a license to export the uranium). The chairman of Uranium One had, over the 
prior years, made over $2 million in donations to the Clinton Foundation, 
and as Rosatom announced its intention to purchase Uranium One, Bill 
Clinton received $500,000 for a speech he made to a Russian bank that was 
promoting Uranium One stock and had ties to the Kremlin. The Times’s 
angle in the 2015 story was buried in the tenth paragraph:
Whether the donations played any role in the approval of the 
uranium deal is unknown. But the episode underscores the special 
ethical challenges presented by the Clinton Foundation, headed by 
a former president who relied heavily on foreign cash to accumulate 
$250 million in assets even as his wife helped steer American foreign 
policy as secretary of state, presiding over decisions with the potential 
to benefit the foundation’s donors.
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As we will see both here (Figures 5.18, 5.19a, and 5.19b) and in Chapter 6, 
the Times story provided legitimation and validation for a broad and 
aggressive set of political attacks on Hillary Clinton as having given control 
of over 20  percent of American uranium to the Russians. These attacks 
were fact- checked extensively. The Washington Post Fact Checker awarded 
four “Pinocchios” to the claim that “Hillary Clinton gave uranium to 
the Russians.” The Post explained:  “The State Department was one of 
nine agencies on the committee that approved the deal. The deal was also 
separately approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There is no 
evidence Clinton herself got involved in the deal personally, and it is highly 
questionable that this deal even rose to the level of the secretary of state.”61 
Moreover, the company being bought held uranium extraction rights but not 
an export license that would have allowed it to take uranium, once extracted, 
out of the country. Fact Checker found that “[t] he author of ‘Clinton Cash’ 
falsely claimed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State had ‘veto power’ and 
‘could have stopped’ Russia from buying a company with extensive uranium 
mining operations in the U.S. In fact, only the president has such power.”62 
PolitiFact gave a “mostly false” grade to a version of the story that Trump 
offered as a candidate in June 2016 and it added a point- by- point response to 
efforts by the author of Clinton Cash to sustain the claim.63 As the New York 
Times wrote in April 2015, the Clinton Foundation raised “special ethical 
challenges” when Hillary Clinton was secretary of state, but as it also stated 
in the tenth paragraph of that story, “[w]hether the donations played any role 
in the approval of the uranium deal is unknown.”64 To anyone not enmeshed in 
the right- wing echo chamber, the story recounted by Hannity, Gingrich, Lou 
Dobbs, and Judge Jeannine— and more than anyone, Donald Trump— that 
Hillary Clinton as secretary of state gave Russia 20 percent of our uranium, 
is simply false. Its truth did not increase with repetition or the incendiary 
vehemence of its delivery.
Searching for Uranium One in our corpus of stories from the pre- election 
and post- election periods offers a sense of how unusual the spike in coverage 
of the story was over the month beginning in the third week of October 2017 
(Figure 5.13). Even the initial spike in coverage, which followed the release of 
Schweizer’s book and the big New York Times story about it, was a fraction 
of the October– November 2017 spike. The campaign- period coverage of the 
topic in August 2016, when there was much focus on the Clinton Foundation, 
was dwarfed by comparison.
We can get some quantitative purchase on the shift in emphasis in the 
discussion by comparing the results of a standard clustering algorithm 
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(Word2Vec) that draws a spatial arrangement of words that often appear 
together (Figure 5.14). Looking at Uranium One coverage online from April 
2015 to October 2017, there are two main clusters: those anchored in “Hillary 






















































































Figure 5.13 Sentences per day mentioning Uranium One in open web media, April 1, 
2015– February 25, 2018.
Figure  5.14 Word2Vec clustering of terms in Uranium One– related stories, April 1, 
2015– October 14, 2017.
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Foundation.” Bridging the word “uranium” and the foundation cluster are 
words related to the mining business: “mining,” “investors,” and “transactions.”
The pattern of usage after October 15, 2017, reflects the shift in the media 
framing of the topic (Figure 5.15). In addition to the foundation- related cluster, 
a new cluster emerged around the terms “dossier,” “allegations,” “scandal,” and 
“probe.” These clusters are bridged by the term “prosecutor.” In the latter half 
of October 2017, the Uranium One story had been promoted in conservative 
media as a counternarrative to the Mueller investigation and coverage of the 
two had become tangled up.
A different perspective is offered by mapping the web- linking structure 
of Uranium One media coverage. Figure 5.16, which is based on all the sites 
that published stories on Uranium One from April 2015 to February 2018, 
exhibits a highly atypical structure, with a core of right- wing sites clustered 
tightly around the New York Times and The Hill. On the left (in deep blue), 
the primary sources are Fact Check and PolitiFact, and the story that makes 
the Washington Post relatively prominent is the Post’s fact- checking story, 
which gave the Uranium One story four Pinocchios. Few images reflect so 
clearly how the New York Times coverage of the Uranium One story was used 
as a key source of legitimation for the right.
Additional insights can be gleaned by decomposing the image into three 
distinct periods: the initial release of the Clinton Cash book in April– May 2015 
Figure  5.15 Word2Vec clustering of terms in Uranium One– related stories, October 
15, 2017– February 27, 2018.
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(Figure 5.17a); the August 2016 period associated with the Breitbart release 
of the Clinton Cash movie (Figure 5.17b); and the October 2017 coverage 
(Figure 5.18). In the first two periods we see very clearly that coverage was 
anchored in the legitimating power of the New York Times story, which drew 
upon a prepublication copy of the Schweizer book. We will return to this in 
Chapter 6. By October 2017, although the New York Times story continued 
to play an important role as a source of authority, coverage in The Hill largely 
took over.
The quantitative measures and maps point us toward the timing of 
key events and inflection points, and provide macrolevel validation that 
something significant was going on, as well as identifying the most influential 
media sources. However, getting into the guts of what happened requires a 
more detailed examination of the stories themselves.
Figure  5.16 Network map of Uranium One stories, April 2015– February 2018. 






Network map of Uranium One stories. Architecture and node sizing by media inlinks.
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On October 17, 2017, John F.  Solomon coauthored a detailed piece of 
investigative reporting on the Uranium One story in The Hill. Solomon, 
executive vice president at The Hill, is the former editor- in- chief of the 
Washington Times who was hired away by Sinclair Broadcasting to serve as 
chief creative officer for its relaunch of Circa News.65 Circa also published 
Figure  5.18 Network map of Uranium One stories, October 2017. Architecture and 
node sizing by media inlinks.
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a piece based on the same revelation that same day.66 The opening three 
paragraphs of the Solomon article set the stage.
Before the Obama administration approved a controversial deal in 
2010 giving Moscow control of a large swath of American uranium, the 
FBI had gathered substantial evidence that Russian nuclear industry 
officials were engaged in bribery, kickbacks, extortion and money 
laundering designed to grow Vladimir Putin’s atomic energy business 
inside the United States, according to government documents and 
interviews.
Federal agents used a confidential U.S. witness working inside the 
Russian nuclear industry to gather extensive financial records, make 
secret recordings and intercept emails as early as 2009 that showed 
Moscow had compromised an American uranium trucking firm with 
bribes and kickbacks in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
FBI and court documents show.
They also obtained an eyewitness account— backed by documents— 
indicating Russian nuclear officials had routed millions of dollars to 
the U.S. designed to benefit former President Bill Clinton’s charitable 
foundation during the time Secretary of State Hillary Clinton served 
on a government body that provided a favorable decision to Moscow, 
sources told The Hill.
Despite the insinuation of payments from Russians to the Clinton Foundation, 
the remainder of the story explained that the FBI was investigating Russians 
who were abusing their position while directing the U.S.  operations of the 
Russian company that bought Uranium One. The charges alleged that the 
Russians offered contractors no- bid inflated price contracts in exchange 
for kickbacks. The Russian executives were cheating the Russian owners of 
Uranium One to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders or other 
owners of the firm. Indeed, the remainder of the story has very little to say 
about the Clintons, dedicating a mere 100 additional words to recalling 
Schweizer’s book. The emphasis, instead, was on the nefarious character of 
Russian corruption and the supposed failures of the Department of Justice in 
investigating, charging, and reporting on the matter.
“The Department of Justice (DOJ) continued investigating the matter for 
nearly four more years,” Solomon and Spann wrote, “essentially leaving the 
American public and Congress in the dark about Russian nuclear corruption 
on U.S.  soil during a period when the Obama Administration made two 
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major decisions benefiting Putin’s commercial nuclear ambitions.” This is 
where they introduce the new element into the story, finding fault with the 
Department of Justice. This element remains prominent and distinct, as the 
word clouds make clear, throughout the coverage over the next several weeks. 
The story in The Hill makes an explicit connection between that alleged 
failure and the compromised position of the central figures of the Trump- 
Russia investigation and lays the groundwork for what will follow in the next 
three weeks of coverage:
The investigation was ultimately supervised by then- U.S. Attorney 
Rod Rosenstein, an Obama appointee who now serves as President 
Trump’s deputy attorney general, and then- Assistant FBI Director 
Andrew McCabe, now the deputy FBI director under Trump, Justice 
Department documents show. Both men now play a key role in the 
current investigation into possible, but still unproven, collusion 
between Russia and Donald Trump’s campaign during the 2016 
election cycle. McCabe is under congressional and Justice Department 
inspector general investigation in connection with money his wife’s 
Virginia state Senate campaign accepted in 2015 from now- Virginia 
Gov. Terry McAuliffe at a time when McAuliffe was reportedly under 
investigation by the FBI. The probe is not focused on McAuliffe’s 
conduct but rather on whether McCabe’s attendance violated the 
Hatch Act or other FBI conflict rules.
The connections to the current Russia case are many. The Mikerin 
probe began in 2009 when Robert Mueller, now the special counsel in 
charge of the Trump case, was still FBI director. And it ended in late 
2015 under the direction of then- FBI Director James Comey, whom 
Trump fired earlier this year.
The Hill story then reported that the investigation ended with a whimper 
when the defendant pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to commit 
money laundering. The authors implied that the plea, the understated 
announcement from the Department of Justice, and the fact that the 
evidence cited for the plea only covered actions that occurred after approval 
of the Uranium One deal all suggested that the Department of Justice was 
at least derelict in its handling of the matter. The piece closes with a quote 
from a Republican former representative that leaves the impression of a cover- 
up: “Not providing information on a corruption scheme before the Russian 
uranium deal was approved by U.S.  regulators and engage appropriate 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da176
176
congressional committees has served to undermine U.S.  national security 
interests by the very people charged with protecting them.”
The story in The Hill by Solomon and Spann received some immediate 
coverage in mainline publications, including Newsweek, Bloomberg, and 
Yahoo! News, but took off like wildfire in the right- wing media ecosystem. 
On the day it was published, we collected over 40 stories that picked 
up the original story:  from Fox News and the New  York Post, through 
Breitbart and the Daily Caller, to the Gateway Pundit, Infowars, and 
Truthfeed. Several YouTube videos were made about it. One, made by an 
alt- right activist, received over 48,000 views,67 while Alex Jones’s Infowars 
version received 42,000. The Gateway Pundit, as usual, cut to the chase 
with a headline:  “DEEP STATE SWAMP:  Comey, Mueller, Rosenstein, 
Are Linked to Clinton Uranium One Deal— MOST CORRUPT 
OFFICIALS EVER!.” Alex Jones, not to be undone, titled his segment 
“BREAKING:  Mueller Transferred Uranium To Russia, Hid Clinton 
Crimes.” For all the excitement online, the Uranium One story is not 
actually a story about social media or online dissemination, but a traditional 
media story. All the stories published on October 17 combined received 
slightly over 400,000 Facebook shares, about half of which were of The Hill 
story itself, and almost all the remainder distributed between the New York 
Post and Breitbart. Rush Limbaugh raised The Hill story on his talk radio 
show that day, saying:
The FBI, folks, we have learned that there was collusion between the 
FBI and the Obama administration and the Russians in 2009 and 2010 
over this uranium deal. Real collusion! Much more collusion than 
whatever Russia was doing by spending a hundred thousand dollars 
buying ads on Facebook. This is a blockbuster story, and it comes from 
our old buddy John Solomon, used to be at Circa, used to be at AP, 
used to be at the Washington Times, now he is at TheHill.com.
This really is a bombshell, except outside of TheHill.com it’s 
being ignored because it totally upsets every premise behind the get- 
Trump investigation. While they have no evidence of any collusion 
by Trump with Russia or versa- vice- a, there is all kinds of evidence 
that the FBI has had since 2009 and 2010 and suppressed over the 
Clintons, Bill and Hillary and the Canadian mogul that donated to 
their foundation and the transfer of United States American uranium 
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to Russia. Bill Clinton personally was enriched by thousands and 
thousands of dollars, as was the Clinton Foundation, the Crime 
Family Foundation.68
But the real powerhouse driving the story became Fox News.
As the map in Figure 5.20 shows, Fox News served alongside The Hill as 
a prominent node in the coverage. YouTube also clearly played a significant 
role. To understand that role, we analyzed the 92 YouTube videos that 
received links from stores related to Uranium One over the course of 2017. 
We coded them all, after removing the four which were off- topic. In Figures 
5.19a and 5.19b, which depict the top 10 and top 30 videos by number of views, 
respectively, we see that the “Hannity Show” on Fox News is by far the most 
popular. Five of the top 10 videos are Hannity shows. The first- and third- most 
watched videos were two different versions of the same October 19 Hannity 
monologue, which we discuss in detail below. The second- most watched 
video in the set is from the Young Turks, a YouTube news and commentary 
program. They offered a middle- of- the- road validation of The Hill story 

























































Figure 5.19a Top 10 most watched videos about Uranium One, 2017.
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concerns. An MSNBC segment debunking the Hannity storyline made the 
top 10, along with two more independent productions that repeated and 
validated the Hannity claims (InspoNews and WeAreChange).
Expanding the set to the top 30 increases the diversity of outlets but 














































































































Figure  5.19b Total views of the top 30 most watched YouTube videos on Uranium 
One by producer, 2017.
Figure 5.20 Screen of Hannity monologue, October 19, 2017.
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join from the Fox lineup, as does Alex Jones’s Infowars lower down the 
viewership distribution. We also begin to see independent right- wing sites, 
including four that are explicitly alt- right or white- identity sites. Only a 
single video among these 30 top videos by viewership joins the MSNBC 
rebuttal.
On the day of the original Hill report, Fox Business led television coverage 
with mentions in three shows:  “After the Bell” at 4:00  p.m.,69 “Making 
Money with Charles Payne” at 6:00  p.m.,70 and “Lou Dobbs Tonight” at 
7:00  p.m. Dobbs spoke with former Deputy Assistant to the President 
Sebastian Gorka who, after throwing an aside at James Comey for “almost 
single- handedly” destroying the reputation of the FBI, declared that an FBI 
source was going on record with evidence of “pay for play, of corruption 
occurring, and people will have to go to prison, because, it’s going to be a 
humdinger.”71 The next day, Fox News aired segments about Uranium One 
on their two most highly rated shows, Hannity and Tucker Carlson. The 
Hannity segment included an interview in which Gingrich introduced 
a version of a claim he would repeat, that this was “the biggest scandal in 
history.” Following these reports, in the early morning hours of October 19, 
President Trump tweeted: “Uranium deal to Russia, with Clinton help and 
Obama Administration knowledge. Is the biggest story that Fake Media 
doesn’t want to follow!”
Later that day, Trump again emphasized the story and its significance to 
the ongoing investigation of his own campaign with Russia in a television 
interview:
If the mainstream media would cover the uranium scandal and that 
Russia has 20% of the uranium for whatever reason, and a lot of people 
understand what those reasons may be— I think that’s your Russia 
story. That’s your real Russia story, not a story where they talk about 
collusion, and there was none. It was a hoax. The real Russia story is 
uranium and how they got all of that uranium, vast percentage of what 
we have. That is, to me, one of the big stories of the decade.72
Harris Faulkner and Neil Cavuto ran segments on these comments on 
Fox that day, but the most important piece was Hannity’s monologue that 
night.
Hannity’s October 19 monologue, which ran nearly 15 minutes, became 
the most viewed YouTube video on this controversy. But while its half million 
views make it dominant on YouTube, it’s important to remember that the 
same show got over three million viewers on cable, assuming that Hannity 
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had an average- for- him audience that evening. Hannity’s segment opened 
with a dramatic statement:
Tonight, massive bombshell breaking news developments in the 
biggest scandal ever involving Russia. We will continue to do what 
the corrupt lying mainstream media will not do because we will prove 
they are complicit in what is a huge coverup. We will explain how 
the Clintons and Obama administration created a massive national 
security crisis by handing Vladimir Putin and Russia 20% of America’s 
uranium, which is the foundational material to make nuclear weapons 
and tonight we will explain in detail who and how many people knew 
that the Russians had infiltrated America’s uranium market and how 
all of this was before the Uranium One deal.73
The opening includes the three elements of misdirection. First, Uranium 
One, not the Trump- Russia investigation, is the really big scandal involving 
Russia. Second, any media organization that tells you otherwise is part of 
“the corrupt lying media.” And finally, all this is a huge cover- up involving 
the very people now investigating Donald Trump. Hannity then claimed that 
Bill Clinton had been paid $500,000 and cited both The Hill and the Circa 
reports that the FBI had evidence that “includes eyewitness accounts, that 
the Russian nuclear officials were funneling millions and millions of dollars 
to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary was actually serving as Secretary 
of State and personally signing off on the Uranium One deal. According to 
both explosive reports, the Obama Administration hid the evidence of this 
Russian bribery plot from Congress.”
As Hannity was saying these words, the screen behind him showed an 
image of the Clintons with the words “Clinton Kickback Scheme?” The 
Hill report at no point said that Hillary Clinton had personally approved 
the deal— there is no evidence she was involved at all, the State Department 
was one of nine agencies that voted unanimously, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission separately signed off on the deal. And the “eyewitness accounts” 
reported by The Hill were of kickbacks from American contractors of Russian 
companies to the Russian executives. The kickbacks had nothing to do with 
the approval or the Clintons. Hannity’s audience, however, was actively led 
to believe that all the evidence pointed to kickbacks from the Russians to 
the Clintons for the approval of the uranium deal. That assertion was purely 
fabricated.
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The fundamental purpose of the revival of the story became clear toward 
the end of the segment. Hannity turned from old adversaries to new, just as 
The Hill piece did:
Of course these names will all sound familiar. The deputy Attorney 
General today, Rod Rosenstein, of course is second under the 
department of justice, under our attorney general Jeff Sessions. Then we 
have Andrew McCabe. They oversaw the FBI operation into the Russia 
bribery case. They clearly were well aware about what was taking place. 
They need to be put under oath. They need to tell us, why were they 
silent? Then Robert Mueller, too. He should not be leading any probes 
into Russian collusion. Guess why? He should be answering questions 
about the real Russian scandal. He should be put under oath. The 
conduct of Rod Rosenstein, McCabe, Mueller, it’s inexcusable. There’s a 
massive conflict of interest. They told nobody and in no way can they be 
trusted to conduct a fair investigation into anything— it’s time for them 
to literally resign— get out of the way or come public with everything 
they know. That’s my position. I  think they’ve been compromised. 
Especially when it comes to Russia. It’s well past time for many of them 
to go. These people are corrupt and they’ve been compromised.74
Robert Mueller was a Republican who was appointed by George W. Bush to be 
the director of the FBI and who oversaw the reorganization of the FBI into a 
counterterrorism agency after 9/ 11. James Comey was a registered Republican 
for most of his adult life and had served as deputy attorney general under 
George W. Bush. As FBI Director, Comey likely tipped the 2016 presidential 
election to Donald Trump with his October surprise announcement about the 
Clinton email server investigation. Rod Rosenstein’s conservative credentials 
were such that he was nominated to become a federal appellate judge by George 
W. Bush. He was blocked by Maryland’s two Democratic senators and held up 
in a Senate Judiciary Committee controlled by Democrats. Andrew McCabe 
was a career FBI agent who told ABC News that “I have considered myself 
to be a Republican my entire life,” adding “I’ve voted for every Republican 
candidate for president in every election, except the 2016 one, in which I did 
not vote.”75 Fox News subjected these mainline law- and- order Republicans to 
the libel that they corruptly aided Russia in strengthening its nuclear weapons 
capability while weakening ours. Yesterday’s “Heroes of the Revolution” were 
overnight denounced as today’s counterrevolutionaries.
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Hannity ended the segment as he started it, with an attack on the 
media. On the backdrop (Figure 5.21), a slide depicted the logos of CNN, 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, ABC, CBS, NBC, and MSNBC, 
while Hannity said:  “Finally, you’ve got the liberal media. For years we’ve 
been telling you journalism is dead. They’ve been lying to you, the American 
people, for well over a year about Russia, Russia, Russia. The press has been 
spreading fake news conspiracy theories almost 24/ 7 nonstop. Why are they 
so silent in this case?”76
In this one brief quote, Hannity explained precisely why American con-
servatives distrust professional journalism. In the upside down world of the man 
who peddled in “Orgy Island” smears, cribbed “spirit cooking” conspiracies 
from Infowars, and trumpeted the Seth Rich conspiracy, these professional 
journalism outlets have been “spreading fake news conspiracy theories almost 
24/ 7 nonstop.” As he put it, “For years we’ve been telling you journalism is dead.”
Hannity had it right. Right- wing media have been attacking mainstream 
journalism for decades. The theme of mainstream media bias has been a fixture 
of right- wing media at least since the 1944 launch of right- wing magazine 
Human Events by remnants of the America First Committee that had opposed 
U.S. entry into the war against Nazi Germany, and was an oft- repeated theme 
in the other media outlets that made up the first wave of postwar conservative 
media that we will describe in Chapter 11.77 But Rush Limbaugh, as he launched 
the second- generation right- wing media ecosystem, gave the attack on 
mainstream media its hyperbolic anti- journalism tone. Limbaugh christened 
Figure 5.21 Screen of Hannity monologue, October 19, 2017.
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CNN the “Clinton News Network” in 1999, described the New York Times 
as “a coordinated leftist house organ,” and called the Times’s editor Howell 
Raines “Mullah” Raines, featuring his picture on his “website wearing a 
superimposed turban” in 2002.78 And in 2011 Limbaugh coined the term 
“The Four Corners of Deceit,” that “in our culture . . . altogether combined, 
suffice to lie to students and the American people. The Four Corners of Deceit 
are government, academia, science, and the media.”79 Fox News’s own “Fair 
and Balanced” motto has from the start primed its viewers that other outlets 
are not. The continuously stated message is that all media not dedicated to 
a right- wing view are biased and partisan and that only those that are right- 
wing partisan are truthful and fair. That message was touted from the bully 
pulpit of the presidency weekly during the first year of the Trump, capped by 
President Trump’s 2017 Fake News Awards to CNN, the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, ABC News, and so forth (Figure 5.22).80
Figure 5.22 Donald Trump tweet announcing the 2017 Fake News Awards.
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da184
184
In Chapter 11 we describe the extensive evidence of asymmetric patterns 
of distrust in media in the United States. In particular the data describe a 
long- term pattern among conservatives that combines extremely low and 
decreasing trust in most media outlets and media in general, combined 
with a level of trust in Fox News that is extraordinarily high for any media 
source. Liberals and people with mixed liberal and conservative views 
spread their attention more evenly. And while liberals and moderates on 
average have much higher trust in media as a whole, they are generally more 
skeptical of any given outlet and trust no single outlet to the high degree 
that conservatives trust Fox. The attacks on journalism that we describe 
throughout this book almost certainly influence these patterns of trust and 
explain how conservatives have come to trust Hannity and Limbaugh as 
liberals trust the BBC and PBS.
On October 20, the day after Hannity’s extraordinary segment on 
Uranium One, Fox and Friends ran a segment about the Uranium One deal 
in which the spoken text was “the BIG Russia story is the fact that Bill and 
Hillary Clinton, because of her position as Secretary of State, were able to 
cash in one of the largest scandals that have ever involved the United States.”81 
The big block letters at the bottom of the screen read: “Trump: Fake Media 
Excusing Dem Russia Deal.” As the text shifted to emphasizing that this story 
was about nuclear weapons capability, Mueller’s stint at the FBI, and Loretta 
Lynch at the Department of Justice, the bold caps under the screen scrolled 
Figure 5.23 Screen appearance on Fox and Friends, October 20, 2017.
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the outlandish claim that “Russia Got 20% of U.S. Nuke Industry Under 
Obama.” (Figure 5.23)
That evening, Lou Dobbs interviewed Peter Schweizer, author of Clinton 
Cash, on his Fox Business show, opening with how vindicated Schweizer 
must feel. On October 24, Hannity returned to the Uranium One story, 
interviewing former Speaker Newt Gingrich. Gingrich opened his segment 
by calling the story “the greatest corruption scandal in American history,” 
bigger, he said, than the Teapot Dome in the 1920s, worse than the Grant 
administration in the 1870s, arguably the most corrupt administration in 
American history.82 That same evening, Lou Dobbs on Fox Business opened 
his show with the words:
Incriminating evidence, tying former President Clinton to the 
Uranium One scandal. The former president, Hillary Clinton, the 
Obama Administration are NOW, now, clearly in focus in what 
appears to be a quid pro quo deal that gave Russia ownership of a fifth 
of US uranium. NOW, those carping about Russian collusion with the 
current administration, they are silent as the REAL collusion involving 
collusion has been staring everyone straight in the face for years.
Three days later, Hannity aired a Sebastian Gorka interview, comparing the 
Clintons’ involvement in Uranium One to the Rosenbergs handing over 
nuclear bomb design secrets to the Soviet Union, and helpfully reminding 
viewers that the Rosenbergs had been executed for their deeds.83 One or more 
Fox programs returned to this “biggest scandal,” every day for the remainder 
of the month. It then died down for a while until November 14– 15, when 
Jeff Sessions announced that the Department of Justice would take a closer 
look at the allegations, and then testified on the Hill about Russian influence 
during the 2016 election.
As Figures 5.24a and 5.24b show, the peaks in coverage on Fox Business 
and Fox News are closely aligned with coverage on the web. Certainly, there 
was a lot of coverage online throughout this period, but online audiences 
were dwarfed in comparison to the reach of Fox television. Given the 
sustained, repeated attention paid to the Uranium One story, at all hours of 
the day nearly every day, and the tenor and tone of these Fox News stories 
as they spun vastly overstated, often simply false versions of the events, 
combining actual spoken words with strong on- screen imagery, it would be 
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Figure  5.24a (Top) Percentage of 15- second segments mentioning Uranium One by 








































































































Figure  5.24b (Bottom) Sentences per day mentioning Uranium One in open web 
media, October 15– December 31, 2017.
difficult to see the coverage from October to November 2017 as anything 
but a coordinated, sustained propagandist effort by the cable television 
network to shift attention to Uranium One as the “real Russia scandal” 
and to discredit the president’s opponents and discredit the ongoing 
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investigation against him. Whatever efforts anyone else made on Facebook, 
Twitter, or the open web were largely secondary to the efforts of the most 
important source of news for nearly half of Trump’s voters: the network that 
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6
Mainstream Media Failure  
Modes and Self- Healing in  
a Propaganda- Rich Environment
In the preceding three chapters we examined the propaganda feedback 
loop, how it forms, and how it facilitates disinformation and the manipulation 
of beliefs of a population. But our observations about the highly asymmetric 
nature of the American media environment, and the survey- based evidence 
we described in Chapter 2, which suggests that no more than 30 percent of 
the American population inhabits the insular, propaganda- rich right- wing 
media ecosystem, indicate that whatever one thinks of the result of the 2016 
election, it could not have been purely the result of right- wing propaganda. 
Here, we identify two central attributes of mainstream media and professional 
journalism— balance and the scoop culture— that shaped election coverage, 
and in some cases made them particularly susceptible to being manipulated 
into spreading right- wing propaganda.
Balance and Negativity
Despite the dispersion of attention and the large number of media and 
channels available to them, as Americans were beginning to tune in to election 
coverage over the summer and early fall of 2016, one word was repeatedly 
on their minds when they thought of Hillary Clinton:  email. Over the 10 
weeks from July 11 to September 18, 2016, Gallup included in their U.S. Daily 
Tracking poll the question “What have you read, seen, or heard about Hillary 
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the top word in response was “email” (Figure 6.1),  and even during the 
convention week, it was the second word after “convention.” Comparing the 
word clouds that Gallup produced from this survey data is one of the most 
vivid illustrations of how candidates can be framed in entirely different ways.1 
“Lie,” “scandal,” and “foundation” were not far behind “emails” in framing 
Clinton’s candidacy in the minds of American voters.
We analyzed the text of all the stories that mentioned either candidate’s 
name in the top 50 media sources measured by media inlinks for the 
18 months prior to the election. This list (included in the online appendix) 
(b)(a)
Figure  6.1 Words most used to answer the question:  “What have you read, seen, 
or heard about Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump in the past several days?” July 11– 
September 18, 2016. Created by Gallup.
Republished with permission of Gallup, Inc., from GALLUP, “Email” Dominates What 
Americans Have Heard About Clinton by Frank Newport, Lisa Singh, Stuart Soroka, Michael 
Traugott and Andrew Dugan. Election 2016, September 19, 2016; permission conveyed through 
Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.
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features primarily mass- market media. Our findings dovetail remarkably well 
with Gallup’s public opinion polls about what people associated with each 
candidate. As Figure 6.2 shows quite clearly, sentences that included both the 
terms “Clinton” and “emails” far outstripped other meaningful combinations 
we searched for either candidate, while sentences that included “Trump” and 
“immigration” outstripped the various other, more scandal- related terms 
associated with Trump. That does not mean that Clinton coverage outside 
the right- wing media ecosystem was necessarily negative and that coverage of 
Trump was neutral or positive. In fact, most of the media coverage was negative 
for both candidates, as Thomas Patterson and his collaborators showed.2 But 
the Gallup data strongly suggest that however negative the orientation of 
the stories, the residual in voters’ minds was that Trump was associated with 
immigration, and Clinton, with emails. Our results across top- performing 
media are confirmed by the more detailed and deep analysis of New  York 
Times coverage by Duncan Watts and David Rothschild. Consistent with 
Patterson’s findings, Watts and Rothschild showed that horse- race- style 
stories dominated coverage, but that for the remainder, scandals outstripped 
substantive policy stories. Most damningly, coverage of emails associated with 
Clinton vastly outstripped discussion of her policy positions. As they put it 
in reference to the days after the Comey announcement about reopening 
the email investigation, “To reiterate, in just six days, The New York Times 














































































































Figure  6.2 Sentences in mass- market open web media mentioning topics related to 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during the 2016 election period.
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policy issues combined in the 69 days leading up to the election” (emphasis in the 
original).3
Where did the email coverage come from? We have already seen how 
central emails were to the efforts to rally the base and harness hatred and 
revulsion as motivators in the election— in the pedophilia stories and in the 
stories claiming Clinton was corruptly colluding with Arabs and Muslims. 
There, the emails offered the quintessential illusory anchor that feeds the 
pedantry of the paranoid mind otherwise unmoored in reality. But what 
about the mainstream? A review of the ebb and flow of email- related stories 
reveals that it was not fake news sites that framed the Clinton candidacy 
in terms of emails. Nor was it Russian propagandists. Russian propaganda 
definitely contributed to the email discussion. And Russian hackers obtained 
and then released the DNC and Podesta emails. But as we look at the 
pattern of attention to emails over the course of the 18 months leading up to 
the election, a much more banal story emerges. Figure 6.3 offers a timeline, 
broken down by quintile, of the number of sentences per day that mentioned 
“Clinton” and “emails” in the same sentence, from March 2015, when the 
New York Times broke the story that Clinton had used a private email server 
during her tenure as Secretary of State,4 until Election Day.
The first overall feature that the timeline reveals is that there is no significant 
difference in the pattern of coverage between the top right- wing publications 
and the top center and center- left publications. The ebb and flow of attention 
across the media quintiles is highly correlated and, if anything, is led by the 
professional journalism– oriented outlets. The second overall feature is that 
while Republican candidates certainly took advantage of Clinton’s woes, 
and the stories include many instances of Republican candidates referring 
to Clinton’s emails as a major issue during both the primary and general 
elections, most of the events are driven by the actions of civil servants that 
were then covered by professional journalists, each following more or less 
standard professional norms. Of the 16 coverage peaks, 5 follow email releases 
or formal reports from the State Department, and 4 more, including the 
two most significant bumps in coverage, followed the FBI investigation, in 
particular the July announcement by James Comey that the investigation was 
closed and the last- minute reopening and reclosing of the investigation around 
Anthony Weiner’s laptop. Only one peak was associated with the Benghazi 
committee hearings. Two peaks related to court victories by Judicial Watch, 
an organization that has been using Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
litigation to go after the Clintons since 1994. Judicial Watch was being funded 
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Scaife, whom the New York Times described as “one of the leading financiers 
of the right- wing effort to bring down the Clintons.”5 Those court decisions 
forced first Clinton staff, then Clinton herself, to answer questions about 
the emails. Two more peaks were media- created events surrounding media 
interviews with Republican candidates. Outside of the State Department 
emails, only the Podesta email dump created a real spike in media coverage, 
and that was the only spike where email coverage was clearly led by coverage 
on the right wing of the media ecosystem— as we saw with the Hillary- Saudi 
Arabia- Qatar- ISIS email.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 are bimodal maps; one set of nodes in the map are of 
specific emails and another set of nodes are the sources that linked to them. 
These maps make quite clear that there were specific emails in the dumps— 
both the Podesta dump and the DNC dump— that drew attention outside 
the right- wing media system. In particular, an email from the Podesta dump 
involving Hillary Clinton’s statement that “you need both a public and 
a private position,” and an email from the DNC dump suggesting she had 
given Clinton questions from town hall events in advance, which cost Donna 
Figure 6.4 Media sources that linked to Hillary Clinton’s “public and private position” 
email. Nodes sized by number of media inlinks.
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Brazile her position as CNN commentator. The major outlets on the right are 
still highly influential (network nodes are sized by media inlink count), but 
the Washington Post, CNN, and Politico in the center- left, and the Huffington 
Post and Salon on the left also link to one or both emails.
But looking beyond these discrete instances, the overall pattern of coverage 
in mainstream professional media makes clear that most of the email- related 
stories were not from the DNC or Podesta email dumps; more coverage was 
devoted to the slowly unfolding saga of Clinton’s use of a private email server 
while in office as secretary of state. It is a story of civil servants at the State 
Department and the Justice Department doing their jobs, first to declassify 
and release the emails, then to determine whether maintaining the private 
server had violated Department policy, and finally to determine whether 
there were grounds for prosecution. One could come up with “deep state” 
conspiracy theories about how these civil servants intentionally sabotaged 
the Clinton campaign, and some on the “clickbaity” left indeed tried to do 
so. But the more likely albeit banal explanation is that a politician made a 
mistake in office, and her actions collided with professional norms applied 
conscientiously by civil servants, FBI investigators, and journalists. Her 
Figure 6.5 Media sources that linked to email suggesting Donna Brazile gave Hillary 
Clinton town hall questions in advance. Nodes sized by number of media inlinks.
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political opponents then took advantage of her error and were able to spin, 
emphasize, and perhaps overblow the importance of that story.
If there is fault in the incessant coverage of emails, it is a fault in patterns 
of compliance with professional media norms, not in their violation. 
Patterson’s explanation of the negative coverage he found, aligning with 
the conclusion of Watts and Rothschild, was that a core driver of the email 
focus was misapplication of the objectivity norm as even- handedness or 
balance, rather than truth seeking. If professional journalistic objectivity 
means balance and impartiality, and one is confronted with two candidates 
who are highly unbalanced— one consistently lies and takes positions that 
were off the wall for politicians before his candidacy, and the other is about 
as mainstream and standard as plain vanilla— it is genuinely difficult to 
maintain balanced coverage. The solution was uniformly negative coverage, 
as Patterson and colleagues showed, and a heavy focus on detailed objective 
facts. The emails were catnip for professional journalists. They gave journalists 
something concrete to work with. They had the aura of salacious reporting 
of uncovered secrets, while being unimpeachably factual and professional. 
And they allowed the mainstream publications to appear balanced in that 
their coverage of the two candidates was equally hard- hitting and tough. 
The need to publicly perform balance also exposed mainstream media to 
the standard practice of “working the ref.” We already saw in Chapter 5 how 
right- wing outlets complain that the media is biased and liberal. In addition 
to disorienting their own viewers and denying them alternative pathways to 
check propagandist claims to which they are exposed, these attacks tend to 
push mainstream reporters and editors to seek out stories that will exculpate 
them from the accusation. As a result, the search for publicly performing 
neutrality becomes a vulnerability that right- wing propagandists can 
and do exploit. We return at the end of this chapter to what can stand in 
for neutrality:  the pursuit of objectivity as an open, self- correcting pursuit 
of truth irrespective of its partisan spin or orientation, however one- sided 
this may seem in an environment that is, by its very architecture, prone to 
asymmetric patterns of falsehood.
Scoops and Headlines in a Propaganda- Rich 
Environment: Bannon Harnesses the Times
As the Democratic National Convention wrapped up at the end of July 2016, 
Hillary Clinton’s poll advantage was at the highest it would ever reach. The 
normal post- convention bump in polls was enhanced by a powerful speech 
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given by Khizr Khan, an immigrant from Pakistan and father of a fallen U.S. 
Army captain, Humayun Khan. Donald Trump’s response to the speech, in 
which Khizr Khan offered to lend Trump his copy of the U.S. Constitution, 
was seen by many as denigrating a Gold Star family. Over the course of August, 
however, the topic of conversation had shifted to the Clinton Foundation, 
and in particular to allegations that Hillary Clinton had offered quid pro 
quo favors, trading State Department access and influence in exchange for 
donations to the Clinton Foundation. A review of media coverage related to 
scandals for either candidate shows quite clearly that the Clinton Foundation 
story had early prominence in April and May 2015, and then lay mostly 
dormant until it was picked up again in August 2016 (Figure 6.6). The story’s 
re- emergence 15 months after its initial publication damaged Clinton and was 
likely a major factor in her steady decline in the polls, a slide that continued 
until the debates and the damaging Hollywood Access video improved her 
standing.
As we described in Chapter 5, the Clinton Foundation claims were based 
primarily on Breitbart editor- at- large Peter Schweizer’s book Clinton Cash. 
The book had been funded by the Government Accountability Initiative, 
cofounded by Steve Bannon and Schweizer with funding from Robert 
Mercer. Schweizer gave the New York Times access to research materials and 
an advance copy of the book, and the Times published a story that became the 
most important source of legitimation and validation for the attacks on the 
Clinton Foundation, entitled “Cash Flowed to Clinton Foundation Amid 
Russian Uranium Deal.”6 The Times did not disclose Schweizer’s affiliation 
with Breitbart or the Mercer funding behind the book, validating him instead 
as a former fellow at Stanford University’s “right- leaning Hoover Institute.” 
The headline clearly implied corrupt deal making, while the body was more 
measured and included an admission, buried in the tenth paragraph, that 
there was no evidence of corruption.
Despite the Times’s “scoop,” most of the discussion of the Clinton 
Foundation during the first wave of coverage in the spring of 2015 centered 
in the right- wing media sphere. Breitbart, Free Beacon, the Washington 
Examiner, Fox News, Hot Air, Newsbusters, and the Daily Caller were among 
the media sources that produced the most stories mentioning the Clinton 
Foundation in May 2015. Politico, Yahoo! News, and The Hill were also in 
the top 10. By June 2015, the stories that continued to circulate did so almost 
exclusively in the right- wing media sphere. Despite not making the top 10 in 
number of stories, the New York Times was third among media sources shared 
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The Times’s story about the Russian uranium deal was the reason, and it was 
the second- most shared story on Facebook related to the Clinton Foundation 
in May 2015. The most shared link was a petition launched by Judicial Watch 
to “Demand Answers on Clinton Corruption.”
One major role of stories from the Times and other traditional professional 
media was to offer legitimacy to the claims made by Schweizer in Clinton 
Cash. Breitbart’s top three most shared stories on Facebook in May 2015 were 
titled:
11 Explosive Clinton Cash Facts Mainstream Media Confirm are 
Accurate
REVEALED:  Washington Post Uncovers 1,100 Hidden Foreign 
“Clinton Cash” Donations
Devastating Timeline Reveals the Transfer of Half of U.S. Uranium 
Output to Russia as Hillary Clinton’s Foundation Bags $145 Million
These stories relied on the Times story for confirmation. As the Trump 
campaign sought to resurface the Clinton Foundation allegations, the early 
2015 New York Times story became the second- most shared story about the 
Clinton Foundation on Facebook in August 2016.
How did this year- and- a- half- old story become so central to the campaign 
in August 2016? On July 23, the eve of the Democratic National Convention, 
Breitbart launched the movie version of Schweizer’s Clinton Cash, a version 
edited to appeal to supporters of Bernie Sanders. The site’s announcement 
makes this intention as clear as can be. In its initial report on the release, 
Breitbart quoted MSNBC and the Guardian as sources, asserting that the 
movie was “devastating” or “designed to stir up trouble” at the convention. 
The Breitbart story emphasized that “[t] he New York Times, Washington Post, 
ABC News, and other Establishment Media have verified and confirmed 
the book’s explosive revelations that Hillary Clinton auctioned State 
Department policies to foreign Clinton Foundation donors and benefactors 
who then paid Bill Clinton tens of millions of dollars in speaking fees.”7 
Breitbart approvingly embraced Time magazine’s report that it was “aimed at 
persuading liberals” and “likely to leave on- the- fence Clinton supporters who 
see it feeling more unsure about casting a vote for her.”8 Throughout August, 
alongside the New  York Times uranium story, the freely available YouTube 
distribution of Clinton Cash was the next most shared link about the Clinton 
Foundation on Facebook.
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Our own analysis of YouTube sharing patterns underscores the extent to 
which the video version of Clinton Cash did double duty— both aimed to 
split Bernie supporters from Clinton and rally the party base. We analyzed the 
most tweeted YouTube videos in our election period Twitter set and mapped 
them based on how they were tweeted with other videos (Figure 6.7). The 
location on the map is determined by how often a video link is tweeted with 
another Twitter video. The size of the node is determined by how often a video 
was tweeted. And the color, unlike most of our other maps, is determined by a 
Louvain community detection algorithm, one of the standard algorithms used 
in network analysis to identify what parts of a network form a community in 
terms of similar patterns of linking. The map shows not only that the Clinton 
Cash YouTube video was the most widely tweeted video throughout the 
election but also that it straddled the line between core Trump supporters 
(based on its location in the network) and Bernie supporters (based on the 
Figure  6.7 YouTube videos linked to by campaign- related stories. Nodes sized by 
number of tweets, edges represent co-sharing by the same Twitter user, and colors by 
Louvain community detection.
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community detection algorithms, which places it clearly within the Bernie 
community).
On July 15, 2016, a week before the video version of Clinton Cash 
was released by Breitbart, Representative Marsha Blackburn sent a letter 
cosigned by 64 of her House Republican colleagues to the heads of the 
FBI, FTC, and IRS demanding that they investigate the allegations of 
corruption at the Clinton Foundation. A week later the commissioner of 
the IRS wrote a perfunctory response, informing the representative that he 
had forwarded the letter to the IRS office responsible for examining exempt 
organizations.9 Four days later, on July 26, the second day of the Democratic 
Convention, the Daily Caller reported on this letter under the headline 
“EXCLUSIVE: IRS Launches Investigation of Clinton Foundation.”10 The 
next day, Fox News, crediting the Daily Caller’s “exclusive,” reported under 
the headline “IRS looking into Clinton Foundation ‘pay- to- play’ claims” 
that “[t] he IRS confirmed in a letter it is looking into claims of ‘pay- to- play’ 
practices at the Clinton Foundation, after dozens of Republican lawmakers 
requested a review of potential ‘criminal conduct’ at the organization 
founded by the family at the center of this week’s Democratic National 
Convention.”11
On July 29 the New York Post published an editorial asking why Hillary 
had not boasted about the Clinton Foundation at the convention. The Post 
speculated that it was because the Foundation was being investigated by the 
FBI over “intersections” between the Foundation and the State Department, 
“like her role in handing Russia exclusive mining rights to 20 percent of US 
uranium reserves via a company that donated millions to the foundation.”12 
This editorial was, in turn, referred to by Fox News13 and Breitbart.14 The 
next day Fox News reported that “ ‘Clinton Cash’ Author Doubts IRS Will 
Thoroughly Investigate Clinton Foundation.”15 The pattern here is important 
and distinct. The stories are repeated and linked to internally within the 
network of sites. They receive reinforcement through repetition and variation 
of sources. Readers within this tightly interconnected network of sites will 
have encountered at least a headline associating Clinton, the foundation, 
and corruption several times, from diverse sources. It will make it easier to 
remember the association, reinforcing recall. The repetition in multiple 
stories also increases the credibility of the story. It is precisely this architecture 
of reciprocal citation and reinforcement in a tightly- knit network of media 
outlets that led us to characterize the phenomenon as network propaganda.
The central role of the Daily Caller, and the legitimating role of the 
New  York Times’ 2015 story, become clear on the map of the Clinton 
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Foundation stories in the last week of July 2016 (Figure 6.8). The distinct 
separation usually evident between the right- wing media sphere and the rest is 
gone, and instead the Daily Caller, Breitbart, and Fox are all clustered around 
the New York Times as a result of linking to its 2015 coverage as a source of 
validation for their current set of stories. The large Scribd node represents 
links to the IRS letter in response to the Blackburn letter.
The direction and size of the links in the map also show the extent to 
which Breitbart and Fox linked to the Daily Caller and also how they all 
linked to the New  York Times and the Washington Post to legitimate the 
claims. The selective and strategic use of media usually criticized by the 
right is highlighted by the links from Breitbart, Fox News, and the Trump 
campaign site to PolitiFact during this week in late July 2016. These links 
primarily focused on an April 2015 PolitiFact assertion that a specific claim 
in Schweizer’s book was truthful:  Bill Clinton was indeed paid $500,000 
or more for each of 13 speeches, only two of which occurred while Hillary 
was not secretary of state. Needless to say, the links from right- wing sources 
to PolitiFact did not include a June 30, 2016, report on Trump’s claim that 
Figure 6.8 Online linking practices for stories about the Clinton Foundation during 
the Democratic Convention, July 25– August 1, 2016.
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Clinton was paid to approve the Russian uranium deal, which they found to 
be mostly false.16
If we look at the number of sentences that mentioned the Clinton 
Foundation or Clinton Cash over the period from mid- July to mid- September, 
when this issue was most salient, the pattern becomes clear: right- wing media 
coverage of this topic was more extensive during this period and generally 
preceded coverage by other parts of the media ecosystem by a day or two. 
And, perhaps counterintuitively, the most pronounced effect was on center- 
left media— that is, mostly traditional professional media.
We see the first bump in right- wing coverage corresponding to the July 
23 release of Clinton Cash. It can be seen more clearly if we zoom in on the 
period just before the August 9 bump.
Because these graphs describe the number of sentences across media 
quintiles that were published on these days, it does not include the influence 
of stories published much earlier in the campaign period that were linked 
to— most importantly, the New  York Times story about the Uranium One 
deal. This influence comes across very clearly when we observe the word cloud 
that typifies the right- wing media discussion of the Clinton Foundation: the 
most distinct word in these media is “uranium” (Figure 6.10a). This word is 
notably absent in coverage of the Clinton Foundation from the left- center 
(Figure 6.10b).
As the sentence- count line chart (Figure 6.9 on the next page) makes 
clear, the next major movement in the story occurred around August 9, 2016. 
On August 7, the Rebuilding America super PAC published a 30- second 
television ad reviving the allegations, in which the Washington Post fact- 
checking process gave the ad three Pinocchios.17 On August 9, Judicial Watch 
released a batch of emails it had obtained through FOIA litigation. Judicial 
Watch alleged that these emails exposed specific communications from Doug 
Band to Huma Abedin and Cheryl Mills at the State Department seeking 
special access for Gilbert Chagoury, whom Judicial Watch describes in its 
press release as “a close friend of former President Bill Clinton and a top 
donor to the Clinton Foundation.”18 As the Figure 6.11 visualization shows, 
the following day, August 10, was the first time that center- left media covered 
the Clinton Foundation significantly more than the right media, and Figure 
6.12 shows that the words that typified center- left coverage indicate that the 
story linking Abedin, Chagoury, and Mills were a significant part of that 
coverage spike.
Fox television coverage played an integral part in propagating the Clinton 
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(a)
Figure 6.10a Words used most 
frequently by right open web media 
mentioning the Clinton Foundation or 
Clinton Cash, July 23– August 5, 2016.
(b)
Figure 6.10b Words used most frequently 
by center- left open web media mentioning 
the Clinton Foundation or Clinton Cash, July 
23– August 5, 2016.
online, the Internet Archive’s selection of television transcripts indicates that 
television coverage that mentioned the Clinton Foundation before August 10 
was seen almost exclusively on Fox News, Fox Business, and local television 
Fox affiliates. After August 10, CNN joined the Fox networks, but on local 
channels the story remained primarily the focus of Fox affiliates (Figures 6.13 
and 6.14).19
By August 18, although coverage had declined, the reporting raised 
enough questions to inspire a formal response; Bill Clinton announced that 
the foundation would stop taking foreign donations if Hillary Clinton was 
elected president.20 Bill Clinton’s promise did little to quiet the story. On 
August 22 Donald Trump publicly called for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor to investigate the claims of a corrupt quid pro quo relationship 
between the State Department and the Clinton Foundation. That same day, 
Bill Clinton published a more detailed letter stating that if Hillary Clinton 
was elected, the foundation would cease accepting foreign donations and 
transition out of operations that depended on matching funds from countries 
where its programs operated, and that he would step down from a position on 
the foundation’s board and stop raising funds for the foundation.21 That same 
day, Judicial Watch released a second batch of emails. This string of events 
attracted even more coverage, and most importantly, a broad range of sources 
outside the right- wing sphere.
The number of sentences referring to the Clinton Foundation was well 
over twice as large August 22 to 26 as it had been during the prior August 
10 to 12 peak. Television coverage, too, was substantially higher (except at 
the outlier Fox affiliate in Raleigh, North Carolina, which had covered the 


























































































































































 Mainstream Media Failure Modes and Self-Healing 207
207
and MSNBC covered the story as much as Fox News did (Figure 6.13). CBS 
and the other networks’ local affiliates also covered the story extensively 
(Figure 6.15).
A map of media attention August 22 to 26 shows that while the New York 
Times and the Washington Post continued to be major nodes, Judicial Watch 
played a key role in the narrative with its new trove of emails obtained under 
FOIA (Figure 6.16). CNN and Politico, which were generally prominent in 
the debates but had not been during the earlier spike in interest in the Clinton 
Foundation on August 9– 10, took a more prominent role. So too did the 
Associated Press (AP) and the Wall Street Journal, neither of which previously 
played a significant role. The most linked- to stories in the New York Times 
on those days included a general background story covering the Bill Clinton 
announcement about his stepping down if Hillary was elected, the Trump 
campaign’s emphasis on the foundation, and a story on the Judicial Watch 
email release.
Social media attention, by contrast, centered on Judicial Watch and, to a 
lesser extent, Breitbart, as Figure 6.17, with nodes sized by Facebook shares, 
makes clear.
The stories from traditional professional media over this period underscore 
the difficulty mainstream media faced in reporting on an issue of such 
sensitivity and complexity in the teeth of a sustained communications effort 
Figure  6.12 Words used most frequently by center- left open web media mentioning 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Mainstream Media Failure Modes and Self-Healing 211
21
from a motivated party: the right- wing media ecosystem. Balance demanded 
hard- hitting reporting. And coverage needed eye- catching headlines. The 
most linked- to and Facebook- shared story from the Washington Post, for 
example, was titled “Emails reveal how foundation donors got access to 
Clinton and her close aides at State Dept.”22 The opening paragraph read: “A 
sports executive who was a major donor to the Clinton Foundation and 
whose firm paid Bill Clinton millions of dollars in consulting fees wanted 
help getting a visa for a British soccer player with a criminal past.” The 16th 
and 17th paragraphs read:
There is no indication from the emails that Abedin intervened on 
behalf of Casey
Wasserman, an L.A. sports executive who in 2009 asked Band for 
help getting a visa for a British soccer star trying to visit Las Vegas. 
Band indicated that the office of Sen. Barbara Boxer (D- Calif.) had 
Figure 6.16 Directed linking behavior of media sources within the Clinton Foundation 
topic, August 22– August 29, 2016.
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already declined to help, given the player’s criminal record. A Boxer 
spokesman described the request to her office as “routine” but one 
with that Boxer did not assist, “given the facts of the case.”
“Makes me nervous to get involved but I’ll ask,” Abedin wrote to 
Band in May 2009 after he forwarded her an email from Wasserman.
Band responded: “then don’t.”
In other words, for those brave few who read past the intervening 15 paragraphs, 
the story would more accurately have begun:  “Emails reveal that donors 
sought access, but Clinton aides refused them when they deemed the requests 
inappropriate.” The fifth paragraph, which followed two more claims of potential 
conflicts, stated: “The emails show that, in these and similar cases, the donors did 
not always get what they wanted, particularly when they sought anything more 
than a meeting.” This and many other stories used the three events— the Trump 
Figure 6.17 Directed linking behavior of media sources shared on social media within 
the Clinton Foundation topic, August 22– August 29, 2016. Nodes sized by number of 
Facebook shares.
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call for an investigation, the Judicial Watch email release, and the Bill Clinton 
email about his role in the foundation— together as evidence that the foundation 
was an appropriate focus of news coverage. Just as the New York Times had done 
with the Uranium One story, the Washington Post here led with the insinuation 
of potential corruption— a much juicier angle— rather than with the absence 
of evidence of actual wrongdoing, and then it buried that truthful concession 
deep in the middle of the story. This is simply the framing corollary to the “If 
it bleeds, it leads” trope. In this case, Judicial Watch and the Trump campaign 
were doing what media activists have been doing forever:  staging events that 
would motivate professional media as a way of setting the agenda. What we see 
here is a successful operation to put red meat too juicy to pass up in front of 
traditional media. And the availability of new emails, this time obtained legally 
through FOIA rather than by illegal hacking, gives the reporting the grounding 
in objective fact that satisfies the professional norms and gives cover to the 
sensationalist framing necessary to publish front- page news.
The fact that the traditional professional media were the targets of 
intentional manipulation does not absolve them of responsibility for 
checking the materials put in front of them, much less of supporting a Trump 
campaign narrative. In this regard, the Associated Press offers an example of 
particularly poor reporting. The unusually large presence of the AP as a node 
in the link economy that week is due to a story that appeared on Twitter as 
follows: “BREAKING AP Analysis: More than half those who met Clinton 
as Cabinet secretary gave money to Clinton Foundation.” The study was 
quickly debunked, and within two weeks, the AP had issued a retraction of 
that assertion and deleted the tweet. The gist of the story was that the AP 
uncovered 154 people without official positions with whom Clinton had 
met, and of these 85 had connections with foundation donors. The AP story 
focused on Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunnus, an introduction 
to the Kennedy Center’s chairman at a Kennedy Center awards ceremony, 
and a conversation with the head of the MAC Cosmetics AIDS charity arm 
about raising funds for an AIDS education campaign. As Matthew Yglesias 
put it the morning after the story came out: “The State Department is a big 
operation. So is the Clinton Foundation. The AP put a lot of work into this 
project. And it couldn’t come up with anything that looks worse than helping 
a Nobel Prize winner, raising money to finance AIDS education, and doing 
an introduction for the chair of the Kennedy Center. It’s kind of surprising.”23
But as the preceding figures make clear, by the time the AP issued the 
retraction of the headline (though not the story itself ), the spikes in coverage 
had already occurred, and the story had made its impact. In particular a big 
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spike in television coverage on non- Fox- affiliated local television channels 
happened on August 24, immediately after the AP story and after New York 
Times and Washington Post stories on August 22 and 23. This coverage, in 
turn, brought the issue to a broader public.
The critical lesson of this chapter of the Clinton Foundation story is that the 
manipulation was not a result of Facebook fake news or of the fragmentation 
of public discourse. Precisely because the majority of Americans do not 
get their news from Facebook or from the right- wing media ecosystem, it 
was necessary for the actors on the right— Bannon and Schweizer through 
the Government Accountability Institute (GAI), Breitbart, Fox, the Daily 
Caller, and Judicial Watch— to frame a story that was attractive enough for 
mainstream media to cover and to provide reason for mainstream voters 
to doubt Hillary Clinton’s integrity. There simply are not enough voters 
who get their news largely from the right- wing media ecosystem to win an 
election. Right- wing media must harness broader parts of the ecosystem to 
achieve their strategic goals. In this case, they kept the story alive with several 
distinct media “hits”— the release of a book while offering careful “exclusive” 
access to major newspapers; a film; multiple releases of email dumps; and 
responses by political actors to these media events (from the congressional 
representatives’ letter to the IRS to Donald Trump’s public statements). 
Right- wing media succeeded in pushing the Clinton Foundation to the 
front of the public agenda precisely at the moment when Clinton would 
have been anticipated to (and indeed did) receive her biggest bounce in 
the polls:  immediately after the Democratic convention. And as we saw 
in Chapter  4, even after mainstream interest receded, the validation from 
mainstream media continued to add credibility to the much more sinister, 
tribal narratives surrounding the foundation that we saw emerging in both 
the pedophilia and Islamophobia narratives.
Truth Under Fire: Error Correction  
and Self- Healing Among Winners  
of Trump’s Fake News Awards
In Chapters  3 and 5 we saw that the same Fox News reporters and shows 
repeatedly played central roles in the various disinformation campaigns. Malia 
Zimmerman wrote the initial pieces in both the “Lolita Express” Clinton 
pedophilia story and the Seth Rich story. Hannity, the network’s biggest 
star, was central to those two as well as Uranium One. Lou Dobbs pushed 
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the “deep state” framing and Uranium One. Fox and Friends was central in 
propagating the Seth Rich conspiracy theory. Bret Baier was central on the 
Lolita Express. The reporters who played prominent roles in propagating 
these false stories paid no professional price, because the network they work 
for is a propagandist, not journalistic, enterprise.
Central to the practice of objectivity as truth seeking is not infallibility but 
institutionalized error detection and correction. This is as true for journalism 
as it is for the scientific method, though the speed of publication, sensitivity to 
markets, and levels of evidence necessary in each enterprise differ significantly 
and result in different institutional details. And for all the differences between 
them, the projects of journalism and science are both committed to norms of 
truth seeking anchored in a reality that is prior to and external to opinion 
and perspective. It is fundamentally different from the project of denying the 
possibility of truth beyond partisan perspective.
As we showed in Chapter  5 and return to in Chapter  11, professional 
journalism has been under sustained attack from right- wing media since 
the emergence of Rush Limbaugh to national prominence in the late 
1980s early 1990s. The presidency of Donald Trump saw an unprecedented 
escalation in the war on journalism and a challenge to the very possibility 
of institutionalized truth seeking, as opposed to partisan perspective. In 
the teeth of this attack, both mainstream and net- native outlets continued 
to practice mutual checking and verification, as well as relying on internal 
controls to impose checks, communicate error, and discipline reporters who 
circumvented these checks.
Here we review what happened to the major media stories that received 
President Trump’s and the Republican Party’s Fake News Awards of 2017.24 
Rather than circling the wagons, in most of these cases news organizations 
exposed, admitted, and corrected errors over very short timelines, through 
both internal processes and network processes of mutual monitoring. The 
dynamic is fundamental to error avoidance, detection, and correction in a 
well- functioning media ecosystem and is exactly the opposite of the mutually 
reinforcing roles that entities in a network subject to the propaganda 
feedback loop exhibit. We lay it out here because, after decades of media 
criticism from both the left and the right, it is hard for many to accept that 
there is something very real about the project of objectivity- as- truth seeking 
and that this has real consequences for the construction of understanding 
and resilience to bullshit. Even if in theory perfect objectivity is unattainable 
and truth necessarily provisional, in practice, in the lived experience of media 
ecosystems, organizations set up to pursue those goals function differently 
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and pose different levels of resistance to propaganda and bullshit than those 
designed to produce a post- truth world.
On December 1, 2017, ABC News’s Brian Ross falsely reported that retired 
General Michael Flynn would, as part of his plea deal, testify that then- 
candidate Trump himself had instructed Flynn to contact Russian officials 
during the campaign. Several hours later, the network issued a correction, 
in which it explained that its source had contacted the network to explain 
that the story was inaccurate and that what he had said was that during the 
campaign the candidate had asked Flynn to find ways to repair relations with 
Russia, and it was only after the election that then- President- elect Trump 
asked Flynn to contact Russian officials to discuss working jointly against 
ISIS.25 That evening CNN reported on the error, emphasizing that the report 
had caused a major drop in the Dow Jones, that ABC had learned that its 
story was in error at 6:00  p.m. that evening, and that Ross would issue a 
correction on- air at 6:30  p.m.26 CNN later described how, under pressure, 
ABC tweeted and posted a correction, rather than a clarification. The next 
day the Times, the Post, Politico, and other sites reported on the error and the 
retraction, and Ross was suspended for four weeks. Raw Story and Newsweek 
published reports of the original incorrect ABC report, but then appended 
the ABC correction.27 The only stories we identified in our set that could 
be considered amplifications or versions of the story that went uncorrected 
was a Think Progress report on the mistaken ABC claim, that did not later 
append a retraction,28 and a report in the Palmer Report, published before 
and without reference to the ABC story, claiming that Flynn “is testifying 
that Donald Trump and Jared Kushner ordered him to be the point man 
for communicating and conspiring with the Russian government during the 
election,” and did so before the ABC report and without reference to it (and 
also without foundation).29 The basic dynamic we observe is self- correction 
within hours, extensive reporting by other major outlets within the center, 
center- left, and left of the mistake and the correction, the disciplining of the 
reporter who made the error, and minimal detectable repetition of the false 
report even on marginal sites on the left.30
On December 8, 2017, CNN published a report that mistakenly stated 
that Donald Trump Jr. had received a website and decryption key to preview 
emails before they were made public by WikiLeaks. The original report 
claimed, based on sources, that the email to Trump Jr. was dated September 
4, 2016. A few hours later, the Washington Post obtained a copy of the alleged 
email and reported that it had been sent September 14, 2016, not September 
4, and thus came after, not before, the emails had already been reported on 
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publicly. By 6:05  p.m. that day, CNN had issued a correction to its story, 
credited the Washington Post for its find, and linked to the Post story as well 
as to the text of the email showing the September 14 date prominently. Except 
for one, every story we could find updated the story to include the correction. 
Raw Story, a left- wing online news organization founded in 2004, is the 
one exception we found; Raw Story published a story based on the original 
CNN report but without reporting on the correction.31 A partisan site like 
Talking Points Memo issued a blaring, all caps headline that focused on the 
correction, not the allegation.32 Across major mainstream and left media 
the report was on the mistake, the correction, and how it handed the right a 
weapon in claiming that all the reporting against the president was fake news. 
Reporting on the right did just that.
The next recipient of the fake news awards was a report in Time magazine 
that President Trump had removed a bust of Martin Luther King Jr. from the 
Oval Office. Time reporter Zeke Miller mistakenly reported on inauguration 
day that MLK’s bust had been removed from the White House. He corrected 
the error and apologized by email, Twitter, and an online correction to 
the Time story. The story got practically no repetition or amplification, 
and primarily was reported on the right, as an example of “fake news” by 
mainstream media, and to some extent elsewhere as an example of how right- 
wing media or the president use failures to attack the media. A  somewhat 
similar pattern occurred when Washington Post reporter Dave Weigel tweeted 
out a photo showing a Trump rally in Pensacola, Florida, with seats half 
empty, a photo that turned out to be premature as the stands later filled up. 
The photo was not part of an actual story published by the Post. In a tweet the 
president demanded an apology and retraction. In a response tweet, Weigel 
responded “Sure thing:  I apologize. I  deleted the photo after @dmartosko 
told me I’d gotten it wrong. Was confused by the image of you walking in the 
bottom right corner.”33 A few more of the Fake News Awards went to trivial 
stories, such as a Newsweek story that Poland’s first lady had refused to shake 
Trump’s hand, or a CNN story mocking the president for his boorishness 
in overfeeding decorative fish during a visit to Japan. Stories of greater 
significance included a CNN story, prior to James Comey’s Senate testimony, 
which anticipated that he would refute President Trump’s claim that Comey 
told him that he was not under investigation. The report was retracted as soon 
as Comey’s testimony was pre- released and included no such affirmation.34 
Another award went to Paul Krugman for writing a blog post at 12:42 a.m. 
the night of Trump’s election, as stock markets were dropping, in which 
Krugman flippantly wrote:  “It really does now look like President Donald 
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J. Trump, and markets are plunging. When might we expect them to recover? 
Frankly, I  find it hard to care much, even though this is my specialty. The 
disaster for America and the world has so many aspects that the economic 
ramifications are way down my list of things to fear. Still, I guess people want 
an answer: If the question is when markets will recover, a first- pass answer is 
never.”35
Calling this kind of flippant opinion statement “fake news” seems more 
like taking a victory lap over a mistaken prediction made publicly by a vexing 
opponent than anything else.
The most dramatic story of significance began on the evening of Thursday, 
June 23, 2017. CNN had published a report, based on a single anonymous 
source, claiming that the Treasury Department was looking into a meeting 
between the chief executive of a Russian investment fund, itself subject to 
sanctions and under Senate Intelligence Committee investigation, and a 
Trump transition team official, Anthony Scaramucci, a few days before the 
inauguration.36 Later that same evening Breitbart and Sputnik each published 
a detailed criticism of the piece.37 By the next day CNN had disabled links 
to the story and, possibly under pressure from BuzzFeed to explain why the 
story had been removed,38 appended an editor’s note that read:  “Story did 
not meet CNN’s editorial standards and has been retracted. Links to the 
story have been disabled. CNN apologizes to Mr. Scaramucci.”39 The original 
CNN tweets that pushed out the story were deleted and replaced with links 
to the editorial note instead. By Monday morning two reporters on the story, 
and the executive editor of CNN’s investigations unit who was responsible 
for them, had resigned. As with the other cases we have described, all the 
reporting that followed, both on CNN itself and on other mainstream outlets, 
was about the mistake, the resignations, and the importance of maintaining 
the highest standards and responsibility in the teeth of the sustained attack by 
the president on the trustworthiness of the media.
It is important to focus specifically on what was wrong about the CNN 
story. There was no disagreement that Scaramucci had in fact met Kirill 
Dimitriev in Davos, or that the Russian Direct Investment Fund he headed 
was under U.S.  sanctions. Bloomberg had conducted an interview with 
Scaramucci in Davos at the time, and he acknowledged the meeting and 
connected it to intentions to bridge relations.40 The CNN report linked to 
that Bloomberg interview, which had been published in January under the title 
“Trump Aid Talks Investment with Sanctioned Kremlin Fund” and correctly 
quoted Scaramucci’s response to Bloomberg, referring to Dmitriev: “What 
I  said to him last night, in my capacity inside the administration, I  would 
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certainly reach out to some people to help him.” The CNN report described 
Senators Elizabeth Warren and Ben Cardin’s demand sent to incoming 
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin that he investigate the meeting, and 
linked to Mnuchin’s pro forma response letter, that, if confirmed, he would 
“ensure that the appropriate Department components assess whether further 
investigation of this matter is warranted.”41 The error was in relying on a 
single congressional source, probably a Democratic staffer, to open and frame 
the entire piece with “Senate investigators are examining the activities of a 
little- known $10- billion Russian investment fund whose chief executive 
met with a member of President Donald Trump’s transition team four days 
before Trump’s inauguration.” The assertion that the Senate was actively 
investigating the meeting, and the implication, based on a single source, 
that more facts were emerging than those reported in January, cost the three 
reporters their jobs.
The sole example we found of substantial diffusion of what remained a 
fundamentally uncorrected error relates to an August 7 story in the New York 
Times. The Times reported that it received a leaked draft of the scientific report 
on climate change by 13 federal agencies, that the conclusions and findings 
stood in stark contradiction to the administration’s agenda on the environment 
and climate science, and that the scientists were concerned the administration 
would suppress it.42 The most extreme follow- on to the story, published on a 
site called EcoWatch, interpreted the Times story as “while the administration 
tries to suppress its agencies talking about climate change, a leaked report 
has concluded that millions of Americans are feeling the effects of climate 
change right now.”43 Vanity Fair quoted the Times report under the headline 
“Damning Federal Climate Report Leaked Before Trump Can Suppress It.”44 
Other reports offered somewhat less sensational versions, focused more on 
the likely true claim that some scientists working for the federal government 
feared the administration would suppress a report whose conclusions were 
so directly opposed to the administration’s position on climate change. That 
same day, one climate scientist involved in writing the report pointed out that 
there was no leak and that the draft report had been out and available in public 
during the comment period and remained available on the Internet Archive.45 
That evening a political scientist quoted in the Times story as having worked 
on the report tweeted that the report had been out since January, and the 
next morning noted that a side- by- side comparison showed that the report 
the Times obtained was the same one as the version that had been on the 
Internet Archive since January and that a draft of the report was still available 
for purchase from the National Academies of Sciences.46 On August 9 
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both the Washington Post online and Fox News criticized the Times for the 
misleading implication that the draft report had not been made public. They 
argued correctly that by claiming to have obtained and published a leaked, 
previously unpublished report, the Times implied that the administration’s 
failure to publish was evidence that fears that the report would be suppressed 
were well founded.47 The Times’s correction was minimal. It acknowledged 
the prior availability of the report and emphasized instead the reporting 
that government scientists and scientists involved in writing the report were 
concerned that the administration would not formally release the report. 
While not an impossible reading of the original Times story, the implication 
captured by the Vanity Fair headline we quoted above is certainly what gave 
the Times’s story its claim to be front- page news. The report was ultimately 
released by the administration in November 2017, and the Times never really 
acknowledged that its framing had been misleading.
Comparing the Uranium One, Seth Rich, and Lolita Express and Orgy 
Island diffusion patterns we observed in earlier chapters on the one hand, and 
the various winners of the “fake news awards” on the other hand, underscores 
the fundamentally different dynamics in the right wing as compared to the 
rest of the American political media ecosystem. When observing right- 
wing conspiracy theories, we saw positive feedback loops between the core 
of that network— composed of Fox News, leading Republican pundits, and 
Breitbart— and the remainder of the online right- wing network. In those 
cases we saw repetition, amplification, and circling of the wagons to criticize 
other media outlets when these exposed the errors and failures of the story. By 
contrast, the mainstream media ecosystem exhibited intensive competition 
to hold each other to high journalistic standards, and a repeated pattern of 
rapid removal of content, correction, and in several cases disciplining of the 
reporters involved. Moreover, in none of these cases did we find more than 
a smattering of repetition and amplification of the claims once retracted. In 
the one case where we are not convinced that the retraction was sufficient, 
the Washington Post published a criticism of the misleading New York Times 
story, and most of the stories that repeated the claims focused on the likely 
truthful aspect of the report— that there are government climate scientists 
concerned that the administration would suppress climate science reports— 
rather than on the sensationalistic and conspiratorial implication that only 
through the leak to the New  York Times could these scientists prevent the 
suppression and that the leak was some heroic act of whistle- blowing.
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As our data show, the fundamental architecture of information flow in 
the two clusters is different. As the case studies show, the organizational 
practices and consequences for reporters are different. And the narrative 
sharing practices of the network of sites that diffuse the stories follow 
fundamentally different pathways. It would be truly remarkable if falsehoods 
diffused and decayed symmetrically in two networks exhibiting such 
fundamentally different structure and dynamics. And, as we have consistently 
seen throughout this book, they do not. Conspiracy theories, falsehoods, and 
rumors that fit the tribal narrative diffuse more broadly and are sustained for 
longer on the right than in the rest of the media ecosystem. As such, it would 
be surprising if people who occupied the right wing of the network were not 




PA RT T H R E E
The Usual Suspects
In Part Two we covered the actions of what we perceived to be the primary 
actors of network propaganda and the American political media ecosystem 
more generally. Here, we turn to the primary culprits that have received more 
sustained public attention as the alleged causes of our present moment of 
information disorder. In Chapter 7 we briefly consider the argument that alt- 
right activists hacked the media ecosystem by inserting various destructive 
memes into the mainstream media that helped Donald Trump win the election. 
There has been excellent work focused on the alt- right, on Reddit and 4chan, 
aiming to document the efforts of these communities to propagate their views 
across the media environment. Here, we offer a brief case study where that 
pathway in fact succeeded, and we offer it as an example of what we call the 
propaganda pipeline— the path from the periphery to the core through a series 
of well- known amplification sites, most prominently Infowars and Drudge. 
That said, we argue that the pipeline, while real, was not as important as the 
intentional efforts of larger, more central propagandist media, and indeed, 
depends on those media’s willing adoption of the memes generated on the 
periphery to have a broader impact. In Chapter  8, we spend a good bit of 
time assessing the evidence of the existence, pathways, and impact of Russian 
information operations. In Chapter 9, we conclude with considering the three 
main threats related to Facebook:  Facebook microtargeting and dark ads, 
Cambridge Analytica, and commercial clickbait factories. We explain why 
we think that the behaviorally informed, microtargeted dark ads are likely 
the most important novel threat to democratic practice independent of the 
overall architecture of the media environment, but caution that there is no 
evidence that they have already played the role that they hypothetically could 
play. We also suggest that both the Cambridge Analytica and commercial 
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7
 The Propaganda Pipeline: Hacking 
the Core from the Periphery
“If there’s a story that can hurt Hillary, I  want it in the 
news cycle,” Cernovich said. “When I  first started, that 
meant figuring out how news cycles work.” One way to 
propel a story into the mainstream is to get it linked by the 
Drudge Report. “If it’s on Drudge, then it’s on ‘Hannity,’ ” 
Cernovich said. “If it’s on ‘Hannity,’ then Brian Stelter’s 
talking about it on CNN.” The Drudge Report favors big 
newspapers and established right- wing blogs; Danger and 
Play is not on the list. “If I have a really hot story, I might 
leak it to someone at Breitbart, or to someone else who can 
get the Drudge link.” That journalist usually returns the 
favor by embedding a Cernovich tweet in the story.1
Thus far we have documented our claim that the media ecosystem in 
both the right and the rest is largely dominated by top- performing media 
sites, their publication decisions, and their interactions with each other. 
In this, our work deviates from the standard narrative that followed the 
election of 2017, which emphasized Facebook advertising, alt- right trolls, 
and Russian propaganda efforts. We do need to qualify our findings in one 
important respect. The internet is wide open. It is populated with a diverse 
set of political actors, all of whom want to influence the public debate. And 
some of these actors are quite sophisticated in how they take advantage of the 
media ecosystem architecture to insert their narratives, memes, and frames 
into the network directly and through the major propagation outlets. We call 
this process the “propaganda pipeline,” exemplified perfectly by the quote 
from Mike Cernovich, whom Andrew Marantz from The New Yorker dubbed 
“the meme mastermind of the alt- right” in the piece from which we quote 
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the opening of this chapter. In our work on the early stages of the various 
conspiracy theories we repeatedly interacted with such efforts, some of which 
in fact succeeded in reaching a broader audience through the pipeline.
Our observations lead us to believe that these efforts, while real and 
observable, were not determinative in the election or the first year of the 
Trump presidency. The major frames of this period were immigration and 
Islamophobia, Hillary Clinton emails and the Clinton Foundation, and the 
assault on the rule of law and journalism implied by the “deep state” frame. 
The top media outlets and political elites, not Redditors or meme propagators 
from the alt- right, were primarily responsible for distributing these frames 
widely. As we described in Chapter 3, this is even the case with the Clinton 
pedophilia narratives, where some of the peripheral actors had their greatest 
success. The Fox News versions of the Clinton pedophilia stories were 
overwhelmingly more visible than the version that started on Reddit and was 
accelerated by Cernovich and then- Sputnik reporter Cassandra Fairbanks, 
which we describe here. These efforts exist. Media outlets and observers should 
be aware of them. Sometimes they even succeed. In the case we describe here, 
they made it to Hannity and the Washington Times, and from there across 
the right- wing media ecosystem. But it is important not to overstate their 
importance in the overall dynamic of network propaganda. And because 
these dynamics seem to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the alt- right 
and Russian information operations, our story here is also a down payment on 
Chapter 8, where we dig deeper into Russian intervention.
Spirit Cooking
“LEAKED EMAIL appears to link Clinton Campaign Chairman to bizarre 
occult ritual,” tweeted Sean Hannity at 11:50 a.m. on November 4, 2016, linking 
to a radio and online segment on the topic. Hannity (who later removed 
the page from his archives) linked to a story from LifeZette— the website 
founded by Laura Ingraham— headlined:  “WikiLeaks:  Clinton Campaign 
Chair Participated in Occult Magic: Emails reveal Podesta attended ‘Spirit 
Cooking’ event that has been described as Satanic.” That same morning, 
the Washington Times published a story entitled “Wikileaks:  Podesta 
invited to ‘Spirit’ dinner: host’s known ‘recipes’ demand breast milk, sperm,” 
crediting the Drudge Report as having broken the story. At 8:19 a.m. on 
November 4, Drudge, under the typically understated headline “WIKI 
WICCAN: PODESTA PRACTICES OCCULT MAGIC,” had posted a 
link to a segment by Alex Jones’s Infowars (more than half of Infowars referrals 
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from other sites come from Drudge). And Infowars was clearly the source 
of Hannity’s insight, as Hannity’s headline doesn’t even bother to vary the 
adjectives from the Infowars headline: “ ‘Spirit Cooking’: Clinton Campaign 
Chairman Practices Bizarre Occult Ritual” (Figure 7.1). 2 The Infowars story 
was built primarily around a post that Cernovich had published on his blog, 
Danger and Play, several hours earlier, as well as two posts by Cassandra 
Fairbanks, then a Sputnik news reporter, who published posts that themselves 
wove together Reddit and 4chan posts with tweets and interview quotes from 
Cernovich and other alt- right personae.
The story began with an email from the set of John Podesta emails that 
had been hacked by Russian agents and released on WikiLeaks in October 
2016. The “spirit cooking” email was from Tony Podesta to his brother John, 
forwarding an invitation from performance artist Marina Abramovic “to the 
Spirit Cooking dinner at my place.” The occult sex ritual framing and the 
striking image of Abramovic holding a bloody, skinned goat’s head are both 
borrowed directly, with credit, from the story Cernovich posted the night 
before.3 Cernovich, who also propagated the Pizzagate story, came to broader 
public attention when Donald Trump Jr. tweeted that he would have been 
awarded a Pulitzer “in a long gone time of unbiased journalism.”4
Most of the Infowars story was, however, indebted to two Fairbanks stories. 
Fairbanks had apparently started her activism and writing career on the left, 
protesting the failure to prosecute the 2012 rape in Steubenville, Ohio, and 
covering Black Lives Matters events. As she told the BBC,5 during the primaries 
she had supported Bernie Sanders and was thinking of supporting Jill Stein, but 
decided in June 2016 that Trump was her candidate and set out to persuade 
her Twitter followers. In her WeAreChange signature line, Fairbanks described 
herself as “a DC- based writer and political commentator who has been 
published in a range of outlets including Sputnik News, International Business 
Times, Teen Vogue, and TeleSUR.” In exchanges with Guccifer 2.0, as we will 
see in Chapter 8, she described Sputnik as her “day job.” She continued writing 
for Sputnik throughout 2017, but moved to the Gateway Pundit in 2018.
Fairbanks’s late- night November 3 spirit cooking story mostly described 
Abramovic’s performances without much commentary and embedded a 
video and images of the performance. Fairbanks’s story was not written in an 
outraged tone, allowing the artist’s intentional effort to disturb her audience 
to speak for itself. At 1:00 a.m., WikiLeaks tweeted that story.6 WikiLeaks 
was also the first public- facing Facebook page to share the spirit cooking story.
The Infowars story amped up the volume by explaining that spirit cooking 
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Crowley’ and involves an occult performance during which menstrual blood, 
breast milk, urine and sperm are used to create a ‘painting’.” To deepen the 
conspiracy, the Infowars story picked up the pizza storyline that would become 
the foundation of Pizzagate soon after the election: “Some are even linking the 
spirit cooking revelation to claims that the Podesta emails contain ‘code for child 
sex trafficking’ that is hidden behind mentions of types of food.” The source 
cited for this proposition was another story by Fairbanks, also posted November 
3. Fairbanks’s story, “Internet Is On Fire With Speculation that Podesta Emails 
Contain Code For Child Sex,”7 reported what others were saying, rather than 
making her own claim, and ended with a modifier of “Whether this is a case 
of confirmation bias, or something more sinister— one thing is certain: People 
really do not trust Hillary Clinton— to the point where thousands of people 
are actually having serious discussions about whether or not she is involved in a 
child sex ring.” Whatever the modifier, the article combined a Reddit post with 
a string of tweets to incorporate three more strands in the narrative.
First, Fairbanks described a Reddit post8 connecting the story to the 
case of Laura Silsby and her Baptist missionary organization: The New Life 
Children’s Refuge. Silsby and 9 of her colleagues tried to transport 33 children 
out of Haiti and to the Dominican Republic in the aftermath of the 2010 
Haitian earthquake. The 10 missionaries were charged with kidnapping 
and held for three weeks pending investigation and charging. Their lawyer 
had requested that Hillary Clinton, then- secretary of state, intervene, but 
the State Department limited its engagement to standard consular services 
for the situation.9 A  week later, Bill Clinton, who was coordinating the 
U.N. relief efforts, made a public plea for the U.S. and Haitian governments 
to resolve the issue of the 10 American missionaries. Ultimately, 9 of the 10 
were released, and Silsby was convicted of a lesser offense and sentenced to six 
months imprisonment. At the time, the Fox News coverage of the event was 
highly sympathetic to Silsby, describing her as a “40- year- old businesswoman” 
who thought the children she was trying to help were “orphans whose homes 
were destroyed in the earthquake.”10 By 2016, the story received a less anodyne 
treatment. In Fairbanks’s telling, “Silsby was found guilty in Haiti of child 
trafficking in 2010, after she attempted to cross the Haiti- Dominican Republic 
border with 33 Haitian children— all but one of the children had at least one 
living parent and were not orphans. Nine others who were arrested along with 
her were freed, thanks to the efforts of the Clintons.” Fairbanks followed this 
framing with a pullout of a Mike Cernovich tweet asking, “Were 33 children 
for Bill Clinton and Jeffrey Epstein’s ‘use’? Forget corruption, these emails 
expose connections to child sex trafficking,” relating the story back to the 
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Lolita Express storyline we encountered in Chapter 3. Fairbanks returned to 
the Lolita Express story in the conclusion of the piece, where she quoted from 
an interview she conducted with Cernovich: “Cernovich added that because 
of the facts that Clinton’s top aide Huma Abedin’s husband is currently 
under investigation for sexting a minor, and Bill Clinton flew on convicted 
pedophile Jeffrey Epstein’s private jet (which is called ‘The Lolita Express’), 
the whole inner circle deserves scrutiny.”
The final strand in the story is pizza— or rather, the belief that the use of 
words that related to food items represent code for criminal sex trafficking. 
For this part, Fairbanks moved from Cernovich to another alt- right persona, 
the @JaredWyand Twitter handle. Wyand is an online persona associated 
with the alt- right who, after having been banned from Twitter, was warmly 
embraced by the Daily Stormer for postings such as “The Media is nothing 
more than the propaganda arm for our Zionist occupational government” 
and “This is all orchestrated by Jews to topple Western Civilization and 
reshape it in their vision.”11 The @JaredWyand Twitter handle had been 
central to several distinct campaigns tied to Russian interests— a Twitter 
campaign to negate allegations of Russian doping at the World Anti- Doping 
Agency, Twitter campaigns around the Vault7 leak of CIA cyber surveillance 
and warfare tools, and one of a cluster of accounts active on the French far 
right during the 2017 French presidential election, and was actively tweeting 
on six of the top 10 most widely reported stories linking to any of the Podesta 
emails.12 Fairbanks used the JaredWyand tweets as the basis to report that 
“[t] heories and screenshots began to swirl, claiming that bizarrely- worded 
emails about food were codes for child sex trafficking.” Fairbanks qualified her 
reporting with “It is important to note that this is originated on anonymous 
message boards, and the ‘keywords’ were not listed in any of the emails.” 
This disclaimer, however, was immediately followed by several tweets from 
JaredWyand and the interview with “lawyer and popular author/ journalist” 
Mike Cernovich repeating versions of the idea that it was code. The start of 
the article includes, as an example of the “code for child sex” in the title, an 
image that Fairbanks described as “Asian girls eating pizza” (Figure 7.2).
The first appearance of the term “pizza” in combination with pedophilia 
or child sex in our data set is in a November 3 Reddit post, “Someone tell 
me I’m wrong!” That post listed all the various ways in which the word 
“pizza” appeared in the Podesta emails, and speculated that pizza is a code 
word for sex trafficking in children.13 The next appearance is another Reddit 
post, which collects a set of Reddit threads that bear on the theory.14 And 
the third appearance is Cassandra Fairbanks’ post from WeAreChange that 
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pulls these theories together.15 The “Comet Pizza” aspect of the story was 
added on November 7 and took on a life of its own.16 WikiLeaks picked 
up Fairbanks’ Abramovich story at 1:00 a.m. on November 4. Seven hours 
later, the Infowars segment curated both of Fairbanks’s November 3 stories 
and Cernovich’s into a collection of insinuations that the spirit cooking email 
was tied to occult satanic sex practices and that these were, in turn, linked 
to trafficking in children, to the “Lolita Express,” and to the use of pizza- 
related code words to stand for sex trafficking. Amplified within minutes 
by Drudge, the core insinuation made it to Hannity and the Washington 
Times three or four hours later. Over the course of the day, versions of the 
story were repeated on Gateway Pundit (which included Michelle Malkin’s 
tweet promoting attention to #SpiritCooking),17 Truthfeed, WND, Western 
Journalism, Ending the Fed, and Before It’s News.
Assuming that after Infowars and Drudge dissemination was primarily 
through direct exposure of these highly visible sites, with our colleague Justin 
Clark we examined 76,127 tweets from 19,696 accounts that mentioned spirit 
cooking, Abramovic, or otherwise met a broad search for tweets related 
to the conspiracy before publication of the Infowars story. Of these, nine 
tweets from eight accounts were from Twitter handles identified by the 
House Intelligence Committee as Russian- operated accounts. Two of these 
preceded the WikiLeaks tweet. As a robustness check, we compared these 
Figure 7.2 WeAreChange story introducing the “pizza pedophilia” frame.
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tweets to the broader private list of Twitter handles central to other Russia- 
related campaigns, which we described in the Jared Wyand context, and 
found that accounts that had participated in at least three such campaigns 
accounted for about 4 percent of the accounts, and 8 percent of the tweets 
prior to the Infowars story. Similarly, they accounted for 7  percent of the 
tweets that mentioned @Wikileaks, and 6  percent of the tweets aimed at 
Alex Jones with this story. The time signature of these tweets and accounts is 
more or less flat as a proportion of tweets, accounting for between 5 percent 
and 15  percent of the tweets in any given minute between publication of 
the Fairbanks story and the Infowars story. That temporal signature is more 
consistent with a background presence and continuous engagement of active 
Twitter accounts that were also involved in Russian campaigns than with a 
coordinated campaign to influence WikiLeaks or Alex Jones to publicize this 
particular story, or to amplify it to a degree not otherwise consistent with 
background attention among right- wing and conspiracy- minded Twitter 
users looking for such stories to amplify.
The spirit cooking story perfectly encapsulates the propaganda pipeline 
from the periphery to the core, drawing in the various suspects in producing 
information disorder and the relationships among them. One suspect is the 
Russian information operation. Certainly, the email hack itself was Russian. 
Cassandra Fairbanks, a Sputnik reporter, wrote the report that curated and 
transmitted the Reddit, Twitter, and 4chan memes into a package that was 
then tweeted and shared on Facebook by WikiLeaks overnight and became 
the basis for an Infowars story by morning. The JaredWyand handle had 
appeared in other Russia- consistent campaigns quite prominently, most 
clearly the arguments against the World Anti- Doping Agency’s sanctions 
against Russian athletes. The low- level background presence of known or 
arguably Russian Twitter handles in the propagation period is also observable. 
The Reddit and 4chan posts themselves, by contrast, are consistent with 
models in work that focuses on how alt- right trolls on these platforms 
experimented with memes that they tried to insert into mainstream media.18 
These were early19 posts that got out a few hours ahead of the story,20 and 
some developed quite imaginative conspiracy theories around pizza party 
invitations.21 The involvement of Cernovich also connects the story to the 
alt- right, as does Jared Wyand, assuming he represents an authentic alt- 
right persona rather than a Russian plant. Ending the Fed is one of the most 
successful original “fake news” sites from the November 2016 BuzzFeed 
story. All the dramatis persona of information disorder are here. And yet, the 
amplification depended first on WikiLeaks’ Twitter and Facebook accounts, 
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then on Alex Jones and Drudge, and then on the rapid and enthusiastic 
embrace by all the major nodes in the right- wing propaganda network over 
the course of several hours. It would have been standard practice for a well- 
balanced media ecosystem to simply refuse to touch such a far- fetched story 
or actively to debunk it. But the cultural and commercial model of the outlets 
that picked up the story was not aimed at producing objective journalism. 
It was designed to produce cathartic outrage in its readers and viewers and 
to be rewarded by clicks and views. It was aimed to produce a sense of “us 
against them.” Its goal was to disseminate images, descriptions, and video 
clearly intended to evoke a visceral reaction of disgust, and through that 
disgust to mobilize viewers, readers, and listeners to political action. And as 
we saw in Chapter 3, the two parts of the American media ecosystem differ 
systematically in the incentives and institutional constraints media outlets 
face. On the right, in particular, the propaganda feedback loop had made the 
cost of publishing falsehood that is consistent with partisan bias low, and the 
opportunity to present the publication as being at the forefront of the truth- 
telling brigade valiantly uncovering corruption, perfidy, and perversion by 
the opposing party was highly valued. As we saw in both Chapters 3 and 6, in 
the rest of the media environment the opposite incentives operated, and the 
institutional structures and attention patterns of audiences made amplifying 
these kinds of falsehoods more costly.
While the propaganda pipeline can, then, work to transmit narratives 
from the periphery to the core, our analysis suggests that the major frames 
and narratives of the campaign and the first year of the Trump presidency did 
not arise from this pattern. Even the Clinton pedophilia narrative was driven 
first and foremost by Malia Zimmerman’s and Bret Baier’s stories on Fox 
News in May 2016, which were then revived on Breitbart radio and online 
by Erik Prince, as we described in Chapter 3, not by the spirit cooking and 
Pizzagate stories that came from the periphery. Indeed, the Pizzagate story 
started exactly as the spirit cooking story started— on 4chan and Reddit, 
picked up and curated by Cernovich and Fairbanks, and then rolled up and 
propagated by Infowars— but never made it up further through the pipeline. 
The pipeline exists. The trolls, propagandists, and marginal figures know 
about it and want to leverage it. But it can only work with willing and active 
complicity of outlets higher up the chain— Drudge, Hannity, and the rest 
of the more visible members of the media ecosystem. And their complicity, 
in turn, depends on the architecture of the network within which they 
themselves sit, the incentives it gives them, and the institutional constraints it 
imposes or fails to impose on them.
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Are the Russians Coming?
By early 2018 only the willfully blind or complicit could continue to 
reject the proposition that Russia has been running information operations 
for years aimed at intensifying political divisions and weakening democracy 
in the United States and Europe. From diverse perspectives and efforts, 
accounts by journalists and academics, intelligence agencies in the United 
States and Europe, and the special counsel investigating relations between the 
Trump campaign and Russia have supported this finding. Even the Trump- 
supportive House Intelligence Committee investigation confirmed that 
Russia had mounted cyberattacks on American targets and used social media 
to sow discord during the 2016 election. A weaker European Union, and a 
more fractured U.S. polity and inwardly- focused U.S. foreign policy, would 
leave Russia with greater leeway to pursue its own foreign policy goals, and a 
steady stream of news about Western democracies in disarray offers legitimacy 
for Vladimir Putin’s own brand of strongman illiberal populism. If we were 
persuaded that Russian propaganda and interference were the primary reason 
that the United States elected a president so congenial to Russia’s interests; 
that the third largest economy in Europe, the United Kingdom, had voted 
to depart the Union; that Spain and Catalonia came to the verge of splitting; 
or that Italy’s Euroskeptics won a majority of the seats in Italy’s parliament, 
we would be observing the most dramatically successful attack on democracy 
since the end of World War II.
Three primary sources of skepticism, or at least caution, about the 
Russian interference hypothesis emerged during the year after the election. 
First, supporters of President Trump resisted the implication that Trump’s 
election was a victory for Russian information warfare not the American 
people. Second, veteran watchers of the controversy over weapons of mass 
destruction and intelligence on Iraq, and the media groupthink failures that 
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accompanied them, took the interagency consensus on Russia with a grain of 
salt. Both of these lines of skepticism were on display in Chapter 5: the Fox 
News interventions for the former, and the Glenn Greenwald articles for the 
latter. The third form is standard academic working skepticism. This is simply 
the result of applying rigorous standards of proof to claims and assessing the 
stronger and weaker aspects of claims by these standards. In this chapter we 
apply this standard and explain why we are persuaded by the weight of the 
evidence that there was a sustained Russian effort; but we offer reasons for 
caution around some of the more expansive narratives— that the social media 
environment was overrun by Russian bots or that street protests in America 
were fomented to a significant degree by Russian agitation. We emphasize 
the difference between proof of the existence of Russian efforts and proof 
of their impact and suggest that the evidence of impact is less clear. In 
particular we are guided by the observation that the primary goal of Russian 
disinformation is to instill a sense that “Nothing is True and Everything is 
Possible,”1 or to “dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay.”2 If that is the case, then 
to overstate the prevalence and effect of Russian attacks is to aid their success. 
Just as terrorism succeeds most when it evokes an overreaction and causes a 
society to respond from fear and anger rather than calculation, so too will 
Russian active measures have their largest effect through evoking a harmful 
autoimmune response from the countries under attack.
Our primary contribution here is to examine the interaction between the 
asymmetric architecture of the American media ecosystem that we discovered 
in our own work and the presence of the Russian efforts. In a nutshell what 
we observe is that Russian efforts take advantage of existing fissures and 
pathways. The differences between the right- wing media ecosystem and 
the ecosystem occupied by the rest, from the center to the left, make the 
former more susceptible to propagandist efforts than the latter. The insular, 
domestically produced network of sites and social media diffusion networks 
that traffic in politically motivated falsehoods, coupled with the persistent 
attacks on mainstream media and other evidence- based institutions and 
expertise, have made the right wing of the American media ecosystem more 
susceptible to penetration, less resilient, and less capable of self- correction. 
When Russian propaganda efforts are consistent with right- wing American 
framings and beliefs, these falsehoods are able to insert themselves, propagate, 
and gain credence in the right- wing media ecosystem. By contrast, similar 
efforts aimed to leverage left- wing biases have to overcome the basic checks 
provided by a media ecosystem inhabited by professional- norms- oriented 
media outlets.
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Russian Origins
Vladimir Putin’s first term in office from 2000 to 2008 was marked by a 
highly restrictive policy toward mass media but permissive policy toward 
online communication. Internet penetration in Russia was low, and the 
reputational costs of a significant crackdown on a symbolically important 
but politically marginal medium likely outweighed the perceived political 
risks associated with letting the internet flourish. By the end of Putin’s first 
two terms, LiveJournal had become the dominant blogging platform, and a 
report authored by Bruce Etling, one of us (Faris), and several other of our 
colleagues concluded “the political blogosphere appears to remain a free and 
open space for Russians of all political stripes to discuss politics, criticize or 
support government, fight corrupt practices and officials, and to mobilize 
others around political and social causes.”3 It was into this relatively open, 
highly contested networked public sphere that Dmitry Medvedev entered, 
earning the nickname “Blogger- in- Chief ” from one observer.4 In support 
of his activity, Medvedev’s government began to redirect youth movements 
originally developed to counter any Russian “color revolution” efforts on 
the streets to online activity, and trolls and bots made their first observed 
appearance in Russian online debates.5
The major change, however, coincided with Putin’s return to office in 2012 
and in response to the most sustained and forceful protests since the implosion 
of the Soviet Union. A combination of changes in ownership and direct 
legal pressure forced online platforms Yandex, Vkontakte, and LiveJournal 
to suppress oppositional voices, and media critical of the government were 
forced to change leadership, often leading reporters to emigrate and set up 
shop abroad. Moreover, the wide- open, commercial nature of the Russian 
internet before 2012 gave birth to companies highly proficient in search engine 
optimization and commercially oriented trolling. These capabilities became 
the foundation of the new state- managed online information campaigns 
against opposition leaders.
In 2013 independent Russian investigative journalists published the first 
reports on the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which would ultimately 
be indicted by Robert Mueller in 2018. Registered in 2013, the IRA would 
become a troll factory, employing paid agents to shape online conversations. 
Russian investigative reporters critical of the government went undercover 
and reported repeatedly on the agency from 2013 to 2015.6 Looking at the 
research on online communications in Russian politics from the first decade 
of the twenty- first century, it seems quite clear that the capabilities deployed 
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against the United States in the 2016 election cycle and beyond were still in 
their infancy by the time they were deployed. There was one investigative 
journalism piece by Russian expats as early as 2003 observing patterns of 
information manipulation by “Internet brigades” within the Russian media 
ecosystem. That report was also the basis of the first academic English- 
language description of Russian “third generation controls” on internet 
discourse in 2010 by Deibert and Rohozinski.7 Deibert and Rohozinski 
identified coordinated campaigns by “ ‘Internet brigades’ to engage, confuse, 
or discredit individuals or sources. Such action can include the posting of 
prepackaged propaganda, kompromat, and disinformation through mass 
blogging and participation in Internet polls, or harassment of individual 
users, including the posting of personal information.”8 The most publicly 
prominent voice raising the alarm about this class of attacks on democracy 
was Evgeny Morozov in The Net Delusion in 2011, who offered it as a frontal 
assault on the then- prevailing wisdom that the internet democratizes political 
discourse.9
The early investigative journalism and academic work on the Russian 
internet was complemented by national security research following the 
Ukranian crisis of 2014.10 Reports from researchers studying Russian national 
security, including think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe and some in 
NATO, began to evaluate operations in Russia and its near sphere, from 
Georgia to Ukraine, Moldova, and beyond. By March 2015 the European 
Council was concerned enough to form the European Union’s East StratCom 
Task Force to deal with the dangers of Russian information operations in the 
“Eastern Partnership” countries— Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. This body of research precedes the U.S.  election 
and identified strategies remarkably congruent with those observed in other 
countries by diverse researchers who are not all on the same page. For skeptical 
Americans concerned that the Russia story is a groupthink overreaction to 
the election, this body of research should offer some increased confidence 
that it is real. Perhaps, as some suggest, present Russian doctrine merely 
updates Soviet “active measures.” Perhaps it reflects adaptation and extension 
of strategies that Russian military and intelligence leaders believe the United 
States used to undermine Russia in its own sphere of influence. The most 
obvious trajectory is that what we saw in Russian operations in America is 
merely an extension of the strategies that the Russian state developed to quell 
domestic political debate after the 2011– 2012 protests. Whatever its origin, 
the sum of the extensive Russia- centered literature is to document that present 
Russian doctrine and practice, at home, in its near periphery and increasingly 
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in the European Union, involves extensive information operations of 
roughly the form observed in the United States during the election period 
and since. These techniques include breaking into computer systems to 
obtain compromising information and releasing it in public; creating false 
accounts on social media to propagate opinions and reports; leveraging the 
affordances of social media advertising platforms; and combining white 
propaganda on RT and Sputnik with gray and black propaganda sites and 
social media accounts to disseminate and add credibility to false information 
and propagate destabilizing disinformation.
Hacking and Doxxing
Beginning a week after Hillary Clinton formally secured a majority of the 
Democratic delegates to the convention, and culminating in a big WikiLeaks 
email dump on the Friday before the Democratic National Convention 
opened, someone began to release batches of emails on a site called DCLeaks, 
emails obtained by hackers from the email system of the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC). The crux of the most damaging emails, particularly those 
released by WikiLeaks on the eve of the Democratic National Convention 
on July 22, 2016, showed that DNC leadership had strongly favored Hillary 
Clinton over Bernie Sanders, despite the organization’s commitment to 
neutrality among the primary candidates. This forced the resignation of then- 
DNC Chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz.11
Hacking into opponents’ email and computer systems, obtaining 
compromising information, and then “leaking” it back out to the public as 
part of an online propaganda campaign is a technique Russian propaganda 
efforts have used repeatedly in Russia and abroad.12 Immediately after 
the first DNC breach, CrowdStrike, the security firm hired by the DNC 
to investigate the breach, came out with a report claiming that the hack 
had been perpetrated by two Russian groups, Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear. 
One was allegedly associated with the GRU, Russian military intelligence, 
the other was possibly associated with the FSB (successor to the KGB).13 
Over the next few months, other information security firms and expert 
groups such as FireEye and ThreatConnect added their own independent 
assessments, concluding that the digital forensic evidence supported the 
proposition that the DNC hack was perpetrated by Russian operations.14 
In October and December of 2016, the Department of Homeland Security 
and the FBI released joint statements asserting that the DNC hack was 
likely directed by the Russian government and that the attacks and 
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subsequent leaks were “consistent with the methods and motivations of 
Russian- directed efforts.”15
On January 6, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
released a joint assessment by the FBI, CIA, and NSA that included a broader 
and more detailed set of assertions.16 This assessment attributed the DNC 
and Podesta email hacks to Russian state actors (although on this question the 
report was heavy on “trust us” and light on forensic details). It also claimed that 
these were part of a broader propaganda and social media campaign (again, 
though, focused on RT rather than any more exotic efforts). And it explicitly 
rejected the idea that Russia had tried or succeeded in any way in tampering 
with the 2016 vote- tallying process. Pushing back on the findings of this report 
was a central feature of the Seth Rich story we noted in Chapter 5. We return 
to that theme here in the context of describing white and gray propaganda. 
For now, we accept the consensus of diverse commercial information security 
firms, technology trade press investigations, mainstream media reports, and 
the consensus assessment of the U.S. intelligence community.
Social Media Influence: Sockpuppets, Bots, Cyborgs, and Ads
The indictment issued by Robert Mueller against the Internet Research 
Agency, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and other Russian nationals offered detailed 
allegations regarding the pattern of Russian intervention, combining false 
accounts on Facebook and Twitter, bots, strategic targeted advertising 
bought under false identity, and mobilizing real- space protests by unwitting 
Americans.17 The core strategy, according to the indictment, was to increase 
disaffection, distrust, and polarization in American politics. The practical 
targeting seemed intended to boost enough of the white- identity vote to 
drive voters to the polls in states that made the difference, to suppress enough 
of the black vote, and to suppress enough of the left vote or divert it to Green 
Party candidate Jill Stein, to tip the election. Given the baseline purpose of 
undermining trust in democratic institutions, however, simply sowing these 
divisive themes would have been a perfectly reasonable consolation prize. 
There were two core claims in the indictment. First, it claimed that the 
defendants had infiltrated social media networks through the use of false 
accounts, whether fully automated (bots), humans masquerading as someone 
other than who they are (sockpuppets), or some combination of the two 
(cyborgs). Second, it claimed that they bought targeted political advertising 
online under false accounts and presented themselves as authentic American 
political activists to spread divisive narratives, organize real- world protests, 
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and push stories that undermined Hillary Clinton and supported Donald 
Trump. We take this indictment not as proof but as one piece of evidence 
among many pointing toward the reality of Russian interference in the 
election. We will use its precision and confidence later in this chapter to raise 
questions about the likely actual impact on the election and the American 
public sphere more generally.
The indictment’s allegations are congruent with independent reports by 
investigative journalists, disclosures by Facebook, Twitter, and Google in their 
testimonies to the House and Senate intelligence committees, and academic 
studies of Russian operations. Following the first round of committee 
hearings, Facebook issued a report in April 2017 on “information operations” 
that was widely read to cover Russia’s activities, although it avoided saying 
so. In anticipation of the second round of congressional hearings, Facebook 
released an updated report,18 as did Twitter.19 Facebook, Twitter, and Google 
returned to testify in late October, when the most extensive disclosures 
occurred. Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee released a sample 
of ads that had been shown on Facebook and that, according to the company, 
had been purchased by agents of Russia. The ads disclosed various groups 
masquerading as American activists on both the right, such as Defend the 
2d, Secured Borders, and Stop A.I. (where A.I. stood for “All Invaders,” not 
“artificial intelligence”) and the left, such as Blacktivists and LGBT United. 
These releases included methods clearly intended to instigate street clashes, 
such as publishing ads for opposing protests on the same day across the 
street from each other, one called “Stop Islamization of Texas” and the other 
called “United Muslims of America.” Facebook’s testimony reported that the 
Internet Research Agency campaign had published 80,000 posts that were 
shown directly to over 29 million people.
A team led by Young Mie Kim of the University of Wisconsin leveraged 
the Facebook groups identified by the minority report of the House 
Intelligence Committee to produce the best study of Facebook advertising 
by, among others, suspicious Russian groups. They found that 5.6  percent 
of the Facebook ads served to their large, nationally representative sample 
of subjects were from one of these sites, and their work obviously identified 
only a lower bound of Russian intervention using purchased ads.20 Facebook 
also testified that Russians had used Instagram to share over 120,000 photos 
from 170 accounts. And committee Democrats released a list of over 2,700 
Twitter handles that have since become the canonical set in efforts to study 
Russian influence on Twitter. Twitter claimed that the handles had posted 
over 130,000 tweets during the election period. Beyond these, Twitter 
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testified that the company had identified 36,000 Russia- linked bots that had 
shared 1.4 million tweets that received about 288 million views. Google, for 
its part, testified that it believed the Internet Research Agency had bought 
ads on YouTube, ran 18 channels, and uploaded over 1,100 videos, which they 
reported as having received very few views: a total of 309,000 views spread 
across the 1,100 videos. All three companies emphasized that, while the 
absolute numbers seem large, they represent tiny slivers of the total amount 
of posts, tweets, videos, and other engagements and uses of their respective 
sites.21
Both before and after these reports, journalists reported a series of stories 
fleshing out these techniques. A report in the Daily Beast, for example, was 
the first to document a real- world anti- immigrant protest in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
The rally was organized using Facebook events by the Russian- controlled 
site Secured Borders.22 CNN similarly reported and offered details of the 
incendiary efforts of Blacktivist, a month before the details about the account 
emerged in congressional testimony. The Wall Street Journal reported that 
four of these highly divisive accounts, Secured Borders, Blacktivist, Heart of 
Texas, and Being Patriotic, had between them nearly a million followers.23 
The New  York Times tried to track down “Melvin Reddick of Harrisburg 
Pennsylvania,” who used Facebook to promote DCLeaks, the site initially 
used to tease the DNC emails before the broader release on WikiLeaks. They 
were unable to locate anyone in the United States who matched the profile, 
but a Brazilian site took interest and with help from their readers located the 
man, a Brazilian national, whose picture was used in the account.24
As a report from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Labs makes clear, 
however, the most extensive and in- depth reporting came from independent 
Russian journalists, some working abroad for fear of retaliation, who 
uncovered much of this activity.25 Polina Rusyayeva and Andrei Zakharov, 
journalists at RBC, a media group that has published stories critical of 
business interests close to Valdimir Putin and come under pressure from the 
Russian government for it,26 published the most comprehensive leaked set 
of Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram accounts run by the Internet Research 
Agency in the U.S.  election. These included accounts aimed at African 
American audiences, such as Blacktivist or DON’Tshoot; accounts aimed at 
anti- immigrant sentiment, such as Secured Borders and Stop all Invaders; at 
Republicans, such as TEN_ GOP and Tpartynews; and at police officers, such 
as Back the Badge or Pray4Police; and so forth.27
Some more detail on the commonly- used terminology is useful. “Bots” 
refer to fully automated accounts or scripts that simply share, tweet, or retweet 
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news headlines, with or without links, retweet other accounts, or exhibit 
similarly simple actions in high volumes with minimal human supervision. 
“Sockpuppets” usually refers to fully human accounts that pretend to be 
people they are not. We prefer “sockpuppets” to “trolls,” because the “trolls” 
term has been used in two quite different meanings in the debate. In long- 
standing studies of 4chan and other internet countercultures, the term had 
quite distinct meanings that were more nihilist than programmatic. As three 
of the leading scholars of these hacking and trolling subcultures argue, by 
2017  “trolling” in American usage had come to mean too many things in 
too many contexts to continue to be a useful analytic category.28 In Russia- 
centered studies, by contrast, “trolls” means human participants paid to 
intervene in an online conversation to shape it in favor of whoever is paying 
them. That was the Russian usage, identified in Russia, by the Novaya Gazeta 
report that first outed the Internet Research Agency.29 We prefer “sockpuppet” 
to “human” because we think it important to separate out instances where 
human beings are presenting their own real persona, even if paid, and those 
where an individual takes on one or more persona that they manage in a fully 
human process but present to the outside world as someone other than who 
they are. We mean this to cover individuals paid to post repeatedly, captured 
by the “50 Cent Army” metaphor applied to both China and Russia, whether 
they do so by controlling one account or several. Increasingly these actors use 
scripts and supervised automation to increase their effectiveness. Accounts 
that use these practices are increasingly described as “cyborg” by social media 
researchers.30
White Propaganda, Gray Propaganda, and Useful Idiots
There are several other major pieces of the Russian interference puzzle: the 
role of the state- owned RT and Sputnik in developing and reporting stories 
targeted at specific countries; the role of apparently local media outlets that 
are in fact run by Russian agents; and the role of genuinely local media that 
propagate Russian- developed narratives, wittingly or unwittingly, either 
to push a political agenda or to attract readers and advertising dollars. The 
latter are the “useful idiots.” In Cold War– era propaganda studies, “white” 
propaganda referred to communications by an outlet acknowledged to be of 
one party or another, where the information was more or less accurate but 
framed to favor that party. “Black” propaganda referred to spreading lies 
and deception through falsely described sources. “Gray” propaganda was 
somewhere in between.
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The January 6, 2017, ODNI report focused heavily on RT as a major source 
of propaganda. The report particularly emphasized a number of statements 
that RT editor- in- chief Margarita Simonyan made to various Russian and 
foreign outlets. Those statements explicitly described RT’s role as a state- 
funded outlet to serve as an important part of Russia’s defense system in the 
information wars.31 In our own studies RT was a moderately visible site during 
and after the U.S.  election, shared more by Trump followers than Clinton 
followers, by a 3:2 ratio. The relatively low direct visibility of RT, however, 
understates the impact of the site through repetition of its stories on other 
sites in the network. Some of those propagandist sites are masked Russian 
outlets (gray propaganda), and some are pawns who repeat the Russian line 
for their own purposes.
Infowars, the eighth- most tweeted site on the right, repeatedly republishes 
RT content. A  BuzzFeed investigative report found that Infowars had 
republished over 1,000 stories with an RT byline between 2014 and 2017, 
without RT’s permission.32 Analyzing the text of stories in our own 2017 set, 
we found 431 stories in which a sentence of at least 32 words on Infowars was 
identical to one found on RT. Those stories account for about 3 percent of 
the Infowars stories in our 2017 dataset. The stories generally either simply 
republish RT content or quote and link to the site. Sean Adl- Tabatabai, the 
author of YourNewsWire.com, which has risen to a position of significant 
visibility in the right- wing media ecosystem and played a prominent role 
in propagating Pizzagate and the Seth Rich conspiracy, responded to an 
interview question from the Evening Standard with “I love Russia Today!” 
The Evening Standard author described RT as “one of his most cited sources” 
and followed up with: “You are aware that it’s Russian propaganda, right?” 
to which Adl- Tabatabai responded, “Well, the BBC is British propaganda. 
It’s the same thing.”33 In other words, it would be a mistake to imagine that 
the primary role of RT is to propagate content directly through social media 
campaigns. Rather, the evidence suggests that RT intentionally serves as a 
source and hub of a much more diffuse network of sites that reuse narratives 
the station produces.
In the other direction, RT and Sputnik offer accreditation for others who 
carry the Russian line. For example, in the case of the campaign to smear the 
White Helmets, a humanitarian organization in Syria, RT and Sputnik gave 
significant prominence and repetition to blogger Vanessa Beeley, associate 
editor of 21stcenturywire.com, who was at the epicenter of the Russian- led 
disinformation campaign.34
 Are the Russians Coming? 245
245
In our study of the “deep state” frame, we found that RT gave Ron Paul a 
platform to propagate the idea just after the election, that Sputnik published 
a piece by an editor of 21stcenturywire.com, and that both sites repeated this 
frame often throughout 2017. Zero Hedge offered guest publishing slots for 
The Saker (described in Chapter 5), who runs a site with quite a bit of Russian 
apologia, as well as an early piece from the Strategic Culture Foundation,35 a 
Moscow- based think tank that Politico described as a part of Russian influence 
efforts.36 Despite these traces of Russian efforts, the most important anchors 
of the deep state frame were American and came from diverse political 
orientations. The Virgil posts on Breitbart and its full- throated embrace by 
Fox offered a quite distinct frame from the Greenwald pieces. But it would 
be a stretch to imagine that either Greenwald or Breitbart needed Russian 
prompting to frame their criticism as they did. Similarly, in Chapter  7 we 
saw the central role that Cassandra Fairbanks, then working for Sputnik but 
publishing on WeAreChange, played in weaving together the spirit cooking 
and Pizzagate narratives. Reddit users and alt- right characters concocted 
those narratives from the Russian- hacked Podesta emails and fed them into 
stories that WikiLeaks, Infowars, and Drudge pushed up the propaganda 
pipeline.
From our observations of the last three years, there is one example that 
might count as a significant temporary success of the interplay between 
white, gray, and black propaganda. It involves the Guccifer 2.0– Adam 
Carter– Forensicator line of attack on the Russian origins of the DNC hack, 
which was interwoven with the Seth Rich conspiracy theory we encountered 
in Chapter 5, but was quite distinct. In particular this line of attack was more 
directed toward harnessing the national security skepticism that characterized 
the Greenwald posts than the partisanship of the Breitbart/ Fox variety. We 
say that this story “might” count as a success because the evidence that it was 
primarily a Russian effort, as opposed to genuine pseudonymous critics of the 
national security establishment or fans of WikiLeaks, who were then aided at 
the margins by Russian propagandists, is circumstantial. We say the success 
was “temporary,” because it succeeded in changing the public narrative 
around the DNC leak for about two months in the middle of 2017 before the 
orientation of the narrative returned to the original configuration of the right 
in opposition to the rest of the media ecosystem.
As we described in discussing hacking and doxxing, by the time that the 
ODNI released its January 6, 2016, report, there was broad consensus that 
the DNC had been hacked by Russian operations and that the “Guccifer 
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2.0” persona who claimed responsibility was a Russian cover (an allegation 
later elaborated and supported in a July 2018 indictment by the special counsel). 
On February 8, 2017, a person writing under the pseudonym Adam Carter first 
published what would become a regularly updated blog post describing the 
reasons to doubt that Guccifer 2.0 was in fact part of a Russian information 
operation. He argued that Guccifer 2.0 was an effort by the Clinton campaign 
or the DNC to point the finger at Russia and discredit WikiLeaks.37 The 
primary evidence was that metadata from the documents Guccifer 2.0 released 
suggested that the document was in fact created by a person with ties to the 
Democratic National Committee. On February 17, as the deep state narrative 
was spinning up in response to the Michael Flynn resignation, a different 
person going by the handle tvor_ 22 and the Cyrillic нет (nyet) published a 
later- deleted post on Medium that analyzed the documents made public by 
Guccifer 2.0. That post argued that the extremely obvious ways that Guccifer 
2.0 “hid” clues of being Russian were best explained as efforts by the DNC 
to hide the origin of the leaks, by the CIA to besmirch Russia, or by Russia 
to sow disinformation and chaos.38 On March 8, tvor_ 22 published another 
deeply ironic post suggesting that the Russian Bear “paw prints” all over the 
alleged hacks were so laughably clumsy that they were more likely to be CIA 
false flag operations than actual Russian operations.39 Whether this account 
was a bemused hacker ironically taking on an obviously made- up Russian 
persona to state that the paw prints were too obviously Russian to have been 
really Russian, or whether it was a Russian information operation pretending 
to be such a bemused hacker, is anyone’s guess.
On March 20, 2017, the House Intelligence Committee ran its Hearing on 
Russian Active Measures. Representative Adam Schiff ’s opening statement 
underscored the sustained Russian attack, connecting the DNC hack, 
the DCLeaks site, and the Guccifer 2.0 diversion operation as elements in 
the attack on the American presidential campaign.40 In response Sputnik 
News reporter Cassandra Fairbanks tweeted “Pretty sure Guccifer 2 is not 
a ‘creature of Russia,’ @RepAdamSchiff ” and attached a screenshot of a 
direct message exchange she had had with Guccifer 2.0 on August 24, 2016. 
In that exchange she offered to interview Guccifer 2.0, and he answered that 
he would rather that she interview him for her WeAreChange blog, saying 
“I don’t like sputnik coz it’s Russian.”41 Who exactly might be persuaded by 
a Sputnik reporter sharing a purported screenshot from an alleged Russian 
agent claiming that he is not in fact a Russian agent, is a curious question. 
These Fairbanks tweets were then included in the Adam Carter blog as part 
of the evidence that Guccifer 2.0 was not a Russian job. The Senate Select 
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Committee on Intelligence then held its open hearings on disinformation 
and Russian active measures on March 30.
Following the congressional hearings, April saw an uptick in Seth Rich 
and Guccifer 2.0 conspiracies. On April 8, former Playboy model Robbin 
Young published a set of purported screenshots from Twitter direct message 
exchanges with Guccifer 2.0. In one of the messages Guccifer 2.0 asked for 
help investigating “the real story of his life and death  . . .  his name is seth, 
he was my whistleblower.”42 That same day the WikiLeaks Twitter account 
tweeted Young’s DMs, linking Adam Carter’s site, which hosted a copy of 
the DM exchange.43 Stories on Heat Street and republished on Zero Hedge 
with the clickbaity title ‘Guccifer 2.0’ Chat With Nude Model Sparks New 
Conspiracy Theories About Seth Rich Murder” followed,44 joining the 
Gateway Pundit.45 Fox and Friends then also reported on the Robbin Young– 
Guccifer exchange as raising the question of Seth Rich’s murder, although 
added that “it’s not clear if the messages are, in fact, authentic.”46 Toward the 
end of April, Cassandra Fairbanks returned to the conversation with two 
stories in Big League Politics. In the first, she used alleged screenshots from 
Twitter DMs with Guccifer. She described her relationship with Guccifer 
as involving the writing of a story about the leaks. “At this point,” Fairbanks 
wrote, “I was still supporting Sanders in the primary.” Among those chats, she 
reported, Guccifer 2.0 tied the death of Shawn Lucas, who had served papers 
on the DNC alleging primary fraud against Sanders, to that of Seth Rich.47 
In the second, she reported on Adam Carter’s allegations that Guccifer had 
deliberately planted Russian fingerprints on his account.48 It was clear that 
at this point the Guccifer 2.0 story was trying to attract left- wing partisans 
whose skepticism of the national security establishment would outweigh 
their partisan proclivity to believe the worst of Donald Trump. Between the 
Guccifer 2.0 persona, Fairbanks’s position at Sputnik, the timing surrounding 
the congressional hearings into Russian interference, and the party most likely 
to benefit from this shift in blame, circumstantially this storyline exhibits 
more hints of a Russian effort than does the Seth Rich episode, which would 
soon took center stage in May and June.
On July 8, 2017, the New  York Times published its first story on the 
famous Trump Tower meeting arranged by Donald Trump Jr. with Natalia 
Veselnitskaya.49 The next day, they followed up with reporting that 
Trump Jr. had been enticed to the meeting with the prospect of damaging 
information on Hillary Clinton. That same day, an individual working 
under the pseudonym the Forensicator published an analysis of the Guccifer 
2.0 metadata, introducing a new factor into the analysis of the email leak/ 
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hack: the data transfer rate at which the files were copied was too high for any 
existing broadband connection to sustain, much less from an international 
connection.50 The story was then reported on Disobedient Media51— a 
website that is hard to peg as either clearly left or right— generally skeptical of 
powers that be, but with a heavy focus on WikiLeaks and Julian Assange (when 
we observed the site, four of twelve stories under “U.S. Politics” concerned 
Assange; another four covered the Nunes memo). Adam Carter is the site’s 
technology writer. Its cofounder and contributor, William Craddick, is also 
a contributor to Zero Hedge, where his profile proudly announces that he 
“[d] iscovered and published the Clinton- Silsby human trafficking scandal”52 
that we encountered in Cassandra Fairbanks’s posts in Chapter 7.
From there, the story spread through the by now usual suspects on the 
right: the Free Republic, the Gateway Pundit, Zero Hedge, and BB4SP, with 
a Zero Hedge story getting the extra credit of citation by the Daily Stormer 
prefaced by “Well, if the Jews and their shills thought this was the end of 
their troubles, they were wrong.”53 Unsurprisingly, RT carried the story 
as well.54 The story also appeared on a subreddit for supporters of Bernie 
Sanders, r/ WayOf TheBern. There, the post laid out the Adam Carter and 
Forensicator analyses and concluded: “In short, Russiagate is a hoax concocted 
by the DNC in collaboration with Crowdstrike, and given the stamp of approval 
by Deep State tools— hand- picked by James Clapper— eager to defame Russia. 
The Democrats and the MSM subsequently embellished this narrative by 
claiming that the Trump campaign somehow had ‘colluded’ in Russia’s non- 
existent interference.” (emphasis in original). 55 The post was clearly trying to 
leverage the dual valence of the “deep state” frame— appealing to the older, 
more general anti- national- security- establishment frame— even as the frame 
continues to do work on the right in its new, more partisan form. Despite this 
one appearance on the left, the story remained almost exclusively in right- 
wing media for the next two weeks.
On July 24, 2017, a group of former U.S.  intelligence professionals 
published an open letter to the president on consortiumnews.com, question-
ing the consensus view of the active intelligence community that the 
DNC hack was perpetrated by Russian intelligence.56 Veteran Intelligence 
Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) had formed to protest manipulation of 
intelligence that led to the Iraq War.57 The group who signed this open letter 
consisted, among others, of William Binney, Kirk Wiebe, and Ed Loomis, 
individuals who had been at the center of exposing the elements of the illegal 
surveillance programs initiated by the Bush administration after 9/ 11. These 
revelations later exploded in 2006, and parts were later corroborated in the 
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materials by Edward Snowden. These were no crackpots or Russian stooges 
but respected professionals with a personal history of calling foul, getting it 
right, and for some of them, being persecuted for it by the Bush and Obama 
administrations. Some were heroes to libertarians and civil libertarians alike. 
The memo relied on the work and logic of the Forensicator and Adam Carter, 
which identified the “key fact” that
someone working in the EDT time zone with a computer directly 
connected to the DNC server or DNC Local Area Network, copied 
1,976 MegaBytes of data in 87 seconds onto an external storage device. 
That speed is much faster than what is physically possible with a hack.” 
(emphasis in the original). It thus appears that the purported “hack” of 
the DNC by Guccifer 2.0 (the self- proclaimed WikiLeaks source) was 
not a hack by Russia or anyone else but was rather a copy of DNC data 
onto an external storage device.
They surmised from the metadata that downloading the volume of 
materials in the specified time would have required a download speed of 22.7 
megabytes per second (slightly over 180 megabits per second). Using average 
speeds from speedtest.net, the authors of the VIPS memo argued that such 
speeds were not available in the United States from broadband providers but 
that that speed was very close to the speed usually obtained in downloading 
to a USB thumb drive. The memorandum hypothesized from these facts 
that a likely scenario was that the DNC wove a story of Russian interference 
to discredit any wrongdoing that the emails exposed, as well as to turn it to 
the disadvantage of Donald Trump, tarring him with being the preferred 
candidate of Vladimir Putin. The story was initially republished on a few left- 
wing sites and on the Antiwar blog, got substantial coverage on the right, and 
was picked up by RT and Sputnik as well.
On August 9 The Nation published a long piece by Patrick Lawrence, 
detailing the VIPS claims as well as the underlying work that Forensicator 
and Adam Carter had published.58 The next day, Bloomberg published a 
column by Leonid Bershidsky. Bershidsky had been a journalist in Russia and 
wrote very publicly about his disillusionment with Russia when he emigrated 
to Germany after the Crimea annexation. His column suggested that the 
VIPS analysis and The Nation story demanded more serious coverage from 
traditional media. He further argued that the participation of such highly 
respected professionals warranted more than the back- of- the- hand treatment 
they had received from mainstream media.59 New  York Magazine and the 
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Washington Monthly published stories criticizing The Nation story, but with 
little analysis.60 Salon published a piece summarizing the VIPS argument, 
claiming that mainstream media were ignoring the story because it was an 
embarrassment that they had all rushed to the wrong judgment and lamenting 
that the VIPS memo was receiving attention almost exclusively by right- wing 
media.61
Indeed, on the right all the top sites immediately picked up The Nation 
story and used its provenance as a major source of legitimation as a Breitbart 
headline makes clear: “Left- Wing Magazine The Nation Report Puts ‘Russian 
Hack’ DNC Narrative in Freefall.”62 Tucker Carlson interviewed Bill Binney 
on his show and framed the VIPS claims as “not just that the President Trump 
didn’t collude with Russia, you’re calling into question the core allegation; 
that Russia is responsible for hacking into the DNC server.”63 The VIPS 
memo did nothing of the sort. It made no claims at all about the broader 
“collusion” question and focused very specifically on evidence regarding the 
DNC hack. Nonetheless, the chyron filling the bottom of the screen cycled 
between “Former NSA Technical Director, Trump- Russia Collusion Story is 
Bogus, Agenda- Driven,” and all caps “FMR NSA TECH DIR: NO PROOF 
OF COLLUSION.”
Figure 8.1 bears attention. Carlson hosted Binney for five and a half 
minutes. For much of this time Binney focused narrowly and technically 
on the forensic evidence surrounding the DNC hack itself. His jargon was 
likely opaque to most TV viewing audiences. Carlson nodded gravely and 
Figure 8.1 Bill Binney interview on Tucker Carlson, August 14, 2017.
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listened intently. Binney said nothing about the Trump Tower meeting or the 
question of whether or not there was or was not collusion between the Trump 
campaign and Russian state operatives. But the core message was impossible 
to miss. An unimpeachable expert offered detailed technical analysis that 
refuted the core claim of the Trump- Russia investigation.
Figure 8.2 describes the link network of stories surrounding the Guccifer 
2.0 analysis that resulted in this remarkable interview. It leaves no doubt as to 
the centrality of the interventions by Forensicator (both the WordPress blog 
and the publication on Disobedient Media) and by the Adam Carter blog 
(g- 2space). It leaves no doubt that The Nation adoption of this storyline was 
key. The Intercept, as we will soon see, was actually part of the rejection of the 
theory, not its adoption, and came much later, in the autumn of 2017.
In the meantime, it seems that some of The Nation’s staff were rebelling 
against the publication of Lawrence’s piece. By August 15, the Washington 
Figure 8.2 Network map of stories that mention the Forensicator theory of Guccifer 
2.0. Architecture and node sizing by media inlinks.
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Post reported that, under internal pressure from journalists at The Nation, 
the magazine was conducting a post- publication review.64 On September 1, 
2017, The Nation appended an editor’s note to the original August 9 story 
and published a collection of pieces on the VIPS memo.65 Those pieces 
included the results of an independent investigation of the VIPS memo that 
The Nation had asked Nathan Freitas of the Guardian Project to conduct, a 
countermemo by dissenting members of VIPS, including some like Thomas 
Drake and Jesselyn Radack, who had long been allied with Binney and other 
signatories on the original VIPS memo, and a response by the authors of the 
original VIPS memo. The Freitas memo offered a detailed technical analysis 
that explained how the Forensicator memorandum went well beyond the 
data available and how the original VIPS memo had extrapolated further 
beyond the Forensicator’s analysis.66 The VIPS dissenters also focused on 
the extent to which the Binney group had jumped to conclusions beyond 
those warranted by the Forensicator’s analysis, rather than raising the less 
sensational but legitimate questions of why the intelligence community has 
not released detailed evidence supporting the claim that Russians had hacked 
the DNC servers.67 The original VIPS memo authors responded, primarily 
emphasizing the devastating damage that the intelligence errors leading up to 
the Iraq War had caused and warning of the danger that we were, once again, 
suffering from a similar bout of groupthink.68
Major media outlets reported on the follow- up coverage in The Nation, 
which was viewed as a near- retraction of the original story in The Nation. 
Right- wing media covered the same collection of stories as an indication 
that The Nation caved in to mainstream anti- Trump media pressure. The 
story re- emerged in November, when two veteran national security reporters, 
Duncan Campbell and James Risen, reported in the Intercept that CIA 
Director Mike Pompeo had met Bill Binney at President Trump’s request. 
The most notable feature of this story was that it was published in the 
Intercept, founded by Glenn Greenwald, who had been the most important 
source of skepticism of the Russia hypothesis outside of the right- wing media 
ecosystem, and who had long worked with national security whistle- blowers 
among the VIPS memo authors and dissenters. The November 7 story about 
the Binney- Pompeo meeting, however, emphasized the extent to which the 
VIPS- Binney- Forensicator theory had by now been abandoned and used the 
meetings primarily as a signal of concern that Pompeo was bending the CIA to 
serve Trump’s agenda rather than preserving the independence of the agency. 
Other publications in the mainstream and left emphasized the impropriety 
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of the Trump’s intervention and the danger posed by a CIA director willing 
to bend the agency’s mission to help the president politically. Publications 
on the right, by contrast, framed the meeting as further support for Binney’s 
theories.
The Guccifer 2.0 case and those of Infowars, 21stcenturywire.com, True 
Pundit, YourNewsWire.com, and Zero Hedge, all present the basic difficulty 
of sorting out which of these are gray or black propaganda outlets, as opposed 
to honest critics promoted by propagandist outlets on one hand, and useful 
idiots just out to make a point or a buck, on the other.
True Pundit, a site founded in March 2016, has grown explosively during 
the first year of Trump’s presidency and was identified by the German 
Marshall Fund’s Hamilton 68 project (an online dashboard offering 
visualizations of “topics and URLs promoted by Russia- linked influence 
networks on Twitter”) as one of the sites most widely promoted by Russian 
social media operations.69 It showed up in our observations as one of the 
most tweeted sites involved in the propagation of the deep state frame. 
Practically nothing is known about the origins or authors of this successful 
site. A bit more is known of YourNewsWire.com. The site was described by 
Snopes as a “notorious fake news generating site,” in the context of refuting 
its theory that the June 2017 suicide bombing at the Arian Grande concert in 
the Manchester Arena, in which 22 people were killed and over one hundred 
injured, was a false flag operation.70 It has the dubious honor of a perfect 
“pants on fire” score from PolitiFact.71 A Hollywood Reporter profile of the 
two owner- authors, a couple living in Los Angeles, noted in passing that 
an unnamed British paper had reported that “a European Union task force 
set up to combat Russian propaganda had classified the outlet as a proxy.”72 
Digging deeper into the British press coverage, however, about the Brit who 
moved to Los Angeles with his American husband and makes a living by 
spinning checkout- counter- tabloid material, some of which is written by his 
mother, suggest that Sean Adl- Tabatabai is more an Alex Jones wannabe than 
a chapter from The Americans.73 Because of all the negative coverage, Google 
removed the site from its advertising network in 2017, and it remains to be 
seen what impact this will have on the site. While the couple told Hollywood 
Reporter that the move had cost them a 60 percent drop in their revenues, 
data from the first quarter of 2018 show that the site had retained its level of 
traffic, with monthly visits roughly halfway between the Weekly Standard 
and Reason magazines— a position it had held without much variation 
throughout the preceding 18  months. One of Zero Hedge’s lead authors 
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resigned from the site in mid- 2016, telling Bloomberg in the process that 
he was fed up with cranking out stories that fit the model of “Russia=good. 
Obama=idiot. Bashar al- Assad=benevolent leader. John Kerry=dunce. 
Vladimir Putin=greatest leader in the history of statecraft.”74 Nonetheless 
Lokey, the former Zero Hedge contributor, also told Bloomberg that these 
guidelines were honed carefully to increase clicks rather than for a political 
purposes.
Perhaps investigative journalists or law enforcement agencies can find 
smoking gun evidence that one or another of these actors is in fact a Russian 
agent. We have not found such evidence in the public record. But the 
actual observed patterns of behavior suggest that whether there is a formal 
relationship or whether these sites merely repeat the party line because it 
fits their ideology or contributes to their bottom line is substantially less 
important than understanding that these sites behave in this manner and that 
we are able to tag such sites as repeat offenders when it comes to spreading 
Russian propaganda. For purposes of legal responsibility, knowledge and 
intent are critical. For purposes of understanding what sites often serve as 
pathways for Russian propaganda, witting, unwitting, or witless matters a 
great deal less than the fact of being such a conduit.
Caution, After All
We began this chapter with the claim that one would have to be willfully 
blind or complicit to deny the fact that there has been a sustained Russian 
attack on the American media ecosystem aimed at sowing division and 
disinformation. The evidence we described in condensed form should be 
enough to support that assertion. There are simply too many diverse sources 
to ignore:  government and nongovernment, for profit and nonprofit, 
defense- centered and internet- research- centered, American and European, all 
of which confirm the general pattern and many of the details that support the 
claim that Russia mounted a sustained campaign against the United States as 
well as various countries in Europe.
But evidence of sustained effort is not the same as evidence of impact 
or prevalence. It would be profoundly counterproductive to embrace the 
narrative that we can no longer know what is true because of Russian bots, 
sockpuppets, or shady propaganda. Indeed, having us adopt that attitude 
would mark a remarkable success for that Russian effort: the success in denying 
democracy one of its core pillars— the capacity to have a public debate based 
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on some sense of a shared reality and trust in institutions. To be clear, we do 
not claim that the following pages “prove” that Russian efforts didn’t matter. 
We offer them rather as examples of the kind of perspective and scrutiny we 
think necessary before one moves from alert to panic in understanding the 
threat of the attack.
Hacking and Doxxing Minimal Effects
While the Podesta emails may have been released primarily to rally the base, 
it is very clear from the timing and context that the DNC email hack and 
its release on DCLeaks and WikiLeaks was intended to deny Clinton the 
support of disappointed Sanders supporters. In that regard, it represented a 
relatively obvious target, given the contentiousness of the primary, and, as we 
saw in Chapter 6, paralleled the strategy Breitbart pursued with the release of 
the Clinton Cash video that same weekend before the convention.
How important were these hacking attacks? We have already seen in 
Chapter 6 that “emails” was the word most closely associated with Clinton in 
the run- up to the election, but we also saw that media attention was primarily 
driven by State Department releases and to a lesser extent Judicial Watch 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) victories. The DNC and Podesta emails 
certainly produced increased attention, particularly the latter, but the response 
even to the Podesta emails was dwarfed by the Comey announcement about 
reopening the State Department server investigation. The emails certainly 
provided fodder for right- wing media. They were at the heart of Pizzagate. 
But they were not at all at the root of the much more widely held Clinton- 
pedophilia conspiracy theory concerning the Lolita Express, which, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, was rooted in FOIA- enabled reporting by Fox News using 
flight logs and earlier Gawker reporting. The Seth Rich and Guccifer 2.0 
conspiracies certainly played repeated roles over the course of 2017 as means 
of diverting attention from Russia- related news that was embarrassing to 
Donald Trump, but, as we saw in Chapter 5, the heavy lifting on Seth Rich 
was done by Fox rather than by Russian active measures.
If we look at the direct functional target— splitting Sanders supporters 
from Clinton— the hacking operations seem to have failed. Reviewing the 
coverage of the DNC email leaks reveals that, as we have repeatedly seen, the 
media ecosystem occupied by the Sanders left lacked the kind of conspiracy- 
amplification sites so typical of right- wing media. The stories from the emails 
did in fact emerge and were covered by both left and center- left media. But 
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then they receded. The most widely shared email from the DNC dump was 
an email from Amy Dacey to Brad Marshall, both of the DNC, entitled “No 
shit.” In that email Marshall proposed planting a question in a Sanders event 
in which Sanders would be asked about his religion. Marshall wrote, “I think 
I  read he is an atheist. This could make several points difference with my 
peeps. My Southern Baptist peeps would draw a big difference between a Jew 
and an atheist.” This original email was covered by the Intercept, Washington 
Post, CNN, and Politico, coverage that was quite prominent when measured 
by media inlinks (Figure 8.3a). Marshall then followed up with “It’s the 
Jesus thing,” to which Dacey responded, “AMEN.”75 This latter part of the 
exchange got more attention on Facebook generally, in particular on the right 
(Figure 8.3b).
After the mainstream coverage, however, no major Facebook- or Twitter- 
driven sites kept the story alive on the left, so the impact of the story was 
small. We see an even starker rightward bias when we look at the other major 
(a)
Figure  8.3a Media sources that linked to the initial leaked “No shit” email. Nodes 
sized by number of media inlinks.
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Facebook- shared email that could have inflamed the left. Entitled “re: Alaska 
‘Counter’ event,” the email mentioned an informant inside the Bernie 
campaign helping the DNC. Here coverage stayed purely within the right- 
wing media ecosystem, primarily the Gateway Pundit and to a lesser extent 
sites like beforeitsnews.com and dcclothesline.com (Figure 8.4).
To the extent that the DNC leaks were intended to splinter the Democratic 
Party, they appear to have largely failed, and they appear to have failed largely 
because the media ecosystem on the left did not follow the same practices that 
were available for the propagandists to harness when they aimed at the right. 
The stories were reported in major publications and minor; they took their 
course; but they did not devolve into polarizing hatred- inducing stories of the 
kind we saw in Chapters 3, 4, and 7.
(b)
Figure 8.3b Media sources that linked to the final “AMEN” response in the exchange. 
Nodes sized by number of Facebook shares.
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Infiltrating Social Media
Using Social Media to Introduce Frames
Claims about social media amplification need to address not only the 
presence of a campaign but also the impact that a campaign has on framing, 
agenda setting, or behavior on a scale large enough to shape events. We 
can take, for example, one of the very specific allegations in the Mueller 
indictment:  “Defendants and their co- conspirators began purchasing 
advertisements that promoted a post on the ORGANIZATION- controlled 
Facebook account ‘Stop A.l.’ The post alleged that ‘Hillary Clinton has 
already committed voter fraud during the Democrat Iowa Caucus.’ ” The 
Figure  8.4 Media sources that linked to the leaked “Re:  Alaska ‘Counter’ Event” 
email. Nodes sized by number of media inlinks.
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indictment went on to identify communications by the Russian- controlled 
Twitter handle @Ten_ GOP on August 11, and then again on November 2, 
alleging primary and intended general election voter fraud by the Clinton 
campaign.
For purposes of understanding whether the acts are illegal, the marginal 
impact on agenda setting during an election cycle is irrelevant. If an 
accountant steals $5,000 from a billionaire client, her theft is no less a crime 
for the fact that the billionaire will not miss the $5,000. But if we are trying 
to put the acts in context, we need to understand what role that particular 
intervention might have played in the overall “voter fraud” frame and how it 
played out in the election. Looking at our election data, Figure 8.5 makes clear 
that there is in fact a distinct uptick in the use of the “voter fraud” in early 
August (you need to look carefully not to be confounded by the huge upsurge 
in mid- October).
If Russians injected that meme into the American election, even if they 
were not responsible for the later upsurge, that would indeed be a major 
concern. Zooming in on mid- July to mid- August, however, Figure 8.6 suggests 
that the uptick in use of the term “voter fraud” precedes August 4, when the 
indictment alleges a Russian Twitter campaign to push the term. Indeed, the 
term peaks on that day and declines thereafter.
What precipitated that spike in early August was not Russian bots, 
sockpuppets, or targeted advertisements but a candidate’s strategy. On July 
27, during a Reddit AMA (Ask Me Anything) forum, Trump was asked, 
“We firmly believe Hillary will try and steal this election through vote fraud, 
especially given recent events. What is your campaign doing to ensure that we 





























































Figure 8.5 Sentences per day mentioning “voter fraud” during the election period.
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and authorities must be vigilant from keeping those from voting that are not 
authorized to do so.”76 The candidate’s assertion of voter fraud got coverage 
in the Washington Post, on ABC News, on the “PBS NewsHour,” in the 
Guardian, and in the Miami Herald, alongside the New York Post.
On July 29 a court in North Carolina struck down that state’s voter ID 
law, holding that it had discriminatory intent and targeted African Americans 
“with almost surgical precision.”77 That same day courts in Wisconsin and 
Kansas similarly struck down as unconstitutional laws passed by Republican 
state legislatures involving voter ID and other restrictions. These decisions 
were widely reported across the media and launched a series of attacks by 
the Trump campaign. That same day, Breitbart published an interview with 
Roger Stone under the title “Roger Stone on the Milo Show: How Trump 
Can Fight Voter Fraud.”78 There Stone alleged that voter fraud was widespread 
and stated that, “[i] f there’s voter fraud, this election will be illegitimate, the 
election of the winner will be illegitimate, we will have a constitutional crisis, 
widespread civil disobedience, and the government will no longer be the 
government.”79
At a campaign rally on August 1 Trump picked up the theme, alleging that 
the Democratic primary had been rigged and that “I’m afraid the election is 
going to be rigged, I  have to be honest.”80 Later that day he appeared on 
Hannity81 and claimed that the 2012 election and Democratic primary had 
been rigged and that the general election might be. The next day Trump 
appeared on the “O’Reilly Factor,”82 then still the most popular show on Fox 
News,83 claiming that people were going “to vote 10 times” because of the 
court decisions striking down the voter suppression laws in North Carolina, 
Wisconsin, and Kansas. O’Reilly and Hannity each boasted audiences 















































Figure 8.6 Sentences per day mentioning “voter fraud,” July 15– September 20, 2016.
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that repeated Trump’s campaign speech statement. Although Limbaugh, 
not a Trump supporter in the primaries, questioned the campaign tactic as 
defeatist, he nonetheless reinforced the message by saying of Trump’s claim, 
“And, of course, there’s gonna be some people who believe this because there 
have been elections where there has been fraud. I mean, everybody knows 
this.”84 Limbaugh’s audience, though hard to gauge accurately, is estimated 
to be between 15 and 20 million listeners a week. On that same day, Trump 
again repeated the claim in an interview published in the Washington 
Post, saying, “there’s a lot of dirty pool played at the election, meaning the 
election is rigged.”85 The following two days, coverage of this voter fraud 
claim in its various iterations spiked across the entire political spectrum. 
The proposition that Russian ads on a Facebook account had a meaningful 
impact on pushing the voter fraud frame after it had been pushed repeatedly 
by the Republican candidate and covered across the major media ecosystem 
for several days, including the most highly watched right- wing talk shows, 
strains credulity.
The same goes for the alleged November 2 tweet that the indictment 
describes. The tweet from @TEN_ GOP stated “#VoterFraud by counting 
tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward 
County, Florida.” But again, the big spike in coverage of voter fraud followed 
an early morning October 17 tweet, in which Trump wrote: “Of course there 
is large scale voter fraud happening on and before Election Day. Why do 
Republican leaders deny what is going on? So naive!” Nancy Pelosi and Harry 
Reid released a joint statement in response,86 calling on Republicans to affirm 
the fairness of the democratic process. Broad public coverage ensued. By 
November 2, the issue had mostly receded yet again, and again, it is difficult to 
conclude that the @TEN_ GOP had a significant incremental contribution. 
Moreover, Pelosi and Reid were fighting an old battle that had simply been 
rekindled by Trump in his various comments, both in August and in October. 
The North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Kansas laws which were struck down 
were all based on the oft- repeated but never proven claim that voter fraud 
is widespread in the United States. An NBC story by Zachary Roth that 
sought to put Trump’s August 1 and 2 comments in context,87 emphasized 
that it recapitulated misstatements that John McCain made in 2008.88 Those 
misstatements had resulted in a Public Policy Polling finding in 2009 that 
over 50 percent of Republicans believed Acorn had committed voter fraud 
and stolen the election for Obama.89 He traced the claims further back yet, 
to the 2004 Bush campaign and the 1996 Bob Dole campaign as well. The 
Russians pushed a false narrative persistently repeated by Republican elites 
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in an effort to justify laws known to disproportionately decrease eligible 
Democratic votes, particularly among Black and Latino populations. They 
introduced nothing new. As Limbaugh said, “I mean, everybody knows this.”
Using Social Media to Suppress and Split the Democratic Vote
The indictment also alleges that the Russians used Instagram accounts they 
called “Woke Black” and “Blacktivist” to send messages to dissuade black 
voters from voting or to divert their vote to Jill Stein. If we consider Jill Stein, 
in the three states where her vote margin was larger than the Trump/ Clinton 
difference— Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania— at least according to 
exit polls, Stein drew 1 percent or at most 2 percent of the Black vote, less than 
pre- election polling suggested.90 More importantly, a pre- election Bloomberg 
report on the Trump campaign’s media campaign quoted an unnamed “senior 
official” as saying, “we have three major voter suppression operations underway,” 
one of which was to emphasize Clinton’s use of the term “superpredator” in 
1996 to discourage black voters from showing up at the polls.91 That report 
described in detail a campaign, using Facebook to post messages and videos 
that featured the recording of Clinton’s comment, targeted using Facebook’s 
capabilities to make sure that “only the people we want to see it, see it.” The 
interviewee from the campaign boasted that “[w] e know because we’ve 
modeled this” that “[i]t will dramatically affect her ability to turn these 
people out.” And that same report quotes Steve Bannon, then running the 
Trump campaign, as saying, “I wouldn’t have come aboard, even for Trump, 
if I hadn’t known they were building this massive Facebook and data engine.” 
Again, as with the “voter suppression” frame, it is difficult to lend credence to 
the proposition that the Internet Research Agency, through Instagram posts, 
made a meaningful marginal impact in comparison to the directed efforts of 
the Trump campaign working with Facebook’s political marketing team.92
Unlike many other aspects of the allegations, however, the questions of 
voter suppression through targeted advertising are eminently resolvable, if we 
have the right disclosure system in place. Unlike Twitter, Facebook actually 
has the real identity of every account holder. And Facebook also has a record 
of the entire set of communications to which an account holder was exposed. 
It would not be too difficult to run a comparison between all the accounts 
exposed to Russian advertising interventions and accounts of otherwise 
demographically similar matched accounts— say, Black registered voters in 
Florida in the same congressional districts or smaller geographic settings— 
and then match the voter rolls with the real identities of the Facebook account 
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holders. We could then know, to a high degree of confidence, whether being 
exposed to these Russian ads was significantly associated with lower turnout 
than among matched Facebook users who were not exposed to the advertising. 
It is precisely to conduct such investigations that it would be important to 
produce a record of all targeted advertising, and to make it available, under 
constraints appropriate to preserve the privacy of the individuals and the 
integrity of the voting process, for researchers who study the effect of online 
communications on American democracy.
Real- World Protests
Perhaps the most exotic Russian interventions involve the orchestration 
of real- world rallies. These are included in the Mueller indictment, in the 
congressional hearings record, and in several news reports. The idea that 
Russians impersonating Americans get real Americans to actually get out on 
the streets and protest has a spy movie quality to it that is irresistible. Two 
cautions must, however, be kept in mind. First, the reported demonstrations 
were a drop in the bucket on the background of the steady stream of campaign 
events, not least among these mass appearances by the candidate or surrogates 
in which masses of people shout in unison, “Lock her up! Lock her up!” At 
the time, the Russia- induced protests drew little attention, and it is hard to 
imagine that this handful of secondary pro- Trump or anti- Clinton events had 
a meaningful impact on the election or the level of animosity between the two 
parties in the run- up to the election. The second is that these protests were not 
only relatively small, but whatever traction they had was in the context of a 
much broader and deeper political animosity that was not of Russian making.
The very first such report, in the Daily Beast, concerned an effort by the 
Secured Borders persona to mount an anti- immigration rally in Twin Falls, 
Idaho.93 As a Daily Beast story explained, Twin Falls had been the target of a 
long- standing hate campaign starting with a January 2016 story that reported 
on Chobani’s plan to hire immigrants, entitled “American Yogurt Tycoon 
Vows to Choke U.S. With Muslims.” Infowars ran stories, among them pearls 
such as “500% increase in tuberculosis in Twin Falls,” and “Idaho Yogurt 
Maker Caught Importing Migrant Rapists.” Chobani sued, and as with 
Pizzagate, Alex Jones was forced to settle.94 Breitbart, for its part, fanned the 
flames of anti- immigrant fervor with a different hyped- up version of a case 
of sexual assault dealt with by Idaho’s juvenile justice system.95 Despite the 
fertile ground laid by right- wing media, only 48 people registered at the event 
site, and, according to the Daily Beast, only four claimed to have gone. The 
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city’s mayor, however, told the New York Times that “after two years of ‘robust 
debate’ over the city’s refugee resettlement program, which dates to the 1980s, 
it was ‘kind of surreal’ to discover that Russia had joined in.”96 Again, though, 
it’s important to recognize that however surreal the discovery, its actual impact 
on the debate in Idaho or in Twin Falls was, for all practical purposes, nil.
Twitter Bots and Shaping the Debate
Finding bots is hard. Finding Russian bots is even harder. They operate on 
a very large scale and therefore are only amenable to automated searching. 
In order to train a machine learning algorithm, one needs a large training 
set of accounts one knows for sure are “bots” or “Russians” and ultimately 
both. This is the “ground truth” that is the weakest link— because no matter 
how sophisticated the algorithm, or how many data points it relies on, all 
the algorithm does is identify more instances of the entities that were in its 
training set. If we are uncertain as to whether the entities in the training set are 
bots or Russians, we will be equally uncertain about the entities the algorithm 
identifies as similar to them. There are several efforts aimed at identifying 
such accounts. Some simply look at the posting rate of Twitter accounts and 
assume that accounts tweeting more than some threshold number of posts 
are bots.97 We used a variant of this approach to filter the most obvious bots 
from our Twitter maps. Some, most prominently the Indiana University 
group headed by Filippo Menczer that developed the Botometer and Hoaxy, 
and its graduates, try to diagnose individual accounts based on a broad range 
of characteristics.98 Again, we used a variant of this approach as well to test 
whether bots influenced our overall structure. In the Russian context, efforts 
by Joshua Tucker’s lab at New York University (NYU) have provided some 
powerful initial results.99 Others try to take an approach that moves away 
from diagnosing whether an individual account is a bot or not, and instead 
asks whether a network of accounts is a coordinated effort, whether fully 
automated or not.100 Similarly, distinguishing whether an account is or is not 
“Russian” as opposed to, say, a party whose interests are aligned with those of 
Russian propagandists is at least as difficult as deciding whether a clickbait 
factory is a Russian propaganda site or merely a nihilist out to make a buck. 
The Hamilton 68 project, which has garnered a lot of media attention because 
of its attractive visualizations and ease of use, relies on 600 hand- selected 
accounts whose nature and justification the project will not disclose publicly. 
They may be completely right, but it is difficult to rely on such an opaque 
process that purports to rely on such a small set of accounts. By contrast, the 
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SMaPP Lab project at NYU analyzes accounts that announce their primary 
language as Russian, and so is very likely to be right about the Russian origin 
of the accounts, and uses a robust hand- coding approach in determining what 
is, and is not, a bot; but as its creators clearly explain, this will not cover most 
of the interventions in the U.S.  context, which are masked as Americans. 
Several researchers take an approach similar to the one taken by Young Mie 
Kim and her colleagues to quantify Russian Facebook advertising, which we 
noted earlier in this chapter— that is, using as their basis Facebook or Twitter 
accounts identified publicly by the companies or congressional committees 
as “Russian.” This approach is reasonably sound to set a lower bound on the 
activity but will clearly understate its actual level.
The projects we describe are the best of class in what they do at present. 
They should be encouraged and improved, published and cited. But they 
should not form the basis of reporting, with the kind of certitude one often 
reads in media accounts, that some large percentage of Twitter activity or a 
particular campaign are bots at all, much less Russian bots. The space is in 
continuous flux; the campaign strategies of the propagandists shift and 
mutate, and the research is getting better fast. For all we know, by the time our 
book is out the problem of bot detection and Russian operations detection 
will be solved. But we doubt it.
Beyond identification, the more important question is effect. The support 
of an army of bots does not necessary mean that a story is going to take off 
and be picked up by real accounts. For example, we analyzed all the emails on 
WikiLeaks, including those released by the State Department associated with 
the Clinton private server, the DNC hack, and the Podesta hack, and all the 
stories that linked back to any one of those emails, to create a bimodal map 
of emails and stories. This map allows us to identify the emails that appeared 
most frequently in media stories, who had produced the story, and the extent 
to which those stories had influence by any of the measures we have been using 
throughout the book— Facebook shares, tweets, and media inlinks. One of the 
most curious standouts is an email included in only six stories. By comparison, 
the most covered emails appear in anywhere from 60 to over 240 stories.
Yet one of the stories about this email was among the most highly tweeted 
stories in our entire set. The email was a 2010 email, related to the Chelsea 
Manning leaks to WikiLeaks. It was dated five days before the publication of 
the embassy cables leak, but after publication of the Afghanistan and Iraq war 
logs leaks, from then- Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, to 
then- Secretary of State Clinton, attaching a memo outlining “possible legal 
and nonlegal strategies re wikileaks.”101 The story that was most promoted on 
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Twitter was from True Pundit, emphasizing that Clinton was willing to use 
“nonlegal means” as evidence for the core claim in the story— that Clinton 
was promoting a drone strike on Julian Assange (then in London  . . .) to 
stop publication of the embassy cables.102 Given that the claim that Clinton 
wanted to order a drone strike on Assange got no traction more broadly, 
this particular case suggests some caution before assuming that a substantial 
Twitter promotion campaign will necessarily promote a story in the media 
agenda. The sparse attention from other media stories and the minuscule 
number of stories about it (Figure 8.7), combined with the remarkably high 
tweet count strongly suggest that the story was the subject of a synthetic 
Twitter promotion campaign. While it is possible that such a campaign could 
Figure 8.7 Map of emails hosted on WikiLeaks and sources linking to them.
The only two sites that reported on the “legal and nonlegal means” email from the State 
Department– released set were True Pundit and RT; the True Pundit story was among the most 
tweeted among stories that linked to an email.
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reflect True Pundit’s purchase of a viral marketing campaign, none of the 
other stories True Pundit published about the emails received more than one 
or two tweets. More likely, given that RT was the only other site to report 
on this email, is that the Twitter campaign was in fact Russia- directed. This 
would also be consistent with a later 2017 finding by Hamilton 68 of a brief 
period when True Pundit was again highly pushed by what they define as 
Russian bots.103 And again, given that no other True Pundit story in our email 
set was accompanied by a similarly large Twitter campaign, it seems more 
likely that Russian propagandists found a story that they decided to promote, 
but that it turned out to be of little interest to the right- wing media sphere as 
a whole, apart from other Russian propagandists.
The basic point is a simple one. We are not denying that there have been 
repeated Russian Twitter and Facebook campaigns aimed to push one narrative 
or another. It is worthwhile to try to identify these and to flag them as Russian 
efforts, so as to enable Americans who want to avoid being drawn in, because 
of the Russian origin of the attempt, from being duped. But it is critical to 
understand that without pickup from more influential media somewhere in 
the American public sphere, these Russian efforts will languish unnoticed. 
In order for Russians to be influential, their efforts must flow through the 
media ecosystem Americans inhabit. It is there that stories flourish or falter. 
The American media ecosystem is as resilient to Russian propaganda as it 
is resilient to all other falsehoods, whatever their source. And as we saw in 
our discussion of Russian white and gray propaganda, there is a part of the 
American media ecosystem for which knowing that the origin of a story is 
Russia is no reason to ignore it, as long as it aligns with the tribal narrative they 
are pushing. Willing embrace of divisive Russian propaganda, not innocent 
error because of Twitter and Facebook manipulation, is the core challenge.
Looking at the Russian interference in the U.S. 2016 election suggests 
three conclusions. First, both Americans and Europeans assessing the Russian 
threat need to be cautious in assessing the actual danger. Many current efforts 
are, justifiably, focused on the genuinely challenging problem of detection. 
Doing this critically important work creates a strong bias to assume that the 
hard- won successful observations of intervention are a sign of large impact 
and threat. However, trying hard, as the Russians clearly are, does not equal 
actual success in affecting the outcomes or attitudes of a society at large. And 
other countries, particularly those that have a pattern of trust in major media 
more similar to Germany’s, like Sweden or Canada, may be a lot more resilient 
to information operations than countries with more dysfunctional media 
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ecosystems, like the United States. Each country has to make its own internal 
assessment of its genuine susceptibility and tailor its responses to its real threat 
model, rather than to the perceived technical possibility of intervention as itself 
the threat. Second, given that generalized trust is an important ingredient in 
any democratic society, it is important not to overstate the impact of Russian 
propaganda and thus feed that generalized distrust. If Russian propaganda is 
in fact shaping events, we need urgent action. If instead it is simply an ever- 
present irritant, we need to put it in its right place. Inducing overreaction 
would be a major success for Russian information operations.
But the most important implication is for American conservatives, 
particularly economic and national security conservatives rather than white- 
identity conservatives. They have a genuine conflict on their hands. There 
is mounting evidence that “the Fox News effect” has given the Republican 
Party a clear edge in the past several election cycles. There is, it seems, a clear 
short- term partisan advantage of going along with the style and focus of 
these right- wing media outlets. But competition among outlets seeking to 
attract conservative audiences has resulted in a feedback cycle, as sites vie to 
produce more outrage and anger and get ever more extreme in their framing. 
If Breitbart’s third- most shared headline on immigration is “Six diseases 
return to U.S. as Migration Advocates Celebrate ‘World Refugee Day,’ ” then 
Gateway Pundit will respond with its second- most shared headline on the 
subject, “Obama Changes Law:  Allows Immigrants with Blistering STDs 
and Leprosy into U.S.” And so the cycle continues. Infowars may circulate 
conspiracy theories about “Jeb Bush: Close Nazi Ties Exposed,” but it is Fox 
News hosts who consistently and repeatedly imply that the investigation into 
Russian interference is a “deep state” conspiracy to reverse the outcome of the 
2016 election. This competitive dynamic among right- wing media increases 
the shrill, conspiracy- tainted tone and content of coverage and makes right- 
wing audiences ever more susceptible to manipulation.
The result is a United States that is vulnerable to disinformation 
campaigns, both foreign and domestic. That susceptibility does not come 
from Russia, though Russia clearly has been trying to exploit it. That 
susceptibility does not come from Facebook, though Facebook has clearly 
been a primary vector online. It comes from three decades of divergent 
media practices and consumption habits that have left a large number of 
Americans, overwhelmingly on the right of the political spectrum, vulnerable 
to disinformation and ready to believe the worst, as long as it lines up with 
their partisan identity. And that susceptibility should be, in the long term, 
unacceptable to conservatives every bit as much as it is to all other Americans 
despite its short- term electoral benefits.
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Mammon’s Algorithm
Marketing, Manipulation,  
and Clickbait on Facebook
Facebook sits at the center of the epistemic crisis after 2016. In the 
immediate aftermath of the election, Craig Silverman’s stories on BuzzFeed 
focused on the “fake news” clickbait fabricators that garnered more Facebook 
engagement than traditional media outlets. In the middle of 2017, Facebook’s 
willingness to sell advertising to Russian operatives and its hosting of a 
number of prominent Russian sockpuppet groups put it in the hot seat. By 
early 2018 the long- simmering story of Cambridge Analytica, the U.K.- based 
data analytics firm that had obtained tens of millions of Facebook profiles in 
order to develop techniques for manipulating voters, boiled over and spilled 
onto Facebook’s lap.
The fundamental problem is that Facebook’s core business is to collect 
highly refined data about its users and convert that data into microtargeted 
manipulations (advertisements, newsfeed adjustments) aimed at getting its 
users to want, believe, or do things. Actors who want to get people to do 
things— usually to spend money, sometimes to vote or protest— value that 
service. Describing this business as “advertising” or “behavioral marketing” 
rather than “microtargeted manipulation” makes it seem less controversial. 
But even if you think that microtargeted behavioral marketing is fine for 
parting people with their money, the normative considerations are acutely 
different in the context of democratic elections. That same platform- based, 
microtargeted manipulation used on voters threatens to undermine the 
very possibility of a democratic polity. That is true whether it is used by 
the incumbent government to manipulate its population or by committed 
outsiders bent on subverting democracy. The clickbait factories, the Russians, 
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and Cambridge Analytica all took advantage of the intentional design of 
Facebook’s system. We dedicated Chapter 8 to the Russians and discuss the 
other two here. And while we remain unpersuaded by the evidence that any of 
these three distinct abusers made a significant impact on the election, the basic 
business of Facebook, when applied to political communication, presents 
a long- term threat to democracy. We dedicate a good bit of Chapter  13 to 
addressing how at least political advertising can be regulated to constrain the 
abusive potential of the model.
The Basic Threat: Platforms of Persuasion
Less than a month before Election Day, two reporters for Bloomberg, 
Joshua Green and Sasha Issenberg, were given access to the inner workings 
of the Trump digital campaign.1 The context, as they describe it, was that 
“[a] lmost every public and private metric suggests Trump is headed for 
a loss, possibly an epic one.” They wrote their story before James Comey’s 
October surprise— his announcement that the FBI was reopening an inquiry 
into Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server— shifted the course of the 
election. Green and Issenberg followed Brad Parscale, the head of the Trump 
digital campaign. Parscale was authorized to tweet on Trump’s behalf, and 
Green and Issenberg describe him shooting off a message while Trump was 
onstage at a campaign event:  “Crooked @HillaryClinton’s foundation is a 
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE. Time to #DrainTheSwamp!”
In October 2016, the Trump campaign had what appeared to be a highly 
sophisticated digital campaign that was focused on 13.5  million voters in 
16 battleground states that they believed were persuadable. As Green and 
Issenberg told it, the strategy was not to expand the electorate but to shrink 
it through targeted voter suppression campaigns. The campaign messaging 
was explicitly negative and focused on three target populations that the 
Clinton campaign hoped to win by a large margin: African Americans, young 
women, and “idealistic white liberals.”  The Trump campaign had long sought 
to discourage supporters of Bernie Sanders from converting to Clinton 
voters and tried to exploit and exacerbate divisions on character and policy. 
For Sanders supporters, Clinton was weak on trade policy, having tried to 
thread the needle between prior support for the Trans- Pacific Partnership 
and the political climate that had soured on free trade agreements. The 
Trump campaign also sought to drive a wedge between Clinton and African 
American voters by highlighting Clinton’s use of the term “superpredators” 
in a 1996 speech. Trump had tweeted earlier in August “How quickly 
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people forget that Crooked Hillary called African- American youth ‘SUPER 
PREDATORS’ - Has she apologized?”
The centerpiece of the digital campaign was named Project Alamo and 
included voter information data that was used for fundraising and digital 
political advertising. The voter data base, which included data provided by 
the Republican National Committee (RNC) and Cambridge Analytica, 
reportedly had 4,000 to 5,000 data points on 220  million Americans. By 
the end of the campaign, the digital platform had elicited several million 
small donations that totaled more than a quarter billion dollars. While 
prospects for the Trump campaign did not look promising in mid- October, 
the campaign had come a long way since June 2016, when it appeared to be 
dead in the water. Then, the campaign had little to no money in the bank, a 
total of 30 staffers on its payroll, and virtually no ad spending in swing states.2 
Many thought at the time that Trump would outsource the campaign to the 
RNC, though relations between the Trump team and the RNC were tepid 
at best. A month prior to the July convention, Trump had replaced campaign 
manager Corey Lewandowski with Paul Manafort and had hired Parscale to 
lead his digital campaign. Parscale had no experience in politics but had built 
websites for the Trump family businesses. Whether by necessity or design, 
the campaign focused its attention on the digital campaign and allocated its 
available funding to buying ads on Facebook.
It is remarkable that the Trump campaign was able to spin up a competitive 
campaign over the next several months with so little experience and using 
a thoroughly heterodox approach. For the digital campaign, the answer lay 
in Facebook. The social media giant had built out capabilities specifically 
tailored to make it a powerful, affordable, and indispensable tool for political 
campaigns. By partnering with firms such as Acxiom, Facebook allowed 
campaigns to target voters drawing on multiple sources of data that linked 
together Facebook accounts with email addresses, postal addresses, phone 
numbers, and any number of data points on specific American voters.3 
Facebook provided an interface that allowed campaigns to target specific 
voters, geographic regions, or demographics or to send ads to hyperspecific 
segments of the population based on this personal data. This capability 
was coupled with tools— designed first for commercial applications— to 
quickly evaluate how well different alternatives of the same message elicit 
engagement in the target audience. This A/ B testing supported broad- scale 
experimentation and removed much of the guesswork from advertising. 
Green and Issenberg reported that during the campaign, the Trump campaign 
created “100,000 distinct pieces of creative content.” African American 
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audiences were reminded of Clinton’s superpredator remark while likely 
Sanders supporters were told about how the DNC rigged the primaries for 
Clinton.
Data- rich behavioral microtargeting approaches to political campaigning 
are not new. As Politico reported on the work of Karl Rove in the 2004 
campaign: “Microtargeting became the rage of the 2004 campaign after Rove 
green- lighted a project to use a wider array of databases to identify potential 
Bush voters. The campaign bought data that allowed it to cross- reference 
religious affiliations, shopping habits and club memberships to unearth 
pockets of Bush supporters in normally hostile or inscrutable areas.”4 More 
prominently, the Obama presidential campaign of 2008 and particularly the 
much- lauded “nerds” of Obama’s 2012 campaign used data- intensive methods 
to model voter behavior and target specific groups for their messaging and 
engagement efforts.5 Clinton hired some of those celebrated nerds for her 
campaign.6 And the success of the Obama campaign efforts drove the RNC 
to invest in their own data collection and analytics in preparation for the 
2014 and 2016 elections. Those RNC efforts were complemented by the 
Koch brothers major investments in data mining to identify voters and test 
the effectiveness of various campaign strategies7 and by Robert Mercer’s 
investment in Cambridge Analytica.8
The ideas of using internet technologies to collect data and using as many 
data points as possible to deliver as microtargeted a message as possible are 
not new. But the dynamics that have increased the efficacy of big data analysis 
in general were at work here as well:  Facebook’s massive footprint; the 
increased storage and processing capacity to allow major platforms to refine 
and scale data analysis; and the development of machine learning algorithms 
to extract meaning from ever larger data sets. And Facebook has carved out 
a uniquely powerful position in the world of political campaigning. Not 
only does the company provide access to tools that leverage fine- grained 
data on tens of millions of Americans, but, as Daniel Kreiss and Shannon 
McGregor showed, Facebook offered to embed company representatives 
within campaigns to work elbow to elbow with campaign staff.9 For Parscale, 
the transition from business to politics was an easy one: “I always wonder why 
people in politics act like this stuff is so mystical. It’s the same shit we use in 
commercial, just has fancier names.”10 In a “60 Minutes” interview on CBS 
after the campaign, Parscale told viewers, “I understood early that Facebook 
was how Donald Trump was going to win. Twitter is how he talked to the 
people. Facebook was going to be how he won.” As our analysis of mainstream 
media coverage in Chapter 6 and of offline media in Chapter 11 make quite 
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clear Trump supporters primarily used some combination of Fox News, 
broadcast television, and talk radio as their primary media, and Trump’s 
candidacy benefited from an extraordinary amount of mainstream media 
coverage that had an estimated value in the billions of dollars.11 But there is 
no reason to doubt Parscale’s assertion that Facebook was the life blood of the 
Trump digital campaign, and more importantly, the focus of a majority of the 
spending of the overall campaign.
Writing in the New  York Times just after Obama’s November 2012 re- 
election, Zeynep Tufekci sounded an early alarm on the downsides of big 
data- fueled political campaigns.12 She emphasized two primary concerns 
that remain in play today. The first concern is campaigns taking “persuasion 
into a private, invisible realm” where opponents and watchdogs have no 
ability to respond. The second concern is that the science of persuasion is 
getting better and the ability to manipulate voters through the digital realm 
is heightened, offering an inroad for influencing voters through emotion 
and irrational biases. Tufekci followed in 2014 with an expanded academic 
critique of “computational politics” that turns “political communication into 
an increasingly personalized, private transaction and thus fundamentally 
reshapes the public sphere, first and foremost by making it less and less 
public . . .”13 Many of the concerns she articulated then played out in spades 
during the 2016 campaign, particularly the application of microtargeting 
in combination with dog- whistle politics and fear mongering that tore at 
deep social divides in the United States. The infrastructure for harvesting 
behavioral data online continues to advance by linking together data gathered 
on a range of different services and platforms. Dipayan Ghosh and Ben Scott 
describe in detail the many layers and techniques used to collect, aggregate, 
and utilize user data to carry out propaganda on the internet.14 The range 
of approaches they describe were developed with commercial applications 
and advertising dollars in mind and repurposed for political ends. They say, 
“The simple fact that disinformation campaigns and legitimate advertising 
campaigns are effectively indistinguishable on leading internet platforms lies 
at the center of our challenge.”
The most extensive study published to date on microtargeted Facebook 
political advertising was done by a team led by Young Mie Kim of the 
University of Wisconsin. Kim and her collaborators recruited a nationally 
representative sample of about 9,500 subjects to install a browser extension 
that collected data about ads they had been served in the six or so weeks 
leading up to the 2016 election. They analyzed the roughly five million 
ads that their subjects had been served, of which about 1.6  million were 
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political ads. They found that about 11  percent of the ads were from 
“suspicious groups,” meaning groups banned by Facebook, lacking content 
after Election Day, or lacking profile information. Another 5.6  percent 
were delivered by groups identified as Russian- operated by the House 
Intelligence Committee. This is clearly a lower bound on the prevalence 
of Russian Facebook advertising. Twenty percent of the ads were from 
“astroturf ” or otherwise unregistered groups, and another 20 percent were 
from legitimate nonprofits that had not reported to the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) as a political action committee (PAC) or any other 
electioneering activities or independent expenditures (the ads were issue 
ads— ads that support an issue, not explicitly a candidate— so reporting was 
not necessarily required). Only about 11 percent were from groups actually 
registered with the FEC, and another 5 percent were of various questionable 
news sites. The largest category of ads, slightly over one- quarter, were 
“other”— sensationalist clickbait and links to meme generators. Examining 
who was targeted by these ads, Kim and her coauthors found that the ads 
were targeted at battleground states, and perhaps the most troubling finding 
was that households earning less than $40,000 were most heavily targeted 
with advertisements focusing on immigration and racial conflict. The study 
did not, however, report individual level microtargeting, as opposed to 
broader geographic or demographic targeting.
Tufekci’s work and Ghosh and Scott’s work suggest that large- scale data 
analysis will eventually make microtargeting much more effective than it 
is now. Because manipulations will happen at the level of the individual 
user, campaigns will be able to sharpen messages, including those intended 
to elicit fear and loathing or to intimidate voters from turning out, free of 
the relative moderation enforced by public scrutiny. Kim’s study suggests 
that we have a little bit of time to address the concern but that solving the 
problem only for explicit formal electioneering will not solve the much more 
pervasive problem of “dark ads,” advertisements seen only by their narrowly- 
targeted intended recipients, and therefore unavailable for public scrutiny, 
and dark money, political funding whose sources are not disclosed. Indeed, 
the primary finding is that Facebook makes it easy and cheap for even 
unsophisticated, informal groups to leverage microtargeting techniques. It is 
precisely because of this longer- term threat that in Chapter 13 we emphasize 
the importance of disclosure requirements and even more so the creation of 
a comprehensive public record of all the ads, electioneering and issue ads, in 
a way that makes them accessible to third parties for continuous monitoring 
and exposure.
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Plumbing the Political Soul: The Dirty Tricks Crew
The concern over the role of psychological profiling in political persuasion 
hit the headlines in 2018 over the tactics and role of Cambridge Analytica. 
Cambridge Analytica was founded in late 2013 by Robert Mercer and Steve 
Bannon. An offshoot of SCL, a British strategic communications company, 
Cambridge Analytica was created to utilize cutting- edge data analysis 
techniques to provide insights on audiences to inform public communication 
and persuasion efforts. The investment provided Mercer and Bannon with a 
key entity in the political communications and influence game. The company 
has engaged in political campaigns around the globe and frequently touted 
its “special sauce”— psychographic profiling techniques meant to uncover 
political leanings of voters that would not otherwise be apparent, perhaps even 
to the voters themselves, and to offer guidance on how these voters might be 
more effectively persuaded by striking specific deep- seated emotional chords. 
The company derived this technique from research at the University of 
Cambridge. The researchers who conducted the underlying academic research 
(but were not associated with Cambridge Analytica), Michal Kosinski, David 
Stillwell, and Thore Graepel, combined personality surveys with Facebook 
data to show that “digital records of behavior, Facebook Likes, can be used 
to automatically and accurately predict a range of highly sensitive personal 
attributes including:  sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political 
views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, 
parental separation, age, and gender.”15 After Cambridge Analytica failed to 
convince these researchers to work with them, the company hired Alexander 
Kogan to replicate their methodology. Kogan created a Facebook app, 
recruited participants on Mechanical Turk to take a survey and download 
an app that harvested their Facebook data and data from their network of 
friends. This presumably enabled them to map personality traits against 
behavior on Facebook, for example, what people “liked,” which would then 
allow them to make similar personality inferences about any Facebook user, 
and they now had data on 87 million Facebook users.
After the November 2016 election, Cambridge Analytica eagerly took 
credit for the “pivotal role” they played in the unexpected success of the 
Trump campaign. Parscale offered a different narrative that downplayed 
the role of Cambridge Analytica and reserved more of the credit for the 
Trump digital team. Many observers voiced great skepticism over the hype of 
psychometrics that Cambridge Analytica was selling,16 some referring to the 
product as snake oil.17 Ultimately, the company acknowledged that it had not 
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used its psychographic special sauce for the Trump campaign. The company 
did reportedly contribute to the Trump campaign in other ways, however, 
by supplying data, coordinating ad spending, and providing strategic advice.
The saga of Cambridge Analytica took a downward turn in March 2018. 
A former employee and whistle- blower, Chris Wylie, revealed that Cambridge 
Analytica had collected Facebook data on false pretenses— forcing Facebook 
to publicly acknowledge this issue— and had not deleted the data when 
required to do so. A more damaging revelation occurred when executives of the 
company, including CEO Alexander Nix, were recorded by an investigative 
team from Channel 4 News in Britain claiming to have entrapped politicians 
using bribes and sex workers.18 The recorded conversations also captured the 
managing director, Mark Turnbull, describing the use of questionable tactics 
to surreptitiously influence public discourse by tapping into the deep- seated 
fears of voters: “You just put information into the bloodstream of the internet, 
and then you watch it grow, give it a little push every now and again, over time 
to watch it take shape.” This was done, he said, in a way that is “unattributable, 
untrackable.” In the taped conversation, the Cambridge Analytics team also 
took credit for crafting the “defeat crooked Hillary” campaign, and Nix 
reported that they provided for the Trump campaign “all the research, all the 
data, all the analytics, all the targeting, we ran all the digital campaign, the 
television campaign, and our data informed all the strategy.” In May of 2018, 
the company closed down without ever demonstrating the effectiveness of its 
behavioral profiling approach.
A key outstanding question is how persuasive microtargeting tools based 
on social media usage actually are. This may seem like a silly question given all 
the money spent on online advertising and the value the stock market places 
on data- driven marketing potential. But it is in fact remarkable how little 
credible evidence there is that targeted political advertising based on social 
media usage works any better than techniques that already existed 15 years 
ago or even longer.19
The best publicly available scientific evidence that Facebook- based 
psychographic data is effective, and, indeed, possibly more effective than 
existing marketing techniques, comes from a pair of papers coauthored by two 
of the original 2013 paper authors using Facebook data to identify personality 
traits, Kosinski and Stillwell, along with other collaborators. In 2015 they 
published an article that showed that machine prediction of personality was 
more accurate than human prediction.20 In 2017, they published an article 
showing that advertising designed to fit the recipient’s personality attribute 
(e.g., giving an extrovert and an introvert different tenor and frame to advance 
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the same product or purpose) performed better for people who possess that 
attribute than advertising designed for people with its opposite (that is, 
showing an introvert an advertisement designed for an extrovert; or showing 
a person low on openness and advertisement designed to fit a person high on 
that measure).21 First, although the 2015 paper did show that machines could 
predict personality traits better than people, they could only do so slightly 
better, and both humans and machines did either a touch worse or a touch 
better than a coin toss. Second, the 2017 paper is the strongest published 
evidence supporting the idea that personality traits predicted from Facebook 
usage can be used to design advertising that affects behavior and, indeed, that 
it improves on existing marketing techniques.
The effect sizes in this 2017 study, however, suggest that the concerns 
about Cambridge Analytica’s impact are likely exaggerated. The 2017 paper 
reported on the results of three experiments. The first experiment matched 
the ad type to the personality type and did not significantly change click- 
through rates. On average it increased actual buying among those who did 
click through 1.54 times. To get a sense of the order of the effect, in that 
experiment they ran the manipulation on over three million people and 
achieved 390 individual purchases, including purchases by people on whom 
the manipulation did not work as expected. The second experiment focused 
on openness. It showed an effect on low openness users, but not on high 
openness users, and had some effect on click- through and conversion, but 
again, achieved 500 app installs out of over 84,000 manipulations. The much 
higher conversion rate is likely due to the fact that installing the app was free. 
Voting, in this regard, is more likely to be similar to actually paying money 
than installing a free app. The third campaign compared a company’s standard 
marketing message with a personality- fit message. The personality- informed 
ad improved the conversion rate from 0.32 percent to 0.37 percent, an increase 
of 0.05 percent— that is, for every 10,000 people who were exposed to the 
advertisement, 5 more people installed the app using the psychographically 
informed advertising than would have been predicted to install after seeing 
the standard advertising the company was already using. In a state like 
Pennsylvania, which saw slightly over 6.1  million voters in 2016, if you 
correctly identified every single voter’s personality (and remember, the 2015 
paper suggested the level of accuracy between 50 percent and 60 percent), and 
every personality trait were as effective as the most effectively manipulated 
personality trait, and you reached every single potential voter, and got this 
level of improvement, you could shift about 3,000 votes more than standard 
techniques (assuming that political advertising pre- Facebook psychographics 
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data and commercial marketing pre- Facebook psychographics data are 
roughly equivalent in effectiveness). Trump beat Clinton in Pennsylvania by 
about 44,000 votes. If, more plausibly, the effect size were like the effect the 
researchers saw when they actually asked people to buy something, the effect 
would be a few hundred votes across the entire state.
Even this low estimate vastly overstates the likely impact. Recall that the 
accuracy of identifying the users’ personality should halve the effect. Worse, 
misidentified targeted appeals have been shown, in a study of the effect of 
canvassing in Wisconsin in the 2008 election, to actually turn off voters who 
are misidentified and who do not want to be contacted, and turn them against 
a candidate.22 Another study suggested that narrowly targeted appeals turn 
off some voters while appealing to others, but it is unclear whether the gains 
among the latter outweigh the losses among the former.23 More generally, not 
everyone uses Facebook often enough to be a useful part of a target audience, 
and we should expect to see the efficiency gain from a microtargeted 
advertising campaign decline as one moves from the most predictably sensitive 
potential voters to those who are less clearly identifiable to those who will 
actually respond negatively, creating an upper bound on the effectiveness of 
a campaign well below the maximum theoretically reachable population.24 
All this ignores the fact that the advertising is conducted in the context of a 
blitz of advertising, backed up by door- to- door canvassing, phone banking, 
and a range of outreach strategies based on a wide range of prior data from 
real- world activity, from voting patterns and political donations, through 
memberships, mailing lists, and other commercially available transactional 
marketing data.
We are not arguing that psychographically microtargeted advertising 
can never work or will never work. Nothing in the available public record 
excludes it from becoming the kind of advertising juggernaut that it was 
hyped up to be in Nix’s public presentations. But unless Cambridge Analytica 
somehow succeeded within the span of two years in vastly improving on the 
techniques developed by the academics who invented the techniques on 
which the company was founded, it seems more likely that the Cambridge 
Analytica public announcement greatly exaggerated their role in the Trump 
campaign than that the Trump digital team dramatically underplayed the 
company’s contribution. The impact of the more sophisticated versions of 
psychographics that raised alarms also appear to be overblown.
What is clear is that Facebook was a far more important tool for the 
campaign and that its microtargeting functionality is considered by political 
consultants to be a potent and widely used campaign tool. Facebook’s initial 
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public response to the Cambridge Analytica story emphasized the “breach 
of trust” on the part of Cambridge Analytica— the fact that the company 
harvested the data of millions of Facebook users without complying with the 
company’s terms of service. From the perspective of basic threat to democracy, 
however, the privacy violation was significantly less important than the fact 
that Facebook collects and uses all these data, and that it imposes on its 
users terms of service that certainly allow the company and its clients, if not 
outsiders like Cambridge Analytica, to use the data as manipulatively as they 
choose. For all the reasons we outlined in our skepticism about Cambridge 
Analytica’s impact, we should be similarly cautious to impute to Facebook 
magical powers of persuasion. Nonetheless, it is plausible that microtargeting 
will improve as the algorithms for identifying personal characteristics 
improve; that it will be more effectively targeted only at those subjects most 
likely to be affected as desired; and that voter suppression campaigns on social 
media in particular may put a candidate over the top in very close campaigns. 
There is no evidence to confirm that this is true. Using tailored advertisements 
to change hearts and minds, and more importantly voter behavior, is still 
primarily an act of faith, much like most of the rest of online advertising.25 
In Chapter  13 we do, however, suggest that the basic risk of undermining 
voter autonomy and the almost certain erosion of our collective confidence 
in the legitimacy of election outcomes are sufficient grounds to recommend 
that individually tailored, or too narrowly targeted advertising techniques 
should be constrained in the political context. At a minimum we argue that 
platforms like Facebook should be required to maintain all of their ads and ad 
experiments in a publicly accessible database, so that abusive practices can be 
exposed by opposing candidates or independent researchers.
Clickbait Fabricators Meet Facebook’s Algorithms
“If there’s one fundamental truth about social media’s impact 
on democracy it’s that it amplifies human intent— both good 
and bad. At its best, it allows us to express ourselves and take 
action. At its worst, it allows people to spread misinformation 
and corrode democracy.”
These words were written not by a technology pundit or new- media critic but 
by a Facebook product manager focused on civic engagement. He goes on to 
say: “I wish I could guarantee that the positives are destined to outweigh the 
negatives, but I can’t.”26
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The success of Facebook is a story of scale. The company figured out how 
to maintain a platform that serves over two billion users as well as advertisers 
who generate tens of billions of dollars in revenue, and the only way to do 
this was to create automated interfaces that require few humans in the loop. 
Advertisers need not ask for permission to place an ad, and user interactions 
are governed by algorithm.
The Facebook News Feed algorithm, from which almost half of adult 
Americans get news at least sometimes,27 has altered the media landscape. In 
particular, it has given rise to a large number of new media organizations, many 
of which exist only thanks to advertising revenue they receive from publishing 
on Facebook. Just as Web 2.0 did for the first generation of bloggers, for these 
entities, Facebook dismantled the obstacles for participation in the news 
ecosystem, and unlike Web 2.0 and bloggers, solved the revenue question in 
the same platform. Capital requirements are modest. The ticket to success 
is figuring out how to work with the algorithm that determines how many 
people will see your articles, and this depends in large part on the actions of 
readers. If you can figure out how to get people to click on your article, you 
are in business.
This has provided opportunities for smaller media organizations to 
compete for attention with large well- funded and established media sources. 
By serving up a stream of news stories coming from many media sources, the 
distinction between sketchy and reputable news sites is diminished. We see 
audiences that focus attention not only on the New York Times but also on 
the Palmer Report, and we see the overlap in audiences of Fox News and 
Truthfeed. This does not mean that hyperpartisan clickbait always wins on 
social media, or that all small media on Facebook are clickbait fabricators. But 
the economic rewards of producing media that use anger, outrage, ridicule, 
and tribal bonding are immediate and significant. Producing political 
clickbait is cheap enough to sustain a modest small business— individuals can 
sit at home and make a living producing bullshit that gets people to click 
on it for the entertainment value— or real business, as entrepreneurs have set 
up shop to produce many of these clickbait fabrication plants on both sides 
of the political divide.28 As a challenge to democracy, we can think of the 
political effects of clickbait factories as emissions of the commercial model 
of Facebook. They are external costs imposed on democracy as a side effect of 
the business model of matching advertising dollars to clicks, in the presence of 
human users whose cognitive apparatus includes the capacity for both system 
one (autonomous, rapid, unconscious) and system two (slow, reflective) 
decision- making.29 Unsurprisingly, clickbait fabricators have figured out that 
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people are quicker to click on materials that trigger system one automatic 
unreflective responses than materials that appeal to system two controlled 
reflective decision- making.
Before we shake our heads at the upstarts, it is important to recognize 
that the tension between making money and writing high- quality news 
stretches back at least to the early penny presses and the need to sell copy. The 
corrupting influence of the need to sell to the widest possible audience has 
been a central and oft- repeated theme of media criticism at least since Harold 
Innis’s Bias of Communications in 1951. At some level, Facebook clickbait is 
simply the grandchild of the tabloid headline and the Sun’s page 3, which, 
in turn, is simply the more frankly licentious cousin of the organizational 
pressures that drove the New York Times and Washington Post to choose the 
sensationalist and overblown headlines they did for the Clinton Foundation 
stories we described in Chapter 5. At another level, many of these sites, which 
often peddle pseudoscience conspiracy theories as gladly as they peddle 
political conspiracy theories, are merely the present- day incarnations of 
supermarket checkout- counter tabloids. And if we use those as a baseline, we 
should remember that in the 1992 election, the last fully pre- internet election, 
about 5 percent of the respondents to the Pew media survey reported that 
they regularly read the National Enquirer, the Sun, or the Star. That was 
roughly as many as those who said they regularly watched the “MacNeil/ 
Leherer NewsHour” on PBS or C- SPAN (6 percent each).30
Our own data support the proposition that the economic incentives and 
ease of reach that Facebook offered did, in fact, result in Facebook’s political 
content exhibiting more extreme partisanship than either Twitter or the open 
web. Political clickbait sites were most commonly found on the far edges of 
the political spectrum and were significantly more pronounced on the right. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, at the extremes, clickbait sites popular on Facebook 
were happy to peddle in pedophilia and rape stories on both the right and 
the left, but the pattern did not extend as far or as deep on the left as on 
the right. The political extremes are the habitat of the politically active, those 
that are most likely to engage in directionally motivated reasoning and willing 
to tolerate hyperpartisan media that often sacrifice accuracy and nuance in 
favor of sensational and politically biting content. When we view the most 
prominent media during the 2016 election by cross- media linking, Twitter 
shares, and Facebook shares (Tables 9.1– 9.5), we see that in the center the top 
sites are generally consistent across these three measures. In the center- left and 
center- right, there are modest differences. When we move to the left and right, 
the differences are substantial. On the left, Occupy Democrats, Addicting 
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Info, and Bipartisan Report, classic examples of hyperpartisan media, were 
popular on Facebook but not on Twitter or in the link economy. On the 
right, the top sites on Facebook include Conservative Tribune, Truthfeed, 
Western Journalism, Political Insider, and Ending the Fed.
Throughout this volume, we have treated hyperlinks as a core measure 
of authority and credibility among media producers. A  high imbalance 
between that measure and Facebook shares seems to be highly predictive of 
Table 9.1 Most popular media on the left  
from May 1, 2015 to November 7, 2016.
Rank Inlinks Twitter Facebook
1 Huffington Post Huffington Post Huffington Post
2 MSNBC Politicus USA Politicus USA
3 Vox Daily Kos MSNBC
4 Daily Beast Raw Story Vox
5 HillaryClinton.com Salon Raw Story
6 NPR MSNBC Daily Kos
7 PolitiFact Mother Jones New Yorker
8 Slate Think Progress Occupy Democrats
9 Salon Daily Beast Addicting Info
10 BernieSanders.com Vox Bipartisan Report
Table 9.2 Most popular media on the center- left  
from May 1, 2015 to November 7, 2016.
Rank Inlinks Twitter Facebook
1 Washington Post CNN New York Times
2 New York Times New York Times CNN
3 CNN Washington Post Washington Post
4 Politico Politico NBC News
5 Guardian Guardian US Uncut
6 NBC News Mashable Guardian
7 CBS News NBC News Time
8 The Atlantic BuzzFeed Politico
9 LA Times Time Daily News
10 BuzzFeed BBC The Atlantic
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a site being political clickbait. Among the 10 most popular sites on Facebook 
on the left were three media sources that were nearly invisible in the link 
economy:  Addicting Info, Bipartisan Report, and Occupy Democrats. 
Though extremely popular on Facebook, these sites received 53, 37, and 25 
inlinks, respectively, out of the 235,000 inlinks of this sample. More than a 
third of those links, in turn, were among these same three sources. Similarly, 
on the right, five sites among the top 10 had vanishingly small footprints in 
Table 9.3 Most popular media on the center  
from May 1, 2015 to November 7, 2016.
Rank Inlinks Twitter Facebook
1 The Hill The Hill The Hill
2 Wall Street Journal Yahoo! News ABC News
3 Business Week Wall Street Journal Yahoo! News
4 ABC News USA Today USA Today
5 USA Today Business Week Wall Street Journal
6 Reuters Reuters Business Insider
7 Yahoo! News ABC News Mediaite
8 Business Insider Business Insider Reuters
9 Forbes Mediaite The Intercept
10 CNBC Forbes Forbes
Table 9.4 Most popular media on the center- right  
from May 1, 2015 to November 7, 2016.
Rank Inlinks Twitter Facebook
1 National Review Russia Today Real Clear Politics
2 Observer Real Clear Politics National Review
3 RedState RedState Observer
4 Weekly Standard National Review TMZ
5 Russia Today TMZ Russia Today
6 Reason Weekly Standard RedState
7 The White House Observer Federalist
8 McClatchy DC Federalist Free Thought Project
9 TMZ The Resurgent Patheos
10 Morning Consult Reason The Resurgent
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the link economy. The Conservative Tribune received just 45 inlinks from 
this sample, half of which came from Ending the Fed. The inlinks to Western 
Journalism number 130, half of which came from the Conservative Tribune. 
The Political Insider was the recipient of 66 links. Truthfeed received 46 
inlinks, 40 of which came from the Gateway Pundit, and Ending the Fed had 
four inlinks. Sites that were low on inlinks but popular on Twitter or both 
Twitter and Facebook were at least highly partisan, and in many cases also 
among the worst offending conspiracy sites. During the election, low inlink 
sites on the left included Politicus USA and Raw Story, both of which were 
popular on both Facebook and Twitter. On the right, The Gateway Pundit 
ranked third on Facebook and fifth on Twitter during the election period, 
but was cited infrequently with only several hundred inlinks. Infowars 
ranked ninth on Twitter and eighteenth on Facebook, but received a small 
number of citations in the link economy. Another media source popular on 
social media but with very low traction in the link economy was the Right 
Scoop. It ranked seventh on Twitter and seventeenth on Facebook, but had 
only 221 links.
Most sites that were particularly dependent on Facebook for attention, 
whether left or right, followed similar recipes. They engaged in little or no 
original reporting and freely borrowed from other sources, producing short 
posts or articles with provocative titles intended to drive social media traffic. 
Most of them were not only highly partisan but also featured the most 
Table 9.5 Most popular media on the right  
from May 1, 2015 to November 7, 2016.
Rank Inlinks Twitter Facebook
1 Breitbart Breitbart Breitbart
2 Fox News Fox News Conservative Tribune
3 DonaldJTrump.com Washington Examiner Gateway Pundit
4 New York Post Daily Caller Fox News
5 Washington Times Gateway Pundit Daily Caller
6 Daily Caller Right Scoop Truthfeed
7 Daily Mail Daily Mail Western Journalism
8 Washington Examiner Infowars Political Insider
9 WikiLeaks New York Post Ending the Fed
10 Free Beacon Washington Times New York Post
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questionable reporting, and have been frequently cited in discussions of fake 
news and criticized by fact- checking sites.31 It is important to emphasize that 
not all sites with this kind of profile are clickbait fabricators. The New Yorker 
has a much higher footprint on Facebook than on Twitter, largely due to 
the Facebook popularity of the Borowitz Report, a satirical take on current 
events and news. Its most popular story was titled “Stephen Hawking Angers 
Trump Supporters with Baffling Array of Long Words.” Similarly, the satirical 
publication The Onion has high Facebook sharing numbers and low tweets 
or links.
By combining relative attention on Twitter, Facebook, and the link 
economy, we are able to place media sources in groups that are highly 
suggestive of their position in the larger media sphere. A  distinct set of 
websites received a disproportionate amount of attention from Facebook 
compared with Twitter and media inlinks. From the set of media sources that 
were in the top 100 by inlinks or social media shares during the 2016 election, 
13 sites fell into this category (Table 9.6). Many of these sites are identified 
by independent sources and media reporting as examples of inaccurate if not 
blatantly false reporting. Both in form and substance, the majority of this 
group of sites are aptly described as political clickbait. Again, this does not 
imply equivalency across these sites. The satirical site The Onion is an outlier 
Table 9.6 13 media sources that received a disproportionate  
amount of attention from Facebook compared with Twitter  
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in this group, in that it is explicitly satirical and ironic. The others engage in 
highly partisan and dubious reporting without explicit irony.
How important were these sites in the overall scheme of the election? 
Without quantifying how much of the overall communications environment 
was exposed to false stories produced by these clickbait factories, it is 
impossible to evaluate whether they had an impact, or whether they are 
even news. The most rigorous effort to quantify the question of exposure 
to “fake news” on Facebook during the months leading up to the 2016 
U.S.  presidential election was an article by economists Hunt Allcott and 
Matthew Gentzkow.32 Allcott and Gentzkow surveyed 1208 adults about 
their media use and exposed them to a series of stories, some true, some false, 
that had been circulated during the three months before the election, and 
some that were “placebos”— stories they had made up for the experiment 
that had not in fact circulated at all. Their first finding was that about 
70 percent of respondents recalled seeing the big true stories they included 
in their survey, and just under 60 percent of the respondents believed these 
stories. By contrast, only 15  percent of respondents reported remembering 
any of the fake news stories they asked about, and 8  percent reported that 
they had believed them. For comparison, 14 percent reported that they recall 
having seen the placebo stories, and 8  percent reported remembering that 
they believed them. Allcott and Gentzkow calculate that a fake headline was 
about 1.2 percent more likely to be remembered than a placebo that was never 
published. Using these numbers, they calculated that an average American 
adult would have seen about 1.14 fake stories during the election cycle. They 
complement this survey data with traffic data that suggests that traffic to the 
top 665 top news sites in their set was roughly 19 times as high as traffic to the 
65 fake news sites they identified, and that even on those sites no more than 
60  percent of the stories were fake. The fundamental point of Allcott and 
Gentzkow’s work is that even if Facebook clickbait- type fake news had a large 
audience in absolute terms, on the order of hundreds of millions of visits, this 
still translates into a tiny fraction of the campaign news- related websites that 
people visited, and an even tinier fraction of the stories to which they were 
exposed. A later paper by Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler 
confirmed Alcott and Gentzkow’s core finding, that relative exposure across 
the American media ecosystem was likely low. They used data collected from 
the browsing habits of a representative sample of U.S. users and found that 
while quite a few Americans (1 in 4) “visited a fake news site” at least once, 
only about 2.6 percent of articles Americans read about politics in September 
and October of 2016 were from such sites.33 This level of exposure is consistent 
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with the 5 percent who responded in 1992 that they regularly got news from 
tabloids. Furthermore, Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler found that consumption 
of stories was much more concentrated by comparison to bare exposure to 
such sites. About 10 percent of the most highly partisan among the observed 
population accounted for 60 percent of the stories visited, further limiting the 
likely persuasive effect, as opposed to the identity- affirming and entertaining 
effect, of political clickbait.
Despite their likely small effect on the election, political clickbait sites 
drew extensive public attention as the initial suspects in causing information 
disorder. The fact that they were so clearly prominent on Facebook put 
pressure on the company to do something. And because the company is so 
powerful relative to those who publish on it, it began to experiment over 
the course of 2017 and 2018 with a range of measures intended to tamp 
down on these clickbait sites. These included various configurations of 
affordances that allowed users to identify suspicious stories for factchecking, 
collaborated with factchecking organizations to check these, and then added 
a flag when fact checking organizations had disputed the articles, or added 
related information tags. After these initial efforts proved less than entirely 
successful, the company changed the News Feed algorithm to promote 
materials preferred by users’ friends rather than those that used commercial 
promotion. If we look at the 13 sites listed in Table 6.9, we see that most of 
them in fact declined. Addicting Info, Bipartisan Report, and Truthfeed 
declined to almost no traffic over the course of 2017 to early 2018, according 
to data from SimilarWeb. The three sites that had the highest number of visits, 
Conservative Tribune and Western Journalism on the right and Occupy 
Democrats on the left, also suffered dramatic drops over the course of 2017. 
Occupy Democrats declined dramatically in May of 2017, relabeled itself 
Washington Journal and then Washington Press, and ultimately lost about 
two- thirds of its audience. Conservative Tribune and Western Journalism 
both dropped dramatically in September, losing about 60  percent of their 
audience, and Western Journalism continued to decline to near obscurity 
thereafter. Conservative Tribune stabilized at about 40 percent of its earlier 
audience and remains the most visited of this list of sites. The Daily Newsbin 
also largely disappeared, but its author, Bill Palmer, switched to publish the 
Palmer Report, which sustained about five million visits a month from about 
a million unique visitors over the course of 2017. The rest of the sites on this 
list have largely declined. Only The Onion maintained and even increased the 
number of visits it receives, consistent with the fact that it is a completely 
different kind of site.
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What are we to make of these declines? On the one hand, the fact that 
they declined equally on the left as on the right argues against the complaints 
by right- wing sites that Facebook was discriminating against them because of 
their political viewpoint, and strongly suggests that the company was simply 
weeding its garden. It just so happens that, because of the propaganda feedback 
loop, there were a lot more weeds on the right than on the left. Consistent 
with this broad symmetric effect, Figure  2.20 in Chapter  2 compared the 
relative prominence on Facebook of sites between the election period and 
2017. It exhibited no discernable pattern of anti- right sentiment— with sites 
on the left and right equally receding over the course of 2017.
Despite these declines, some of the worst and most influential offenders 
have not only survived, but increased their visibility and shares. Infowars and 
the Gateway Pundit both increased their Twitter footprint and maintained 
their overall visibility at around 20 and 15 million visits a month, respectively. 
True Pundit came out of nowhere to fill the shoes of disappearing sites like 
Ending the Fed, growing from a few hundred thousand monthly visits in 
early 2017 to over 3.5  million in early 2018. YourNewsWire maintained its 
position, hovering between three and five million visits despite the changes 
in algorithms and being denied access to the Google ad network. The Daily 
News Bin was superseded by the Palmer Report without a blip.
It remains to be seen how well Facebook can continue to weed its garden. 
But one suspects that Facebook clickbait sites are here to stay, just like 
spammers and search engine optimizers. There is an opportunity to make a 
buck. There are publishers who will find ways to exploit the platforms and 
their affordances to go after that buck. Some of these publishers will do so in 
ways that pollute the system on which they feed. Criticism of the platform 
companies will lead these platforms to keep fighting the polluting publishers. 
Just like spam, clickbait fabricators will require continuous treatment. Just 
like spam, these polluters will adapt and avoid detection and suppression. 
Just like spam, the platforms will play catchup, but will continue to weed. 
And, just like spam, although politically- inflected commercial clickbait 
will continue to be an irritant, there is no reason to think that it will play 
a significantly more important role than it played in the 2016 election. An 
irritant. Not a crisis.
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Can Democracy Survive 
the Internet?
“Can Democracy Survive the Internet?” was the provocative title of an April 
2017 article by Stanford professor Nathaniel Persily in the journal Democracy. 
It perfectly captured the deep anxiety that the election of Donald Trump, 
and before it the success of the Leave campaign over whether Britain should 
leave the European Union, created for many observers of politics across the 
North Atlantic. The former featured an outsider who violated every rule 
of what would historically have destroyed a campaign within weeks of its 
launch; the latter, a campaign to effect a radical departure from decades of 
British commitment to the European Union. Both seemed to win against 
all that conventional wisdom could muster. Something had happened that 
was fundamentally different from everything that had gone before, and the 
question was how to understand this radical departure. The core thrust of the 
anxiety was that the Big New Thing was the internet:  technology changed 
how citizens and voters engaged each other; how elites engaged masses; and 
how people were, or were not, able to distinguish fact from fiction. Persily’s 
characteristically nuanced analysis suggested three primary effects. The internet 
destabilized established institutions— most importantly, political parties and 
media— allowing marginalized voices and outsiders to reach out directly to 
audiences, but equally so allowing demagogues and nihilists to disseminate 
propaganda and “fake news.” Anonymity and lack of accountability allowed 
Russia to inject its influence. And the internet enabled not only hypertargeted 
advertising but also the development of filter bubbles and echo chambers 
that made users embrace their side’s partisan messaging without question.1 
In the previous chapters we already outlined our skepticism about the actual 
incremental impact of several factors: Russia’s very real efforts, commercial 
bullshit sites, and hypertargeted advertising based on psychographics. The 
Russians tried but were unlikely to have been a critical factor. The commercial 
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bullshit artists made some money, but were peripheral. And while Facebook’s 
data team certainly did make it possible for a complete outsider running with 
little help from party institutions to identify millions of voters and reach out 
to them effectively, the Cambridge Analytica manipulative advertising and 
the dark ads part of the story was still, in 2016, more of a red herring than the 
game changer some made it out to be.
The echo chambers and polarization concerns are recurring themes in 
discussions of the internet and democracy, at least since Cass Sunstein first 
published Republic.com in 2001.2 The filter- bubble concern has been salient 
at least since Eli Pariser published The Filter Bubble in 2011. Sunstein’s basic 
argument, which remained at the core of the two later editions in 2008 
(Republic.com 2.0) and 2017 (#republic), is that the internet and social 
media’s capacity to allow people to curate what they read, see, and hear 
will interact with our baseline social- psychological tendency to seek out 
evidence that fits our preconceptions (confirmation bias), congregate with 
others who are like us (homophily), and avoid information that does not fit 
what we know and like to hear confirmed. Furthermore, relying primarily 
on experimental work in the behavioral sciences, Sunstein argued that when 
people talk only to like- minded people, and do not get exposed to opposing 
views and arguments except in the context of oppositional argument, each 
group gets more entrenched in its own views and perceptions. Fragmentation 
of the media ecosystem leads to polarization both in the sense of segregated 
spheres and in the sense of increasingly extreme versions of the opposing 
views coming to the fore. The innovation in Pariser’s intervention was to 
shift agency from the many diverse users choosing to self- segregate, to the 
companies that design the engagement algorithms. For Sunstein, what drove 
polarization were choices people made when offered the ability to consume 
only bias- confirming news and hanging out only with allies. Pariser argued 
that it was the algorithmic choices of social media and internet firms that 
pushed people into these media consumption and communication practices. 
What drives us to see content that reinforces our views were not our own 
choices, but algorithms that observed us, learned our responses, and fed us 
more of what increased our engagements. Although in both arguments the 
solution was to get internet and social media companies to serve us more 
varied information diets, in Sunstein’s case this suggested that companies 
nudge us to see things that we don’t naturally gravitate toward. Sunstein’s 
argument is based on a conception of deliberative democracy, or perhaps 
republican civic virtue, which requires our engagement with opposing views 
and an agenda set by general news reports even if, left to our autonomous 
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choices, we would rather not. Pluralist views of democracy, by contrast, could 
be quite comfortable with highly segregated information spaces, in which 
groups contesting for political power define competing positions crisply and 
resolve their differences not by agreeing, but by peacefully counting votes at 
the polls. By contrast, Pariser’s diagnosis required a less normatively- freighted 
framework to justify roughly similar interventions. If the polarization and 
segmentation we see were not the outcome of decisions that citizens make 
for themselves, but rather the product of choices companies make for their 
users, then regulating these companies to offer a more varied diet that was 
healthier for democracy did not require us to adopt any particular version of 
democratic theory. All that was needed was a commitment to the proposition 
that members of a democratic polity should be able to choose for themselves 
what they read, see, and hear, rather than have it thrust upon them by 
companies whose interests are fundamentally commercial, not political. The 
negative political communications patterns that resulted from these company 
choices were simply emissions from the commercial companies into the 
political media ecosystem; byproducts that needed to be regulated to keep 
from harming democracy.
Our data, particularly the highly asymmetric structure of the networked 
public sphere, question both diagnoses. If “the internet” is what leads to 
polarization and increasing extremism we observe, then one would expect 
to see the media ecosystem develop symmetric patterns of polarization. We 
should have expected to see (as early studies relying on less data did see) a 
symmetric pattern of segmentation, assuming that users on the left and the 
right operate under similar social psychological dynamics and algorithmic 
decisions. What we observe instead is that everyone outside of the roughly 
30 percent of the population that pays attention primarily to right- wing media 
exists in a mixed- media ecosystem that is not fragmented and is more or less 
normally distributed in its attention around a core of traditional professional 
media outlets. People on the left certainly read left- oriented materials, but 
they also read and engage with publications and media outlets anchored 
in the professional journalistic norms. These are precisely the kinds of 
generalized information intermediaries that played the role of shared agenda 
setting from the end of World War II to the 1980s. . Moreover, polarization 
is a process that took a sharp upturn among political elites in the mid- 1970s, 
well before TCP- IP had even been defined as the internet protocol or Mark 
Zuckerberg was born. Rush Limbaugh had already been declared honorary 
member of the class of Republican House Freshman when Newt Gingrich led 
the Republican “Contract with America” 1994 capture of the House.
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Both the extensive political science literature on polarization and the 
rich literature on American media history argue against “the internet did it” 
narratives. Instead, we suggest that technological, institutional, and political 
dynamics have been interacting for over 40  years to lead the Republican 
Party and Republican voters to gradually become more extreme versions of 
themselves, without operating symmetrically on the Democratic Party and its 
supporters or on most Independents. The 2016 presidential election was the 
moment at which these long- term dynamics reached an inflection point in the 
Republican Party, but not among Democrats. These dynamics explain how 
Jeb Bush, the son and brother of the two most recent Republican presidents, 
can be castigated for his “close Nazi ties” by the eighth- most tweeted media 
site on the right; or how Sean Hannity and his guests on the most highly 
watched cable television program on the most highly watched cable news 
channel can vilify lifelong Republican law enforcement agents as agents of “the 
deep state” who are personally corrupt and conflicted out of a major national 
security investigation. As we have seen repeatedly throughout the preceding 
chapters, the prominent outlets on the left and center simply do not exhibit a 
parallel structure, content, or vehement outrage that we observe on the right. 
These facts are as inconvenient to academics seeking a nonpartisan, neutral 
diagnosis of what is happening to us as they are to professional journalists 
who are institutionally committed to describe the game in a nonpartisan way. 
Both communities have tended to focus on technology, we believe, because if 
technology is something that happens to all of us, no partisan finger pointing 
is required. But the facts we observe do not lend themselves to a neutral, “both 
sides at fault” analysis. Our lived experience is one in which a highly partisan 
House committee “absolves” the president of allegations that are under active 
investigation by an independent counsel and that president then tweets: “As 
the House Intelligence Committee has concluded, there was no collusion 
between Russia and the Trump Campaign. As many are now finding out, 
however, there was tremendous leaking, lying and corruption at the highest 
levels of the FBI, Justice & State. #DrainTheSwamp.”3 Only a conscious and 
frank assessment of why the two sides of the divide developed such different 
dynamics will help us avoid the vortex.
In Chapter  10, we review the literature on polarization and see that 
polarization long precedes the internet and is rooted in asymmetric political- 
elite- driven dynamics. In Chapter 12, we turn to media history and recount 
the rise of second- wave right- wing media, beginning with Rush Limbaugh 
and the shift of televangelism into political coverage. Again, asymmetric 
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polarization precedes the emergence of the internet. We then turn to 
evaluate various hypotheses about why the differences between the left and 
the right emerged as they did and cover both psychological explanations 
and historical- institutional factors. We cannot exclude psychological 
explanations that claim to identify systematic cognitive and affective 
differences between conservatives and liberals, but we offer reasons to see the 
asymmetry more as a function of historical contingency and institutional- 
political factors interacting with universally applicable models of motivated 
reasoning than a result of any intergroup psychological differences. As such, 
we think that while path- dependency will make addressing our present crisis 
difficult, it will not require going against “human nature” in any deep sense, 
but “merely” formidable political will on the part of both Republicans who 
still reject their party’s takeover by its radical wing, and Democrats who 
will have to work with those Republicans to re- establish a more symmetric 
political and media ecosystem.
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Polarization in American Politics
Polarization of Political Elites
In September 2017, a seven- term moderate Republican representative from 
Pennsylvania, Charlie Dent, indicated that he would not seek re- election. 
In his announcement, he decried the rancorous atmosphere in Washington 
afflicted by “increased polarization and ideological rigidity that leads to 
dysfunction, disorder and chaos.”1 He was not alone. When LoBiondo 
Frank of New Jersey followed suit, he declared: “Regrettably, our nation is 
now consumed by increasing political polarization; there is no longer middle 
ground to honestly debate issues and put forward solutions.” Prior to the 
2018 midterm elections, an unusually high number of incumbent Republican 
senators and representatives announced that they would retire from Congress 
rather than seek re- election.2 Polarization was not the only factor at play. 
Some were facing increasingly competitive elections and the possibility of 
losing the power and leverage of being part of the majority party. However, 
increasing polarization and acrimony in Congress was a frequently cited 
factor, accentuating the fact that this is a conspicuous and unfortunate aspect 
of political life in the United States today, even among those who have at 
times helped to further and deepen legislative polarization. And, as we will 
see here, political polarization in the United States appears to be asymmetric, 
and more pronounced among Republicans than Democrats.
Polarization in American politics is most reliably measured in the actions 
of elected officials and is almost certainly led by people who spend their time 
thinking about politics and acting within it rather than people who turn to 
politics episodically, usually in the run- up to elections. A particularly vivid way of 
demonstrating polarization is to generate network maps, based on congressional 
voting records, in which House representatives are the nodes and shared roll call 
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votes between pairs of representatives are the edges. In a 2015 paper, Clio Andris 
and her collaborators showed that the parties were well separated in the 1940s 
and 1950s, began a resorting process in the mid- 1960s that lasted into the 1980s, 
and have been well separated again since the mid- 1980s.3 Figure 10.1 shows 
clearly the pattern over the entire post– World War II era.
Figure  10.1 Partisanship in voting patterns in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
1949– 2011.
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The pattern will be immediately legible to anyone with a passing familiarity 
with American politics since the New Deal. The New Deal and the Fair Deal 
relied on a compromise between Northern Democrats, who emphasized 
economic security and poverty alleviation, and Southern Democrats, who 
supported these goals in principle but only if they were designed so as not to 
undermine the Southern Jim Crow racial caste system.4 The clearly observable 
mixing from the late 1960s to the late 1980s suggests that an important 
factor in the present pattern of polarization is the gradual working out of the 
competing forces of incumbency and party realignment caused by the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bill Moyers quotes Lyndon Johnson as having 
told him, on the night he signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “I think we 
just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a very long time.”5 Kevin 
Phillips’s 1969 book, The Emerging Republican Majority, was considered at 
the time the blueprint for Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy.6 As Phillips 
put it,
The presidential election of 1968 marked a historic first occasion— the 
Negrophobe Deep South and modern Outer South simultaneously 
abandoned the Democratic Party. And before long, the conservative 
cycle thus begun ought to witness movement of congressional, state 
and local Southern Democrats into the ascending Republican Party.7
In his 1969 review of the book, the Times’s political reporter Warren 
Weaver Jr. characterized Phillips’s argument, “the Democratic Party  . . . will 
consist largely of treacherous Yankees who forsook the Republican party over 
the past 30 years, Jews, Negros, some stubborn Scandinavians and the liberal 
establishment.” The “Southern” part of the strategy meant that “[f ] ull racial 
polarization is an essential ingredient of Phillips’s political pragmatism.”8 
Ignoring the incendiary language, part anachronism part animus, Phillips’s 
maps of the realignment and the basic predictions about the geographic 
segmentation and sorting of the two parties were remarkably prescient. The 
element missing from the analysis was that the New Left and the women’s 
movement would evoke in evangelicals a parallel backlash. That backlash 
complemented the white- identity pillar of the emerging Republican majority 
with the pillar of the newly politicized evangelical Christian movement that 
came into its own in 1979 when Jerry Falwell founded the Moral Majority.
The polarization that followed the realignment of Southern Democrats 
into the Republican Party did not result in symmetric polarization bet-
ween the parties. DW- NOMINATE, the academic standard for measuring 
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 the partisan alignment of members of Congress, was pioneered by political 
scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal and later extended in 
collaborative work with Nolan McCarty.9 This technique leverages the voting 
behavior of members of Congress to quantitatively estimate their locations on 
the political spectrum. On a scale of 1.0 to –1.0 for conservative to liberal, the 
measure incorporates how often any given member votes with members from 
the other party as a measure of their ranking from centrist (0.0) to partisan (1.0, 
– 1.0). Looking at all the roll call votes of all members of Congress who have 
ever served in the U.S. Congress, this approach is also able to record changes 
in partisanship over time, and in particular how far from the perfectly centrist 
position various members are. Because individual representatives are relatively 
stable in the degree to which they are conservative or liberal over a career, 
DW- NOMINATE uses the fact that various members of Congress overlap in 
tenure and compares how new members of one or the other party vote relative 
to already- serving members of that party to compare partisanship over time.
Looking at partisanship and polarization of members of Congress since 
the Gilded Age, from 1870 to 1900, it is quite clear that Republicans saw a 
long gradual shift toward more centrist views over the seven decades from the 
election of Teddy Roosevelt until 1968 (Figure 10.2). Northern Democrats 
shifted from being more moderate or centrist than Republicans on the eve 
of World War I, to being more liberal, or further from the perfect centrist 
position, than their Republican counterparts. This long- term move to the 
left ended in the mid- 1950s. The issue positions associated with liberal and 
conservative political ideology have changed, but Northern Democrats’ 
voting patterns have remained remarkably consistent in their ideological 
position over the past six decades. Southern Democrats were the most 
polarized by this measure before World War I— that is, they were most likely 
not to vote with members from the other party. From World War I to the New 
Deal, Southern Democrats became the most centrist in the sense that they 
were the most likely to vote with Republicans. They occupied this position 
until 1968. Republicans then began to transition toward a caucus made up of 
members who took more consistently conservative positions, with a sharper 
swing beginning in 1977. Meanwhile, Southern Democrats began a long- term 
convergence with Northern Democrats, with smaller inflection points in 1991 
and 1998, as electoral trends accelerated or decelerated the speed with which 
Southern Democrats were replaced by Southern Republicans. The remaining 
Southern Democrats were increasingly from majority- minority districts and 
voted squarely with the Northern Democrats. The Southern Democrats 
converged to the orientation of the Northern Democrats, who changed the 



























































Figure 10.2 Polarization in the U.S. Congress by Party, 1879– 2015.
Source: https:// voteviewblog.com/ 2015/ 06/ 10/ more- on- assymmetric- polarization- yes- the- 
republicans- did- it/ .
least over this period of time, arriving back at a DW- NOMINATE score of 
– 0.4, where they had been since the mid- 1950s. The Republicans continued 
to become increasingly conservative. By 2000, Republicans had become 
more conservative than Democrats were liberal, and on the eve of the 2016 
election, Republicans were more conservative than they had been at any 
point since the Gilded Age. While DW- NOMINATE has become quite 
standard in political science, there remains a lively academic debate over the 
comparability of these scores, particularly over very long periods of American 
political history.10 Some are not, as we are, persuaded that DW- NOMINATE 
is the best available measure for tracking these changes.11 But given that Poole 
and Rosenthal have done this continuously since 1983, we think that the 
measures are robust at least for understanding patterns of polarization in the 
past half century.
These patterns suggest a basic underlying dynamic that is tied to the three 
pillars of the present Republican coalition. First, the white- identity pillar, the 
intentional product of the Southern Strategy that was so clearly represented in 
the tenor of the immigration coverage we described in Chapter 4. Second, the 
pillar of evangelical Christians, who have been a mainstay of the Republican 
party since the election of 1980, and whose politicization was driven by 
a backlash against the politics of the 1960s, the sexual revolution, and the 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da300
30
destabilization of the traditional patriarchal family structure by the Women’s 
Movement. And the third, the emergence of organized business in the 1970s, 
and the deep strategic turnaround that American businesses undertook in 
response to a series of political losses in the 1960s, particularly under the 
auspices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable. 
As Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson documented in Winner- Take- All- Politics, 
political contributions by this movement followed very different patterns 
for Republicans and Democrats. The former received sustained, party- 
building and movement- building contributions; the latter received primarily 
rewards for individuals who were reliable allies rather than for the party as 
a whole.12 The first two pillars of the Republican coalition— white identity 
and political evangelicism— are defined in terms of social identity, rather than 
practical needs, and are therefore particularly amenable to the organization 
of a party based on a shared ideology, rather than shared interests. The third, 
business- oriented pillar is more results- focused, but the results it sought were 
deregulation and tax reduction— that is, reduced state capacity. The veto- rich 
American legislative system made developing a strategy based on ideological 
purity— and the gridlock likely to result— congruent with that goal. Grover 
Norquist’s tax pledge, initiated in 1985, is the quintessential example of 
taking the most practical of political questions— how much money to raise 
and spend— and turning it into an ideological litmus test with a single right 
answer: “no new taxes.” As Matthew Grossman and David Hopkins argued in 
Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats, the 
Republican Party can therefore function as a party committed to ideological 
purity,13 punishing moderates who try to compromise to get things done 
with contested primaries and lost funding. By contrast, the Democratic Party 
has a long pattern of interest- group coalition politics. It therefore focuses 
on delivering to its various constituent interest groups the policy outcomes 
that keep them in the tent. This focus on results means that Democrats value 
half loaves, whereas Republicans often interpret a half loaf as a full betrayal. 
Representatives faced with such asymmetric responses among their supporters 
and funders are likely to adapt their behavior, and the resulting asymmetric 
patterns of behavior are perfectly consistent with these different incentive 
structures set up by the two major parties in American politics.
Polarization of the Public
Given the evident and growing partisan divide in Congress, it is natural to 
surmise that this is accompanied by and fueled by rising polarization of the 
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public. However, despite broad agreement among scholars and political 
observers that elite polarization is a reality, there is less consensus about 
whether the electorate is as highly polarized, or has been polarizing at all. 
The fact that voters are sending representatives to Congress that are acting 
in increasingly partisan ways is not by itself enough to establish that the 
mass public is similarly polarizing or that elite polarization is rooted in mass 
polarization.14 This pattern of voting more extreme representatives into office 
could simply be the result of there being fewer moderate candidates to attract 
the votes of moderates. As the differences in party candidates grow over time, 
centrist voters are left with more extreme options that do not reflect their 
moderate views. According to this view, voters are not the instigators of elite 
polarization but passive victims of the forces of elite polarization, which leave 
them fewer and fewer centrist options. Independent voters or voters that lean 
slightly to the right or left would have to choose between staunch liberals or 
conservatives.
There are many conceptions of polarization and many of the disagreements 
among scholars stem from different definitions and measures of polarization.15 
There are many ways in which the electorate on the left and right may pull 
apart. There are policy differences across a range of economic and social topics 
from taxation and trade policy to guns, abortion, and minority rights. Politics 
is also deeply personal, and partisans tend to dislike one another.
Among those who study polarization of the broader public, there is 
wide consensus on two key points. First, voters are better sorted than in the 
past. Democrats now more reliably identify as liberal while Republicans 
now more consistently identify as conservative. The southern realignment 
among voters is a big part of this, but increased ideological- partisan sorting 
has occurred across the country.16 The correlation of party and self- reported 
ideology has increased from 0.28 in 1972 to 0.58 in 2012.17 Since fewer people 
who identify as Democrats now hold conservative views and fewer people 
who identify as Republicans hold liberal views, this sorting process has led to 
less overlap in the political orientation and attitudes of the parties and greater 
homogeneity within parties. However, political sorting does not necessarily 
entail diverging views on issues. Sorting can in principle produce more 
homogenous parties without voters taking on more extreme positions on 
particular issues. The process of political sorting could simply be reshuffling 
voters into more coherent groups where party identities and opinions are 
more homogenous. A second point of consensus is that voters who are most 
active politically are more polarized. In the words of Alan Abramowitz and 
Kyle Saunders: “The most interested, informed, and active citizens are much 
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more polarized in their political views.”18 Activists, however, constitute a 
small minority of the public. If defined by those who work on campaigns, 
they make up about 5 percent of the eligible electorate. The number is higher 
if based on the number who contribute to campaigns: about 10 percent of 
the electorate.19
There is less consensus about what has happened to the majority of 
Americans who are not highly engaged partisans of either party and are 
not as polarized as the most engaged citizens. Morris Fiorina and his 
coauthors have been the leading academic voices expressing skepticism over 
ideological polarization of the broader public.20 Their principal argument is 
that while the political elite and political activists have been growing apart 
ideologically, the large majority of the public have had and continue to hold 
moderate positions on the issues. Long- term trends of two likely signals 
of polarization— strong identification with one of the parties and strong 
identification with conservative or liberal ideology— do not reveal a clear 
pattern of polarization. In periodic surveys conducted over many years, the 
proportions of the electorate that respond as strong liberals, conservatives, 
Democrats, or Republicans have not increased significantly over the past 
several decades.21 Alan Abramowitz and his coauthors offer a different 
interpretation of the available data and report that the number of ideological 
moderates has been declining. Drawing on American National Election 
Studies data, they make the case that the number of political moderates is 
shrinking, as evidenced by a growing proportion of survey respondents that 
report strong partisan identities.22
Both Fiorina and Abramowitz express concern about the negative 
implications of growing partisanship among political elites. They differ, 
however, in the role of the public in this growing divide. For Fiorina, the 
majority of American voters are not the instigators of political polarization 
and are not well served by the divisive political system created by elites. In 
their 2012 book Disconnect, Fiorina and Abrams write:23
In America today, there is a disconnect between an unrepresentative 
political class and the citizenry it purports to represent. The political 
process today not only is less representative than it was a generation 
ago and less supported by the citizenry, but the outcomes of that 
process are at a minimum no better. The present disconnect is cause for 
concern and not something that can be discounted as either normal or 
unimportant.
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For Abramowitz, the American public plays a more significant role in the 
disconnect and hence bears more of the responsibility as well:
There are large differences in outlook between Democrats and Republ-
icans, between red state voters and blue state voters, and between 
religious voters and secular voters. The high level of ideological 
polarization evident among political elites in the United States reflects 
real divisions within the American electorate.24
Recent work challenges the notion that voters are more moderate than 
their elected officials while also drawing into question the definition and 
measure of what constitutes a political moderate. Based on voter surveys, 
David Broockman finds not only that many voters hold a mix of conservative 
and liberal positions but also that many voters also hold extreme positions on 
issues.25 On immigration, for example, approximately one- quarter of those 
surveyed supported a ban on immigration until the border is fully secured 
and were in favor of deporting all undocumented immigrants. He concludes 
that the opinions of the public are not in fact more moderate than those taken 
by elected representatives. By a common measure of ideology, those that favor 
a mix of liberal and conservative policies would be classified as moderate 
regardless of the extremity of their views on the individual policies. Once 
the extremity of views on particular issues is taken into account, Broockman 
shows that the electorate appears substantially less moderate. He also observes 
that while highly knowledgeable and engaged American voters tend to have 
more ideologically consistent views, they do not generally hold more extreme 
views on specific issues.
Elite Polarization and Political Identity:  
Do Leaders Matter?
The literature we have surveyed to this point makes two things clear. First, 
political elites have polarized asymmetrically. Congressional Republicans 
have become continuously more conservative and ideologically pure over the 
past 50 years, while congressional Democrats have converged to the degree 
of partisanship that has characterized Northern Democrats since the mid- 
1950s. Second, while partisan activists have polarized, it is much less clear 
whether the majority of the population has similarly polarized. The remaining 
question is how polarization among elites and activists is likely to affect the 
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majority of the population that does not pay as much attention to politics on 
a regular basis.
Long- standing research in political science rejects the idea that voters 
choose candidates who most closely match their opinions on policy issues. In 
a seminal 1964 paper, Philip Converse provided an early empirical foundation 
for a premise that is now widely accepted, at least among political scientists: a 
large majority of Americans do not have consistent and reliable ideological 
beliefs. Converse found that only about one in six could “assign the terms 
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ correctly to the parties and say something sensible 
about what the terms meant.”26 These findings have been replicated many 
times over the past five decades. In recent work, Donald Kinder and Nathan 
Kalmoe replicated much of Converse’s seminal study. They found that the 
basic description of voter attitudes and behavior articulated many decades 
ago has changed only modestly.27 They found that for most people, self- 
reported ideology had no influence over opinions on a wide range of topics, 
including immigration, affirmative action, gun control, health policy, foreign 
aid, tax policy, and social security. There were two exceptions: abortion and 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQ) rights. However, once the 
authors control for religious beliefs, the impact of ideology on these topics 
disappeared as well. Following in this line, Christopher Achen and Larry 
Bartels dismantle what they describe as the “folk theory” of democracy: the 
idea that people have informed policy preferences and then vote for candidates 
that best match their policy preferences, which in turn promotes elected 
officials that serve the interests of their electorate. Instead, they conclude 
that voters are mostly disinterested in politics, ill- informed about political 
matters, and likely to make their voting choices based on a set of factors that 
have no relationship to the proposed agenda and competence of their favored 
candidate.28
An alternative to the well- informed rational voter theory is that individ-
uals are driven primarily by partisan identity. This model, frequently known 
as the Michigan model, was developed by political scientists in the 1950s 
and articulated in the 1960 classic The American Voter. The core premises 
of this model are that voters inherit a partisan identity early in life from 
their family and social environment, and that this affiliation, typically with 
the Democratic Party or Republican Party, shapes political values and 
perceptions of political affairs. The essence of this model, that for most voters 
the foundations of political thinking and decisions are social, has held up well 
over the years.29 Americans organize opinions on politics and current affairs 
around their attitudes toward social groups.30 Kinder and Kalmoe also find 
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that party identification is more stable over time than ideological affiliation 
and that this is rooted in social ties:  “public opinion arises primarily from 
the attachments and antipathies of group life.” Voters apparently establish 
their party affiliation first and then adapt their views of issues and ideology 
to align with party. They estimate that those who base political perspectives 
on group identity— the ideological innocents— outnumber voters with 
strong ideological and issue- based opinions by a factor of 5 to 1.  This 
distance between ideology and affiliation is not an impediment for political 
engagement. Partisanship presents more opportunities for citizens to express 
their affiliation and take action, whether by voting, working for a campaign, 
attending rallies, or contributing to campaigns. “Parties are material realities 
in a way that ideologies are not.”31
The key role of partisan affiliation in determining the views and 
actions of the electorate through a top- down process is clearly evident in 
the responsiveness of partisans to political leaders. Voters take cues from 
political elites on questions of policy. They tend to first choose their favored 
leaders, and then adopt the political views and stances of the leaders.32 This 
phenomenon was demonstrated in an innovative study carried out with the 
cooperation of state legislators. Working with researchers, legislators sent out 
issue positions to constituents but with randomly assigned content, some 
with extensive justification and others with little background. They found in 
subsequent surveys that voters frequently adopted the positions of legislators 
even when little justification for the positions was provided. Moreover, 
legislators were not viewed more negatively when the position statements 
were in opposition to voter positions. Voters require little convincing to adopt 
new policy positions, and where the positions of elected officials conflict with 
voter positions, voters are willing to look beyond that.33 A study carried out in 
the wake of the 2016 election took advantage of Donald Trump’s “ideological 
schizophrenia” to assess the influence of political leaders on voter opinion.34 
They found that “low- knowledge respondents, strong Republicans, Trump- 
approving respondents, and self- described conservatives are the most likely 
to behave like party loyalists and simply accept the Trump cue— in either 
direction.” When Trump promoted a conservative position, his supporters 
agreed. When Trump adopted a more liberal position, they agreed.
Partisan responses to the cues of the political leaders applies also to the 
positions taken by leaders from the opposite side. The response of Democrats 
to the positions staked out by Trump are a good example of this. Among 
Democrats there was a marked shift in political values on topics where Trump 
took strong controversial positions. There was an increase, from 50 percent 
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to 64 percent, in the percentage of Democrats who believe that immigrants 
strengthen the country because of their hard work and talent.35 Similarly, there 
was a large increase from 2015 to 2017 among Democratic survey respondents 
who view racial discrimination as the main impediment to Blacks “getting 
ahead.”
The implication of the work on the plasticity of voters’ policy preferences 
and their responsiveness to cues from leaders of parties— parties they adopt as 
a matter of identity— is that patterns of polarization among political leaders 
can affect patterns of polarization in the public. It means that leaders have 
considerable latitude to define what it means to be a Republican or Democrat, 
or what it means to be conservative or liberal. It is whatever they say it is. 
In ideological terms, partisanship is more flexible and less prescriptive. In 
the 2016 election, this explains how Trump was able to reset party doctrine 
on issues such as trade and Russia while still holding a vast majority of the 
GOP vote. But it also offers a transmission mechanism for the well- measured 
asymmetric polarization among elected representatives to the broader 
population of party identifiers.
From Social Identity to Affective Polarization
The fact that social identity begets party affiliation helps explain not only 
why leaders can induce populations to shift positions over time but also why 
polarization can take on such deeply affective negative responses to partisans 
of the other party.36 Expressive partisanship has a strong emotional component 
that provides a stronger driver for engagement and activism compared to 
involvement based on intellectual grounds.37 People choose sides and become 
emotionally invested in promoting their side and opposing the other side. 
These group bonds then determine opinions on issues and the interpretation 
of political events. As Lilliana Mason writes, political sorting creates a stronger 
overlap in social identities that exacerbates polarization. Increasing partisan 
and ideological alignment results in greater partisan bias, activism, and anger. 
“Partisan identities have become increasingly aligned with religious and 
racial identities. Republicans tend toward Christian and white identities, and 
Democrats tend toward non- religious and non- white identities. With these 
highly aligned identities, people tend to be more sensitive to threats from 
outsiders, reacting with higher levels of anger than those with cross- cutting 
identities.”38 Even without any change in the underlying distribution of issue 
opinions, sorting can fuel greater enmity toward the opposing party and 
inspire more activism. “The effect is an electorate whose members are more 
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biased and angry than their issue positions alone can explain.”39 And ethnic 
identity has come to play a particularly large role in this dynamic. Donald 
Kinder and Cindy Kam show how the definition of in- groups and out- groups 
based on ethnic background exerts an influence on political attitudes across a 
range of issues, including immigration, social support programs, and policies 
to counteract terrorism.40
It is hardly news that in- group/ out- group dynamics involve as much 
negative response to the out- group as it does positive response to the in- group. 
Utilizing survey data, Miller and Conover demonstrate that “stronger partisan 
identities, more than ideological identities or preferences, are associated with 
a greater sense of partisan hostility— specifically, party rivalry and anger.”41 
They report that those with the strongest partisan identities maintain the most 
hostile and uncivil attitudes and that they are also the most likely to vote. These 
dynamics readily explain the extraordinary passion and enthusiasm of Trump 
political rallies, which was both a point of pride for the campaign and a shock 
for many, particularly the unmistakable rage of many Trump supporters. 
Anger and outrage has always played a motivating and instrumental role in 
political mobilization, but the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 2016 
campaign reached levels not seen in the United States in many years. And the 
anger and frustration palpable in demonstrations of “The Resistance” since 
inauguration day is hardly the stuff of rational democratic discourse, any more 
than Hillary Clinton’s infamous “basket of deplorables” was an invitation to 
pragmatic dialog. But the 2016 election was simply the working out of the 
much longer trend of growing animosity and distrust between liberals and 
conservatives. This partisan hostility, referred to as affective polarization, has 
risen sharply over the past two decades. According to Pew Research Center 
survey data, the number of Republicans that view Democrats unfavorably has 
risen from 74  percent in 1994 to 91  percent in 2016. Democrats that view 
Republicans unfavorably has increased from 59  percent to 86  percent over 
the same time period. In surveys carried in 2014, Pew researchers found that 
36 percent of Republicans and 27 percent of Democrats responded that the 
opposing party’s policy agenda “threaten the nation’s well- being.”42
Based on survey data that includes “thermometer” ratings of in- groups 
and out- groups, Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes described 
a significant chilling of feelings for the other party among Republicans and 
Democrats. Over the past several decades, these ratings of the out- party have 
declined 15 points on a 100- point scale, while in- group feelings have been 
stable. Surprisingly, perhaps, partisan affective responses are stronger in the 
data Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes analyze than are affective responses to race 
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or religion, a finding that Iyengar and Sean Westwood confirmed in a series 
of studies specifically focused on comparing racial to partisan animosity.43 
Consistent with the asymmetric partisanship literature, they also find that 
while the negative affective response has increased significantly across the 
partisan divide, it has increased more for Republicans than for Democrats. 
In 1960, practically no Democrats or Republicans reported that they would 
be “somewhat or very unhappy” if their child married a member of the other 
party. By 2010, one- third of Democrats and one- half of Republicans responded 
that they would have that response to their child marrying a member of the 
opposite party.44 In more recent work, Iyengar and Westwood moderated that 
finding by testing it across a wider range of measures, finding that negative out- 
group affect was high among Democrats and Republicans broadly speaking 
to a roughly similar extent, although they did find that when comparing 
Democrats and Republicans who were “strongly partisan . . . outparty animus 
is significantly higher among Republicans.”45
Abramowitz and Steven Webster use the term “negative partisanship” 
to highlight the fact that the growing hostility voters feel toward the other 
party is not matched by a stronger affinity for their own party: “A growing 
proportion of Americans dislike the opposing party more than they like their 
own party.” They hypothesize:
The rise of negative partisanship in the American electorate appears 
to be part of a vicious cycle of mutually reinforcing elite and mass 
behavior. Confrontational politics in Washington and in many state 
capitols is causing Democratic and Republican voters to develop 
increasingly negative views of the opposing party and to vote along 
party lines from the top of the ticket to the bottom. Negative views of 
the opposing party among voters, in turn, encourage political elites to 
adopt a confrontational approach to governing. Given these mutually 
reinforcing patterns of elite and mass behavior, negative partisanship 
is likely to remain an important feature of American politics for the 
foreseeable future.46
Polarization Before Considering Media Dynamics
Before we turn to considering media and political communications, let us 
evaluate where we are. There is very good evidence that party elites, and 
elected representatives in particular, have experienced significant party 
polarization in the sense that liberals and conservatives have mostly sorted 
 
 Polarization in American Politics 309
309
themselves into Democrats and Republicans, respectively, and that the 
most visible component of this move was the realignment of Southern 
Democrats to the Republican Party. It is also clear that this movement was 
asymmetric and that since 1968 Republicans have continuously moved to 
the right, while Democrats have converged more or less to the location of 
Northern Democrats in the mid- 1950s. It is clear that party activists, ranging 
in number between 5 percent and 10 percent of the voting population, have 
similarly polarized in their positions. And it is quite clear that the broader 
population, if it has polarized at all, has polarized affectively— in the way it 
feels about the other party— rather than programmatically, or the practical 
policy preferences it holds. The long- term and regional trajectory of 
these patterns strongly argues against the internet being a prime driver of 
polarization. Part of the story relates to the gradual sorting of the parties by 
ethnic identity— with Democrats relying more heavily on nonwhite voters, 
and Republicans relying overwhelmingly on non- Hispanic white voters. 
For both sides the roots of this dynamic are in the 1960s— the success of the 
civil rights movement and the successful harnessing of the white backlash 
by the Republican Party, and the response to demographic changes that 
followed the adoption in 1965 of a much more open immigration policy. 
Another part of the story reflects the response of religious Americans, 
particularly Christians, and among them particularly evangelicals, to the 
sexual revolution and the women’s movement, such that today evangelicals 
are a critical pillar of the Republican coalition. These dynamics initially 
manifested in the centrality of abortion, and more recently LGBTQ 
rights, as a party- identity litmus test. Yet another part of the story reflects 
growing economic inequality and insecurity, and the successful harnessing 
of identity concerns and ideological purity by the pro- business wing of 
the Republican Party to divert attention from the practical effects of its 
sustained political campaign against unions, regulation, taxation, and 
redistribution.
There is, in other words, plenty at work before we start to consider 
partisan media generally, and the internet and social media in particular. 
And as we turn now to consider media, we have to keep in mind how the 
media ecosystem interacts with these long- standing structural shifts in the 
shape of polarization and partisanship in America. As the preceding 10 
chapters already tell in great detail, there is little surprise in store in the 
next chapter. Yes, media matters. Our observations of the past three years 
online and our review of the recent media history of the United States 
both suggest that right- wing media has been performing different roles for 
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Republicans than left- wing media has played for Democrats. We observe 
in the real world the pattern we outlined in Chapter 3 as the propaganda 
feedback loop. The asymmetry, and the feedback loop it triggered, has its 
roots in talk radio since 1988 and in Fox News since 1996. And Fox, in 
particular, continues to play a more important role in the process than the 
internet.
31
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The Origins of Asymmetry
No one, today, can be simultaneously honest, informed, 
and successful in the Republican Party.
William Rusher, Publisher, National Review, 1960 (lamenting 
Barry Goldwater’s loss of the party’s nomination to Richard Nixon)1
Facebook didn’t create the asymmetric architecture of the American 
public sphere. Nor did the internet or the blogosphere. The asymmetry is 
already clear in patterns of attention to cable news networks and talk radio. 
As Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj document in their book, The Outrage 
Industry, left- wing partisan commentators like Lawrence O’Donnell on 
MSNBC can be every bit as vehement and emotional in the outrage business 
as right- wing partisans like Sean Hannity. Among stories suspect enough 
to be checked by PolitiFact, Rachel Maddow’s mostly- false or worse ratio 
(48 percent) is not meaningfully different than Hannity’s (50 percent). But 
liberal audiences do not pay attention to, or trust, their partisan commentators 
at rates even approaching those that typify conservative audiences. In the run- 
up to the 2012 election, Fox News viewership outstripped that of MSNBC 
and CNN; Maddow was drawing audiences one- third the size of the then- 
most popular conservative commentator, Bill O’Reilly.2 By November 2016, 
Adweek reported that “Fox News beat CNN and MSNBC combined across 
all dayparts.”3 Since Donald Trump’s election, MSNBC has seen a relative 
increase in viewership, but still, of the top five rated cable news shows, only 
Rachel Maddow was present on the left, behind Sean Hannity and Tucker 
Carlson, and ahead of Laura Ingraham and Bret Baier.4 Consistent with the 
ratings of individual shows, a Pew survey found that only 9 percent of Hillary 
Clinton voters reported using MSNBC as their primary source of news about 
the election. The corresponding number for Trump voters and Fox News was 
40 percent.5 The asymmetry in talk radio is even starker. There is, effectively, 
no nationally syndicated liberal talk radio to speak of. From Rush Limbaugh, 
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through Sean Hannity, to Mark Levine and a host of others vying for the 
same market, talk radio captures tens of millions of listeners weekly, and it is 
almost exclusively right- wing outrage.6 Berry and Sobieraj also document the 
differences in language and rhetorical devices employed by different outrage 
outlets. Liberal media tend to have more mockery and direct confrontation 
between opponents; conservative media have few head- to- head confrontations 
but more misrepresentative exaggeration, insulting language, and name- 
calling, along with ideologically extreme activation language.7 Compared to 
liberal outlets, conservative programs live on outrage; the likelihood that a 
given program was conservative, as opposed to liberal, increased linearly with 
the number of instances where one of their categories of “outrage expression” 
appeared in a program.8 Perhaps unsurprisingly, getting your news from 
outrage merchants does not help you get a handle on reality. As Joanne Miller 
and her collaborators and, independently, Adam Berinsky have shown, for 
Democrats, the more knowledgeable they are about politics, the less likely 
they are to accept conspiracy theories or unsubstantiated rumors that harm 
their ideological opponents. But for Republicans more knowledge results in, 
at best, no change in the rate at which they accept conspiracy theories, and at 
worst, actually increases their willingness to accept such theories.9
There have been numerous experiments aimed at creating left- wing 
equivalents of the mainstays of right- wing media, most prominently Air 
America’s effort to replicate conservative talk radio in 2004 and MSNBC’s 
strategic shift toward creating a left- oriented mirror to Fox News in 2006. 
In the early stages of Web 2.0, which coincided with the George W.  Bush 
administration and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, a flourishing left- wing 
political blogosphere emerged alongside and in interaction with both 
mainstream media and the Democratic Party. None of these were able 
to replicate the industrial organization, market success, or political and 
cultural significance of the right, and none of these succeeded in creating a 
symmetrically polarized media ecosystem with balance between the left and 
right. Instead the left remained firmly anchored, together with the center, 
in “the reality- based community,” while the right largely shifted to a revival 
of the nineteenth- century partisan press. As Theda Skocpol and Vanessa 
Williamson put it in their study of the rise of the Tea Party:
American democracy is, in an important sense, caught betwixt and 
between in the new media world. The frank, exuberant, all- around 
partisanship of the nineteenth century is not quite what we now have. 
True, there are both liberal and conservative bloggers, and on the tube, 
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the Fox political slant is weakly countered by liberal- slanted shows 
on MSNBC. But mostly what America has right now is a thousand- 
pound- gorilla media juggernaut on the right, operating nineteenth- 
century style, coexisting with other news outlets trying to keep up 
while making fitful efforts, twentieth- century style, to check facts and 
cover “both sides of the story.”10
It would be difficult to offer a more succinct encapsulation of what our 
data describe. Both the macroscale architecture our data uncover, and the 
detailed, microlevel data we collect on specific case studies support this basic 
asymmetry.
Origins
Partisan press was as American as apple pie in the nineteenth century. 
Vitriol, partisanship, and smear campaigns were the order of the day. But 
as Michael Schudson’s classic work showed, American journalists in the 
1920s began to develop norms and institutions that made objectivism and 
fact- based reporting— removed from partisan opinion— the hallmark of 
the profession.11 The process was very much an application to journalism of 
the much broader emergence of managerialism, or Weberian rationality, to 
all social systems. From Taylorism and Fordism in industry, through the rise 
of the administrative state and the expert agencies, architecture and urban 
planning, to the professionalization of science and what we now think of as 
“the professions,” the era of modernism saw a broad reorganization of social 
relations across diverse domains into structures oriented around expertise, 
objectivity, and evidence.12
As norms of objectivity developed for the mainstream, political 
suppression muted the left and right wings of the American sphere. The 
revolution in Russia and America’s entry into World War I  drove the first 
Red Scare. The judicial opinions that laid the foundations for what would 
become, decades later, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions that 
permitted speech to be suppressed only if it presents a “clear and present 
danger” were dissenting opinions or later- overturned decisions surrounding 
suppression of socialist antiwar efforts— The Masses,13 Schenck,14 and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams.15 Five times Socialist presidential 
candidate Eugene Debs was imprisoned for 10 years under the Espionage Act, 
although later pardoned by President Warren G. Harding. As radio burst onto 
the scene as the new mass medium in the 1920s, efforts to produce left- wing 
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media encountered regulatory resistance. In 1925, the Chicago Federation 
of Labor launched WCFL. In 1927, the Socialist Party of America launched 
WEVD (after Eugene V. Debs). Both outlets came under severe pressure from 
the Federal Radio Commission as propaganda stations and were forced to 
accept lower- power, constrained licenses that significantly inhibited their 
growth and adoption.
On the right Father Coughlin became a mass phenomenon and is 
the direct lineal ancestor of Rush Limbaugh and conservative talk radio. 
Beginning his career with religious broadcasts in the late 1920s, Coughlin 
shifted in the 1930s from purely religious broadcasting to politics. Initially 
he mixed ardent anti- communism with an embrace of the New Deal. 
After 1934, however, Coughlin became both anti– New Deal, denouncing 
it as creeping communism, and increasingly pro- Fascist, anti-semitic, 
and antiwar. Unlike the socialist and labor stations, which the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) had constrained from the start, 
Father Coughlin may have reached as many as 30 million listeners.16 And 
his broadcasts became a classic case study in early research on propaganda.17 
In 1939, after the war began in Europe, guidelines from the National 
Association of Broadcasters on selling time to “spokesmen on controversial 
public issues” and the threat that failure to comply with these would result 
in FCC nonrenewal of licenses forced Coughlin off the air. It would be 
five decades before his conspiracy- theory- laden, emotional, propagandist 
style would return to the airwaves, one year after the FCC finally repealed 
the fairness doctrine.
During the war, Henry Luce, the head of Time Inc. and publisher of 
dozens of magazines, responded to concerns about a growing regulatory state 
and encroaching wartime propaganda by putting in motion a process whose 
conclusion would become the institutional heart of the post– World War II 
professional ethos: the 1947 Report of the Commission on Freedom of the 
Press. The principal concern to which the commission responded was the 
increasing power of media companies and the prospect of greater censorship 
by the government under the guise of ensuring that media served American 
interests. The commission brought together 12 intellectuals to study the role 
of media and took on the name of its head, Robert Hutchins, the president 
of the University of Chicago. This coterie of upper- class white men met 
periodically over a four- year period and issued in 1947 a scathing report on 
media practices at the time. The legal scholar C. Edwin Baker described the 
work of the Hutchins Commission “the most important, semiofficial, policy- 
oriented study of the mass media in U.S. history.”18
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The Hutchins Commission defined the key functions of media as follows:
First, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s 
events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for 
the exchange of comment and criticism; third, a means of projecting 
the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; 
fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of 
the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching every member of the society 
by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press 
supplies.
They concluded that the media was failing to meet these goals:
These needs are not being met. The news is twisted by the emphasis 
on firstness, on the novel and sensational; by the personal interests of 
owners; and by pressure groups. Too much of the regular output of 
the press consists of a miscellaneous succession of stories and images 
which have no relation to the typical lives of real people anywhere. 
Too often the result is meaninglessness, flatness, distortion, and the 
perpetuation of misunderstanding among widely scattered groups 
whose only contract is through these media.
The commission concluded that the failures of media put freedom of 
expression at risk:  “Press practices at times have been so irresponsible that 
if continued society is bound to take control for its own protection.” They 
ultimately recommended self- regulation and called on media to commit itself 
to take its social responsibilities more seriously.
In politics bipartisanship reigned ,and the mainstream dominated in 
the post– World War II years. The New Deal and Fair Deal saw progressive 
Democrats and Southern Democrats ally around programs that alleviated 
poverty and stabilized economic security while largely excluding Black 
populations from many of their benefits.19 Treaty of Detroit labor relations 
(agreements beginning in 1950 between the United Auto Workers and the 
Big Three automobile manufacturers that set labor and wage standards 
across large industrial sectors and were the foundation of post- war industrial 
peace and middle- class wage growth) and the sustained economic growth 
they enabled led to relatively widespread sharing of the returns, and the 
dominance of Keynesianism took much of the sting out of economic policy 
politics. The horror of Nazism and the solidarity of wartime experience 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da316
316
largely discredited the America First wing of the American right. And the 
Cold War largely united Democrats and Republicans at the expense of the 
left under McCarthyism.
Against this political background, and in the media and regulatory 
environment of postwar America, right- wing media remained on the 
periphery of mass channels. Clarence Manion’s “Forum” was the most 
successful radio program on the right and was popular from its launch in 
1954 to its end in the late 1970s. The weekly program played a significant 
role in the rise of the postwar conservative movement, supported the Barry 
Goldwater candidacy, and worked in constant cooperation with the National 
Review and other conservative outlets. It was nonetheless limited to what a 
weekly show could do in terms of mass coverage.20 On the left, the Cold War 
and the Second Red Scare, McCarthyism, and the implementation of Treaty 
of Detroit labor relations through a more or less centrist accommodation 
between New Deal Democrats and Eisenhower- Nixon Republicans, meant 
that left- wing media were marginalized. While efforts like Pacifica Radio, 
launched in 1946, existed throughout this period, these remained relatively 
localized and did not reach national influence.
Magazines, with respectable but limited circulation in the tens of thousands 
up to around 200,000, continued to provide a forum for partisan commentary 
and news. On the left, The Nation had been published since 1865, and The 
Progressive and The New Republic (until it was bought in 1974 and moved 
right) operated since the rise of the Progressive movement before World War 
I. Mother Jones and The American Prospect joined them in later decades. On 
the right, Human Events launched in 1944 as a vestige of the America First 
antiwar movement, and developed over the 1950s and 60s as a major voice in 
the rise of the conservative movement. National Review, of course, became the 
sine qua non of conservative media within a few years of its founding in 1955.21 
And while these conservative publications and the “Manion Forum” formed 
an interconnected network of outlets, with some shared publication facilities 
and with mutual recognition and praise, they never reached the scale and 
scope of either Coughlin’s audience or what would emerge in the 1990s. The 
only moment when conservative publications reached a truly mass audience 
was the publication of three self- published paperbacks in the run- up to the 
1964 election, which were published outside of the right- wing media network 
but sold a total of 16 million copies, containing various conspiracy theories 
to suggest a Lyndon Johnson presidency would be a disaster (including, in 
A Texan Looks at Lyndon, insinuating that Johnson had an interest in the 
John F.  Kennedy assassination that preceded his rise to the presidency).22 
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The Goldwater candidacy and anonymous donor purchases of these books in 
order to distribute them as campaign paraphernalia combined to make these 
paperbacks instant successes, but subsequent efforts to replicate their success 
after Johnson won the election faltered.
Ultimately, the first generation of right- wing media was unable to 
overcome then- prevailing structural barriers to success. Most Americans 
got their news from the three broadcast networks. Radio still operated 
under strict group ownership limits, which meant that national syndication 
required negotiations with many independent station owners. Broadcast 
operated under the FCC’s fairness doctrine, whose core requirements were 
that broadcasters cover matters of public importance and that they do so 
fairly, mostly in the sense that they air competing positions. The doctrine 
was often associated with a right of reply for politicians who were subject to 
personal attack and other elements of the broader “public trustee” doctrine 
that held that private broadcasters holding licenses to public airwaves 
should act in managing those airwaves as a trustee for the real owners— the 
American people. While the fairness doctrine did not often result in complete 
silencing, it made many broadcasters skittish about airing programming 
that they thought might trigger an obligation to grant free response time to 
those attacked in these broadcasts. Daily newspapers were local and largely 
independent. All these conditions made it hard for first- generation postwar 
right- wing media to reach mass distribution on a national scale. Indeed, the 
anchor tenants of the first- generation right- wing media system were never, or 
almost never, economically sustainable as businesses. They relied on donations 
from listeners, a handful of ideologically committed wealthy individuals, and 
some corporate sponsorship. On the left these same economic barriers joined 
the more direct effects of anti- Communist sentiment and political and legal 
constraints stretching from the first Red Scare into the 1960s.
The one enduring legacy of that post– World War II generation of right- 
wing media was the basic rhetorical frame of liberal media bias. As Nicole 
Hemmer traces in great detail, Human Events imparted that sense that 
mainstream media was biased against conservative beliefs from its earliest 
days. By the 1960s the insistence that mainstream newspapers were biased and 
that it was necessary to produce media that were objective, but not impartial, 
was a basic tenet of conservative media. Hemmer describes a moment when, 
as part of the years- long battle between the UAW and the Kohler Company 
about whether Kohler would be a union shop, Manion offered Herbert 
Kohler an open channel to air his views. The union threatened to sue the 
station, and, fearing liability, the network of Mutual stations that aired the 
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“Manion Forum” canceled that day’s show. Manion responded by setting up 
his own network, syndicating his show to independent broadcast stations 
and setting up the first prototype of a conservative network. A basic theme 
emerged throughout the network of conservative publications in the 1950s 
and ’60s. Mainstream media were biased against conservative views; the 
FCC’s fairness doctrine, and the norms of objectivity held by Northeastern 
publishing, radio, and television elites all excluded conservative views from 
the media; and the only answer was to create mass- scale media that would 
balance out that broad media bias by taking a conservative perspective on 
what to report and how to report on it. That viewpoint of liberal media bias 
was embraced and repeated vocally by Spiro Agnew, and later by Richard 
Nixon as the Nixon administration struggled with increasing pressure from 
traditional journalistic sources— from the Pentagon Papers to Watergate. 
But that era also coincided with professional journalists receiving the highest 
levels of trust and positive public opinion, among both Democrats and 
Republicans, that has been recorded in the General Social Survey.23
Just as there was right- wing criticism of mainstream media, there 
was a steady flow of left- wing media criticism, most famously Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent,24 but no less so 
Ben Bagdikian’s Media Monopoly25 and work by Robert McChesney, Ed 
Baker, and others, about the extent to which mainstream media reflect the 
perspectives and interests of corporate owners, government insiders, and 
the national security establishment. It was precisely that sense that underlay 
some of the early enthusiasm associated with the emergence of the internet 
as a democratizing medium, freeing individual and informal networks of 
individuals to play a greater role in setting the agenda, reporting the news, 
and mobilizing in a new networked public sphere.26 But because a left- wing 
mass media ecosystem never emerged in the same way as it did in the 1990s 
on the right, this left- wing version of the media- bias argument remained 
largely within the academic and activist domain and never became a 
basic narrative shared by large parts of the population. But on the right, 
televangelism, talk radio, and ultimately Fox News were able to reach mass 
audiences that eluded the first generation of postwar conservative media, 
and it was these outlets’ mass appeal that successfully generalized the 
“liberal media bias” frame to large parts of the population. That imbalance 
between the left and right’s ability to develop highly partisan mass media 
outlets, rather than the absence of a left- wing critique of media, accounts 
for the clear asymmetry in levels of trust in media between right- leaning 
and left- leaning mass audiences.
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After Disco: Talk Radio, Televangelism,  
and Cable News
Over the course of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, a series of technological, 
institutional, and political changes removed each of the structural barriers 
that had contained the first generation of right- wing media and created the 
conditions for the emergence and dramatic success of the second generation 
right- wing media system that undergirds today’s asymmetric architecture, 
anchored by Fox News and talk radio.
The 1970s saw substantial moves to deregulate cable and remove many of 
the byzantine constraints that the FCC had placed on it during the 1960s and 
early 1970s at the behest of incumbent television broadcasters.27 At the same 
time, several technological developments increased cable channel capacity 
and the reach of national networks. Satellite distribution of content to local 
cable ground stations allowed Ted Turner to launch TBS as the first national 
cable network. Developments in compression, set- top box, and later hybrid 
fiber- coaxial systems dramatically increased channel capacity over the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s, making room for more niche- programming channels 
to develop. One of the earliest format innovations was CNN. In 1980, when it 
launched, CNN was a far- out idea— a 24- hour news channel in an era when 
the major news networks were losing money on creating a 30- minute show 
at prime time. Its audience grew dramatically over the course of the 1980s. 
Beginning with a paltry 1.3 million households at a time when network news 
was viewed by tens of millions across the three networks, CNN quickly grew 
and within a decade matched the big three networks in news audience. In 
1991 the Iraq War marked the coming of age of CNN, as it became the go- 
to source, and in the early stages the only source, with coverage from inside 
Baghdad. By 1992 Pew found that about 30 percent of Americans who said 
they got their presidential election news on TV got it on CNN.28 It was 
only at that point, with the business model proven and the technological 
trajectory toward increasing channel capacity settled, that two more 24- hour 
news channels— Fox and MSNBC— joined the fray in 1996.
Another major media development in the 1970s and 1980s was the 
emergence of televangelism and evangelical Christian broadcasting. Despite 
their long presence as part of the American religious experience, in the 1940s 
and 1950s evangelicals were largely marginalized on the airwaves through 
the combined efforts of the major mainline religious organizations and 
the broadcast networks.29 Religious broadcasting during that period was 
treated as part of the broadcasters’ public interest obligations, which the 
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FCC allowed broadcasters to satisfy by airing mainline religious broadcasts 
on a “sustaining” basis— that is to say, unpaid.30 In 1960– 1961, the FCC 
made two regulatory changes that would ultimately enable televangelism to 
replace mainline churches on the airwaves. Intense lobbying by evangelical 
broadcasters led the FCC to change its rules in 1960 to permit broadcasters 
to treat paid religious programming to count against their public interest 
obligation. And evangelical broadcasters paid. By the end of the 1970s, 
paid evangelical programming used this opening to almost entirely displace 
mainline religious programming on mainstream broadcast stations. In 1961 
Congress also passed the All Channel Receiver Act, which required all TV 
sets to be enabled to receive Ultra High Frequency (UHF), not only the 
established Very High Frequency (VHF) channels. This change made the 
largely fallow UHF licenses usable, and these became the basis for a new 
crop of Christian broadcasters. By 1978 there were 30 new religious stations. 
More importantly, syndication of the top 10 religious programs, through 
paid programming, accounted for half the religious programs aired. As cable 
capacity and adoption expanded, cable reception in turn evened out the 
quality differential between UHF and VHF stations, and the new possibility 
of combining cable local distribution with the satellite national syndication 
that had enabled Turner’s launch of TBS, also enabled Pat Robertson to launch 
the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) a few months later. Robertson 
had purchased a defunct broadcast license in 1961 and began broadcasting 
his “700 Club” in 1963. By the mid- 1980s CBN’s viewership was third only 
to CNN and ESPN.31 This rise in audience share for Christian broadcasting 
coincided with a reorientation of evangelicals toward politics. In support of 
this reorientation, Robertson changed the format of the “700 Club” in 1980 
to include the first investigative journalism and news reporting segments aired 
by religious broadcast.32 The reach of these broadcasts is a matter of some 
controversy, but 20 million American households is a reasonable estimate of 
the number who watched at least some religious programming in the 1980s.33 
While televangelism viewership declined in the wake of the scandals that hit 
televangelists in 1987, most prominently Jim and Tammy Bakker, the new role 
of evangelicals as a major pillar of the conservative Republican coalition made 
sure that Christian broadcasting remained an important and distinguishing 
element of the right- wing media ecosystem— one that came out of a distinctly 
different moral universe than the framework that underlay the objectivity 
norms of professional journalism.
Like cable and televangelism, AM talk radio emerged out of an interaction 
between technological and regulatory changes. The tragic story of how David 
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Sarnoff— legendary radio pioneer, head of RCA, and founder of NBC— used 
litigation and FCC channel allocation proceedings to frustrate and delay 
adoption of Edwin Armstrong’s superior FM radio technology is oft told and 
well known.34 It delayed widespread adoption of the technology for decades, 
well after it drove Armstrong to suicide in 1954. It was only in the 1970s that 
the number of FM receivers came to equal that of AM receivers, and it was 
only then that a significant new generation of DJs began experimenting with 
using the technology, particularly its ability to transmit stereo, to play longer 
format, non- top- 40 music.35 By the early 1980s FM radio far overtook AM, 
and music in particular was shifting to the higher fidelity, stereo- capable 
systems. AM needed something new, that did not suffer so much from the 
technical deficit. That something would turn out to be talk radio. And, as 
cable did for Turner’s superstation model, satellite distribution to ground 
stations allowed national syndication on a scale and quality that transmission 
over copper wire had not, significantly increasing the potential reach of this 
new format.36
But for political talk radio to emerge, one regulatory piece had to fall 
in place. Driven by a deep ideological commitment to free markets, FCC 
Chair Mark Fowler, perhaps known best for his quip that a television is just 
a “toaster with pictures,”37 led a campaign to repeal the fairness doctrine 
throughout most of his tenure in office. The doctrine had had a varied life 
since 1949. Throughout the ’50s and ’60s, first- generation right- wing media 
outlets saw the fairness doctrine as a direct threat to their ability to use radio. 
However, Nixon’s use of the FCC and the increasingly sophisticated strategic 
use of fairness doctrine complaints by both conservatives and liberals alike 
evened out the partisan effects by the 1970s.38 Fowler built a record of these 
complaints and worked over years until the FCC repealed the fairness doctrine 
as inconsistent with the First Amendment. The repeal was completed in 1987.
In 1988 Rush Limbaugh’s daily three- hour shock- jock right- wing talk 
radio show became nationally syndicated. His visceral, emotional style; his 
unabashedly partisan exhortations and commentary; and his sheer capacity 
to sustain three hours a day of programming launched the second- generation 
right- wing media ecosystem (as well as saving AM radio). By 1990 he was 
reported to be syndicated on over 300 stations and reaching 5 million listeners 
a week.39 In 1992 he was reported to have 14 million listeners every week, and 
launched his syndicated television program Rush Limbaugh Show, which 
was produced by Roger Ailes.40 That year, Ronald Reagan sent Limbaugh 
a letter lauding him as “the number one voice for conservatism in our 
country.”41 In 1993 National Review’s cover anointed Limbaugh “The Leader 
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of the Opposition.”42 When Republicans took the House in 1994, Limbaugh 
was feted as the “majority maker,” an honorary member of the freshman class 
of the 104th Congress. Newt Gingrich’s former press secretary described 
Limbaugh as the most important person other than Gingrich in achieving 
the new Republican majority,43 and Tom DeLay credited him with giving the 
Republicans their ideological marching orders in the 1993– 1994 run- up to 
their victory.44 By 1996 the Pew report on voter media consumption already 
treated Limbaugh as one of the major sources of news for voters, noting that 
Limbaugh “has many more Republicans and twice as many conservatives in his 
audience than business magazines.” In that survey, 37 percent of respondents 
said they got news about presidential candidates and the campaign from talk 
radio, and about 20 percent answered that question with Focus on the Family 
or the Christian Broadcasting Network.45 The style Limbaugh developed, and 
has retained since, includes strong emotional appeals to audiences, continuous 
criticism of mainstream media aimed to undermine trust in media, systematic 
efforts to undermine trust in government whenever led by Democrats, and 
policing of Republican candidates and politicians to make sure they toed the 
conservative line.46 In 1996 Limbaugh abandoned his syndicated television 
program and focused on radio, where he has been reported (occasionally 
with skepticism) to attract on the order of 14 to 20 million listeners weekly 
since the early 2000s.47 Roger Ailes, in the meantime, found a new partner in 
Rupert Murdoch and launched Fox News.
Talk radio was supercharged beyond Limbaugh by the industry 
consolidation that followed the loosening of ownership limits in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. That act was the most extensive reform of 
communications law since 1934. Most of it dealt with enhancing competition 
in telecommunications. But the act also significantly reduced the ownership 
limits on radio stations and made mergers easier. Throughout the preceding 
decades, FCC radio regulation reflected a clear commitment to localism— 
to the idea that local radio stations should serve the local community— by 
preferring to license locally owned stations— and to competition, by setting 
clear caps on how many stations any single company could own, both 
nationally and locally. As Clinton Democrats came to embrace deregulation 
alongside Reagan Republicans, both constraints were loosened significantly. 
The result was a rapid consolidation in the radio station markets. Clear 
Channel Communications in particular went on a buying spree. By one 
account the firm owned 43 stations nationwide before the 1996 Act, and 
eight years later owned over 1,200 stations, reaching over 100  million 
listeners.48 One of those purchases included Jacor Communications, which, 
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like Clear Channel, had started to grow through acquisitions after 1996. But 
Jacor brought to Clear Channel more than its 230 stations. It also brought 
Premier Radio, the producer of the radio shows of Rush Limbaugh, Sean 
Hannity, and Glenn Beck. Hours of right- wing radio propaganda were now 
seamlessly syndicated throughout the United States; and radio, to this day, is 
the communications platform that reaches the most U.S. adults daily.49 One 
politically liberal survey of talk radio in 2007 found that talk radio featured 
conservative programming over liberal programming by a 10:1 ratio.50 
Conservatives gladly acknowledge that talk radio is overwhelmingly their 
turf.51 Air America, the liberal counterpart to conservative talk radio, largely 
failed as a commercial enterprise. Democracy Now! succeeded in establishing 
itself as a listener- supported daily radio broadcast in about 350 cities across 
the United States, initially on a handful of Pacifica radio stations and now 
occupying an hour a day, sometimes repeated for another hour. Lacking the 
benefits of Clear Channel’s distribution network or commercial funding, 
the program is concentrated in relatively liberal states and regions. In part, the 
weakness of left- leaning radio may reflect the diversity of the liberal coalition. 
Conservative talk shows aim at and capture a large and relatively homogenous 
block— white, Christian, and older. Liberals include Black and Hispanic 
populations, each seen as its own market segment,52 and liberal radio also had 
to contend with NPR, an enormously successful radio system that maintains 
a palpable liberal editorial tone while adhering to mainstream journalistic 
norms in reporting— in that regard more like a liberal version of the Wall 
Street Journal, than like Fox News or MSNBC. And in the 2000s liberals 
tuned into late night comedy, particularly John Stewart and then Stephen 
Colbert, for their mass media partisan diet. In the news segment of the 
market, nothing emerged to match Fox News as an alternative partisan news 
system, dedicated to providing sustained news coverage from a consistently 
partisan perspective until MSNBC shifted strategy in 2006, a decade after 
Fox News and nearly 20 years after Limbaugh.
Murdoch and Ailes’s innovation was to capture market share in the 24- 
hour news channel not by competing on the same model as CNN, but by 
offering a similar 24- hour news format oriented to leverage the market that 
Limbaugh had proven— giving right- wing audiences an outlet they did 
not have within media constrained by professional journalistic norms.53 
Fox News combined the format of CNN’s 24- hour news network model 
with the audience- segmentation strategy that had been developed by the 
Christian broadcasters and Limbaugh in the 1980s and early 1990s. Rather 
than serving the median viewer in hopes of capturing a share of it, which 
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was the prevailing theory of how to compete in the three- network world of 
over- the- air broadcast, channel abundance made room for stark audience 
segmentation as a robust and successful strategy. Within five years of its 
launch, and particularly after September 11, 2001, Fox News caught up to 
and then passed its major rival, CNN. By the 2016 election cycle American 
right- leaning audiences had been exposed for two decades on television (and 
nearly three on radio) to a propagandist mass media outlet built on feeding 
its viewers with news that fit and reinforced their world view while constantly 
pointing fingers at all other media sources as biased. The strategy paid off 
for Fox in producing an immensely loyal viewership, and for the Republican 
Party with a core of support highly resilient to the vicissitudes of real- world 
failure or transient political winds.
Studies by Pew of the news habits of Republicans and Democrats 
demonstrate the significant difference between the two audiences. A  2014 
study found that 47  percent of “consistently conservative” respondents 
identified Fox News as their “main source of news about government and 
politics.”54 Another 11 percent mentioned “local radio” as their main source, 
and in a breakdown of sources of news that meant that Hannity on radio, 
Limbaugh, Glenn Beck on radio, and Beck’s “The Blaze” all ran ahead of 
ABC, CBS, or NBC, much less CNN.55 By contrast, “consistently liberal” 
respondents were spread out much more evenly across various media, including 
primarily CNN (15 percent), NPR (13 percent), MSNBC (12 percent), and 
the New York Times (10 percent). Conservatives not only watch and listen to 
Fox News and talk radio, they also express high trust in these sources. A full 
88 percent of consistently conservative viewers trusted Fox News, 62 percent 
trusted Hannity, and 58  percent trusted Limbaugh. Among “consistently 
liberal” respondents, NPR, PBS, and the BBC were the most trusted sources, 
hovering around 70 percent. MSNBC, which since 2006 has mounted the 
most explicit effort to mirror the Fox News strategy for the left, received only 
a 52 percent trust score from consistently liberal respondents and was trusted 
by fewer than half of the “mostly liberal” respondents, all of whom trust 
CNN and the major television networks to a degree largely consistent with 
the trust patterns of respondents who were “mixed” liberal and conservative 
(Figure 11.1).
This pre- election snapshot reflects one moment in a long trajectory of 
declining and divergent levels of trust in journalism between conservatives 
and liberals, Republicans and Democrats. Gallup has been measuring distrust 
in media since the mid- 1990s.56 In 1998 and 2000 party identifiers of both 
parties, and independents, were closest to each other in the level of trust in 








































Figure 11.1 Trust in media by ideological identity.
Source: Pew Research Center.
media:  52- 53- 59 (R- I- D) in 1998, and 47- 53- 53 (R- I- D) in 2000. Election 
coverage separated democrats from Republicans in 2001, but 9/ 11 brought the 
two groups together in 2002: 39- 52- 65 in 2001, 49- 52- 59 in 2002. Republican 
trust in media dropped over the remainder of George W. Bush’s first term in 
office, from 49 percent in 2002 to 31 percent in 2004, where it stayed fairly 
stable until 2015 and the beginning of the 2016 election cycle. In 2016, just 
before the election, it dropped precipitously to 14 percent and remained at 
that level in 2017. These patterns of extremely low trust in media are highly 
consistent with the pattern of attention that we observe in our data— with 
conservative audiences tweeting and sharing on Facebook stories from within 
an insular right- wing media ecosystem and largely ignoring most other 
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sites. By contrast, Democrats’ trust in media rose over the course of George 
W. Bush’s first term, from 53 percent in 2000 up to between 60 percent and 
65 percent until the first year of the Barack Obama presidency, after which 
it saw a gradual steady decline, down to 51  percent in 2016, followed by a 
sharp upswing in 2017 back to 72 percent, its highest value in the Gallup set 
and closely matched only by the 2005 Gallup poll (which likely coincided 
with coverage of Hurricane Katrina). Again, this trust is consistent with our 
behavioral observations about which sites users who are not on the right tend 
to share and amplify. The category of “independents” that show up in these 
polls should not in fact be treated as a completely distinct third group. Surveys 
suggest that this group is made up mostly of Republican and Democratic 
leaners (slightly more Republicans than Democrats), with only 15 percent of 
all independents truly not leaning toward one or the other party. Both sets 
of “lean- party” respondents are very similar to party identifiers of the party 
toward which they lean.57 Unsurprisingly, independent trends “split the 
difference” between the responses of party identifiers. The pattern suggests 
(a) systematically less trust among Republicans throughout the period, and 
(b)  a correlation between trust in media and the party of the president in 
power. If mainstream media are consistently somewhat critical of whoever 
happens to be in power, then partisans of that president will see media as less 
trustworthy whenever that party is in control and more trustworthy when the 
opposite party is in control.
The longest relevant time series on the question of trust in media is the 
General Social Survey’s question on confidence in the press. Most revealing is 
the partisan breakdown of the question that is the inverse of Gallup’s question. 
Where Gallup reports all those who have “a great deal” or a “fair amount” of 
trust in media, the GSS also collects data on everyone else— in particular, 
those who have “hardly any” trust in media (Figure 11.2).58
Several patterns emerge. First, extreme distrust of the press media was very 
low in the 1970s and the immediate post- Watergate era, although it briefly 
bounced upward during that era among Republican Party identifiers. The 
Reagan- Bush years in the 1980s to 1992 saw Democrats jump in their high 
distrust from 14  percent to about 20  percent, while Republicans saw their 
distrust rate hover around 30  percent during the 1980s. Republicans saw a 
clear inflection point from 1990, when their “hardly any” category made up 
29 percent of Republican respondents, to 47 percent in 1993, as Bill Clinton 
became president and on the eve of the Gingrich revolution. Republicans 
response remained stable until 1998, when it again inflected upward from 
44 percent in 1998 to the upper- mid 50s (56– 57 percent, up to 60– 61 percent) 









































Figure  11.2 General social survey responses:  percent of population responding that 
they have “hardly any” confidence in the press (1973– 2016).58
from 2002 until the 2016 election. Among Democrats, by contrast, there 
was an inflection point from 1990 to 1993 (22 to 35  percent), and distrust 
stayed at that level except for a brief peak (41%) during the Lewinsky affair 
in 1998 percent (which was also the Republican’s lowest “hardly ever” answer, 
at 44 percent), from where it gradually declined until 2006. It again shifted 
upward from a low of 31 percent in 2006 to a high just under 40 percent over 
the course of the Obama years.
Given the great number of factors involved in broad, population- level 
trends of trust and distrust, it is impossible to identify a clear causal line from 
media coverage to levels of trust in media. It is hard, for example, to lay the 
1990 dramatic increase of distrust in media at the feet of Rush Limbaugh, 
given that “hardly ever” responses among Democrats increased by 50 percent 
(from 22 percent to 35 percent) between 1990 and 1993, a very similar degree 
of change as that among Republicans during the same time period (29 percent 
to 47 percent). By contrast, the Republican inflection point in 1998 certainly 
could reflect a Fox News effect similar to the effect we describe at the end 
of this chapter. It is difficult to imagine that the sustained attacks on the 
credibility of the media by political leaders and the partisan press for over 
two decades have been entirely inert and have not contributed meaningfully 
to undermining their audience’s confidence in the independent press. And it 
is difficult to imagine that attacks such as these by Fox News, the news source 
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conservatives trust above all other news sources in the country, have no effect 
on the fact that precisely those conservatives who most trust Fox News also 
have the lowest trust in all other media. And the result is quite an outlier by 
international standards. The Reuters Institute found that U.S.  media were 
more starkly polarized than in other countries, primarily in the sense that 
right- wing viewers did not look at most mainstream publications and that 
self- described right- leaning survey respondents showed much lower trust 
in news media than self- described left- leaning respondents.59 The most 
powerful finding in the Reuters Institute report was that “[i] n the United 
States the headline rate (38%) is up, although there is a 15- point gap between 
this and trust in the sources you use (53%). Only Hungary, another deeply 
polarized country, has a bigger gap between general trust (31%) and the 
sources you use (54%).”60
Existing in a media ecosystem dominated by media whose role is to 
confirm your preconceptions and lead you to distrust any sources that might 
challenge your beliefs is a recipe for misinformation and susceptibility to 
disinformation. At the end of the day, if one side most trusts Fox News, 
Hannity, Limbaugh, and Beck, and the other side most trusts NPR, the BBC, 
PBS, and the New  York Times, one cannot expect both sides to be equally 
informed or equally capable of telling truth from identity- confirming fiction.
As we discussed in more detail in Chapter  3, the propaganda feedback 
loop that creates the patterns of distrust and media attention and the 
dynamic way in which media production and consumption patterns feed into 
each other and into the behavior of political elites, seem sufficient to explain 
the sustained differences between Democrats and Republicans in their 
susceptibility to conspiracy theory and rumor.61 The audiences of talk radio, 
Fox News, and other conservative media outlets are subject to a sustained 
flow of identity- confirming news and attacks on potential sources of error 
correction, and are informed by their political elites that certain facts and 
attitudes are identity consistent and that challenges to these facts reflect bias 
of the other side, rather than being the products of professional, objective 
norms. Right- wing audiences are systematically disconnected from potential 
sources of disconfirmation. As the dissonance between what they receive 
from their own media and what they receive from outside increases, a deeply 
asymmetric trust structure develops which associates identity- confirming 
news as trustworthy and identity- disconfirming news as suspect. This does 
not require any special psychological profile; it is merely a direct consequence 
of the architecture of the media system. And it means that a population with 
high trust in bias- confirming news and high distrust in bias- disconfirming, 
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professional- norms- driven media will be more vulnerable to disinformation 
campaigns than a population that has generally higher trust in professional 
journalism on average, but lower trust in any given media outlet. The latter 
population will, on average, check and cross- reference rumors, conspiracy 
theories, and other modes of disinformation more than the former. And it 
is onto that baseline asymmetric structure— of media outlets, political elite 
practices, and media consumption and trust patterns— that the internet and 
social media were grafted. And, unsurprisingly, the different architectures of 
the two parts of the media ecosystem resulted in quite different susceptibility to 
the new techniques of network propaganda. As our case studies in Chapters 3 
to 9 showed, Russian propaganda, commercial clickbait entrepreneurs, 
sockpuppets and botnets, and straight- up partisan disinformation campaigns 
all operated differently in the right- wing media ecosystem than in the center 
and left. And whatever solutions we will embrace, if all we do is treat the 
discrete, social- media- focused manifestations of the underlying structural 
difference, our answers will be partial and unstable.
What About the Internet?
In March1995 the Drudge Report already had 1,000 email subscribers.62 For 
perspective, the yahoo.com domain had only been registered in January of 
that year, and Microsoft would release its first version of Internet Explorer 
in August. At the time the internet enjoyed wide acclaim as a democratizing 
technology. In 1997 the Supreme Court hailed it as a platform on which 
“[t] hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become 
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox. Through the use of web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, 
the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”63 That image captured what 
many of us writing about the internet at the time thought. Reduced costs 
of producing and sharing information, news, and perspectives would, for the 
first time since the emergence of mass circulation print and broadcast, enable 
citizens to participate in setting the public agenda and mobilize for action 
around our intense political concerns, rather than following the agenda set 
by media owners, the advertisers who paid, and political elites to whom they 
paid attention.64 In a 1999 article, for example, one of us described a copyright 
lawsuit by the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times against the conservative 
Free Republic website, and argued that the amateur, citizen- produced 
commentary and speech produced on Free Republic offered an important 
new degree of diversity and free speech in the public sphere that would 
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be lost if courts continued to prefer commercial organizations as the core 
speakers in the networked public sphere. Within a couple of years, however, a 
counternarrative emerged that blamed the internet for causing fragmentation 
and polarization,65 phenomena that we, in Chapters 10 and 11, describe as a 
consequence of longer- term political processes and changes in the radio and 
television media ecosystems.
The first dozen or so years of the twenty- first century continued and 
deepened the pattern. Building on new empirical observations that online 
attention tended to follow power law,66 rather than normal distributions— 
that is, a very small number of sites garnered a very large portion of the 
attention— several authors argued that in practice the internet replicates the 
broadcast model of attention, with a very small number of sites accounting 
for most of what people read or heard.67 Some empirical studies, most 
prominently pioneering work by Nancy Glance and Lada Adamic, tended 
to support Cass Sunstein’s arguments about polarization and fragmentation 
of political discourse, rather than a reconcentration on a small number of 
supernodes.68 Importantly, those early efforts to map the blogosphere tended 
to observe a symmetric pattern of polarization. A different line of argument 
against the democratizing effects of the internet was that they simply were 
not that important. Markus Prior emphasized that most people were simply 
distracted— and enjoyed broad access to entertainment and other formats 
that left them simply uninformed— leaving only the more partisan and 
polarized to participate.69 Matthew Hindman used extensive data analysis of 
blogs and their use to argue that the relative size of the political blogosphere 
was negligible in the overall scheme of internet usage, and that those who 
wrote the top blogs were as much a part of the elite as the op- ed writers.70 
Nonetheless, as we discuss in more detail in Chapter  12, throughout those 
years more of the academic work combined qualitative assessment, survey 
data, and quantitative analysis to argue that the internet had a more 
democratizing effect, whether emphasizing mobilization, diversity of view-
points, or organizational transformation as the elements that made for a 
networked public sphere in which power to set the agenda and influence 
political discourse was more widely distributed.
Although Drudge and the Free Republic were early adopters, the “Web 
2.0” period in the first decade of the twenty- first century saw more or less 
equal growth on the two sides of the partisan divide online. In one of the 
first studies that looked systematically at the differences between the left and 
the right in this period, one of us collaborating with Aaron Shaw showed 
that the primary differences during this period revolved around organization 
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and action orientation.71 Bloggers on the right tended to write many more 
sole- authored sites that primarily shared links to stories found online with 
brief comments. The Free Republic was, in this regard, unusual on the right. 
On the left there were more group blogs and blogs that enabled users to 
write their own diaries. The left also had much more of a focus on action 
orientation— raising funds in particular— than the right blogosphere did.72 
Daily Kos was the standard- bearer of this format. Howard Dean’s insurgent 
presidential campaign in 2004 is generally celebrated as the first political 
campaign supported by the “netroots,” young, mobilized, liberal, internet- 
based activists, which continued to play a significant role in the 2006 and 
2008 campaigns,73 but the decentralized, self- organizing approach was as 
central to Ron Paul’s supporters on the libertarian right as it was for those of 
the netroots on the left. Of the highly visible sites during that early Web 2.0 
period, several on both sides of the political divide continued to be influential 
in the 2016 cycle, such as the Daily Kos and Talking Points Memo on the 
left, or Michelle Malkin, Townhall, and RedState on the right. However, 
the most influential were either founded in that Web 2.0 period as media 
ventures, such as Huffington Post (2005), BuzzFeed (2006), or Breitbart 
(2007), or founded more recently, after 2010. Because the techniques and 
research questions that have been brought to bear in the last few years were 
not available at the time, we do not have a systematic study to which we can 
compare our current results to those that described the blogosphere in its 
first few years. Studies did not include mainstream media; they described 
much shorter snapshots of time, and often included blogrolls, as opposed 
to specifically story links, which means that they reflected to some extent 
affinity networks rather than authority or attention networks, as ours do. 
Because of the differences in what was possible and done at the time, we 
do not know whether the actual linking patterns were similarly asymmetric 
during the first few years of Web 2.0, or whether the networked public sphere 
was more symmetric then, unlike on TV and radio. The earliest analysis we 
have, from our data, goes back to the month before the 2012 election (Figure 
11.3). And while the details are slightly different, and the overall architecture 
is less clearly segregated asymmetrically, it is structurally similar to what we 
found in our data from 2015 to 2018. We see a well- separated right- wing 
sphere, though it is more integrated and offers a more prominent place to 
media outlets we characterized as center- right in 2016, particularly the older 
conservative publications like the National Review or Weekly Standard. The 
rest of the media ecosystem was anchored around mainstream media in 2012 
as it was in our present study. Because we only captured data for one month 
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prior to 2012, this architecture is likely noisy and only indicative of the trend 
toward the patterns we now observe.
As social media, in particular Facebook, replaced Web 2.0 technologies 
central to the blogosphere, the debate took on the familiar structure 
of the prior decade and a half, triggered most powerfully by the Arab 
Spring (and before that the Iranian Green Wave moment) and the brief 
exhilaration associated with seeing a region long- plagued by repressive and 
corrupt regimes rising up to demand democracy.74 Terms like “liberation 
technology”75 or “emancipatory politics” 76 set the frame for Hillary Clinton’s 
State Department to adopt its Internet Freedom Agenda as one of its core 
programs for expanding democracy throughout the world. The Arab Spring, 
and after it Occupy Wall Street and the Indignados in Spain, were the high- 
water mark for the argument that the internet democratizes and liberates. 
The apparent short- term media and attention victories were followed in 
most places by political losses, while the digital trails, particularly on Twitter, 
enabled a new generation of data- collection techniques to evaluate the 
structure of organization in online mobilization. Sandra González- Bailón 
Figure  11.3 Network map of political media in the United States during the 2012 
election. Nodes sized by media inlinks.
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and her collaborators’ research on the Indignados movement showed that 
the structure of online mobilization was more hierarchical and centered on 
major influencers as central nodes.77 Mayo Fuster Morell emphasized the 
ways in which the anti- austerity 15- M Movement in Spain was built on earlier 
mobilization efforts in the Free- Culture movement.78 Zeynep Tufekci’s 
analysis of these protest movements, from Tahrir to Gezi Park and Zucotti 
Park, led to a new ambivalence about the double- edged nature of social media 
for mobilization and the possibilities it opened for repression.79 Nagla Rizk’s 
analysis of the post- revolution networked public sphere in Egypt similarly 
underscored the rising role of both the Egyptian Army and the Muslim 
Brotherhood on Facebook, and their displacement of the earlier, more liberal 
Egyptian blogosphere, as central dynamics in the unfolding of the story of the 
Egyptian revolution,80 with only Tunisia offering a major counterexample.81 
In all, as the dust settled from the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring, 
the liberating potential of decentralized social mobilization began to give 
way to the consideration of the benefits of more organizationally structured 
politics.
As networked discourse shifted from the open web to social media, large 
parts of the media ecosystem became much more opaque. While Twitter 
opened its data and gave rise to a generation of studies that have taught us most 
of what we know about discourse and mobilization on social media, Facebook 
created an enormously powerful platform that was in large parts unobservable 
by anyone who wanted to understand how the internet was affecting demo-
cracy. Anyone, that is, except Facebook scientists. The most significant 
study of polarization on Facebook was done by a team inside Facebook and 
published in Science in 2015.82 Using data from the last six months of 2014, the 
team found that Facebook users who shared news did so in a polarized way, 
but that they did so primarily because they shared what their friends shared, 
and they were segregated into politically homogeneous communities. It was 
users’ sharing patterns, not the design of Facebook’s algorithms that led to 
the polarization. Setting aside the troubling self- serving nature of a team in 
Facebook publishing a study that exonerates Facebook from responsibility 
for polarization in American politics, using data the company would not 
share with outsiders except under a nondisclosure agreement, the pattern of 
polarization they describe dovetails quite well with what we observed. We 
showed that based on Facebook sharing, the two sides of the media ecosystem 
look more symmetrically polarized than when measured by tweets or inlinks, 
but nonetheless there was significant asymmetry, with the right being much 
more skewed. The 2015 Facebook paper similarly showed a broad symmetry, 
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but with the more extreme right- wing content accounting for a larger share 
of right- oriented sharing than the most extreme left- wing sites accounting for 
sharing on the left, and sharing of sites on the left extending much further 
toward the middle of the ideological spectrum. The comparison is imperfect, 
because the Facebook team were not looking specifically to compare, but the 
published materials offer support for the proposition that the asymmetry we 
observe clearly since 2015, and was also visible in our 2012 data, was also there 
in this very large study conducted between our two observation periods.
As we look at the internet and its history, it seems that we have some 
anecdotal evidence of the early success of right- wing- oriented sites, but little 
evidence from the first dozen or so years of political speech on the internet 
of the asymmetries we observe today. We certainly have nothing like the 
sustained evidence of asymmetry in cable television or talk radio. By the 
second decade of the twenty- first century, however, we do in fact see such a 
differentiation, and our data from 2012 and early 2015 suggests that it is already 
well established by then, rather than that it first emerged during the 2016 
presidential campaign. If we understand that online media and offline media 
interact in an integrated single large media ecosystem, we can also understand 
that online media on the right and the left faced different incentive structures 
and different constraints. As mainstream media came online, online left 
media had to contend with audiences that had a moderate trust in mainstream 
media and an architecture of use that exposed them extensively to mainstream 
professional media offline. Selling wild bias- confirming conspiracies risked 
harming a publication’s reputation, or consigning it to amusement rather 
than news, because of negative feedback effects from that sphere’s most 
trusted sources. Online left publications faced the reality- check dynamic. On 
the right, presented with an audience already highly attuned to talk radio and 
Fox News and deeply distrusting of all media outside their ecosystem, right- 
wing sites that came online— Breitbart, Daily Caller, and beyond— faced very 
different competitive pressures, and positive feedback reinforcement for bias- 
confirming news, irrespective of its veracity. Heightened partisanship was a 
positive differentiator, and manifest falsehood (as long as it was only pointed 
out by mainstream outlets that could be painted as corrupt and lying) was not 
a particularly costly practice. Indeed, when Hannity amplifies an Infowars 
story, the falsehood becomes a virtue. Right- wing online media had to adapt 
to a media ecosystem that was already a decade or two into the propaganda 
feedback loop. When Breitbart was launched in 2007, it had to compete for 
an audience that had already listened to Rush Limbaugh for 20 years, and to 
Fox News for 11. When the Huffington Post launched in 2005, Air America 
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was barely a year old, and MSNBC had not yet shifted from trying to copy 
CNN to trying to differentiate as the mirror image of Fox.
It is not hard to explain why a population exposed to news outlets whose 
core professional commitment is to provide partisan bias- confirming news 
will be more susceptible to partisan identity- consistent rumor, conspiracy 
theory, and disinformation than a population whose media consumption 
habits are anchored in media committed to fact checking and objective 
reporting. Those who exist in a media ecosystem committed to objectivity 
(and the commitment need not be perfectly followed; it merely needs to 
restrict the practices in the main) will usually encounter no confirmation, 
or refutation, of the false information in the media they trust the most. By 
contrast, those who pay attention to the partisan media will not generally 
receive disconfirmation and will instead often receive confirmation and 
amplification of the false facts. When the Petra News Agency in Jordan 
was hacked and had a story planted supposedly exposing an interview 
with the Saudi now– crown prince boasting that the Saudis had funded 
20  percent of Hillary Clinton’s campaign, the story was reported on the 
Zero Hedge and then republished on the Fox News website and Infowars.83 
In addition to reinforcing the conspiracy theory fringe claims, the partisan 
media persistently reiterate for their readers, viewers, and listeners that the 
mainstream, professional media are the ones who are biased, partisan, and 
“fake,” and that only they, the partisan media, are in fact those who offer 
“fair and balanced” reporting. This makes the corrective role of professional 
institutions asymmetrically available to the two populations.
We recognize that our findings and the media history we review could be 
explained by the work in political psychology that follows from the rigidity 
model developed by John Jost and collaborators.84 Synthesizing decades of 
work stretching back to the 1950s, Jost and his coauthors proposed a theory 
that suggested that people adopted conservative political positions as a way 
of satisfying a particular combination of cognitive style, personality traits, 
and epistemic and existential needs. Many of these could certainly provide 
a simple answer to why Limbaugh or Fox News succeed on the right to a 
degree that Al Franken or MSNBC never did on the left. If dogmatism, 
intolerance of ambiguity, and a need for closure, order, and structure are 
strong predictors of politically conservative attitudes, these certainly would 
also predict a rapid conversion on a single authoritative source of news that 
offers only confirmation of belief- consistent news and reassures its viewers 
and listeners that other sources that raise doubt are liars. The observed 
patterns of media consumption on the right and the left are also consistent 
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with this model. In particular, the significantly narrower menu of media 
sources used by consistently conservative audiences, and the high trust these 
respondents report in their own media sources combined with their high 
distrust of other sources, even when those other sources are highly trusted by 
everyone else, including nonpartisans of mixed views, are all consistent with 
the rigidity model.
Our own research does not, however, incorporate any measures that 
could deny or refute this effect. The rigidity model has long been contested 
by psychologists who view it as too partisan in its research orientation, and 
recent work in particular raises concerns about several core methodological 
concerns, in particular whether it captures the range of positions that count 
as conservative, particularly the overlap between economic and identity 
issues. More directly relevant to our findings, the critique questions whether 
the rigidity model can account for exposure of study subjects to discourse 
that would shape the alignment of their political answers more than their 
personality or cognitive style.85
Neither the propaganda feedback loop model we describe in Chapter 3 
nor the political economy story we offer here for how that feedback loop 
emerged on the right in the United States between the 1980s and 2000s, 
depend on a psychological theory. They merely require that one side of the 
political ecosystem begin to adopt such a strategy before the other. The 
positive feedbacks between the benefits to elites, who gain a reliable audience, 
the benefits to the broadcasters, who gain a loyal market segment, and the 
beliefs and attitudes of the population begin to reinforce each other within 
the feedback loop. As we explained in Chapter  3, the mainstream media 
then become a source of confirmation for the opposite side of the political 
spectrum because they, on average, will find more lying in the bias- confirming 
media (because there will be more of it there, by design) and provide its 
opponents with truth- based reasons to reject their opponents claims. The side 
that adopts the hyperpartisan media strategy enjoys, in this regard, a first- 
mover advantage in a positive feedback dynamic that then both reinforces 
and disciplines those who are in it. Certainly, endowing the population of 
the side that chooses the bias- confirming media with a baseline personality 
that increases the prevalence of preferences for such media would make 
the tipping easier and faster. But the model does not require a differential 
psychological makeup for the propaganda feedback loop to emerge alongside, 
and in opposition to, media that continue to operate under the reality- check 
dynamic. Once the population being studied is pervasively served by a 
highly asymmetric media system, studies that depend on responses from that 
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population will have to control for the asymmetric effects of media exposure 
and discourse on shaping the political beliefs of respondents.
Fox News vs. Internet: Political Impact Assessments
Moving from identifying patterns of media practice and consumption to 
outcomes is hard. We are most persuaded by three studies by economists that 
look at the effect of Fox News, and at the effects of the internet relative to Fox 
News, over the past 20 years. These studies all support the proposition that 
Fox was the more important component of the right- wing media ecosystem, 
even in the 2016 election.
Over the past decade, two major studies have sought to quantify the “Fox 
News Effect” on America political polarization. The work was pioneered by 
Stefano DellaVigna and Ethan Kaplan in an article published in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics.86 Because the cable industry and cable channel offerings 
were growing and changing fast in the late 1990s, Fox News was introduced 
at different times in different cities. In particular, Fox News’s successful 
completion of carriage deals with major multiple- system operators like TCI 
(later bought by AT&T) sped up its adoption, while its failure to negotiate 
carriage on other cable carriers like Adelphia (taken over by Time Warner 
after its bankruptcy) delayed its adoption. This variation between towns in 
the timing of Fox News entering the market provided a natural experiment 
for the effect of Fox News on voter turnout and partisan voting. DellaVigna 
and Kaplan were able to show that introducing Fox News to a town increased 
the Republican vote share by 0.4 percent to 0.7 percent, and estimated that 
because it likely was responsible for about 200,000 more Republican votes 
nationwide in the 2000 election. In particular, they estimated that Fox News 
was likely responsible for slightly over 10,000 votes in Florida in an election 
won by George W.  Bush by 537 votes. Because the effect was present even 
for Senate seat elections that were too local to be covered by a national cable 
channel like Fox News, DellaVigna and Kaplan argued that the Fox News 
effect acted at the general ideological activation level, rather than specific 
candidate support, and was particularly significant in increasing Republican 
turnout in otherwise Democratic districts.
DellaVigna and Kaplan’s work covered the first election after Fox News 
began to play a significant role. By 2017, two other economists, Gregory Martin 
and Ali Yurukoglu, were able to replicate these results for 2000, improve their 
precision, and extend the analysis to cover the 2004 and 2008 results as well.87 
Martin and Yurukoglu combine several of the most sophisticated techniques 
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available to analyze the partisan bias and effects of media on voting patterns. 
They used a novel instrumental variable (the placement of each of the 24- 
hour news channels on the dial) combined with text analysis to measure the 
degree of partisan slant of the program transcripts from CNN, Fox News, and 
MSNBC over the course of the 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections, applying a 
technique developed by Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro to measure 
media bias in newspapers.88 To these they add voter data, surveys, and 
Nielsen data to provide the most detailed and robust evidence of the central 
role Fox News has played in the partisan polarization of American media 
and voting patterns. In this study, Martin and Yurukoglu replicated and 
strengthened DellaVigna and Kaplan’s original finding that Fox News made 
a critical difference in 2000. They further showed that because it increased 
both its viewership and its partisan slant, the effect of Fox News became 
more pronounced over time. While their data picked up the strategic shift 
MSNBC made in 2006 to try to mirror the Fox News strategy on the left, 
they did not find that MSNBC had a meaningful effect on voting behavior. 
Most importantly, Martin and Yurukoglu found that the primary effect of 
exposure to Fox News was on voters who started the election cycle as centrists 
or Democrats, and over the course of the election cycle were converted to 
Republicans. While this effect declined from 2000 to 2004 and to 2008, it 
was substantially higher than the impact MSNBC had on converting viewers 
who were originally Republicans.
Looking at the 2016 election, anyone assessing the impact of cable versus 
that of the internet has to contend with the fact that Trump supporters 
were, overall, primarily to be found in demographic groups that were 
the least attentive to online news sites and social media. Trump voters 
overwhelmingly reported tuning in to television: Fox News (40 percent), the 
networks (12 percent), and local TV (5 percent). Facebook was the primary 
source for only 7 percent.89 Moreover, the relationship between social media 
and internet use for election news and support for Trump and Clinton, 
respectively, across age groups and gender raises doubt about the role of online 
media in Trump’s rise. If anything, it seems use of social media is inversely 
related to support for Trump. Of white voters in the 18– 29 age range, whose 
social media and internet use for election news was 53 percent,90 fewer than 
40 percent voted for Trump.91 Trump’s share of the vote increased with age. 
Trump’s share of the white vote was over 54 percent in the 45– 64 age range, 
and over 58  percent in the over 65 group, while social media use in these 
demographics was between 5  percent and 1  percent, respectively. Similarly, 
women reported using Facebook for news much more often than men do, by 
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a ratio of 62 percent to 38 percent,92 and supported Clinton over Trump by a 
healthy 12- point difference.93 In another recent paper, Levi Boxell, Matthew 
Gentzkow, and Jesse Shapiro exploited these significant age- based differences 
in partisanship and internet use in a formal analysis of the contribution of 
the internet to polarization. Looking at eight different measures used across 
political science to measure partisan polarization, and at data ranging back 
to 1972, they found that most of the polarization that has happened since 
1996, the first year for which there is regularly collected data on internet use, 
occurred in the populations least likely to be internet connected (those aged 
65 and over), while polarization of those most likely to be online and use social 
media has been fairly stable over this period.94 It is simply unreasonable to pin 
the blame for patterns of trust and distrust in media, or the rise of Trump, on 
a medium that is consistently used less by demographic groups that express 
that distrust or support the president and is used more by populations that 
hold the opposite position on both questions.
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Can the Internet Survive Democracy?
As we write this book in early 2018, the prevailing zeitgeist seems to 
be that all the promise of the internet has been swept away in a cloud of 
manipulation and abuse. Facebook finds itself under questioning on both 
sides of the Atlantic for its uses of the personal data of its users. If there are 
battles over who did what, they seem to be about who used the internet as 
one big manipulation platform, whether it was the Russians, Cambridge 
Analytica, or the Trump campaign, helped by Facebook and Google targeted 
advertising experts. If there was a sigh of relief after the German elections that 
the Russians did not interfere, it was explained as a function of the central 
role and high trust that traditional public broadcasters enjoy in the German 
media ecosystem.
It cannot be, however, that “the internet democratizes” when it enables 
people who think as we do to challenge institutionalized power that protects 
institutions we would rather challenge, but “the internet threatens democracy” 
when it allows people with whom we disagree to challenge institutionalized 
power that protects institutions we would rather protect. It strains credulity 
that the Trump candidacy or the Leave campaign were entirely the product 
of manipulation, Russian or otherwise, rather than the surprising political 
success of a campaign that tapped into attitudes and beliefs held by millions 
of people in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. One 
of the reasons it is so difficult, for example, to identify Russian campaigns 
in the American media ecosystem is that they were so often congruent with 
the organic online mobilization of people who in fact wanted to go out 
and protest against immigration or share memes that denigrate mainstream 
media. These views may be illiberal, but a media ecosystem that effectively 
suppresses widely held beliefs that are contrary to elite opinions is not more 
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“democratic” if elite opinions happen to be pluralistic and egalitarian than it 
is when elite opinions merely protect oligarchy.
The fact that Donald Trump was able to spin up a campaign with little 
support from the Republican Party, is democratizing— in the sense that 
it enabled an insurgent campaign that was far from mainstream consensus 
to emerge and give voice to the anxieties and ambitions of millions in 
Americans who had not been heard so clearly before in the halls of power. 
Much of his success, as we documented earlier in the book, was due to the 
interaction between partisan media on the right and extensive mainstream 
media coverage; but his own campaign organization and spending suggest 
that the campaign itself was focused on using Facebook, Twitter, and online 
mobilization to attract millions. The fact that Bernie Sanders, a party 
outsider, was able to run a credible campaign and raise $230 million for his 
campaign, 60 percent of which was from small individual contributions, is 
democratizing in the sense of allowing outsiders to challenge the consensus 
establishment candidate.
The core argument that the internet was a democratizing technology had 
to do with the fact that in the mass mediated environment, agenda setting 
and framing of what mattered and what was a credible move in political 
contestation was centralized and depended on access to organizational and 
institutional power. The cost of production and distribution of news and 
opinions; the cost of mobilizing on a national scale; the credibility to assert 
in public what was, and was not, news or fact; all these were associated with 
a relatively concentrated power structure. Government, parties, professional 
commercial media, organized corporations, organized labor, to some extent 
national- scale membership organizations— all these were necessary to 
move an idea or a demand from the peripheries of late twentieth- century 
democracy to the core of its political debate. The internet promised to open 
new pathways for agenda setting, framing, and mobilization. People, with 
diverse viewpoints, were able to find each other.1 Citizens and residents could 
mobilize into new, flatter organizational forms.2 More of us could publish, 
and more of us could read a broader set of sources and viewpoints, and we 
could be more engaged when we did so.3 These effects could then spill over 
into broader media because journalists would also read these decentralized 
media and their coverage could be shaped not only by political and corporate 
insiders but by a broader range of public authors.4 These voices, amateur and 
professional, commercial and noncommercial, mobilized and otherwise, 
could together form a networked public sphere where power to set the 
agenda and frame political discourse was more widely distributed than it had 
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been in the latter twentieth century.5 Critically, the organizational literature 
focused on the distributed, nonhierarchical nature of these mobilization 
efforts, ushering in a new era where collective action did not depend on large 
political machines.6
All of these features are still true, and the affordances continue to be available 
for people to organize themselves around establishment organizations, rather 
than having to run through them. It is impossible to ignore the fact that the 
national debate on police shootings of black men was fundamentally altered 
not because one of the major parties took it up; not because the number of 
shootings increased; but because bystanders shot videos of police shootings, 
shared them online, and the Black Lives Matter movement developed, at first 
primarily online, around these shocking images. After the election of Donald 
Trump, activists organized through a Google Doc to organize the Indivisible 
movement, which coordinated citizens to appearance at town hall meetings 
to put pressure on congressional representatives. The Women’s March on 
Washington could not have developed except through online engagement. 
The high school students who organized around school shootings and gun 
control follow the same pattern.
The second decade of the twenty- first century has taught us that while 
decentralization can support democratization, it is susceptible to five major 
failure modes. The first of these became clear after the Arab Spring and 
Occupy: leaderless, decentralized movements can form relatively easily online 
and focus on distinct great moments, like Tahrir, Gezi Park, or Zuccotti Park. 
But converting protest into action requires more structure, discipline, and 
longevity than many of these movements were able to develop, as Zeynep 
Tufekci captured so well in Twitter and Teargas.7 The first failure mode is 
simply the failure to convert from a moment’s surge of decentralized passion 
into a longer- term, sustained effort with competence to engage political 
institutions systematically over time.
The second failure mode is the failure to sustain the decentralized 
openness in the transition to more structured political organization. It 
turns out that marrying the energy of decentralized online action to the 
discipline of a party or government is far from easy. Howard Dean’s 2004 
primary campaign was the first significant political effort that leveraged 
the possibilities of the radically distributed network of activists to raise a 
campaign in a truly decentralized, peer- driven way.8 That particular, fully 
decentralized, user- generated campaign was later foundational to the Ron 
Paul presidential primary campaign in 2008. While both campaigns benefited 
from enormous distributed energy, neither was able to harness and organize 
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it. By 2008 “MyBarackObama.com” took over from the decentralized peers 
of the Dean and Paul campaigns and integrated it into this amazing new 
technology— the social network platform. MyBO provided a centralized 
platform, but still emphasized the decentralized capabilities— people 
creating their own meetups; raising their own campaign bundling efforts; 
communicating their own news. As Micah Sifry documented, however, the 
Obama transition team made a conscious choice to dismantle the grassroots 
army that had helped propel the new president into the White House in 
2008.9 By the end of the campaign, MyBO had two million active members, 
70,000 of whom had started their own fundraising campaigns. Sifry describes 
how several key actors, most importantly Christopher Edley and Mitch 
Kapor, pushed hard for the new presidency to introduce a new, perpetual 
grassroots- engaged democracy, where the presidency and the people use 
the internet for continuous engagement and participation on a mass scale. 
Instead, Democratic Party insiders, threatened with loss of control, persuaded 
the incoming president to fold his online campaign into the DNC, turning 
MyBO into a new Organizing for America site. As Sifry describes it,
Shunted into the DNC, MyBO’s tools for self- organizing were 
dismantled within a year. Instead of calling on supporters to launch 
a voter registration drive or build a network of small donors or back 
state and local candidates, OFA deployed the campaign’s vast email 
list to hawk coffee mugs and generate thank- you notes to Democratic 
members of Congress who backed Obama’s initiatives. As a result, when 
the political going got rough, much of Obama’s once- mighty army was 
AWOL. When the fight over Obama’s health care plan was at its peak, 
OFA was able to drum up only 300,000 phone calls to Congress. After 
the midterm debacle in 2010, when Democrats suffered their biggest 
losses since the Great Depression, Obama essentially had to build a 
new campaign machine from scratch in time for his reelection effort 
in 2012.
Hierarchical, centralized organizations have very different interests and 
concerns than decentralized networks of activists and citizens. And Obama’s 
2012 campaign was the first test run of the third failure mode of the internet 
and democracy— the power of well- organized, data- informed central powers 
to move millions of people from the center out, instead of the other way 
around. It was there that the tide first turned from the internet as decentralized 
enablement platform to internet as data- driven control platform.
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Hailed by many at the time as a success, the Obama 2012 campaign 
represented the first systematic use of big data and individualization for a 
campaign to target individual voters, particularly in the get- out- the- vote 
efforts. Instead of a campaign site like MyBO that had leveraged supporters 
own social networks to organize events, volunteers, and fundraising, it 
was the data geeks who were the new heroes. And the internet they used 
was more about surveillance through social media systems developed for 
marketing than about participatory mobilization. The title and subtitle of 
Alexis Madrigal’s celebratory Atlantic story right after the election captures it 
all: “When the Nerds Go Marching In: How a Dream Team of engineers from 
Facebook, Twitter, and Google built the software that drove Barack Obama’s 
reelection.”10 The triumphalism only gradually gave way to a more sober 
assessment of the implications of this shift toward the capacity of a campaign 
to control mass mobilization and how much it inverted the dynamics we had 
originally celebrated as the democratizing effect of the internet.
Soon thereafter, scientific papers from Facebook researchers—do cu ment ing 
how Facebook could manipulate the moods of Facebook users by altering 
the prevailing sentiment in their newsfeed or increase voter turnout with 
notifications that a friend had voted— launched a new set of concerns with 
algorithmic manipulation of politics.11 Zeynep Tufekci’s “Engineering the 
public:  Big data, surveillance, and computational politics” became the first 
academic essay that highlighted the core affordances that made the American 
internet such a powerful vehicle for political manipulation.12 Tufekci 
identified the ability of social media and internet platforms to leverage big- 
data techniques to provide individually tailored, experimentally validated, 
targeted communication that could leverage the most cutting- edge behavioral 
science to manipulate the beliefs and attitudes of users, using algorithmic 
processes that are entirely opaque to external review and accountability. In 
this story Facebook and Google, much more than Russia or any state, were 
the primary culprits, building platforms for refined, scientifically informed 
manipulation of human individuals at population scales and doing so in 
pursuit of profit under the newly emerging surveillance capitalism13— but 
with clear risks for the very possibility of democratic politics. The major 
threat to the internet as a democratizing force is not the abuse of the system 
but its intended use. Because the internet had been reengineered, primarily 
by Google and Facebook, into a preference manipulation platform, the two 
companies emerged as behemoths whose entire business model was built 
on producing fine- grained data at the individual level, running mass- scale 
experiments on millions of users, and developing the capacity to update the 
N et wo r k  P ro pag a n da346
346
online interaction in real time to achieve behavioral manipulation made to 
order and sold to advertisers. As we described in Chapter  9, the evidence 
that these techniques were critical and effective in the 2016 election is sparse. 
But the fact that something has not yet been shown to have had the critical 
marginal impact is no reason to ignore it as a major threat or constraint on 
how we use the internet in a democratic society. And of all the major threats 
to democracy that we have encountered in this decade, it is the one most 
amenable to regulatory or policy intervention.
The fourth failure mode is that precisely what makes decentralized 
networks so effective at circumventing established forms of control can also 
make them the vehicles of repressive mobs. Here, the failure is not inefficacy, 
subversion by organizations, or reconcentration in the hands of centralized 
organizations that turn the network into a control system. It is rather that 
the methods or goals of the distributed network of actors are themselves 
repressive, rather than participatory. This critique of decentralized networks 
as democratizing followed the Gamergate controversy, as networked 
mobilization was turned into a harassment and intimidation campaign 
against women, game developers, and media critics, in the name of preserving 
geek masculinity and fighting for free speech against “social justice warriors” 
out to destroy it.14 Adrienne Massanari analyzed the design and algorithms 
of Reddit, showing how these affordances enabled the Gamergate campaign 
to take off,15 while Shira Chess and Adrienne Shaw focused on how the 
Gamergaters’ attack on academic feminist studies of gaming culture exhibited 
the classic characteristics of the conspiracy theory- driven, paranoid style, 
in American politics.16 What was different was not that earlier studies of 
the networked public sphere focused on left or liberal mobilization. These 
had always included examples for both left and right sites circumventing 
mainstream media to shape the agenda.17 As Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis 
show, what Gamergate exposed was a new set of distributed attack techniques 
that went well beyond what could be considered still within democratic 
practice:  doxxing (disclosing private documents) private individuals who 
expressed opposing positions; intimidation through personal death and 
rape threats; revenge porn and social shaming; all aggressively gendered and 
aimed at women. Moreover, Gamergate was the proving ground for a set of 
techniques that later developed as the core techniques of disinformation in 
the 2016 election: organized brigades of online harassment organized around 
hashtags or specific memes; use of sockpuppets to push topics and stories to 
prominence, and in particular to put them in front of mainstream influencers 
to propagate the message to society at large; and a networked coalition of 
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loosely affiliated groups around core objects of hatred of the kind we saw more 
in the Unite the Right campaign in Charlottesville, Virginia. It was also where 
some of the core activists of the alt- right got their start.18 Again, though, it 
is important to distinguish elements of the strategy that are expressive— like 
propagating memes or putting them in front of mainstream influencers, and 
elements that are about intimidating opponents. We focus here only on the 
latter, unless the expressive actions fall within what we defined and described 
throughout this book as disinformation. This mode is a “failure” even if it 
does not actually affect the outcomes of election or policy battles. Because 
intimidation campaigns can be personal and relatively nihilistic— not caring 
about discrete policy outcomes— even if they do not affect an outcome at the 
aggregate level, they can and do harm their targets.
The final failure mode is the susceptibility to disinformation and 
propaganda and is the motivating force behind this book. The critical thing 
to understand is that the internet democratizes, if it does, only through its 
interaction with preexisting institutions and organizations— working with 
them and around them, and creating new alternatives that interact with 
them. As one of us put it in an article in 2009, “Like other information 
goods, the production model of news is shifting from an industrial model— 
be it the monopoly city paper, IBM in its monopoly heyday, Microsoft, or 
Britannica — to a networked model that integrates a wider range of practices 
into the production system:  market and nonmarket, large scale and small, 
for profit and nonprofit, organized and individual. We already see the 
early elements of how news reporting and opinion will be provided in the 
networked public sphere.”19 It would be the interaction between “surviving 
elements of the old system,” changed, small- scale new, digital native 
commercial media, volunteer media like Daily Kos and Townhall, more 
effective nonprofits (more effective because they could do much more with 
less online than in the mass media era), and mobilized individuals that would 
form the networked fourth estate. The media ecosystem needed all these 
elements, including the healthy surviving element of traditional professional 
media and nonprofit professional journalism, to be able to benefit from the 
edgier, more partisan distributed, mobilized action. What we saw repeatedly 
in our case studies throughout the book was that this integrated system 
worked like a networked public sphere or fourth estate outside the right- wing 
media ecosystem thanks to the reality- check dynamic that characterized the 
interactions among professional media and newer online media, professional 
and amateur, for profit and nonprofit, fact- checking organizations and 
activists. But when the professional, commercial, and nonprofit think tanks, 
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like Fox News, Breitbart, the Government Accountability Initiative, the 
Center for Immigration Studies, or Judicial Watch, all functioned to reinforce 
the disinformation campaigns, it was then that the networked public sphere 
turned into a networked propaganda system.
We have only presented data here from the United States. It is entirely 
possible that observing the patterns in other countries will offer better 
evidence that it was, in fact, the internet or social media or just Facebook that 
has created the epistemic crisis we observe in the United States, Europe, and 
other democratic societies. But if our experience in America is representative, 
then any analysis of a perceived epistemic crisis anywhere must consider how 
the internet interacts with that country’s entire media ecosystem, and how 
that system in turn interacts with that country’s political- institutional system 
more generally.
We have presented in this Part Four an approach based on a broader sense 
of political economy than simply a media- or technology- centric view. We have 
suggested that many factors have contributed to and fed off of the asymmetric 
polarization in the positions of the two parties in America, with a conservative 
wing particularly focused on ideological purity and symbolic action. These 
factors include the long- term patterns of identity threat born of race relations 
and relatively open immigration policy; the economic insecurity born of 
policies aimed to reduce taxes and services, reduce labor power, and reduce 
regulatory oversight over businesses; and an increasing mismatch between a 
large, deeply religious population and an increasingly pluralistic and gender- 
egalitarian mainstream. These patterns laid the ground work for the 30- year 
ascendance of a commercially successful strategy of news and opinion media 
outlets committed to serving identity- confirming news and views for that 
conservative wing, while denigrating the veracity and honesty of all other 
outlets. Changes in technology (satellite and FM radio, cable transmission, 
and only later the internet), institutions (the deregulation of cable, repeal of 
the fairness doctrine, reduction in ownership limits, and reduced antitrust 
enforcement) and political culture have shaped the emergence of a network 
of media outlets, including radio, cable television, and internet sites, that 
operate in a distinctly partisan propagandist mode. While there were efforts 
of liberals to create a parallel but functionally similar system, these failed 
because the coalition that formed the rest of the polity simply did not have 
the same cohesion to support ideologically pure, reality- agnostic media. 
There were certainly elements of this coalition who were (and are) more than 
happy to consume and produce bias- confirming news and opinion. We have 
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seen, from MSNBC and online, such examples in several of our chapters. But 
the coalition as a whole was too focused on functional results to support a 
dominant propagandist model. Its members were not willing to concentrate 
on bias confirmation to the exclusion of what professional journalism and 
expertise, whether commercial, governmental, or nonprofit, could offer, and 
once the conservative propagandist outlets took off, fact- based journalism 
offered a valuable source of credible, independent, but belief- consistent 
rebuttal for liberals. And so the media and information consumption habits 
of the two parts of the media ecosystem developed separately and distinctly. 
As we in the United States, and anyone else in any other democracy, turn to 
look at solutions, we must consider these background political institutional 
dynamics to understand where they are and where they are likely to go, what 
their susceptibilities to disinformation are, and what nationally specific sources 
of resilience they may be able to harness. It would be particularly unfortunate 
if countries that do not have the same decades- long processes that made the 
United States susceptible to propaganda and disinformation, foreign and 
domestic, will adopt measures that will undermine the democratizing aspects 
of the internet and social media even though they do not, in fact, face the 
same risks, or even though they have sources of resilience that are more robust 
than those we appear to have in America.
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What Can Men Do Against  
Such Reckless Hate?
We opened this book with a threat matrix: a description of the major 
sources of polluted information that have been blamed for threatening our 
ability to tell truth from fiction as a society. We noted that most public 
discussion of the threats focused on novel and technological causes, rather 
than long- term institutional and structural causes. As we come to the 
conclusion of our book, we can say with confidence that writing this chapter 
of possible solutions would have been easier had our analysis revealed a clear, 
technologically driven cause for our present epistemic crisis. It would be easier 
if we knew that the present crisis was caused by entrepreneurial teenagers 
running fake news sites on Facebook, Russian sockpuppet and bot accounts, 
targeted psychographics- informed advertising from Cambridge Analytica, or 
even technologically induced symmetrically partisan echo chambers.
But our studies have led us to the conclusion that these putative risks 
are, for the near future, not the major causes of disruption. We have argued 
throughout this book that none of these actors— Russians, fake news 
entrepreneurs, Cambridge Analytica, Facebook itself, or symmetric partisan 
echo chambers— were the major cause of the epistemic crisis experienced 
within the U.S. media ecosystem during the 2016 election or since. Instead 
of these technologically driven dynamics, which are novel but ultimately less 
important, we see longer- term dynamics of political economy: ideology and 
institutions interacting with technological adoption as the primary drivers of 
the present epistemic crisis. These dynamics, which play out across television, 
radio, and mainstream professional journalism at least as much as through 
the internet and social media, have been developing for 30  years and have 
resulted in a highly asymmetric media ecosystem that is the primary driver 
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of disinformation and propaganda in the American public sphere. The right- 
wing media ecosystem in particular circulates an overwhelming amount 
of domestic disinformation and propaganda, and its practices create the 
greatest vulnerabilities to both foreign propaganda and nihilistic commercial 
exploitation by clickbait factories. Outside the right- wing media ecosystem, 
we observe efforts by partisans, Russians, and clickbait factories, but fact- 
checking norms and journalistic institutional commitments dampen the 
diffusion and amplification of disinformation. These dynamics are inverted in 
the insular right- wing network, and partisan identity- confirming assertions, 
however false, are accelerated and amplified.
In this chapter we take on a range of possible interventions that might 
strengthen media ecosystems and raise the level of public discourse and 
political reporting. While the options are many, there are no silver bullets. 
There are changes that might be led by media producers themselves on 
both sides of the political spectrum. There are a range of intended fixes 
underway by the large social media platforms and supporting mechanisms 
being proposed and developed by public interest organizations, and there are 
options for more aggressive government regulatory action. Because of the size 
of the problem, we are not optimistic that any of these changes will succeed 
on its own. But the lesson we take away from our work is that we as a society 
must lean more heavily toward fixing our currently broken media system. 
Unfortunately, most of the interventions we describe below have real costs in 
terms of uncomfortable acceptance of the partisan nature of the problem and 
of increased private and public control of content.
We divide this chapter into three parts. The first part is dedicated 
to the two major kinds of changes that may actually go to the root of the 
problem:  political- institutional change on the right and a reorientation of 
how journalists pursue their professional commitments in a highly asymmetric 
media ecosystem. The former is the ultimate solution, we think, but is unlikely 
to occur unless the Republican Party suffers a series of political setbacks that 
will force such a fundamental reorientation. The latter is more feasible, and 
we think it can actually make a difference for much of the population. But it 
may have little or no effect on the roughly one- third of the population that 
actively and willingly inhabits the right- wing media ecosystem. The second 
part outlines the most widely discussed practical solutions to the more 
novel, technology- dependent explanations of crisis that have captured most 
of the public attention since 2016. These are primarily: increased control by 
intermediaries, particularly social media platforms and Google, of variously 
defined illegal or otherwise unacceptable content, and regulation of political 
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advertising. The last part will offer a brief overview of various other approaches 
aimed to help reduce the supply of, and demand for, misinformation and 
bias- confirming propaganda.
Reconstructing Center- Right Media
There is nothing conservative about calling career law enforcement officials 
and the intelligence community the “deep state.” The fact that the targets 
of the attack, like Robert Mueller, Rod Rosenstein, or Andrew McCabe, 
were life- long Republicans merely underscores that fact. There is nothing 
conservative about calling for a trade war. There is nothing conservative 
about breaking from long- held institutional norms for short- term political 
advantage. And there is nothing conservative about telling Americans to 
reject the consensus estimate of the CIA, the FBI, and the NSA that we were 
attacked by Russia and suggesting instead that these agencies are covering 
up for a DNC conspiracy. What has happened first and foremost to make 
all these things possible is that the Republican Party has been taken over by 
ever- more right- wing politicians. As an analysis published following Richard 
Lugar’s primary defeat noted, when Lugar first became a senator in 1977, he 
was to the right of more than half of Senate Republicans. Despite moderating 
only a bit over his 36 years in the Senate, by his retirement he had moved from 
being the twenty- third- most moderate Republican to being the fifth- most 
moderate, and even if he had not moderated his views, would have been the 
twelfth- most moderate.1 When Marco Rubio was elected as a senator in 2010, 
he was the firebrand Tea Party candidate, elected alongside Tea Party darling 
Pat Toomey, who had ousted moderate Republican Arlen Specter. By 2016 
Rubio was identified as the “moderate” candidate, even though he had a DW- 
NOMINATE score to the right of the median Republican senator in the 
113th Congress, while the final two candidates in the primary were the third- 
most right- wing senator, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump. As we write these 
lines, we have no idea whether the 2018 mid- term elections, much less the 
2020 election, will deliver losses or gains to the Republican Party. Perhaps the 
hard- right strategy will continue to pay off for Republicans in terms of short- 
term political gains. Perhaps a reversal will force a reorientation. The question 
is whether Republicans who would identify themselves with a Lugar, an Arlen 
Specter, or a John Kasich have a significant chance of recapturing their party 
without a significant reassertion of the role of center- right media.
One of our clearest and starkest findings is the near disappearance of 
center- right media. There is the Wall Street Journal, with its conservative 
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editorial page but continued commitment to journalistic standards in its 
reporting; and to some extent The Hill plays a center- right role. Both sites 
appear in the center of the partisan landscape according to our data because 
readers on the right did not pay attention to these sites any more than 
readers on the left did. Fox News, as we showed in Chapter 2, has asserted its 
leadership role in the right- wing media ecosystem at the expense of becoming 
even more oriented inwardly, toward the insular right wing of the American 
public sphere. Several conservative commentators have emphasized the extent 
to which Fox News has skewed the Republican- oriented media system. David 
French and Matthew Sheffield wrote in the National Review during the run- 
up to the 2016 election that Fox News was “hurting the right” or “making 
the right intellectually deaf.”2 Libertarian Cato Institute Senior Fellow Julian 
Sanchez wrote early and presciently when he described the right as suffering 
what he called “epistemic closure”:
One of the more striking features of the contemporary conservative 
movement is the extent to which it has been moving toward epistemic 
closure. Reality is defined by a multimedia array of interconnected and 
cross promoting conservative blogs, radio programs, magazines, and of 
course, Fox News. Whatever conflicts with that reality can be dismissed 
out of hand because it comes from the liberal media, and is therefore 
ipso facto not to be trusted. (How do you know they’re liberal? Well, 
they disagree with the conservative media!) This epistemic closure can 
be a source of solidarity and energy, but it also renders the conservative 
media ecosystem fragile.3
Our data could not be summed up more perfectly. The right wing of the 
American media ecosystem has been a breeding ground for conspiracy theory 
and disinformation, and a significant point of vulnerability in our capacity, as 
a country and a democracy, to resist disinformation and propaganda. We have 
documented this finding extensively throughout this book by describing both 
the architecture and flows of information and disinformation in the American 
media ecosystem in the past three years and by presenting distinct case studies 
of disinformation campaigns surrounding what we know to be Russian 
hacks of the DNC and Podesta emails and the investigation into Russian 
interference in the election— be it Seth Rich, the Forensicator, Uranium One, 
or the DNC and Podesta email- based stories like spirit cooking.
The question is, in part, whether there is enough will, and money, 
among centrist Republicans to address the fragility of the conservative 
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media ecosystem by supporting publications that are centrally committed 
to reasserting a sense of reality. We are under no illusion that such a 
reorientation will be easy, and we are not even sure it is possible. Our 
observations regarding how Breitbart and Trump brought Fox News to 
heel toward the end of the primary season, and the propaganda feedback 
loop we outline in Chapter 3 suggest that this strategy will be exceedingly 
difficult to carry out, as does the extent to which long- standing conservative 
sites that opposed Trump were shunted aside during the primary. There just 
may not be appetite for reporting oriented more toward objectivity and less 
toward partisanship. But just as Robert and Rebekah Mercer invested heavily 
in creating Breitbart, the Government Accountability Initiative, and other 
elements of the far- right disinformation ecosystem, one might imagine that 
there are enough billionaires and millionaires who do not see themselves in 
the populist, anti- immigrant, anti- trade, and increasingly anti- rule- of- law 
Trump- Bannon image of the Republican Party. We have no basis in our own 
work to advise how such a Herculean feat may be achieved. Perhaps it could 
take the form of leadership or ownership change in Fox News, leveraging 
existing audience loyalty to gradually reintroduce a more reality- anchored 
but nonetheless conservative news outlet. Perhaps it would require launching 
a new media outlet. But without a significant outlet that is both committed 
to professional journalistic values in its news reporting and fact checking 
and trusted by conservatives when it reports what it reports, it is difficult 
to see how center- right, reality- based conservatives can reassert themselves 
within the Republican Party. And without such a reassertion, it is hard to 
see how the fragility of the right- wing media ecosystem does not continue to 
be a hotbed of bias- confirming disinformation and propaganda, foreign and 
domestic.
Professional Journalism  
in a Propaganda- Rich Ecosystem
We have dedicated most of this volume to mapping the media ecosystem, 
documenting its asymmetric structure, and understanding the role this 
asymmetry plays in the dissemination of disinformation. We nonetheless 
emphasized the critical role of mainstream media in this system. In Chapter 6, 
we showed how our work relates to the work of other scholars who looked at 
coverage during the election to underscore the extent to which mainstream 
media focused on horse race coverage, negative coverage, and scandals over 
issues, particularly when it came to Hillary Clinton. We showed how the 
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New  York Times allowed itself to be used in a disinformation campaign, 
laundering politically motivated opposition research by Peter Schweizer by 
bestowing upon it the imprimatur and legitimacy of its name with coverage 
that raised questions in blaring headlines and buried caveats deep in the small 
print of the story. We similarly showed how coverage by other major outlets 
like the Washington Post and the Associated Press in August of 2016 led with 
the scandal- implying headline and buried the admission that evidence of 
corruption was thin at best. But we also showed in Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 8 how 
the reality- check dynamic in play across “the rest” of the media ecosystem 
was able to check disinformation and error on both sides, as mainstream and 
newer online media continuously checked each other’s worst impulses and 
corrected error and overreaching.
Most Americans do not occupy the right- wing media ecosystem. Likely 
more than half of conservative and more independent viewers, readers, and 
listeners are exposed to CNN as well as to network and local television and 
mainstream news sites. The crossover audience, much more than the audience 
already fully committed to the perspective of Sean Hannity or Rush Limbaugh, 
is the most important audience that can be influenced by mainstream media. 
When mainstream professional media sources insist on coverage that performs 
their own neutrality by giving equal weight to opposing views, even when 
one is false and the other is not, they fail. In a famous 2004 study, Maxwell 
Boykoff and Jules Boykoff showed that the climate change coverage of major 
prestige papers— the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street 
Journal, and the Los Angeles Times— gave “balanced” coverage, providing 
a platform not only for arguments that climate change was anthropogenic 
but also to those that climate change was not caused by human activity, even 
though the scientific consensus was by then well established.4 As more recent 
work by Derek Koehler showed, readers form erroneous assessments of the 
weight of the evidence even when they are explicitly told that one view they 
are reading reflects a near- consensus of experts while the other is held by a 
small minority.5 The balanced- reporting norm in that context significantly 
muddied the waters on the politics of climate change, which was exactly the 
purpose of the propagandists. But they could only achieve their goal at the 
population level with the implicit support of mainstream journalists who 
reported on the two sides as more- or- less equal voices in the controversy. Our 
observations regarding the prevalence and diffusion of disinformation in the 
right- wing media ecosystem suggest that mainstream professional journalism 
needs to treat many statements associated with current American politics as it 
later came to deal with coverage of climate science and climate denial.
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Practically, this means that professional journalism needs to recalibrate its 
commitment to objective reporting further toward transparent, accountable 
verifiability and away from demonstrative neutrality. As Thomas Patterson 
wrote in explaining the negative reporting in election coverage, consistently 
negative reporting allowed media outlets to demonstrate their independence 
and neutrality to their audiences. Given the highly asymmetric patterns of 
lying and disinformation coming from the two campaigns, media outlets 
avoided the appearance of bias by emphasizing negativity and criticism in 
their reporting of both sides. In practical terms, that created a broad public 
impression of equivalent unsuitability for office and a paucity of substantive 
coverage of positions.
Instead of engaging in this kind of public performance of neutrality, what 
we might call demonstrative neutrality, objectivity needs to be performed 
by emphasizing the transparency and accountability of journalists’ sources 
and practices, what we might call accountable verifiability. We already see 
it to a degree in the ways in which mainstream media organizations dealt 
with some visible errors in Chapter 6. Some of this is simply emphasis and 
extension of existing practices— providing public access to underlying 
documentary materials, for example. Some would require developing 
institutional mechanisms for independent verification of sources, on the 
model of scientific access to materials and underlying code for reproducibility. 
Whether this should be done in a network of media outlets, as it is in peer 
review in science, by designating a set of independent nonprofit fact- checking 
organizations that will operate as quality assurance for journalistic enterprises 
and be provided with more access to underlying materials than under current 
practice, or at least initially by creating a more prominent role for internal 
“inspector generals” inside the most visible media remains to be seen. More 
controversially and harder to implement, these practices have to be applied 
equally to headlines and framing, where so much of the communicative value 
of the article is conveyed, as they are to discrete factual claims. None of this 
will persuade people who are already inside the propaganda feedback loop, 
nor need it be designed to satisfy them. It is intended to allow journalistic 
enterprises to avoid errors and gain enough confidence internally, and 
communicate enough objective truth seeking externally, so that they can 
abandon demonstrative neutrality and its attendant false impressions.
This broader reorientation should not postpone several narrower and 
more immediate adjustments in journalistic practice. Recognizing the 
asymmetry we document here requires editors to treat tips or “exclusives,” as 
well as emails or other leaked or hacked documents with greater care than 
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they have in the past few years. The “Fool me once, shame on you . . .” adage 
suggests that after, for example, the New York Times’s experience with Peter 
Schweizer and the Uranium One story, mainstream professional journalists 
need to understand that they are subject to a persistent propaganda campaign 
trying to lure them into amplifying and accrediting propaganda. This happens 
of course as normal politics from both sides of the partisan system, but our 
work here shows that one side is armed with a vastly more powerful engine for 
generating and propagating propaganda.
It is certainly possible to resist these attacks without particularly sup-
porting one side over the other. In November 2017, for example, the right- 
wing disinformation outfit Project Veritas tried to trip up the Washington 
Post, offering the Post a fake informant who told the Post that Roy Moore 
had impregnated her when she was a teenager. The sting operation was 
intended to undermine the credibility of the Post’s reporting on Roy Moore’s 
alleged pursuit and harassment of teens when he was a 30- something-year-
old.6 Rather than jumping at the opportunity to develop the Moore story, 
the Washington Post’s reporters followed the professional model— checked 
out the source, assessed her credibility, and ultimately detected and outed 
the attempt at manipulation. Mainstream media editors and journalists must 
understand that they are under a sustained attack, sometimes as premeditated 
and elaborate as this sting, usually more humdrum.
Russian and right- wing political actors have been particularly effective at 
using document dumps, particularly hacked emails, to lure journalists into 
over- reporting. The dynamic is clear. By offering real documents, activists 
and propagandists give journalists the illusion that they have both a trove 
of newsworthy documents— what could be more tempting than a tranche 
of secrets?— and complete control over the sources materials and ability to 
craft a narrative around them. After all, the journalist makes up her own mind 
about what matters and what does not. After a reporter spends hours or days 
pouring over materials, as other competitors are releasing juicy tidbits based 
on the documents, the pressure to produce something spectacular becomes 
powerful. It is not front- page news to report: “folks, we looked at these emails 
for days and they’re pretty humdrum; not much to report.” And yet, now we 
know that these document dumps are intended precisely to elicit attention- 
grabbing headlines followed by professional caveats buried in paragraph 12, 
on the model of “while there is no direct evidence of wrongdoing in these 
emails, they nonetheless raise legitimate questions. . . .” The DNC and 
Podesta email hacks, as well as the Judicial Watch FOIA- based email dumps, 
were all designed precisely to elicit this kind of predictable response. And the 
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editors, reporters, and propagandists all know that very few readers will get 
to paragraph 12. It is irresponsible for professional journalists and editors to 
continue this practice given this pattern. We must develop new standards for 
evidence of wrongdoing before prominent publication of implied allegations 
of corruption. Likewise, we must develop new modes of investigative 
reporting that focus more on propagandists who create document dumps.
Similarly, researchers at the Data & Society Institute who have focused 
specifically on the nether- regions of the internet, like Joan Donovan, have 
questioned whether journalists and editors should curtail coverage of 
fake news and extremist memes.7 Producers of this content thrive on such 
attention, and publication in major outlets only increases the diffusion of the 
falsehoods, whether debunked or not. What is perhaps gained with exposure 
and debunking may, according to these arguments, be more than outweighed 
by the encouragement the speakers receive from the attention and the 
exposure that the falsehoods received.8 Our findings about the insularity of 
the right- wing media ecosystem suggest that for a given rumor or conspiracy 
theory to circulate outside right- wing media, it has to be picked up by outlets 
outside that insular system. Moreover, even inside that ecosystem, a story must 
be picked up by influencers or major outlets to escape obscurity. Decisions 
not to report such stories unless and until they hit a sufficiently influential 
node could in fact dampen distribution to people who would only be exposed 
to them from mainstream media. Whether this dampening effect would be 
outweighed by having the rumors circulate unchallenged should be addressed 
as an open research question.
Despite our various cautions, our findings are good news for professional 
journalistic organizations. The past decade has seen repeated claims that 
the sky is falling; that there is no more of a market for general interest 
professional journals; that audience attention is diffused around the internet; 
that audiences only want entertaining, bias- confirming news; and so forth. 
We find instead that professional mainstream media continue to play an 
enormously important role for most Americans. Indeed, the information 
abundance of this era makes professional mainstream media particularly 
valuable to those living at least partly outside the right- wing bubble. Going 
forward, professional journalists must offer precisely what makes them 
special: credible reporting, in organizations committed to journalistic norms, 
but with a heavier emphasis on verifiable and accountable truth and credibility 
rather than balance and neutrality. As long as the media ecosystem is highly 
asymmetric structurally and in its flow of propaganda, balance and neutrality 
amplify disinformation rather than combating it.
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The Question of Platform Regulation
The primary focus of solutions- oriented conversations since 2016— in the 
United States, in Europe, and throughout the world— has been on changing 
how information is accessible, framed, shared, or remunerated on platforms, 
primarily on Facebook and Google. The big unanswered question is whether 
the time has come for new government regulation or whether the best of the 
imperfect options is to be patient and avoid invasive legal remedies while 
platforms muddle toward the right balance of content moderation tools 
and self- regulatory policies to satisfy their many constituencies, including 
investors, advertisers, and users.
There are a range of measures under consideration, some based on 
regulation, some on self- regulation or voluntary measures. They sometimes 
depend on algorithmic identification of false stories and sometimes on 
human detection and assessment; they usually focus on removal or treatment 
for falsehood or illegality, but sometimes for extreme views; sometimes 
such designations result in additional tagging and marking of the content, 
sometimes in removal or demotion; and sometimes they involve blocking 
advertising and payment to undermine the business model of the purveyors 
of bullshit.
The debate over misinformation and disinformation on online platforms 
has intersected with a growing concern over the degree of concentration that 
internet platforms enjoy in their respective markets. The core examples are 
Google and Facebook. Google dominates search and (through YouTube) 
video, while Facebook dominates social media, through the Facebook 
platform itself and through its ownership of Instagram and WhatsApp. But 
there is real tension between the goal of reducing concentration and increasing 
competition, on the one hand, and the goal of regulating a reasonably coherent 
public sphere, on the other hand. A  Google search for “Gab” displays (at 
least in early 2018) a “people also searched for” box that includes “The Daily 
Stormer.” Gab is a social media platform that developed as an alternative 
for far- right and alt- right users who were banned or constrained by Twitter, 
Facebook, and even Reddit. A crackdown by the platforms in the presence 
of competition diverted their communications to a semi- segregated platform 
but did not remove them from the internet. Whether robust competition is 
helpful for combating misinformation depends on whether the critical goal 
is to eliminate the disinformation or merely to segregate it and reduce its 
diffusion pathways. But segregation only works in a relatively concentrated 
market, where banishment from a handful of major platforms contains 
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content within smaller communities. Current regulatory and activist effort 
is focused on the major platforms precisely because they have so much power 
and changing their diffusion patterns has a large impact on overall diffusion 
patterns online.
From the perspective of disinformation and misinformation, the trouble 
with concentrated platforms is that if and when they fail, or become bad actors 
or beholden to bad actors, the negative effect is enormous. The Cambridge 
Analytica story, with all the caveats about how much of it was true and 
how much was hype, offers a perfect example. Even in the most Facebook- 
supportive version of the story, the company’s overwhelming influence and 
presence made it a single point of failure that enabled Cambridge Analytica, 
by abusing Facebook’s terms of service, to inappropriately collect and use the 
private data of 87 million Facebook users. The story is no better if, instead of 
fingering Cambridge Analytica as the bad actor, it is Facebook itself, using 
permission it obtained by forcing people to click “I agree” on inscrutable 
terms of service, that sells to a political campaign the means to mount a 
targeted advertising campaign intended to microtarget black voters in 
Florida to suppress their votes. The acts of both Facebook and the campaign 
in Florida were legal. But the danger presented by a single company having 
such massive influence over large portions of the population is reason enough 
to focus either on ensuring greater competition that will diffuse that power 
or on tightly regulating how that company can use its market power. In this 
Facebook represents a parallel problem to the challenge created by media 
consolidation after the 1996 Telecommunications Act in the United States, 
where companies like Clear Channel and Sinclair Broadcasting were able to 
expand their audience reach dramatically while combining it with aggressive 
distribution of right- wing propaganda on radio and television. In all these 
cases, solutions that tend to reinforce centralized control over the network 
of content outlets, rather than reduce concentration and with it the degree to 
which any of them provides a single point of failure, seem to exacerbate rather 
than solve the problem.
Our experience in the few areas where there has been normative consensus 
in favor of harnessing the power of platforms to regulate content means that 
we are not in uncharted territory. Child pornography and copyright, with 
all their fundamental differences, have been areas where platforms have been 
regulated, and have even adopted voluntary mechanisms beyond what law 
requires, to contain the spread of information about which we have made 
moral or legal decisions. The problem is that political speech is very different 
from pedophilia and that the copyright wars have taught us well that platform 
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control over speech can shade into censorship, both intentionally and 
unintentionally.
The Contentious Role of Government
The United States has generally taken a light touch approach to internet 
regulation, particularly in respect to political speech. Many other countries, 
especially more authoritarian countries such as China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, 
have forcefully policed online speech. The most aggressive effort in a liberal 
democracy to respond to disinformation and hate speech on social media by 
regulating social media platforms is the German NetzDG law that became 
effective on January 1, 2018. The act applies to platforms with more than 
two million registered users in Germany, thereby preserving the possibility 
for smaller, more insulated platforms to exist without following these rules, 
as well as for new entrants to roll out and grow before they must incur the 
costs of compliance. The law requires these larger platforms to provide an 
easily usable procedure by which users can complain that certain content 
is “unlawful” under a defined set of provisions in the German criminal 
code. These provisions include not only hate speech against groups and 
Holocaust denial but also criminal prohibitions on insulting and defamatory 
publications.
On its face, this would seem to cover much of the immigration coverage 
we described in Chapter  4 and practically all of the personal attacks we 
described in Chapter 3 and Part Two. And while the German criminal code 
offers reduced penalties when the targets of defamation are political figures, 
it does not excuse the defamation. The NetzDG requires companies it covers 
to either delete the content if it is “manifestly unlawful” within 24 hours, or, 
if its unlawfulness is not “manifest,” to take one of two actions. The company 
may decide on the content’s lawfulness within seven days, or it may refer 
the content to an industry- funded tribunal that will be overseen by a public 
authority, which then has seven days to decide on the unlawfulness of the 
content. Violations can be sanctioned at various levels, all the way up to 
50 million euros. Sharp criticism that the draft of the act was overly restrictive 
came from within Germany and outside. In response to the critiques, several of 
the definitions were tightened, an alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
was added, and provisions were added to allow users to challenge blocks of 
allegedly factually false content. These changes did not satisfy opponents, 
and blistering criticism continued from a broad range of observers, including 
Human Rights Watch.
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Critics argued that, faced with a very short time to make decisions, 
companies would err on the side of over- censoring rather than take the risk of 
being found in violation of a law that carries very high fines. Examples cropped 
up as soon as the law began to be enforced. Comedian Sophie Passman poked 
fun at the far- right’s claims that immigrants destroyed German culture with 
a tweet that said that, as long as the practice of airing “Dinner for One” on 
television on New Year’s Eve remained a part of German cultural tradition, 
immigrants were totally welcome to come and destroy it. Her tweet was 
removed because some users misinterpreted it as espousing the rhetoric she 
was mocking. Less silly, but more threatening to democratic contestation, 
at least from an American perspective, were the rapid removals of tweets 
by leaders of the far- right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. After the 
Cologne police tweeted out a New Year’s message in Arabic, among several 
other foreign languages, Beatrix von Storch, deputy- leader of AfD, tweeted 
that the police were appeasing “barbaric, gang- raping Muslim hordes of men.” 
Twitter removed von Storch’s tweet. The company then also removed a tweet 
from AfD co- leader, Alice Weidel, arguing that “[o] ur authorities submit to 
imported, marauding, groping, beating, knife- stabbing migrant mobs.”9 In 
Germany, incitement to hatred is one of the criminal offenses to which the 
NetzDG applies, and it is difficult to argue that the words on their face fail 
that test— and yet the result is state- induced private censorship of the political 
viewpoints of the leaders of a party that represents the views of about 13% of 
the votes. The problem is that there is often a wide gap, filled by case law in 
common law countries and commentary and experience in civil law countries, 
between what a law says on its face and what will be prosecuted, and what may 
lead to a conviction. Think of how unimaginably broad the prohibition on 
insulting someone might be without working knowledge of German law and 
its application by the judicial system. Due to lack of public process or appeal, 
companies are expected to err on the side of caution (censoring arguably 
criminal speech to avoid the fine for inaction). Another major concern is 
that the NetzDG law legitimizes efforts in Singapore, the Philippines, Russia, 
Venezuela, and Kenya to adopt copycat models that incorporate more speech- 
repressive criminal provisions.
In grappling with the trade- off between free speech and extreme, 
counterdemocratic speech, Germany’s experience with the rise of Nazism 
has led it to adopt a more aggressive model than the U.S. First Amendment 
permits. Britain’s and France’s forays into platform regulation focused more 
on countering terrorist recruitment and propaganda, but hate speech is 
generally regulated more tightly in Western Europe than it is in the United 
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States. And a 2017 European Commission report underscored that the model 
by which platforms regulate various forms of illegal speech is hardly new. 
From materials depicting the sexual abuse of children to materials that violate 
someone’s intellectual property rights, democracies generally find some 
materials that they are willing to prohibit and then impose on platforms some 
obligation to take those materials down.
The basic concern of critics of the German NetzDG law— that fear of 
liability would lead firms to exercise private censorship well beyond what 
the legislature could constitutionally impose directly— was at the foundation 
of American legal protection for online platforms. In the United States, the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) section 230 and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) are the foundational laws 
governing liability of platforms for content posted by their users. CDA 
section 230 gave platform providers broad immunity from liability for pretty 
much anything their users published and has been widely considered the 
foundation of the freewheeling speech culture on the net. Courts were happy 
to let platforms avoid liability for quite substantial interpersonal abuse on 
their platforms,10 much less hate speech, which is mostly protected under the 
First Amendment. In the absence of legal constraint in the United States, 
pressure from users has occasionally moved some of the major platforms to 
regulate offensive speech, resulting in “community guidelines” approaches. 
These became the de facto content control rules of the platforms in most 
areas, enforced through end- user agreements as interpreted by the platform 
companies, and punctuated by moments of public outrage that nudge these 
practices one way or another.
Unlike other forms of disfavored speech, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
long held that when copyright is used as the reason to prohibit publication 
of words or images, there is usually no violation of the First Amendment. We 
will not here rehearse the decades of academic commentary that has explained 
why that interpretation of the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment is incoherent. It is the law of the land, and for our purposes it 
explains how, faced with relative constitutional license, Congress developed 
in the DMCA a much more restrictive “notice- and- takedown” regime for 
speech challenged as violating copyright. In doing so, it identified a structure 
that, while not as restrictive as the NetzDG, nonetheless has similar structural 
attributes. Here, platform providers can only escape copyright liability 
over the acts of their users if they maintain a system to allow copyright 
challenges. Those challenges allow copyright owners to challenge the use 
of specific pieces of content on grounds of copyright infringement and to 
 What Can Men Do Against Such Reckless Hate? 365
365
take down that content unless the person posting the content submitted a 
counternotification. This approach would encounter strong constitutional 
headwinds in any context but copyright. In the United States it is easier to 
remove YouTube videos showing students performing a show tune at a school 
play than YouTube videos showing neo- Nazis singing the “Horst Wessel.”
The approach taken by the CDA section 230 has been remarkably 
successful in supporting the development of online publishing platforms. 
This same architecture is ill- suited for fine- grained moderation of human 
interaction. Whether by government mandate or voluntary company action, 
applying online content moderation at massive scale is a particularly gnarly 
challenge. There are a range of options for dealing with problematic speech. 
It can be removed at the source, blocked from circulation by intermediaries, 
removed or demoted by a search engine, or flagged for audiences as 
problematic. The hard part is that someone must first determine standards 
and guidelines for what constitutes problematic speech, and second, design 
a process to weed through billions of online posts, determine which posts 
are problematic, and then find a way to review these decisions to be able to 
correct errors. In the United States the default answer to the first challenge is 
to leave it to companies to decide how to deal with transgressing actors and 
content. Germany has chosen a different path that will almost certainly result 
in the removal of considerably more content. Companies are meanwhile 
expanding the infrastructure for monitoring and sorting content at a massive 
scale, combining algorithms and human review. It is difficult to be optimistic 
about how this can be applied at such scale. The promise of machine learning 
and artificial intelligence to accurately separate the good from the bad has not 
been realized, and the interim solution is hiring tens of thousands of workers 
to review content with company instructions in hand. These processes are 
aided by flagging mechanisms that allow users to flag problematic content. 
Predictably, these mechanisms have their limits as they are easily gamed to 
attack rivals and political opponents. Our experiences, in the United States 
and elsewhere, with both over- and underinclusiveness in the determinations 
of existing systems for managing copyright or nudity, leave us very skeptical 
that these processes will work well, much less seamlessly.
Self- Regulation and Its Discontents
For the lack of better alternatives, the hardest questions of content moderation 
in the United States are being left in the hands of companies:  whether to 
allow the Daily Stormer to be treated like any other web publisher, whether 
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conspiracy theorists should have equal standing on YouTube and in the 
Facebook newsfeed, and whether anti- vaxxers should be allowed to freely 
distribute information that will result in sickness and death.
Over the course of 2017 and early 2018, both Google and Facebook 
announced various measures intended to combat “fake news,” misleading 
information, and illegal political advertising. These measures combined 
various elements of the systems that are already in place and will almost 
certainly suffer from similar difficulties and imperfections, while delivering 
some higher enforcement. It is important not to get caught up in the 
supposed newness of the problem and to recognize that we are dealing with 
known problems with bad information— spam, phishing, sexual exploitation 
of children, hate speech, and so on.
The commercial bullshit or clickbait sites are the most familiar challenge. 
They are simply a new breed of spammers or search engine optimizers. It is 
feasible to identify them through some combination of machine learning 
based on traffic patterns, fact checking, and human judgment, likely 
outsourced to independent fact- checking organizations. Excluding clickbait 
factories is normatively the least problematic, since they are not genuine 
participants in the polity. That is why most of the announcements and efforts 
have been directed at this class of actors. Similarly, dealing with Russian or 
other foreign propaganda is normatively unproblematic, though technically 
more challenging because of the sophistication of the attacks.
The much more vexing problem is intentional political disinformation, 
including hyperpartisan hate speech that is harmful but not false. Perhaps in 
Germany it is imaginable to remove posts by the leader of a political party 
(AfD) supported by over 10 percent of the electorate. In the United States 
private platforms are allowed under current interpretations of the First 
Amendment to censor political speech for whatever reason they choose. 
But widespread political censorship by the major private platforms would 
certainly generate howls of protest from large swaths of the political spectrum. 
Moreover, the most effective propaganda generally builds on a core set of true 
facts and then constructs a narrative that is materially misleading. Efforts 
we ourselves, and many of our colleagues who are studying the landscape of 
disinformation, propaganda, and bullshit, have made to create well- defined 
research instruments that reliably permit trained coders to identify this kind 
of manipulative propaganda leave us skeptical that a reliable machine- learning 
algorithm will emerge to solve these questions in the near future.
There have been some successful efforts to pressure advertisers to remove 
ads from certain programs. Alex Jones of Infowars offers the clearest example 
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of a publisher who has repeatedly published defamatory falsehoods, like 
Pizzagate, that have been debunked by many fact checkers. One company, 
AdRoll, suspended its advertising relationship with Infowars, but Google has 
not turned off advertising for Infowars videos. Some brands, however, have 
instructed Google not to run ads for their products alongside Infowars videos. 
In Jones’s case, this may not be too great of a loss for him, since his business 
model is largely based on directly selling products he markets on his shows (over 
20 percent of Infowars outgoing traffic is to the site’s store, where Jones sells his 
own branded supplements for “male vitality,” brain enhancement, and such). 
These campaigns may reduce the economic incentives for some disinformation 
sites, and they are cathartic for the activists pushing the companies to sever 
ties. But they do not appear to present a systematic, scalable, and long- 
term response to the broader phenomenon of disinformation in the media 
ecosystem. Many of the most widely visited, shared, or linked sites in the right 
wing of the American media ecosystem engage in disinformation regularly or 
episodically. Asking the platforms to solve the problem by blocking a broad 
swath of the right- wing media ecosystem would be palpably antidemocratic.
In 2013 Pew reported that about one- quarter of American adults watch 
only Fox News among the cable news channels.11 A  later Pew study found 
that the number of Americans who preferred getting news on radio, rather 
than television, was about one- quarter the number who preferred television 
news.12 Yet a third Pew study found that, after Fox News, the most trusted 
news sources for consistently conservative respondents were the radio shows 
of Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh, and Glenn Beck.13 These all suggest that 
somewhere between 25 and 30 percent of Americans willingly and intentionally 
pay attention to media outlets that consistently tell that audience what it 
wants to hear, and what that audience wants to hear is often untrue. For the 
rest of the population to ask a small oligopoly of platforms to prevent those 
30 percent from getting the content they want is, to say the least, problematic. 
Platforms can certainly help with the commercial pollution, and to some 
extent they can help with foreign propaganda. But we suggest that asking 
platforms to solve the fundamental political and institutional breakdown 
represented by the asymmetric polarization of the American polity is neither 
feasible nor normatively attractive.
Political Advertising: Disclosure and Accountability
A much more tractable problem, for both law and self- regulation, is online 
political advertising. The problem presents three distinct aspects. First, 
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online ads have been to this date exempt from the disclosure requirements 
that normally apply to television, radio, and print advertising. This is a 
holdover from an earlier, “hands off the internet” laissez- faire attitude that 
can no longer be justified given the size of the companies involved and the 
magnitude of the role they play in political advertising. Second, online 
advertising may be substantially more effective and narrowly targeted in 
ways that subvert judgment and are more amenable to experimentally 
validated behavioral manipulation. Cambridge Analytica’s claims were likely 
overstated, and it is likely that the 2016 cycle did not see these developing 
techniques of psychographically informed behavioral marketing techniques 
deployed with any measureable success. But there is little doubt that the 
confluence of techniques for analysis of very large datasets, A/ B testing in 
product marketing, and the rapidly developing fields of behavioral sciences 
will continue to improve techniques of emotional and psychological 
manipulation. The literature we reviewed in Chapter  9 makes clear that 
the claims of the effectiveness of narrowly targeted advertising are not yet 
scientifically proven. But the continued efforts of industry suggest that 
platforms will continue to increase their ability to individualize and will seek 
to increase their effectiveness at manipulating the preferences of their targets. 
The third problem is that, just as we saw with Russian sockpuppets and 
bots, behavioral marketing techniques often do not take the form of explicit 
advertising. Rather, they are paid influencers who deceptively manipulate 
genuine users. Any regime that focuses its definitions purely on explicit paid 
advertising, and does not address to some extent the problem of masked 
influence, will push propaganda and political marketing from the regulated 
and explicit to the unregulated underground.
The Honest Ads Act
The Honest Ads Act introduced by Senators Amy Klobuchar, Mark Warner, 
and John McCain was the first significant legislative effort to address the new 
challenges of network propaganda. The bill sought to do three things. First, 
it separated paid internet communications from unpaid communications, 
incorporating paid communications into the normal model adopted for 
communication generally, and leaving volunteer or unpaid communications 
alone. Second, it required disclaimers on online advertising, so that people 
exposed to political advertising can see that it is political advertising, not 
part of the organic flow of communications, and who is paying for it. And 
third, and perhaps most important, it required the creation of a fine- grained 
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public database of online political issue advertising, reaching well beyond 
electioneering.
Paid Internet as Political Communication. First, the bill included “paid 
Internet, or paid digital communications” as part of the normal framework 
of contributions and expenditures, addressing what was an anachronistic 
exclusion given the dramatic increase in the significance of internet and social 
media as core modes of political communication. And the bill also expanded 
electioneering— express advocacy for or against a candidate by anyone just 
before an election— to include placement or promotion on an online platform 
for a fee. The use of “paid” and “for a fee” are clearly intended to exclude 
genuine grassroots campaigns. By doing so, the bill recognized the importance 
of preserving the democratizing aspect of the internet— its capacity to 
empower decentralized citizens to self- organize rather than depending on 
the established parties and wealthy donors. This latter provision is also the 
only one that might be interpreted to apply not only to communications 
made in payment to the platforms themselves, as with advertising, but also 
to behavioral social- media marketing firms that specialize in simulating social 
attention to a topic or concern by deploying paid human confederates or 
automated and semi- automated accounts— botnets and sockpuppets.
Disclaimers on Facebook and Google Ads. Second, the bill required online 
advertising to include the kinds of disclaimers television viewers have come 
to expect:  “paid for by” or “I am so and so and I  approve this message.” 
These provisions of the bill emphasize the anomaly that inconclusive Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) advisory opinions have enabled Google and 
Facebook to market to political advertisers not only reach and focus but also 
the ability to remain masked. In 2010 Google persuaded a divided FEC that 
its ads were too short to include a full disclaimer, and the commissioners were 
split between those who wanted to simply exclude Google’s ads from the 
requirements of disclaimer altogether, and those who wanted to condition 
the exclusion on the ad carrying a link to the advertiser’s site, where the 
disclaimer would appear prominently.14 In 2011 Facebook tried to piggyback 
on Google’s effort by arguing that its own advertising was not only too brief 
to allow the disclaimer to show on its face, but that because much of the 
advertising directed not to a campaign site but to news stories supportive of 
a campaign, the FEC should adopt the more complete exclusion supported 
by some of its members in the 2010 opinion.15 In other words, because 
Facebook’s ads were designed to be short to fit with users’ usage patterns, 
and because ads often sent users to media sites rather than to a campaign site 
where a disclaimer could be displayed, imposing any disclaimer requirement 
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on Facebook advertising, even one satisfied merely by disclosure on the target 
site, was “impractical,” a recognized exception to the disclaimer requirement 
in the act.
The Honest Ads Act would explicitly reject the possibility that advertising 
on social media and search would be covered by this “impractical” exception. 
The idea that the biggest and most sophisticated technology companies in 
the world can build driverless cars and optimize messaging and interfaces 
by running thousands of experiments a day, but cannot figure out how to 
include an economical indication that a communication is a political ad and 
construct a pop- up or other mechanism for letting users who want to figure 
out who is behind the act, is laughable. The bill simply states a clear minimal 
requirement:  users have to know the name of the sponsor and have to be 
given the means to get all the legally required information about the sponsor 
without being exposed to any other information.
The necessity of this kind of provision is clear. We assess the credibility of 
any statement in the context of what we think the agenda of the speaker is. That’s 
why we require political advertising to disclose its sponsor to begin with. If 
the Clinton campaign were to target evangelical voters with communications 
that emphasized her opponent’s comments on the Hollywood Access video, 
these voters would treat the communications with more of a grain of salt even 
if its contents are true. The same would be true if the Trump campaign had 
targeted African American voters with narrowly tailored targeted ads quoting 
Hillary Clinton’s use of the term “superpredator” in the context of a 1996 
criminal law reform debate.16 There is nothing wrong with trying to persuade 
your opponents’ base that their candidate is unworthy of their support. 
But doing so behind a mask undermines those voters’ ability to judge your 
statements fairly, including by discounting properly the reliability or honest 
intentions of the speaker.
In 2018 the Federal Election Commission invited comments on its own 
version of the disclosure requirements. These are tailored to the FEC’s 
mandate to deal with electioneering, and largely deal with the nature of the 
disclaimer requirement. One option would simply treat online video like 
television, online audio like radio, and online text like print. The other tries 
to offer more flexibility for online platforms to tailor their disclosure to the 
technology. Presumably, the more flexibility the platforms have to design the 
disclosures, the easier it will be for them to design and test forms of disclosure 
that comply with the letter of the law but offer their clients the ability to 
minimize the number of recipients who are exposed to the disclosure. Our 
own sense is that, if in 2010 the internet companies deserved protection from 
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overly onerous requirements, by 2018 the risk is inverted. Starting with a very 
demanding and strict requirement and then loosening the constraints through 
case- by- case advisory opinions, seems the more prudent course today.
A Public Machine- Readable Open Database  
of Political Issue Advertising
The major innovation of the bill is to leverage the technological capabilities of 
online advertising to create a timely, publicly open record of online advertising 
that would be available “as soon as possible” and would be open to public 
inspection in machine- readable form. This is perhaps the most important 
of the bill’s provisions, because, executed faithfully, it should allow public 
watchdog organizations to offer accountability for lies and manipulation in 
almost real time. Moreover, this is the only provision of the bill that applies to 
issue campaigns as well as electoral campaigns, and so it is the only one where 
the American public will get some visibility into the campaign dynamics on 
any “national legislative issue of public importance.”
The bill requires the very biggest online platforms (with over 50 million 
unique monthly U.S. visitors) to report all ads placed by anyone who spends 
more than $500 a year on political advertising to be placed in an open, 
publicly accessible database. The data would include a copy of the ad, the 
audience targeted, the views, and the time of first and last display, as well as 
the name and contact information of the purchaser. The online platforms 
already collect all this data as a function of their basic service to advertisers 
and their ability to price their ads and bill their clients. The additional 
requirement of formatting this data in an open, publicly known format and 
placing it in a public database is incrementally trivial by comparison to the 
investments these companies have made in developing their advertising base 
and their capacities to deliver viewers to advertisers. Having such a database, 
by contrast, would allow campaigns to be each other’s watchdogs— keeping 
each other somewhat more honest and constrained— and perhaps more 
importantly, would allow users anywhere on the net, from professional 
journalists and nonprofits to concerned citizens with a knack for data, to see 
what the campaigns and others are doing, and to be able to report promptly 
on these practices to offer us, as a society, at least a measure of transparency 
about how our elections are conducted. This public database could allow the 
many and diverse organizations that have significant knowledge in machine 
learning and pattern recognition to deploy their considerable capabilities 
to identify manipulative campaigns by foreign governments and to help 
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Americans understand who, more generally, is trying to manipulate public 
opinion and how.
The database is particularly critical because Facebook and Google will 
continuously improve their ability to deliver advertisements finely tuned to 
very narrowly targeted populations. In the television or newspaper era, if a 
campaign wanted to appeal to neo- Nazis, it could only do so in the public 
eye, suffering whatever consequences that association entails with other 
populations. That constraint on how narrow, incendiary, or outright false a 
campaign candidates and their supporters can run is disappearing in an era 
when Facebook can already identify and target advertising to populations 
in the few thousands range— down to the level of American followers of a 
German far- right ultranationalist party.17 Hypertargeted marketing of this 
sort frees a campaign from being associated with particularly controversial 
messages, while still being able to use them on very narrow populations where 
they appeal. A database that is publicly accessible and allows many parties to 
review and identify particularly false, abusive, or underhanded microtargeted 
campaigns will impose at least some pressure on campaigns not to issue 
messages that they cannot defend to the bulk of their likely voters.
In 2017 Google released a plan to voluntarily implement some of these 
affordances. It announced that it would publish a transparency report about 
who is buying election- related ads on Google platforms and how much money 
is being spent, a publicly accessible database of election ads purchased on 
AdWords and YouTube, with information about who bought each ad, and will 
implement in- ad disclosures— Google will identify the names of advertisers 
running election- related campaigns on Google Search, YouTube, and the 
Google Display Network via Google’s “Why This Ad” icon. These are all 
desirable features, and they may offer some insight into how these elements may 
operate when adopted voluntarily, but the electoral system and its integrity is 
fundamentally a matter of public concern and should be regulated uniformly, 
across all companies and platform, and subject to appropriate administrative 
and judicial procedures. Falling back on private action may be the only first step 
available, given a dysfunctional legislative process, but it cannot be the primary 
permanent solution for a foundational piece of the democratic process.
What About Botnets, Sockpuppets,  
and Paid Social Promoters?
Addressing paid ads will not obviously address “astroturf ” social influence— 
bots, sockpuppets, and paid influencers. Particularly in Chapter  8, in our 
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discussion of Russian efforts, we saw that coordinated campaigns aim to 
simulate public engagement and attention, and to draw other, real citizens to 
follow the astroturfing networks in terms of agenda setting, framing of issues, 
and levels of credibility assigned to various narratives. This practice is used by 
marketing firms as well as foreign governments.
If regulation stopped at “paid advertising” as traditionally defined, the 
solution would be significant but partial even with regard to paid advertising. 
Historically, when a broadcast station or editor was a bottleneck that needed 
to be paid to publish anything on the platform, defining “paid” as “paid to 
the publisher” would have made sense. Here, however, a major pathway to 
communicating on a platform whose human users are provided the service for 
free is by hiring outside marketing firms that specialize in using that free access 
to provide a paid service to the person seeking political influence. Search 
engine optimizers who try to manipulate Google search results to come out 
on top, or behavioral marketing firms that use coordinated accounts, whether 
automated or not, to simulate social engagement, are firms that offer paid 
services to engage in political communication. The difficulty posed by such 
campaigns is that they will not appear on the platforms as paid advertising, 
because those who engage in these platforms are simulating accounts on 
the networks. The marketers— whether they are a Russian information 
operations center or a behavioral marketing firm— engage with the network 
through multiple accounts, as though they are authentic users, and control 
and operate the accounts from outside the platform.
The Honest Ads Act definition of “qualified Internet or digital com-
munication” is “any communication which is placed or promoted for a fee on 
an online platform.” This definition is certainly broad enough to encompass 
the products sold by third- party paid providers whose product is to use the 
free affordances of the online network to produce the effect of a political 
communication, and to do so for a fee. As a practical matter, such a definition 
would reduce the effectiveness of viral political marketing that uses botnets or 
sockpuppets to simulate authentic grassroots engagement, because each bot, 
sockpuppet, or paid influencer would have to carry a disclaimer as to the fact 
that they are paid and the source of payment. Although the whole purpose 
of such coordinated campaigns is to create the false impression that the 
views expressed are expressed authentically in the target Facebook or Twitter 
community, the burden on expression is no greater than the burden on any 
political advertiser who would have preferred to communicate without being 
clearly labeled as political advertising. The party seeking to communicate is 
still permitted to communicate, to exactly the same people (unless the false 
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accounts violate the platform’s terms of service, but it is not a legitimate 
complaint for the marketers to argue that the campaign disclosure rule makes 
it harder for them to violate the terms of service of the platforms they use). The 
disclaimer requirement would merely remove the misleading representation 
that the communication is by a person not paid to express such views.
While the general language of the definition of a qualified internet 
communication is broad enough to include paid bot and sockpuppet 
campaigns, and the disclaimer provisions seem to apply, the present text of the 
bill seems to exclude such campaigns from the provision that requires online 
platforms to maintain a public database of advertisements. The definition 
of “qualified political advertisement” to which the database requirement 
applies, includes “any advertisement (including search engine marketing, 
display advertisements, video advertisements, native advertisements, and 
sponsorships).” It would be preferable to include “coordinated social network 
campaigns” explicitly among the list of examples of “advertisement.” It is 
possible and certainly appropriate for courts to read “native advertisements” 
to include a sockpuppet or bot pushing a headline or meme that supports a 
candidate or campaign. But there is a risk that courts would not. Furthermore, 
the provision requires platforms only to keep a record of “any request to 
purchase on such online platform a qualified political advertisement,” and 
advertisers are only required to make information necessary for the online 
platform to comply with its obligations. It would be preferable to clarify 
that the advertisers owe an independent duty to disclose to the platform all 
the information they need to include paid coordinated campaigns in the 
database, even if the request for the advertisement and the payment are not 
made to the platform.
As with the more general requirements of disclaimer applied to explicit 
advertising, clarifying that the disclosure and disclaimer requirements 
apply to coordinated campaigns will not address every instance of media 
manipulation. A covert foreign information operation will not comply with 
new laws intended to exclude it any more that it complies with present laws 
designed for the same purpose. But just as the disclosure requirements and 
database for advertisements would limit the effectiveness of efforts by would- 
be propagandists (campaigns, activists, or foreign governments) to leverage 
the best data and marketing techniques that Google and Facebook have to 
offer, so too would an interpretation of the bill that extends to commercial 
marketing firms that provide synthetic social- behavioral marketing through 
paid sockpuppets, botnets, or human influencers. This will not address all 
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propaganda, but it will certainly bring some of the most effective manipulation 
tactics into the sunlight.
A Public Health Approach to the Media Ecosystem
The public database called for in Honest Ads presents a model for a broader 
public health approach to our media ecosystem. At the moment, Twitter 
offers expensive but broadly open access to its data, which explains why so 
much of the best research on fake news, bots, and so forth is conducted on 
Twitter. Facebook, by contrast, offers very limited access to its data to outside 
researchers. Google occupies a position somewhere in the middle, with 
reasonable access to YouTube usage patterns, for example, but less visibility 
to other aspects of search and advertising. Each of these companies has 
legitimate considerations concerning protecting user privacy. Each of these 
companies has legitimate considerations in terms of their own proprietary 
interests. And as each of these companies considers its own commercial 
interests, these will often align imperfectly, if at all, with the public interest. In 
order to understand how our information environment is changing, we need 
a mechanism through which to offer bona fide independent investigators 
access to data that would allow us, as a society, to understand how various 
changes in how we communicate— whether driven by technological change, 
regulatory intervention, or business decisions— affect the levels of truth 
and falsehood in our media ecosystem or the degrees of segmentation and 
polarization.
Our communications privacy as individuals and citizens is an important 
concern, but not more so than our privacy interest in health data. And yet we 
develop systems to allow bona fide health researchers access, under appropriate 
legal constraints, contractual limitations, and technical protections to access 
the health data of millions of residents to conduct detailed analyses of 
patterns of disease, treatment, and outcomes. We can no more trust Facebook 
to be the sole source of information about the effects of its platform on our 
media ecosystem than we could trust a pharmaceutical company to be the sole 
source of research on the health outcomes of its drugs, or an oil company to 
be the sole source of measurements of particles emissions or levels of CO2 in 
the atmosphere. We need a publicly regulated system that will regulate not 
only the companies but the researchers who access the data as well, so they do 
not play the role of brokers to companies like Cambridge Analytica.
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What About Defamation Law?  
Intentional or Reckless Falsehoods
As we brought this book to a close, the family of Seth Rich was suing Fox News 
for its false and disturbing story. Alex Jones was forced to retract his Pizzagate 
story, likely under threat of a lawsuit. Nothing under present or proposed 
election law would touch this kind of intentional lying. As Peter Thiel 
showed when he funded “Hulk Hogan’s” lawsuit that bankrupted Gawker, 
a motivated actor with enough money and patience can find a case with 
which to shut down a publication, even under the very permissive American 
defamation law framework. Should we have a system that would allow Jeb 
Bush to sue Alex Jones for portraying him as having “close Nazi ties”? Under 
normal circumstances such a path should raise concerns for anyone who is 
properly concerned with robust political speech. Certainly, defamation has 
been used in many countries as a way of silencing the government’s critics, 
and the strict limits under the New York Times v. Sullivan line of cases make 
this path appropriately difficult. The level of bile and sheer disinformation 
that characterized the 2016 election is such that perhaps raising the cost of 
reckless or intentional defamatory falsehood as a business model, at least, is 
a reasonable path to moderation of the most extreme instances of falsehood. 
But the persistence of the tabloid model in the United Kingdom, despite that 
country’s very permissive defamation law, suggests that even this approach 
would be of only moderate use. Whether such an approach is worth the 
candle depends on one’s empirical answer to the question of how much of 
the defamation comes from fly- by- night fake news outlets, which would 
be effectively judgment proof, and how much comes from a core number 
of commercial sites that have made it their business model to sell false 
information and peddle in conspiracy theory.
Institutionalizing Fact Checking
An approach that has received a good bit of public attention and some platform 
integration focuses on efforts to institutionalize fact checking and generate 
ground- truth labels and marking. First among these are existing fact- checking 
sites and the efforts by platforms to use their collective judgment to remove, 
demote, or label stories. These organizations, PolitiFact, Snopes, Factcheck.
org, the Washington Post’s Fact Checker, are all efforts to institutionalize and 
professionalize the process of checking how true or false the facts in a given 
story are. Of these organizations only one, PolitiFact, systematically reports 
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both true and false judgments by a media source or personality, so as to give 
some broad overall sense of the veracity of an outlet or speaker. All these 
organizations limit themselves to “fact” checking, so they are not useful in 
determining sites that are extremist or hyperpartisan, as opposed to simply 
false. And they all suffer from the one failure that most newer projects will 
also have to contend with. They are treated by the media outlets and users of 
the right- wing media ecosystem as systematically biased, and as our work and 
the work of other researchers finds, are generally not visited, shared, linked to, 
or believed by users on the right.
Despite being ignored by users and outlets on the right, fact- checking 
sites serve an important role for the majority of people outside the right. For 
centrists and people of mixed views, who are not entirely in the thrall of the 
right- wing network, they offer an anchor through which to assess what they 
read and see. For people on the left, they offer an anchor in reality— a way 
of persuading themselves that they are not in the simple mirror image of the 
right- wing propaganda network. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence on the 
effects of fact checking even for this population are mixed. There are some 
studies that suggest that correction and fact checking merely reinforces recall 
by repeating the story and that over time all that is left is a sense that “I’ve heard 
this before.” Others suggest that correction fails, if it does, only for highly 
salient questions that conflict with a person’s prior beliefs.18 Furthermore, 
fact checking takes time and, at least for short- term belief formation, is 
likely too slow to influence immediate perceptions. Nonetheless, our case 
studies show that some conspiracy theories, like Uranium One or Seth Rich, 
remain prevalent for days or weeks. In these cases, it seems plausible that an 
independent source, trusted at least by people outside the echo chamber from 
which the false stories emerge, could play a useful role.
Regardless of their impact on media consumers, fact- checking organ-
izations play a valuable role for academics seeking to study diffusion of 
falsehoods. Determining “ground truth” is an extremely expensive and 
difficult process, fraught with judgments. Most scientific research groups 
are not set up to produce such ground- truth judgments about politically 
salient news, and so referring to some minimal number of decisions by these 
independent sites becomes a “ground truth” on which analyses can then 
proceed. A problem with all of the fact- checking sites is that they can check 
only a fraction of the overall universe of statements, true and false, that can be 
made, and they systematically only spend their time on claims that are at least 
arguably false. Looking at their statistics systematically overstates the amount 
of falsehood, because the numerator of total stories includes only stories that 
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are both (a) suspect and (b) sufficiently visible to draw the attention of one 
or usually more fact checkers. So while these organizations play an important 
role, they overestimate the prevalence of falsehoods in the media ecosystem. 
Several new projects, such as CrossCheck or the Credibility Coalition, are 
trying to redress some of these problems— particularly by developing a richer 
ontology of offensive and misleading forms. Another important reform for 
these organizations would be to invest in creating a baseline ratio of truth to 
fiction for media outlets and politically prominent institutions by dedicating 
some of their resources to assessing a properly randomized sample of stories 
and statements from these outlets and speakers.
It is demonstrably true that institutional fact checking has not prevented 
the continued worsening of the epistemic crisis we describe in this book. 
But more and better fact checking can at least help us better understand the 
nature and the scope of the problem.
Media Literacy Education
One class of interventions proposed has been media literacy education. 
This is a vitally important and active area of research, experimentation, and 
applied work. Survey after survey have demonstrated that many people are 
shockingly poor at effectively evaluating the accuracy of news reporting. 
A  natural response is to improve education and explicitly train consumers 
to be more discerning about what they read and believe. Some programs are 
being rolled out to specifically address the “fake news” problem by teaching 
specific strategies to ferret out disinformation and propagation from online 
news sources. These are laudable projects and may help to chip away at the 
problem. This is not a panacea and will not by itself disarm the incredibly 
resilient psychological and social- identity- based factors that so often lead us 
astray. As foundations and government entities invest in developing these 
efforts, we suggest that they at least acknowledge how little evidence there 
is that media literacy training will relieve the kinds of pressures we identified 
in this volume. There appears to be little evidence that improvement on the 
ability to answer test or classroom media literacy questions actually translates 
into adoption of critical viewing and listening when students consume media 
in the real world.19 A more recent, trenchant critique of media literacy comes 
from danah boyd, whose years of research with youth in media have led her 
to hypothesize that media literacy efforts have trained media consumers to 
be distrustful of all media and in a perverse way less discerning about what is 
credible and what is not.20 Given the considerable faith and resources being 
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invested in media literacy training, the apparent dearth of evidence, and the 
possibility of negative implications, we suggest that such programs be well 
instrumented to assess their positive and negative effects.
Thinking About Solutions
We began this chapter with the acknowledgement that our diagnosis of the 
present information disorder makes identifying solutions difficult. Solutions 
that are based on misdiagnosis, particularly on imagining that Facebook, or 
bots, or the Russians are the core threat, will likely miss their mark. Some level 
of effort from platforms, backed by legal liability as necessary, could help clean 
platforms of some of the garbage they now carry; but regulation informed by 
misdiagnosis, aimed at the wrong targets, will almost certainly lead to over- 
censorship. There are important discrete interventions that can help alleviate 
the present sense of disorder. In particular, we emphasize efforts to make sure 
that political advertising becomes more transparent and susceptible to public 
scrutiny because we see large scale preference manipulation as the core of the 
platform business, and we see that core business presenting a profound future 
threat to democracy.
But our central argument has been that the present source of information 
disorder in American political communications is the profound asymmetry 
between the propaganda feedback loop that typifies the right- wing media 
ecosystem and the reality- check dynamic that typifies the rest of the media 
system. The most important attainable change in the face of that asymmetry 
would be to the practice of professional journalism. Our findings make clear 
that mainstream professional journalists continue to influence the majority 
of the population, including crossover audiences exposed both to right- wing 
propaganda and to journalism in mainstream media. We argued in Chapter 6 
that the present journalistic practice of objectivity as neutrality has perverse 
effects in the media ecosystem we document here. By maintaining the “one 
side says x, the other side says y” model of objectivity in the presence of 
highly asymmetric propaganda efforts, mainstream media become sources of 
legitimation and amplification for the propagandists. Here, we suggest that a 
shift in emphasis in how journalists practice objectivity, from demonstrative 
neutrality to accountable verifiability, could help counteract some of the 
reinforcement and legitimation that the present practice creates on the 
background of highly asymmetric propaganda practices. This will not change 
the perceptions of the 25 to 30 percent of the population that attends purely 
to the right- wing media ecosystem, but could make a significant difference 
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to crossover audiences, and would prevent erosion of the present patterns of 
reliance on objective media in partisan audiences on the left.
A more foundational change is, at present, aspirational. It is that 
Republican leaders recognize the dangers that the propaganda feedback loop 
poses to American democracy, and find a way to lead their party and voters out 
of it. Only those who have credibility and power within the partisan media 
sphere stand a chance of breaking the destructive cycle. While the revolution 
in talk radio and Fox News has provided Republicans with a highly mobilized 
core of supporters, it has done so at the expense of pulling the party far to the 
right, disconnecting its base from reality, and disabling party leaders from 
delivering and acting on bad news where bad news turns out to be the case. 
It is extremely unlikely that this change will happen, however, as long as the 
propaganda feedback loop delivers electoral gains. And such an effort, even if 
undertaken, faces the daunting challenge of communicating with a population 
exposed to decades of propaganda that instilled in them a profound distrust 
of messages that do not conform to their partisan beliefs.
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Conclusion
The second decade of the twenty- first century has seen dramatic new 
strains on the democratic project. The 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s saw the demise of 
the last authoritarian regimes in Western Europe followed by Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and to a degree East and Southeast Asia and 
Africa. By 2018 trends appear to have reversed, and illiberal majoritarian 
parties or authoritarian regimes are asserting themselves across the globe. 
As governments, civil society organizations, academics, and media tried to 
understand what was driving this global change, many focused on technology 
and technological change. Processes of technological progress that were out 
of human control were overwhelming our capacity to make sense of the world 
and govern ourselves as reasonable democracies. The most optimistic feature 
of our work is that the culprit was not technology.
Technology allowed us to analyze millions of stories published over a 
three- year period. Technology allowed us to analyze millions of tweets and 
links, and hundreds of millions of Facebook shares and words to make sense 
of these stories. And yet, all this technology- enabled research has led us away 
from technology as the primary explanatory variable of our present epistemic 
crisis.
Technology is not destiny. Technology interacts with institutions and 
ideology to shape how we make meaning, how we organize our affairs across 
economic, political, and personal domains, and how we make our culture and 
identity.
In the United States, a set of technological innovations rolled out 
since the 1970s, from FM radio, satellites, and cable, through the personal 
computer, the internet, and social media, have been adopted and adapted 
by two fundamentally different epistemic communities in two radically 
different ways. The civil rights revolution, the women’s movement, and the 
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emergence of self- actualization and individual liberty at the heart of both the 
New Left and the neoliberal moment created a new political reality and a new 
bifurcation of American polity in terms of how meaning and identity were 
defined and how these translated into practical political ambitions. On the 
left, a loose coalition of civil rights advocates, feminists, consumer advocates, 
environmentalists, and vestiges of organized labor reorganized to challenge 
an establishment seen as too white, male, and corporate. Some of this 
reorientation focused on identity; much of it was focused on gaining specific 
programmatic victories effected through law and policies aimed at achieving 
better practical outcomes for members of the coalition. On the right, starting 
in the South, white- identity backlash against the civil rights movement made 
common cause with the religious right, which itself emerged as a backlash 
against both the women’s movement’s challenge to the patriarchal family 
and the secularizing force of putting individual choice at the normative core 
of markets and morality.1 These two pillars of the emerging conservative 
coalition were fundamentally about meaning and identity, rather than 
about programmatic achievement. The pro- business pillar of the emerging 
conservative coalition was very much about programmatic achievement, 
particularly deregulation and reduction of taxes, but found ways to translate 
its programmatic goals into articles of faith— most visibly in Grover 
Norquist’s tax pledge. That pledge, initiated in 1986, commits politicians who 
take it to oppose “any and all” tax increases or reduction or elimination of 
credits, without qualification. Functionally, it has become a precondition to 
running for office as a Republican. And it transformed the most basic tool for 
economic and social policy at the heart of the power of the legislative branch 
into an article of faith divorced from practical considerations and immune to 
evidence of changed conditions.
The deregulation of cable and elimination of the fairness doctrine in 
broadcast in the 1970s and 1980s created the institutional conditions for 
divergent organizational strategies to explore the markets for listeners and 
viewers. The increased channel capacity provided first by AM radio, then 
cable, and finally the internet meant that strategies focused on intense 
engagement of large but still minority audiences became a viable market 
strategy. Audiences who made up the emerging conservative movement 
proved a lucrative market for merchants of angry, ideologically pure messages 
that expressed a shared sense of outrage and loss in the fast- moving, fast- 
changing world. Rush Limbaugh was the first major commercial success at 
selling this kind of sentiment since Father Coughlin was forced off the air at 
the beginning of World War II. Fox News followed, and deregulation allowed 
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Clear Channel to consolidate both radio stations and right- wing outrage 
content into a seamless distribution network for these messages, around the 
clock, in every corner of the country, to tens of millions of listeners. These 
outlets offered an ideological coordination point, a cathartic experience of 
shared anger, and a platform for disciplining political elites who did not hew 
to the pure message produced by these new right- wing media. Democrats, by 
contrast, never developed a sufficiently large and homogenous group to form 
the basis of a similarly successful strategy focused on ideological purity. The 
coalition the party represented was too diverse to support a single entity like 
Fox, or Rush Limbaugh in the late 1980s to mid- 1990s. Its constituents spread 
their attention across too many outlets to sustain efforts, like Air America or 
MSNBC, to replicate the strategy that had succeeded so well on the right.
Thirty years of divergent organizational practices and market dynamics 
turn out to produce quite different markets, offerings, and consumption 
habits. When the market in question is the market in informing political 
beliefs and news, it turns out that this divergence produces very different views 
of what is going on in the world and who to believe about what is going on.
Our study offers a large- scale observation, sustained over a substantial 
period of time, of how the American political media ecosystem discusses 
presidential politics specifically and, by extension, national politics. We 
found that there is no single effect that the internet has on democracy, or on 
news media, or on people’s ability to tell truth from fiction. In America, “the 
internet” is really two very different media ecosystems. One conforms to the 
very worst fears of those critical of the effects of the internet on democracy. 
It exhibits all the characteristics of an echo chamber that radicalizes 
its inhabitants, destabilizes their ability to tell truth from fiction, and 
undermines their confidence in institutions. The other is closer to the model 
of the networked public sphere. It combines distinct attention to professional 
media still pursuing norm- constrained journalism with diverse outlets for 
mobilizing activists, challenging agenda setting, and questioning mainstream 
media narratives. This larger part of the American media ecosystem certainly 
has its own share of propagators of disinformation and commercial clickbait, 
but these operate in an environment that contains their dissemination and 
limits their impact.
The differences between the two media ecosystems are palpable. Despite 
extensive efforts, we were unable to find an example of disinformation or 
commercial clickbait started on the left, or aimed from abroad at the left, that 
took hold and became widely reported and believed in the broader network 
that stretches from the center to the left for any meaningful stretch of time. 
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By contrast, as this book demonstrates amply, we found such instances 
repeatedly succeeding in the right- wing media ecosystem, with pervasive 
exposure and lasting effects on the beliefs reported by listeners, readers, and 
viewers within that network. Few if any moments more clearly capture the 
sheer dehumanization that such a dynamic can birth than the sight of the 
host of the fourth- most watched television news show in America, Laura 
Ingraham, tweeting to her two million followers, publicly mocking a 17- year- 
old high school senior, David Hogg, for not getting into the colleges of his 
choice. Hogg’s crime, by which he merited public bullying by a Fox News host 
for the entertainment of her followers, was that he had shown remarkable 
leadership in the high school students protest movement in favor of gun 
control in the wake of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting.
For those not focused purely on the American public sphere, our study 
suggests that we should focus on the structural, not the novel; on the long- 
term dynamic between institutions, culture, and technology, not only the 
disruptive technological moment; and on the interaction between the different 
media and technologies that make up a society’s media ecosystem, not on a 
single medium, like the internet, much less a single platform like Facebook 
or Twitter. The stark differences we observe between the insular right- wing 
media ecosystem and the majority of the American media environment, and 
the ways in which open web publications, social media, television, and radio 
all interacted to produce these differences, suggest that the narrower focus will 
lead to systematically erroneous predictions and diagnoses. It is critical not to 
confound what is easy to measure (Twitter) with what is significantly effective 
in shaping beliefs and politically actionable knowledge in society. We are only 
at the very beginning of the ability to create the capacity to engage in such 
broad, cross- platform research. Television archival data is becoming available; 
talk radio is still observable only through sporadic transcripts. Facebook data 
in nonpublic- pages is largely inaccessible. Political ads are not available, but 
that is changing either through voluntary efforts of companies or through 
changes in campaign law. We need broad, publicly accessible databases for all 
these different media so that we can begin to apply the emerging array of data 
science techniques to a sufficiently broad and diverse set of media to actually 
represent how people get their news and how people come to learn about the 
world and understand it.
It is equally critical not to confound whether a phenomenon is observable 
and whether it actually has an impact. Throughout this book we have 
argued that many of the concerns over information disorder or the post- 
truth moment discussed in the past two years focus on what is observable 
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and novel, without accounting for how impactful it has in fact been. Russian 
information operations penetrated American social media in ways that would 
have been considered the stuff of spy movies in 2012. The evidence supporting 
the existence of these efforts is real and persuasive, and the recent origin of the 
organizations perpetrating them suggest that these efforts are in fact novel. 
The fact that we observe these efforts strongly suggests we need to build 
capabilities to identify them in real time, and interdict and counter them 
as they occur. But simply because these efforts are observable and require a 
response does not mean that they actually had an impact. As we explained 
in Chapter  8, our own findings, when compared to the publicly disclosed 
accusations of interference, suggest that these efforts sought to build on and 
widen already existing fissures in American society but that they appear to 
have mostly amounted to little more than jumping on a bandwagon already 
well underway. Similarly, we do not challenge the veracity of some of the 
excellent journalistic reporting, particularly by Craig Silverman at BuzzFeed 
news, on the hyperpartisan commercial clickbait. These too are very real 
and do in fact pollute the environment. We have no systematic reason to 
think that they could not grow to become an even bigger problem, but our 
observations at present, and the work of others, suggest that these played 
a role not fundamentally dissimilar to that of the supermarket checkout- 
counter tabloid— a side entertainment, not a driver of discourse, opinion, or 
changes in beliefs at a population level.
Unique in our view among the putative novel suspected contributors to 
disinformation dissemination is targeted advertising. Here, as is true of the 
other major suspects, the effect sizes reported in the published science suggest 
that at least psychographically microtargeted advertising of the Cambridge 
Analytica variety is highly unlikely to have made a difference in the 2016 
campaign. We have no similar evidence with which to confirm or refute the 
claims that Facebook put Donald Trump in office by selling his campaign the 
best of their microtargeted advertising capabilities. Nonetheless, the overall 
trajectory of the entire market in personal data collection and algorithmically 
delivered, personalized advertising across the online economy suggests 
that even the small documented effects may well amount to significant 
effects in the near future. Because effects will be extremely hard to measure, 
however, both candidate and issue campaigns are likely to invest heavily in 
these microtargeting techniques, and we will almost certainly not be able to 
measure their impact until it is too late. For this reason we dedicated a good 
bit of our solutions chapter to the regulation and transparency of political 
advertising broadly, not only during electoral campaigns, and believe that this 
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is an area where many ounces of prevention are necessary and justified, even 
in the absence of proof of impact.
Our study is, ironically, both optimistic and pessimistic about 
the possibilities for democracy in an age of ubiquitously networked 
communications. It is optimistic because it suggests that the introduction 
of the internet and social media does not itself put pressure on democracy 
as such. Different countries, with different histories, institutional structures, 
and cultural practices of collective sense- making need not fear the internet’s 
effects. There is no echo chamber or filter- bubble effect that will inexorably 
take a society with a well- functioning public sphere and turn it into a 
shambles simply because the internet comes to town. The American online 
public sphere is a shambles because it was grafted onto a television and radio 
public sphere that was already deeply broken. Even here, those parts of the 
American public sphere that were not already in the grip of a propaganda 
feedback loop and under the influence of hyperpartisan media dedicated 
to a propagandist project did not develop such a structure as a result of the 
internet’s development. In fact, after the election of Donald Trump, online 
communications outside of the right- wing media ecosystem became more 
mainstream- focused, not less; and this was true even on Facebook, the most 
polluted of online platforms. These observations suggest that professional 
journalism continues to play a critical role in anchoring public debate in facts 
and evidence- based norms and that it functions within a vibrant network 
of nontraditional sites that constitute a more decentralized, participatory 
networked public sphere that can work around and through its interactions 
with the mainstream to diversify expression, counter some of the failure 
modes of the mainstream, and make mobilization more democratic.
But that happy image goes only as far as a country’s politics and institutional 
history permit it. The pessimistic lesson of our work is that there is no easy 
fix for epistemic crises in countries where a politically significant portion of 
the population does occupy a hyperpartisan, propaganda rich environment. 
Regulation of, or self- regulation by, platforms can help deal with some of 
the commercial pollution effects. National security identification of foreign 
propaganda campaigns may be able to help cleanse public debate from them, 
although at the cost of substantial surveillance of the major platforms of 
public discourse. If, however, the origins of crisis are primarily domestic and 
comprised of intentional manipulation of large parts of the population by 
its own political leaders and preferred media, there is little that technocratic 
solutions can do consistent with a commitment to free expression. Here, the 
hard work of containing disinformation and hate- provoking messages falls 
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heavily on those media most trusted by people who are still tuned in to the 
majority of the network but are at risk of falling into the disinformation 
vortex. Emphasizing truth seeking rather than neutrality in journalism may 
help. Regulators might seek to limit the market reach of any given platform, 
to avoid making any platform a single point of failure that can be used by 
a disinformation campaign. Public funding for reliable professional media 
and an educated public may help as well. We embrace these diverse measures 
because some of them may, in fact, begin to roll back some of the uncertainty 
and distrust. But if the fundamental problem has deep political roots and takes 
a political shape, it is hard to imagine that it will be solved by technocratic 
rather than political and cultural means.
Breathing new life into the truth- seeking institutions that operate 
on reason and evidence would require a revival of the idea that science, 
scholarship, journalism, law, and professionalism more generally offer real 
constraints on what one can say and do, and that they are not all simply 
modes of legitimating power. This is unimaginable without an underlying 
shift in political culture, a shift that would require either a successful internal 
effort from leaders on the right to extricate their party and its base from 
the propaganda feedback loop or a series of electoral defeats that would 
force such a transformation. The former is unlikely without the latter. These 
political and cultural developments will have to overcome not only right- 
wing propaganda, but also decades of left- wing criticism of objectivity and 
truth- seeking institutions. Developing such a framework without falling into 
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